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## **Coalition Stability and Belief Change: Advocacy Coalitions in U.S. Foreign Policy and the Creation of Israel, 1922–44**

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*This study examines whether advocacy coalitions are stable over time by examining legislative hearings data concerning U.S. foreign policy and the creation of Israel. It uses content analysis of 19 different policy core and deep core belief components applied to testimonies given in 1922 and in 1944. These belief components are used to identify members of advocacy coalitions and to test the coalitions' relative stability of membership over time. In addition, this research examines the stability of the belief systems of these advocacy coalitions. It finds that the structures of the advocacy coalitions remained relatively stable, yet new components of policy core beliefs emerged among all three advocacy coalitions, and such components are converging toward the belief system of the coalition advocating for the creation of Israel.*

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**KEY WORDS:** belief systems, interest groups, external events, content analysis, Tabu search cluster analysis, Zionism, Palestine

### **Introduction**

The study of belief systems has long been a central focus within sociology (Marx & Engels, [1845–46] 1976; Weber, [1915] 1946), social psychology (Festinger, 1957), political science (Axelrod, 1976; Converse, 1964), as well as the study of the policy process (Kingdon, 1984; Sabatier, 1987; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Belief systems draw attention to who deserves and receives benefits and burdens of society affecting the fortunes of the destitute and the privileged. Belief systems go beyond drawing attention, they also shape the relative saliency and perceptions of the causes of problems as well as the preferred solutions. This process of identifying salient issues and their relative causes and solutions influences the selection, design, and implementation of government programs and policies. When disparate belief systems are present, they tend to sustain intransigent conflicts that must be bridged for successful collaboration between adversaries.

Belief systems are one of the principle explanatory variables in the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), which is one of the major analytical approaches for understanding policy processes. The ACF incorporates belief systems into its causal logic for explaining the network structure of advocacy coalitions (Henry, 2011; Matti

& Sandström, 2011), the stability of coalitions over time (Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 1993; Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004), policy-oriented learning within belief systems (Larsen, Vrangbeck, & Traulsen, 2006), within coalitions (Litfin, 2000), between coalitions (Meijerink, 2005), and also policy change (Ingold, 2011). Despite this research on belief systems and advocacy coalitions, many of the questions involving belief systems remained unanswered. Among these unanswered questions in the study of belief systems are how many beliefs are necessary for understanding coalition membership, whether all or some of these beliefs are stable over time, and whether characteristics of the policy subsystem matter in coalition and belief stability. This study provides a better understanding of the puzzle of coalitions and belief systems by analyzing multiple beliefs that shape coalition structure over time in a historical analysis of a foreign policy subsystem, a subsystem that is rarely studied in policy process research.

A majority of applications of the ACF have tended to focus upon environmental and energy issues that involve highly technical scientific debates (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). This has led to little attention paid to foreign policy by ACF scholars, with few exceptions including Litfin (2000) and Hirschi and Widmer (2010). This study complements these past studies by conducting a systematic quantitative analysis of beliefs in two time periods to establish coalitions, which allows for more rigorous documentation of belief systems and evidence of their shifts and changes over time.

According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) and Sabatier and Weible (2007), the ACF was designed to explain the policy process within policy subsystems that deal with issues that are ideologically divisive and technically complex. On the other hand, not all issues are intrinsically about technically complex debates, as some have a more normative basis. Does the ACF apply to such issues as war and peace, race relations, and human rights? Sabatier (1998) addresses this issue explicitly:

Several people have wondered whether the ACF applies to policy domains—such as abortion, gun control, human rights, gay rights, school prayer, gender politics—in which technical issues are dominated by normative and identity concerns. In my view, it should work very well in these areas. Clearly, these subsystems seem to be characterized by well-defined coalitions driven by belief-driven conflict. (pp. 122–23)

This study applies the ACF to the case study concerning the determination by the U.S. government from 1922 to 1944 of who should have sovereignty over the British Mandate for Palestine. This issue is intrinsically about whose right to self-determination matters more, the Jews or the Arabs of Palestine. Chaim Weizmann, the President of the World Zionist Organization,<sup>1</sup> summed up the policy as primarily one of deciding whose justice matters more—the Jews or the Arabs of Palestine. According to Weizmann,

The [Palestine] issue is not between right and wrong but between the greater and less injustice. It is unavoidable that one will have to decide whether it

is better to be unjust to the Arabs of Palestine or the Jews. (Crossman, 1947, p. 133)

The testing of the ACF to the case of U.S. foreign policy and the determination of sovereignty over Palestine is a typical application of the ACF by containing the same independent and dependent variables found in other ACF studies (Jenkins-Smith, St. Clair, & Woods, 1991; Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 1993; Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004), specifically a focus on identifying the advocacy coalitions and the stability of beliefs over time. This study contributes to the literature by providing a historical analysis of coalition and belief stability in a foreign policy context. The findings show that the structures of the advocacy coalitions remained relatively stable, yet new components of policy core beliefs emerged among all three advocacy coalitions, and such components are converging toward the belief system of the coalition advocating for the creation of Israel.

### Advocacy Coalition Framework

The ACF was developed to explain coalition behavior, learning, and policy change in issues characterized by high levels of political conflict (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).<sup>2</sup> The ACF is useful for the study of belief systems in policy subsystems because of its attention to the role of beliefs in the formation and stability of advocacy coalitions in their pursuit of translating those beliefs into public policy (Weible, 2006). The three components of the ACF that this research will focus on are policy subsystems, advocacy coalitions, and belief systems.

A policy subsystem includes a variety of public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain. These actors may coordinate their activities to comprise advocacy coalitions. A policy subsystem may not only be bound to a single geographic unit as studies applying the ACF to international treaties, trade agreements, crises, and health issues have found that policy domains can have an international dimension (Farquharson, 2003; Richardson, 1996). Therefore, the emphasis when identifying a policy subsystem should be placed upon the "policy problem or issue . . . and [those] who regularly seek to influence public policy" (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 119). The issue defining the policy subsystem will be the "question of Palestine," in other words, the determination of a political body sovereign over the geographic region known as Palestine. The actors studied will be policy actors and organizations attempting to influence U.S. policy on the question of Palestine.

