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The "Black" Terrorist International: Neo-Fascist Paramilitary Networks and the "Strategy of Tension" in Italy, 1968-1974

by

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B.A. (University of Michigan) 1977
M.A. (University of California at Berkeley) 1987

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the GRADUATE DIVISION of the UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA at BERKELEY

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1994

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University of California at Berkeley

1994

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Jeffrey McKenzie Bale
Abstract

The "Black" Terrorist International: Neo-Fascist Paramilitary Networks and the "Strategy of Tension" in Italy, 1968-1974

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Jeffrey McKenzie Bale

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California at Berkeley

Professor Richard A. Webster, Chair

Between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s, Italy was subjected to one of the most sustained campaigns of right-wing terrorism and subversion in the history of postwar Europe. This campaign, which has been dubbed the "strategy of tension", was designed to provoke an authoritarian involution of the Italian political system and in the process prevent the Communist Party from joining the ruling governmental coalition. To accomplish this and various subsidiary objectives, its sponsors and perpetrators covertly conditioned the political environment by means of a combination of public bombings, assassinations, coup plots, infiltrations of left-wing groups, provocations, and psychological warfare operations. The seriousness of the situation was reflected in Italian police records, which attributed 83% of the 4384 officially-registered acts of violence between 1969 and 1975 to the extreme right.

There were three main factors which lent this "strategy of tension" a heightened degree of historical and political importance. First of all, the Italian neo-fascists who carried it out were linked to the "Black International", a loosely-interconnected network
of far right groups throughout Europe and other parts of the world. Secondly, through this network they became acquainted with the full gamut of sophisticated countersubversive techniques that had been developed by French military experts, especially the use of "false flag" operations, which they then applied more or less systematically. Thirdly, they received technical assistance, logistical aid, "cover", and other sorts of protection from hardline factions within various Western intelligence services.

This dissertation explores the reasons why this important subject has been ignored, identifies the chief organizational components of the "Black International", painstakingly reconstructs two emblematic case studies associated with the "strategy of tension", and assesses that strategy's broader historical significance. The goal throughout is not only to illuminate a dark but significant chapter in the postwar history of fascism, but also to show how this seemingly arcane sphere of contemporary history is related to highly sensitive aspects of the Cold War. Indeed, this study goes straight to the corrupt, amoral heart of the bipolar confrontation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Bloc.

R. Webster 20 Dec. 1994
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In the early evening of 25 April 1969, a one kilogram bomb composed of chlorine or potassium nitrate and gasoline exploded at the FIAT stand inside Milan’s exhibition area, the Fiera Campionaria, wounding twenty people and destroying property. At around the same time, 7 PM, a bomb of similar construction with three detonators exploded at the exchange office of the Banca Nazionale delle Comunicazioni inside Milan’s central train station, in this instance without causing any injuries. Although few people then realized it, these two relatively modest blasts would prove to be only the first in a series of "neo-fascist" bombings in public places that were to traumatize the Italian people for fifteen years.1 This long chain of bomb attacks culminated with the detonation of an explosive device inside the ninth car of the "904" train from Naples to Milan on the evening of 23 December 1984, which killed sixteen and wounded 266 travelers and occurred very near the site where the "Italicus" train from Rome to Bologna had been bombed ten years earlier. Initially it was widely assumed that such bombings were the isolated acts of small groups of political fanatics, but evidence linking them together and exposing the involvement of Italian secret service personnel later surfaced, suggesting that many of these crimes were the products of a coordinated terrorist strategy.

This strategy, which has been dubbed the "strategy of tension" by knowledgeable Italian observers, was a systematic and unusually virulent campaign of terrorism and subversion conducted by neo-fascist paramilitary groups in Italy between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s. Even if mention is made only of the major operations that were
associated with this strategy, the list would be a long and important one. It would include a series of bombings in public locales that were carefully selected in order to cause the maximum number of civilian casualties, including Milan's Piazza Fontana in December 1969, Brescia's Piazza della Loggia in August 1974, the "Italicus" express train in December 1974, Bologna's central train station in August 1980, and the "904" express train in December 1984. To these one must add a succession of abortive "coups" involving both civilian extremists and high-ranking military personnel, including the 1964 De Lorenzio affair, the December 1970 Borghese operation, and a series of overlapping plots in 1973 and 1974 which were linked to the Rosa dei Venti group and to former non-communist partisans like Edgardo Sogno and Carlo Fumagalli. Beyond these major incidents, there were hundreds, if not thousands, of smaller acts of violence and subversion that were in some way linked to the same overall strategy. The total human material toll amounted to well over 200 deaths and nearly 1500 wounded, many of whom were horribly mutilated. In postwar Europe, only Northern Ireland, the Basque country, and Turkey were subjected to bloodier and more extensive campaigns of terrorism.