This subsystem is nested within other subsystems. These act as institutional constraints upon the subsystem in question. For example, there is a distinct British subsystem concerning the question of Palestine as Britain was the mandate authority. In addition, there are international institutional subsystems relative to the policy such as those within the League of Nations and later the United Nations. On the other hand, there are overlapping subsystems inside the United States such as those concerning defense, foreign policy toward the Middle East, and many others. All of these distinct subsystems at different times and with different veracity influence the

subsystem in question. However, while the members of these subsystems overlap and "spillover" (Howlett & Ramesh, 2002) into U.S. foreign policy on the question of Palestine, they represent the periphery and not the core of those who "regularly" seek to influence this particular policy. Therefore, to bound the scope of this study, only the data from U.S. congressional hearings that were held specifically to determine the issue of sovereignty over the British Mandate of Palestine will be used. This use of congressional hearings is based upon past studies of advocacy coalition stability and beliefs (e.g., Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 1993).

The ACF aggregates political actors in a policy subsystem into advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). This study identifies coalition members based upon their policy core beliefs and coordination. According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), operationalizing two or three policy core beliefs is sufficient to identify at least two advocacy coalitions. This study identifies coalitions based upon one deep core and five policy core beliefs.

Based upon the public attitude and opinion research (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Putnam, 1976), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that actors possess a three-tiered model of beliefs. These belief systems are hierarchical in their abstractness in relation to the subsystem and their transformative nature. The most abstract and least transformative beliefs are deep core beliefs. Next in having relatively greater tangibility and transformative nature are policy core beliefs. Individuals are motivated to convert these deep and policy core beliefs into policies (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The secondary aspects of the beliefs are the most tangible and transformative. The deep core and policy core beliefs relevant to this study can be found in Table 1. Not all of the beliefs that Sabatier (1998) identifies are present. This is consistent with other studies of the ACF (e.g., Hysing & Olsson, 2008). The beliefs were identified based upon the policies within the subsystem and a review of primary and secondary sources. Such a method for identifying beliefs is prescribed by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, pp. 237-56). In total, one deep core belief and five policy core beliefs will be used in this study. These beliefs are further broken up into 19 components that operationalize each belief.

The assumption that policies are best understood as the translation of beliefs and the hierarchy of those beliefs is paramount to this study. These beliefs are not purely rational as it is assumed that individuals possess bounded rationality (Simon, 1985). Beliefs are the result of socialization, making them relatively stable over time because of the tendency by actors to filter information that is counter to their existing beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Therefore, people in different advocacy coalitions will interpret the same information differently, leading to a suspicion of the motives and objectives of their opponents. Once coalitions are formed based upon differences in beliefs, hostility between coalitions is exacerbated because of the tendency for members to remember losses more than gains (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988). This results in an increase in the short-term costs of defection to an opposing coalition and enhances the benefits of long-term solidarity to one's current advocacy coalition.

This suspicion of the motives and objectives of other coalitions leads to the hypothesis that

*Hypothesis 1: On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so. (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999)*

This hypothesis has been tested by many studies of the ACF including Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991), Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair (1993), Zafonte and Sabatier (2004), Weible (2005), Weible and Sabatier (2005), Henry, Lubell, and McCoy (2010), among others. These studies found that advocacy coalition structure was stable over time, even when faced with significant external perturbations. This past research has tested this hypothesis in relatively similar contexts of policy subsystems that dealt with domestic environmental or energy issues, with high-conflict and high-technical complexity. This research will use similar methods but a different context of policy subsystem to test the external validity of the hypothesis to a foreign, historical, and normative policy issue.

### Description of the Case Study

1917–39

Throughout history, there has been a question of what is the proper relationship between Jews and non-Jews, in particular, Christians. Historically, in practice, this relationship was one of economic, political, and religious persecution by Christians toward Jews. This persecution at times erupted into violence. In response to this persecution, many Jews united to form a political movement known as Zionism. Political Zionism developed in the late nineteenth century with the objective of establishing Jewish sovereignty over a territory to defend the Jewish people against anti-Semitism. However, not all Jews supported Zionism. Many of the Jews living in Europe and a majority of Jews living in America had become assimilated and did not support Zionism in part because they viewed Judaism as a religious doctrine and not as a race (Grose, 1983).

One branch of the Zionist movement argued that the Jews should gain sovereignty over the territory of Palestine, which was identified as the religious and historical home of the Jewish people. As part of this objective, the Zionists sought mass immigration of Jews from Europe and Asia into Palestine and to enlist the support of the Great Powers (Great Britain, America, France, and Russia) of the early twentieth century in their efforts to claim sovereignty. However, Palestine was not a barren and desolate land as it was populated by nearly a million Arabs who practiced *de facto* authority over the territory under Ottoman rule until the British took control of Palestine at the end of World War I. It is the political conflict to gain U.S. support for recognizing Jewish sovereignty over Palestine that is the case for this study.

On November 2, 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour addressed a letter to Lord Walter Rothschild declaring support for the creation of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine while preserving the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish population. After the Allied victory in World War I, there

was a debate about the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the British mandate for Palestine. A decision on the issue was to be made by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, but before it could be made, congressmen in the United States sought to intervene.

On April 12, 1922, U.S. Senator Henry Lodge (Republican, MA) introduced a resolution endorsing the Balfour Declaration to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. At the same time, Senator Lodge was advocating a pro-Zionist policy in the Senate, Congressman Hamilton Fish III (Republican, NY) was advocating a similar pro-Zionist policy in the House. Congressman Fish III introduced House Concurrent Resolution 52 to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 18, 1922. The committee held 4 days of public hearings on the resolution. The record of this hearing is part of the data analyzed in this article. The Senate and House resolutions became House Joint Resolution 322 that endorsed the Balfour Declaration and was signed by U.S. President Warren G. Harding on September 21, 1922.

While the Zionists were seeking to influence members of Congress and pass legislation that supported their cause, the members of the Arab community in America were seeking to counter this influence. By the early 1920s, members of the Arab-American community organized in an attempt to represent an Arab point of view to the U.S. government and the American public. The main organization responsible for this activity was the Palestine National League. The Palestine National League published a book entitled *The Case Against Zionism* in 1921. This book had two primary messages: that there should be self-determination and democratic governance in Palestine, and that the U.S. government should not provide material or political support for the Zionists.

Over the next 20 years, the U.S. government attempted to remain a passive observer in Palestine preferring for Great Britain to administer the mandate. However, Great Britain was having increasing difficulty administering Palestine as conflict grew between the Arabs of Palestine and Jewish Zionists. From 1936-39, Palestine was in chaos as the Arabs of Palestine erupted in a violent revolt and a general strike over Jewish immigration and land purchases. In response, Great Britain issued a White Paper in 1939 declaring that Jewish immigration into Palestine would be limited, and restrictions would be placed on Jewish land purchases. The 1939 White Paper proposed an independent and democratic state in Palestine in 10 years, effectively giving control of Palestine to the Arabs by 1949. The U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt made it clear that the United States neither supported nor condemned the British White Paper (Tschirgi, 1983).

#### 1939-44

The same year that the 1939 White Paper was passed by the British, war broke out in Europe. Palestine quickly fell from the British and American political agenda. By May 1942, America had entered the war against Nazi Germany aligned with Great Britain. The Zionists were weary of their relationship with the British after the 1939 White Paper and sought a change in strategy to achieve an independent state. In addition, the magnitude of the Holocaust was beginning to be realized as reports

were being publicized of nearly a million Jews killed by the Nazis in Europe (Grose, 1983). In response to these changes to the policy problem, the Zionists held an international conference in May 1942 at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. The conference brought together Zionist organizations from around the world, and the resolutions passed by the conference called for the immediate creation of a Jewish state in Palestine by means of gaining support and recognition from the U.S. government.

In the spring of 1944 the war remained undecided, millions of Jews had been killed in the Holocaust, and it was a general election year in the United States. On January 27, 1944, Representatives James Wright (Democrat, PA) and Ranulf Compton (Republican, CT) introduced two identical resolutions, House Resolutions 418 and 419. These resolutions stated that the U.S. government should take appropriate action to assist in free Jewish immigration into Palestine, and for the Jews to colonize Palestine to the end that "the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth." Five days later, in the Senate, the same resolution was introduced by Senators Robert F. Wagner (Democrat, NY) and Robert Taft (Republican, OH). These resolutions cite the 1922 resolution as their basis but significantly depart from the 1922 resolution by calling for America to take action on the issue as well as the creation of a Jewish commonwealth rather than a homeland.

The two resolutions were immediately assigned to the Foreign Affairs Committees of the House and Senate, where the House held a public hearing while the hearing in the Senate was closed. The record of the proceedings of the House hearing is used as part of the data for this article.

Prior to the hearings, U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson spoke with Congressman Sol Bloom (Democrat, NY), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, about the impending resolution. Secretary Stimson told Chairman Bloom that the current resolutions were dangerous to the war effort as they could lead to a conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and general unrest in the Middle East (Tschirgi, 1983). It was clear that the Roosevelt administration did not support the resolutions. In the end, neither resolution was reported out of the committees. The Zionists responded to the deferment of the resolutions not as a failure but as a success because they were not adopted because of the current war effort, rather than a lack of political support. This gave hope for a *pro-Zionist* U.S. policy after the war was over (Schechtman, 1966).

Soon after the congressional hearing in November 1944, the Arab National League held a convention attended by 150 delegates representing local chapters from across America. A declaration came as a result of the convention stating that "any approval of a Jewish state . . . in Palestine against the will of its native Arab inhabitants . . . is irreconcilable with the principles of democracy" (Davidson, 2002, p. 31).

The case study establishes that both the Zionists and the Arabs of Palestine were in a conflict, and that a resolution favoring recognition of sovereignty over Palestine by either party would put the other at risk. The Jews of Europe faced the horrors of the Holocaust at this time. It was argued by many, including Zionists, that if Jews did

not achieve sovereignty over their own territory, they would not survive as a people. The Arabs of Palestine viewed immigration and land purchases by Jews in Palestine as a threat to their existence and retaliated with violence and boycotts. The determination of who would have sovereignty over Palestine directly affected the roughly one million Arabs and six hundred thousand Jews who lived in the territory, along with the millions of Arabs and Jews who lived elsewhere in the world including in the United States. The description of the case demonstrates that the policy core beliefs about the question of Palestine were at risk for Arabs and Jews.

### Methods, Data Collection, and Analysis

There were three steps in the analysis to determine if advocacy coalition structure changed. First, the data of the testimonies are coded using content analysis from a codebook. Second, this resulting data is analyzed using Manhattan distances to determine the relative distances between organizations of their expressed beliefs. Third, these distances are then analyzed using a Tabu search cluster analysis to determine membership in a coalition. These three steps combine to provide understanding of advocacy coalition structure similar to Weible (2005), Weible and Sabatier (2005), and Henry et al. (2010). A fourth step is added to complement the coalition structure findings to understand belief change. Each of these methods along with their results will be discussed later.

This study will identify coalition members based upon their expressed beliefs. Coalition members will be labeled based upon their self-identified organizational affiliation at the time of the congressional hearing. The unit of analysis is the testimony given by individuals at the 1922 and at the 1944 Congressional hearings. The individual testimony has been used in the past in ACF studies examining coalition formation and stability over time (Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 1993; Sabatier & Brasher, 1993; Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004). The application of content analysis to the testimony can be used to test hypotheses concerning policy core beliefs of individuals or organizations over time and testing coalition stability over time (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, pp. 237–56).

The total number of testimonies coded from the two different hearings was 70. Eighteen testimonies were coded from the 1922 hearing and 52 from the 1944 hearing. Individuals or organizations providing multiple testimonies were coded as a new testimony and were not combined. These two hearings were selected because they met the criteria of being held during an open session, concerning a resolution about the establishment of sovereignty in Palestine, and made public.

The codebook included 19 belief components that operationalize deep and policy core beliefs as identified by Sabatier (1998). The components were developed from a preliminary reading of the primary sources as well as secondary sources that analyzed the policy debate at the time. According to Sabatier and Weible (2007), identifying only two or three policy core beliefs is sufficient for identifying at least two advocacy coalitions. This study identifies five policy core beliefs and one deep core belief: nature of man (belief 1), orientation on basic value priorities (beliefs 2–7), identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern (beliefs 8 and 9), the

**Table 1.** Beliefs Adapted from Sabatier (1998)

Policy Core and Deep Core Beliefs	Belief Components
Nature of man	1. People should intervene on earth to carry out God's plan.
Orientation on basic value priorities	2. The Jews are a nation. 3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation. 4. The current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty. 5. The United States should seek to maintain security in the Middle East. 6. The United States should seek to maintain security in Palestine. 7. The United States should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people.
Identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern	8. The welfare of the Jews is important. 9. The welfare of the Arabs of Palestine is important.
Overall seriousness of the problem	10. The United States should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine. 11. The United States should use material resources to solve the problems in Palestine.
Basic causes of the problem	12. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be prevented. 13. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be limited. 14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited. 15. The Jews should be blamed for the problems in Palestine. 16. The Arabs should be blamed for the problems in Palestine. 17. The British should be blamed for the problems in Palestine.
Proper distribution of authority	18. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Jews. 19. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Arabs.

relative seriousness of the problem (beliefs 10 and 11), basic causes of the problem (beliefs 12–17), and the outcome desired or the proper distribution of authority (beliefs 18–19). These can be found in Table 1. Content analysis of the testimony was conducted relative to each component belief. Each testimony was coded as +1 for agreement, 0 for neutral, -1 for disagreement, or a 9 for not discussed. This resulted in a 19 × 18 matrix of beliefs and organizations for 1922 and a 19 × 52 matrix of beliefs and organizations for 1944.

Once the coding was completed, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted. A random sampling of eight testimonies from the population of 70 testimonies was taken and coded by the inter-coder. This random sample represented 11 percent of the population above the suggested 10 percent of the population that is needed to determine inter-coder reliability when using a random sample (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Cohen's (1960) Kappa was used to measure inter-coder reliability of the beliefs because it is more reliable than percentage agreement and has been called "the measure of choice" by researchers (Dewey, 1983). While there are some who contend that it has many drawbacks (Krippendorff, 1980), it remains a reliable tool used by scholars to determine inter-coder reliability (Lombard et al., 2002). According to Fleiss (1971), a Cohen's Kappa measurement of agreement at or above 0.40 is "fair" or "fair to good." All 19 of the belief components were at or above Cohen's Kappa of 0.40. Therefore, the inter-coder reliability of these components supports their inclusion in this study.

To determine the coalitions based upon the content analysis of the beliefs, the  $19 \times 18$  matrix for 1922 and the  $19 \times 52$  matrix for 1944 were transformed using Manhattan distances between any two given organizations. Manhattan distance was calculated by the sum  $[p_i - j_i]$ , where "i" ranges from 1 to 19 for each belief component, and p and j represent any two organizations. This created two organization-by-organization matrices that were  $18 \times 18$  for 1922 and  $52 \times 52$  for 1944. At this stage, the distance measure in each cell of the matrices represented the aggregate agreement and disagreement across the 19 belief components between any two organizations. The maximum Manhattan distance between any two organizations is (38), the median distance is (19), and the minimum distance is (0).

Tabu search cluster analysis was then conducted to place each organization into clusters (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002; Hanneman & Riddle, 2001). These clusters were used to identify an organization's coalition membership (see Henry et al., 2010; Weible, 2005; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). Using iterative simulations, Tabu search cluster analysis minimizes within-cluster distances among organizations by partitioning and then rearranging the matrices such that organizations with relatively lower distances are placed in the same cluster, while those with relatively higher distances are placed in a different cluster. Tabu search cluster analysis is used rather than other clustering techniques because it takes different trajectories to find the optimized number of solutions, thus partly avoiding localized solutions. It is also used because it provides a relative goodness of fit ( $R^2$ ) that can be utilized to discern the optimal number of clusters (Borgatti et al., 2002; Hanneman & Riddle, 2001). For 1922 and 1944, the optimal number of clusters with the relatively highest  $R^2$  and lowest number of coalitions that best matched the context of the case study was three. These were then labeled as the "pro-Zionist," "anti-Zionist," and "pro-Arab" coalitions. These labels represent the characteristics of the collective expressed beliefs of the organizations that were found to populate the coalitions.

## Results

### *Advocacy Coalition Stability*

Table 2 presents the findings from the Tabu search cluster analysis of 1922. It divided the 11 testimonies from 1922 into the three coalitions: pro-Zionist, anti-Zionist, and pro-Arab. The  $R^2$  of the Tabu cluster analysis for the three coalitions was 0.71.<sup>3</sup> The pro-Zionist coalition had 11 members represented by the total number of testimonies, five of which came from Representatives in Congress, five from members of the Zionist Organization of America, and one from the Baltimore Hebrew Congregation. Representatives of Congress only belonged to this coalition as all of them supported the pro-Zionist resolution of 1922. The mean Manhattan distance among coalition members was 5.1 units; in other words, any two organizations in the coalition have an average disagreement on slightly more than two beliefs.

The anti-Zionist coalition had only two members represented by the total number of testimonies. Both of these members came from the Union of American

Table 2. Coalition Membership and Properties in 1922

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1. Pro-Zionist coalition
Total number of testimonies: 11
Mean Manhattan distance among coalition members: 5.1
Members: Representative in Congress NY (three testimonies), Representative in Congress MD, Representative in Congress MN, Zionist Organization of America (five testimonies), Baltimore Hebrew Congregation
2. Anti-Zionist coalition
Total number of testimonies: 2
Mean Manhattan distance among coalition members: 2
Members: Union of American Hebrew Congregation (two testimonies)
3. Pro-Arab coalition
Total number of testimonies: 5
Mean Manhattan distance among coalition members: 5.4
Members: Palestine National League (three testimonies), Yale University (two testimonies)
Mean Manhattan distances between coalitions
Between pro-Zionist and anti-Zionist coalitions = 13.6
Between pro-Zionist and pro-Arab coalitions = 20.4
Between anti-Zionist and pro-Arab coalitions = 10
Maximum Manhattan distance between coalitions = 38
Median Manhattan distance between coalitions = 19
$R^2 = 0.71$

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Hebrew Congregation and were Reform Judaic Rabbis. The Manhattan distance between these two members was only two units, meaning that they only disagreed on one of the 19 beliefs.

The pro-Arab coalition had five members represented by the total number of testimonies. These members came from the Palestine National League and from an English Professor at Yale University who was called upon as an expert witness. The mean Manhattan distance among coalition members was 5.4 units, meaning that they disagreed on slightly more than two beliefs and was relatively similar to the pro-Zionist coalition.

The Manhattan distances between the coalitions are telling of the relative polarization on the expressed beliefs between the coalitions. The distance between the pro-Zionist and the pro-Arab coalition was the greatest at 20.4 units, or a disagreement on about 10 beliefs. The pro-Zionist and anti-Zionist coalitions had a mean Manhattan distance of 13.6 units, while the anti-Zionist and pro-Arab coalitions had a mean Manhattan distance of 10 units. This means that the anti-Zionist and pro-Arab coalitions had less disagreement on expressed beliefs than either had with the pro-Zionist coalition.

Table 3 presents the findings from the Manhattan distance measures and the Tabu search cluster analysis for 1944. The Tabu search cluster analysis divided the 52 testimonies into three coalitions again identified as pro-Zionist, anti-Zionist, and pro-Arab coalitions. The  $R^2$  for the Tabu search cluster analysis of three coalitions was 0.79.<sup>4</sup> The pro-Zionist coalition had 43 members represented by the total number of testimonies. Once again, all of the Representatives of Congress that provided testimony were included in this coalition. In total, there were 28 such Representatives of Congress who gave their support for the pro-Zionist resolution of 1944. The next

Table 3. Coalition Membership and Properties in 1944

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1. Pro-Zionist coalition
Total number of testimonies: 43
Mean Manhattan distance among coalition members: 2.4
Members: Representative in Congress NY (11 testimonies), Representative in Congress PA (five testimonies), Representative in Congress MA (four testimonies), Representative in Congress CT (two testimonies), Representative in Congress MD (two testimonies), Representative in Congress CA, Representative in Congress WI, Representative in Congress MI, Representative in Congress VT, Zionist Organization of America (nine testimonies), Harvard University, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Christian Council on Palestine, Mizrahi Organization of America, Poale Zion, American Federation of Labor
2. Anti-Zionist coalition
Total number of testimonies: 6
Mean Manhattan distance among coalition members: 6.1
Members: American Council for Judaism (five testimonies), American Jewish Committee
3. Pro-Arab coalition
Total number of testimonies: 3
Mean Manhattan distance among coalition members: 6.7
Members: Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, Syrian and Lebanese American Federation of Eastern States, Princeton University
Mean Manhattan distances between coalitions
Between pro-Zionist and anti-Zionist coalitions = 12.9
Between pro-Zionist and pro-Arab coalitions = 20.4
Between anti-Zionist and pro-Arab coalitions = 13
Maximum Manhattan distance between coalitions = 38
Median Manhattan distance between coalitions = 19
$R^2 = 0.79$

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largest contingent of pro-Zionist coalition members came from the Zionist Organization of America (nine testimonies). Members of this organization also provided testimony in 1922. Additional testimony also came from the Christian Council on Palestine, Mizrahi Organization of America and Poale Zion, as well as representatives from the American Federation of Labor, Harvard University, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The mean Manhattan distance among coalition members was 2.4 units. This means that the pro-Zionist coalition is dense, as their average level of disagreement is only a little more than one of the 19 belief components. This finding is counterintuitive as the coalition size nearly quadrupled, while the level of disagreement among coalition members decreased by about a single belief.

The anti-Zionist coalition had six members represented by the total number of testimonies. The American Council for Judaism (five testimonies) and the American Jewish Committee organizations belonged to this coalition based upon their expressed beliefs. The mean Manhattan distance among coalition members was 6.1 units. This coalition expanded over time from two to six members, but the level of disagreement also changed from one belief to three beliefs among coalition members.

The pro-Arab coalition had three members represented by the total number of testimonies. These members were representatives from the following organizations: Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, Syrian and Lebanese American Federation of Eastern States, and Princeton University. This coalition was the only one among the

three that lost members from 1922. It also had an increase in the mean Manhattan distance among its members from 5.4 units in 1922 to 6.7 units in 1944. This was also the high mean Manhattan distance among any coalition. This meant that the coalition while losing two members disagreed on an additional belief, a trend that was opposite of the pro-Zionist coalition.

The Manhattan distances between the coalitions reveal the relative polarization of the expressed beliefs between the coalitions. The distance between the pro-Zionist and the pro-Arab coalition was the greatest at 20.4 units, or a disagreement on about 10 beliefs. This was the exact same distance as it was in 1922. The pro-Zionist and anti-Zionist coalitions had a mean Manhattan distance of 12.9 units. This was relatively the same as the 13.6 units distance between the coalitions in 1922. The Anti-Zionist and Pro-Arab coalitions had a mean Manhattan distance of 13 units, a slight increase from the mean Manhattan distance of 10 units in 1922. The distance between the Anti-Zionist coalition to the other two coalitions was relatively equidistant at 12.9 and 13 units. This meant that the Anti-Zionist coalition disagreed with the other coalitions on slightly more than six beliefs. The Anti-Zionist coalition had changed slightly from having less disagreement of expressed beliefs with the Pro-Arab coalition to being more centrist in their expressed beliefs. The mean Manhattan distance between the two extreme coalitions of the Pro-Zionist and Pro-Arab did not change.

These findings support the hypothesis that "on major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so" (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). This analysis was based upon the distance of expressed beliefs among and between coalitions and found that such distances were relatively stable. A complementary form of analysis to determine if the belief systems of the advocacy coalitions changed is examining the relative stability of agreement of expressed beliefs among and between advocacy coalitions.

### *Belief System Stability*

The lineup of allies and opponents was stable among the three coalitions based upon distances of expressed beliefs. However, this does not indicate what beliefs those advocacy coalitions held or had in common. To examine the stability of the belief systems and identify commonly held beliefs, the tables below describe the beliefs of each advocacy coalition in 1922 and 1944. These beliefs are compared over time within advocacy coalitions and between advocacy coalitions and present relative convergence over time.

The beliefs examined exist on a range. Some of these beliefs, based upon the Tabu search cluster analysis, are associated with a pro-Arab position such as "the Arabs of Palestine are a nation," "the current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty," and "Arab welfare is important." While other beliefs are associated with a pro-Zionist position such as "people should intervene on earth to carry out God's plan," "the Jews are a nation," and "the welfare of the Jews is important." Therefore, if over time, the beliefs of advocacy coalition members

include an increasing number of pro-Arab or pro-Zionist beliefs, then we can conclude that the beliefs of that advocacy coalition were shifting in a certain direction.

Tables 4-6 are a statistical description of the expressed beliefs of each of the advocacy coalitions in 1922 and in 1944. The determination of an organization belonging to an advocacy coalition was based upon the findings from the Tabu search cluster analysis. Not all of the beliefs are represented, as some of them did not have agreement by any organization. In other words, there were no positive codes for some beliefs. These tables demonstrate the emergence of certain beliefs. Tables 7 and 8 are a statistical description of those expressed beliefs that were shared by two or more coalitions in 1922 and in 1944, respectively. These tables demonstrate the convergence of beliefs between advocacy coalitions.

### *Emerging Beliefs*

As found in Table 4, the majority of the five members of the pro-Arab coalition in 1922 shared beliefs 3, 4, 6, 9, and 19 all concerning Arab claims to sovereignty over Palestine. While other beliefs were held by a minority of coalition members, these five beliefs are the core beliefs of the pro-Arab coalition in 1922. These five beliefs remained stable among the pro-Arab coalition in 1944. However, by 1944, three additional beliefs emerged that were held by a majority of advocacy coalition members. These are beliefs 5, 7, and 8 concerning a change in the scope of the issue from Palestine to the Middle East, as well as greater concern for Jewish welfare and security.

The emergence of these beliefs reflects the changes in the concerns of the policy elites who testified, as well as the changes in the subsystem. The change in scope of the issue from Palestine to the Middle East is expected based upon the organizational affiliation of those who testified in 1922 compared with 1944. In 1922 a majority of the organizations represented came from the Palestine National League, all of which

**Table 4.** Percentage of Pro-Arab Coalition Members Responding in Agreement with Belief Components

Belief Components	1922, N = 5 (%)	1944, N = 3 (%)
3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation.	80	100
4. The current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty.	100	100
5. The United States should seek to maintain security in the Middle East.	0	100
6. The United States should seek to maintain security in Palestine.	80	100
7. The United States should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people.	0	100
8. The welfare of the Jews is important.	0	66.6
9. The welfare of the Arabs of Palestine is important.	100	100
12. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be prevented.	20	0
13. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be limited.	20	33.3
14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited.	20	0
15. The Jews should be blamed for the problems in Palestine.	20	0
19. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Arabs.	80	100

*Note:* Belief components 1, 2, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 18 had 0 members responding in agreement.

focused explicitly upon Palestine, while in 1944, a majority of the testimonies came from the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate and the Syrian and Lebanese American Federation of Eastern States, both of which have a more regional outlook.

The emergence of the two beliefs concerning Jewish security and welfare was unexpected. It may reflect the external perturbations affecting the subsystem. In this case, the genocide committed by the Nazis in Europe was becoming publicized in the United States. Those providing testimony in support of the rights of the Arabs of Palestine having sovereignty over Palestine sought to demonstrate recognition of the persecution of the Jewish people, and that they should not be denied with security and safe haven. However, this should not come at the expense of the Arabs of Palestine. For example, in 1944, Faris Malouf from the Syrian and Lebanese American Federation of the Eastern States stated that

Those of us who are opposing this resolution do condemn and abhor their [Jews] persecution as repulsive to human conscience and we do not attempt to ignore the existence of a Jewish problem or the urgency for its just solution . . . If the Jews are really seeking a refuge and a homeland where they can live in peace and develop their distinct abilities, Palestine can never become that refuge and it can never solve their problem, certainly not through political Zionism. (Jewish National Home in Palestine, 1944)

This quote demonstrates that those who opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine did recognize the persecution of the Jewish people in Europe. Yet Palestine should not be the answer to remedy their suffering.

According to Table 5, the only belief held by the anti-Zionist coalition in 1922 was belief 14 about unlimited Jewish immigration. This demonstrates that the coalition expressed almost only neutral or negative views of all other beliefs. This belief was stable over time as all of the members of the anti-Zionist coalition shared this belief

**Table 5.** Percentage of Anti-Zionist Coalition Members Responding in Agreement with Belief Components

Belief Components	1922, N = 2 (%)	1944, N = 6 (%)
3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation.	0	16.7
4. The current majority population of a political community should have sovereignty.	0	66.6
5. The United States should seek to maintain security in the Middle East.	0	16.7
6. The United States should seek to maintain security in Palestine.	0	83.3
7. The United States should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people.	0	100
8. The welfare of the Jews is important.	0	83.3
9. The welfare of the Arabs of Palestine is important.	0	50
10. The United States should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine.	0	83.3
11. The United States should use material resources to solve the problems in Palestine.	0	16.7
13. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be limited.	0	33.3
14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited.	50	100

*Note:* Belief components 1, 2, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 had 0 members responding in agreement.

in 1944. By 1944, beliefs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 all emerged. Combined with belief 14, these seven beliefs are the core beliefs of the anti-Zionist coalition in 1944. This emergence of beliefs reflects an interest in Jewish welfare and security, but it is tempered by support that Palestine as a whole should be stabilized and become a democratic state rather than be given to the Jewish people. This is demonstrated by Louis Wolsey from the American Council for Judaism who provided testimony in 1944 stating,

I earnestly commend the first part of the resolutions which extend freedom of opportunity in migration and settlement . . . I believe on a democratic basis the country should be ruled by all people who live in that country, and I do not believe in uniting church and State and simply reserve government to the power of the Jews. (*Jewish National Home in Palestine*, 1944)

This argument by members of the anti-Zionist coalition that immigration to Palestine should be allowed, but not necessarily the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was common among anti-Zionists and reflects the findings.

As found in Table 6, the majority of the 11 members of the pro-Zionist coalition in 1922 shared beliefs 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, and 18. These six beliefs relating to Jewish welfare, sovereignty, and security in Palestine are the core beliefs of the pro-Zionist coalition in 1922. Again, these beliefs were stable over time as they were shared by a majority of pro-Zionist coalition members in 1944. By 1944, two new beliefs emerged among a majority of pro-Zionist coalition members, beliefs 11 and 14. These two beliefs reflect a more demanding position by the pro-Zionist coalition of the U.S. government. The emergence of the belief that material support rather than symbolic support as in the past was now needed to help create Jewish sovereignty in Palestine reflects

Table 6. Percentage of Pro-Zionist Coalition Members Responding in Agreement with Belief Components

Belief Components	1922, N = 11 (%)	1944, N = 43 (%)
1. People should intervene on earth to carry out God's plan.	100	97.7
2. The Jews are a nation.	100	97.7
3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation.	27.3	0
5. The United States should seek to maintain security in the Middle East.	0	4.7
6. The United States should seek to maintain security in Palestine.	18.2	7
7. The United States should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people.	90.9	97.7
8. The welfare of the Jews is important.	100	97.7
9. The welfare of the Arabs of Palestine is important.	0	2.3
10. The United States should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine.	100	97.7
11. The United States should use material resources to solve the problems in Palestine.	0	95.3
14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited.	27.2	97.7
16. The Arabs should be blamed for the problems in Palestine.	45.5	9.3
17. The British should be blamed for the problems in Palestine.	0	16.3
18. Sovereignty over Palestine should come from only the Jews.	54.5	100

Note: Belief components 4, 12, 13, 15, and 19 had 0 members responding in agreement.

the saliency and temporal dimension of the problem. In addition, that Jewish immigration should be unlimited into Palestine is a clear revocation of the 1939 British White Paper policy on limiting Jewish immigration. This belief asks the U.S. government to confront openly the British government on this policy.

Overall, these descriptive tables demonstrate that beliefs were stable over time, and that new beliefs emerged. The stability of beliefs supports the assumption within the ACF that individuals filter new information based upon their belief systems, and that this information will be used in a biased manner to support these beliefs. The emergence of new beliefs may demonstrate a reaction to the external perturbations affecting the subsystem leading to shifts in how the issue is viewed. This finding supports Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991) that coalitions may be stable over time even while new beliefs are emerging.

### *Converging Beliefs*

Tables 7 and 8 reflect the beliefs that were shared by two or three advocacy coalitions. Table 7 displays the descriptive statistics of the shared beliefs of all three advocacy coalitions in 1922. The three beliefs that a minority of pro-Arab and pro-Zionist advocacy coalition members had in common were beliefs 3, 6, and 14. While none of these beliefs were shared by a majority of members by both advocacy

**Table 7.** Percentage of Shared Belief Components between Coalitions in 1922

Belief Components	Pro-Arab, N = 5 (%)	Anti-Zionist, N = 2 (%)	Pro-Zionist, N = 11 (%)
3. The Arabs of Palestine are a nation.	80	0	27.2
6. The United States should seek to maintain security in Palestine.	80	0	18.2
14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited.	20	50	27.2

*Note:* All other belief components were not shared between coalitions.

**Table 8.** Percentage of Shared Belief Components between Coalitions in 1944

Belief Components	Pro-Arab, N = 3 (%)	Anti-Zionist, N = 6 (%)	Pro-Zionist, N = 43 (%)
5. The United States should seek to maintain security in the Middle East.	100	16.7	4.7
6. The United States should seek to maintain security in Palestine.	100	83.3	7
7. The United States should seek to maintain security for the Jewish people.	100	100	97.7
8. The welfare of the Jews is important.	66.6	83.3	97.7
10. The United States should use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine.	0	83.3	97.7
14. Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited.	0	100	97.7

*Note:* All other belief components were not shared between coalitions.

coalitions, they do demonstrate some convergence in beliefs by the two opposing advocacy coalitions in 1922.

Table 8 describes a different story of commonly held beliefs between members of the advocacy coalitions. First, belief 3 that "the Arabs of Palestine are a nation" is no longer shared between the coalitions. The Arab position and argument for sovereignty over Palestine was no longer recognized by a minority of the pro-Zionist advocacy coalition members. On the other hand, there were now four additional beliefs held in common between the advocacy coalitions. Two of those beliefs were held by a majority of all advocacy coalition members, beliefs 7 and 8. This convergence in the security and welfare of the Jewish people was important to all three advocacy coalitions. This can be explained in light of the increased subsystem-wide attention to the Holocaust occurring in Europe. This attention is further supported by the members of the anti-Zionist and pro-Zionist coalitions believing that "the U.S. use symbolic or political resources to solve the problems in Palestine" and that "Jewish immigration into Palestine should be unlimited." The pro- and anti-Zionist advocacy coalitions believed that the United States should take action to assist the immigration of Jews to Palestine as part of the solution for preventing further persecution in Europe.

By examining the beliefs that were shared by advocacy coalitions, we can identify the convergence of beliefs. The inclusion of beliefs from opposing advocacy coalition belief systems demonstrates convergence of beliefs over time. This finding is counter to past studies of the ACF (see Sabatier & Brasher, 1993) that found divergence of beliefs between advocacy coalitions over time. However, this finding may be atypical because of the external perturbations, specifically the Holocaust, affecting the subsystem.

### Coordination among Advocacy Coalitions

These findings and arguments concerning advocacy coalition structure and belief change so far have focused upon the components of policy core and deep core beliefs. In addition to identifying and analyzing beliefs, some level of nontrivial coordination among advocacy coalition members needs to be examined to identify these coalitions as advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Schlager, 1995). Weible and Sabatier (2005) and Matti and Sandström (2011) found that coordination is correlated with the policy core beliefs among policy elites within a given policy subsystem. Therefore, to supplement the mixed methods approaches above for understanding advocacy coalition structure and beliefs, a qualitative description of the policy actors and their cooperation within advocacy coalitions is below.

#### *Evidence of Coordination among Pro-Arab Coalition Members*

Members of the pro-Arab coalition who testified in 1922 and in 1944 are linked to the same organizations. In 1922, four of the five testimonies were provided by members of the Palestine National League. By 1944, the Palestine National League had joined the broader pan-Arab movement that sought national self-determination

for the entire Arab people (Davidson, 2002). One organization that represented this broader movement was the Arab National League. One of the organizations that coordinated with the Arab National League was the Syrian and Lebanese American Federation of the Eastern States (Davidson, 2002), which provided testimony in 1944. Another organization that coordinated with the Arab National League was the Institute for Arab American Affairs. Philip Hitti, the Princeton University professor who was part of the pro-Arab advocacy coalition, was a member of the Institute for Arab American Affairs and a frequent speaker on its behalf (Miller, 2004). Therefore, the majority of the pro-Arab advocacy coalition members providing testimony in 1922 and in 1944 were by organizations that had linkages as well as providing testimony with the objective of gaining recognition by the U.S. government for the rights of the Arabs of Palestine.

#### *Evidence of Coordination among Anti-Zionist Coalition Members*

The two members of the anti-Zionist coalition in 1922 both belonged to the Union of American Hebrew Congregation and to the Central Conference of American Rabbis (American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, 2010; American Jewish Archives, 2010). There is no direct evidence demonstrating that they coordinated their testimony, but the proxy of belonging to multiple organizations and of testifying at the same congressional hearing with the same belief system suggests that they may have been coordinating their activities. In 1944, five of the six testimonies for the anti-Zionist advocacy coalition belonged to the American Council for Judaism. These individuals were members and represented various executive leadership positions in the council. The American Council for Judaism was founded in 1942 with the explicit mission to counter Zionist propaganda in America and to promote the belief that Judaism was a religion and not a national identity (Kolsky, 1990). Similar to the pro-Arab coalition, a majority of those who provided testimony belonging to the Anti-Zionist coalition belonged to the same organizations.

#### *Evidence of Coordination among Pro-Zionist Members*

Among the pro-Zionist coalition testimonies in 1922, all came from the Zionist Organization of America or were members of Congress. The Zionist Organization of America was the largest pro-Zionist organization operating in America at the time and was the representative of the World Zionist Organization. Some of the congressmen cited that they had been contacted by the Zionist Organization of America and its many affiliates prior to the hearing. While there is no evidence connecting each of the congressmen to the Zionist Organization of America, Congressman Fish III, who introduced the 1922 House resolution, did so only after being asked by members of the Zionist Organization of America (Geddes, 1991). The 1944 hearings represent a broad range of actors from various organizations. However, excluding the members of Congress, 12 of the 15 non-congressional members of this coalition were members of the Zionist Organization of America or belonged to organizations that were known to coordinate their activities with the Zionist Organization of America such

as the Poale Zion, Mizrahi Organization, and Christian Council on Palestine (Stevens, 1962). Again, there is no direct evidence that all of the members of the pro-Zionist coalition coordinated their efforts, but a majority of them did belong to the same organizations and did provide testimony at the same hearing with similar beliefs.

Assessing coordination among pro-Arab, anti-Zionist, and pro-Zionist advocacy coalitions lacks the rigor of systematic analysis as found in Henry (2011), Matti and Sandström (2011), and Ingold (2011), but the focus on coalition stability in a historical investigation over two decades places restrictions on the types of data available for collection and analysis. As a result, this analysis of coordination does not conclusively determine that all of those providing testimony in 1922 and in 1944 coordinated. It does, however, show that the majority of the members of each coalition at the time of the hearings did belong to the same organizations or were members of Congress and coupled with the belief that the data support the case that these individuals represent three distinct advocacy coalitions.

### Discussion

The case study demonstrated that U.S. foreign policy toward the question of Palestine was a major controversy where policy core beliefs were in dispute. Applying similar methods to examine advocacy coalition structure as Weible (2005), Weible and Sabatier (2005), and Henry et al. (2010), this research came to the same conclusion as Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991), Zafonte and Sabatier (2004), and Weible and Sabatier (2005) that the lineup of allies and opponents between advocacy coalitions is relatively stable over time. Therefore, this study confirms the hypothesis that

On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so. (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999)

This research is an important contribution to the understanding of the ACF and advocacy coalitions in particular because it tested this hypothesis in a policy subsystem that differed from previous studies. Previous research on advocacy coalition structured by Weible and Sabatier (2005) and Henry et al. (2010) has called for research into policy subsystems that have a different focus than environmental or energy issues and that have different levels of conflict or technical complexity. By focusing upon foreign policy applied to a normative and relatively less technically complex and historical issue, this research responded to this challenge and found that characteristics of subsystems may not affect advocacy coalition structure. The fact that it upheld their findings further demonstrates the external validity of the assumptions and this hypothesis of the ACF relative to advocacy coalitions.

This research made multiple findings concerning belief systems and advocacy coalitions. First, it found that beliefs of advocacy coalitions may emerge over time as changes to the subsystem made them more salient among coalition members. In addition, it found, similar to Weible (2006), that the beliefs of advocacy coalitions may not be homogenous, and that various members will possess various beliefs.

These findings concerning emerging and heterogeneity of beliefs challenge future researchers to use multiple policy core beliefs or at least multiple components of policy core beliefs for identifying advocacy coalitions. Finally, and maybe the most important for future research, it found that belief systems of advocacy coalitions may converge to share multiple beliefs with a single advocacy coalition while maintaining their stability. When the beliefs of an entire subsystem are changing in one direction, as found in this study in a general shift toward more pro-Zionist beliefs, this may be an indicator of what beliefs a future policy change will reflect. Weible and Sabatier (2009) have a similar finding that when an advocacy coalition shifts their beliefs, the change tends to be in convergence with the beliefs of another advocacy coalition.

There are several limitations to these findings. The most important limitation of this study is the reliance on legislative testimony to identify coalitions. While this has been shown to be effective in the past (Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 1993; Sabatier & Brasher, 1993), the data are but the remaining trace of the coalition expressed beliefs in the two time periods. This limitation was in part overcome by incorporating secondary sources and using inter-coder testing, but the point remains that the study remains largely ignorant of coalition behavior and expressed beliefs beyond these testimonies. Also, the testimonies themselves threaten the results; e.g., the organizations in this study self-selected to testify and may not represent the true political landscapes in both time periods. For example, the U.S. Department of State never testified at either hearing. Also, the 1944 hearing was announced and conducted in a matter of a couple of weeks making it highly difficult for any representatives of the Arabs of Palestine to travel to Washington, DC, in time to testify at the hearing. In addition, there was no record that any such individuals were invited to provide such testimony. Despite these limitations, this study provides a rare investigation into advocacy coalitions seeking to influence a foreign and normative policy issue within a historical context.

In the final analysis, this research demonstrates that the ACF is applicable to foreign and normative policy issues. It found that components of policy core beliefs emerged and converged toward the belief system of a single advocacy coalition over time. Yet while these beliefs emerged and converged, the structure of the advocacy coalitions remained relatively stable.

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### Notes

1. The World Zionist Organization was established in 1897 as an umbrella organization for organizations around the world that promoted Zionism. Zionism is the belief that the Jews need to establish their own state to combat against anti-Semitism. One may be Zionists and not necessarily Jewish, and one may be Jewish and not a Zionist. It is a belief about the normative answer to the question concerning the relationship between Jews and people of other faiths.
2. The ACF incorporates a logic and assumptions derived from decades of research; for details, see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999), Sabatier and Weible (2007), and Weible et al. (2009).

3. The  $R^2$  for two coalitions for 1922 was 0.76. While this is higher than the 0.71 found for three coalitions, the difference is relatively insignificant and based upon the case study the inclusion of the pro-Arab coalition members with the anti-Zionist coalition members did not fit the case as well as three coalitions did. The  $R^2$  for four coalitions for 1922 was 0.68.
4. The  $R^2$  for two coalitions in 1944 was 0.76. The  $R^2$  for four coalitions in 1944 was 0.79.

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