The behind-the-scenes sponsors of this strategy sought to provoke an authoritarian involution of the Italian political system and thereby assure—in contrast to many of the neo-fascist perpetrators—the pro-Atlantic orientation of the Italian government. This meant, above all else, keeping the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), the largest and most powerful communist party in western Europe, from joining the ruling governmental coalition. To accomplish this and various subsidiary objectives, these forces covertly conditioned the political environment by means of a combination of public bombings,
assassinations, infiltrations of left-wing groups, provocations, and psychological warfare operations. These actions were designed to achieve several overlapping objectives, among which were 1) to terrorize the public into demanding (or at least accepting) the introduction of repressive security measures; 2) to frighten the moderate left into abandoning or scaling back plans for social, economic, and political reforms; 3) to provoke violent overreactions by the PCI’s base and the extraparliamentary left; and, in this way, 4) to precipitate a direct intervention and crackdown by the armed forces, if not an outright coup modelled on those of Greece (1967) or Chile (1973). In short, the goal was to exacerbate the levels of fear and tension so much that the security forces, buoyed by large-scale support from a psychologically traumatized public concerned about its own physical safety, would be compelled to intervene directly in political affairs, ostensibly to suppress "left-wing" subversives. The neo-fascist organizations in Italy which carried out this "strategy of tension", whose members often had even more radical political solutions in mind for the problems confronting Italy and Europe, were in turn linked to the so-called "Black International", a loosely interconnected network of far right groups throughout the continent and other parts of the world, especially Latin America. Between 1966 and 1974, its organizational hub was a Lisbon-based news agency called Aginter Presse, about which a great deal will be said in Chapter Two.

This brief summary itself suggests that the actions carried out in Italy by local elements of the "Black International" were far more significant than the typical sorts of violence that are customarily associated with neo-fascist "bootboys", such as brawls with members of the extraparliamentary left, unprovoked attacks on immigrants, pitched
battles with the police at soccer matches, and so forth. The seriousness of the situation in Italy was reflected statistically by Italian police records, which attributed 83% of the 4384 officially-registered acts of violence between 1969 and 1975 to the extreme right. Left-wing terrorism, which continues to receive the lion’s share of academic attention, did not become predominant in Italy until the latter half of the 1970s. There were two main factors which lent this "strategy of tension"—as well as the other operations conducted by the "Black International"—a heightened degree of historical and political importance. First of all, many of the neo-fascists who carried it out consciously made use of sophisticated countersubversive techniques with which they had been familiarized, directly or indirectly, by former French Army personnel. Secondly, they received technical assistance, logistical aid, "cover", and other sorts of protection from hardline factions within various Western intelligence services. Both the unconventional warfare specialists and the secret service personnel who were implicated in these anti-constitutional projects made use of the full gamut of countersubversive methods, but they especially favored the employment of "false flag" operations. These were actions carried out by their own operatives or agents that were specifically designed to implicate the opposition in acts of political violence. This could be done by publicly attributing such actions to genuine left-wing groups, infiltrating such groups in order to use them as a "cover" for launching these actions, or actually setting up phony "left-wing" organizations whose members would then carry them out. All three techniques were regularly employed by the various components of the "Black International". The goal of these provocations was to discredit the European left and prepare the public
psychologically for the adoption of pro-Atlantic international policies and "law and order" domestic measures.

Despite the fact that the "strategy of tension" took an unusually large toll of human life by Euroterrorist standards, played a significant role in heightening political tensions and social conflicts in Italy, further corrupted the already dysfunctional political system in that country, and included the worst single act of terrorism in Europe since the end of World War II, the 2 August 1980 bombing at the central train station in Bologna, it has been largely ignored by academic specialists who deal with terrorism and contemporary Italian politics. The degree of neglect in this case is unfortunately emblematic of the general failure of scholars to examine specific incidents or campaigns of right-wing terrorism. As yet there have been almost no serious attempts by historians or other members of the academic community to trace the development and reconstruct the history of rightist terrorism in Europe in the period after 1945. Preliminary efforts to analyze the phenomenon have also been few and far between, especially in comparison with left-wing terrorism. Thus terrorism perpetrated by the extreme right, which is referred to in Europe as "black" terrorism, still constitutes one of the lost chapters of postwar history. Anyone planning to fill in portions of this missing chapter must therefore begin by coming to grips with the reasons for this peculiar lacuna in the historical record.

To some extent the academic neglect of right-wing terrorism is simply an inevitable byproduct of the dearth of serious scholarly work devoted to the activities of the extreme right since the end of World War II, a problem which is almost invariably
commented upon by the handful of specialists on these matters. Although this
deplorable situation has improved considerably in recent years, especially in the wake of
the collapse of communism and the resurgence of the radical right in eastern Europe,
there is no doubt that the history of fascist movements in the post-1945 era still remains
one of the most underrepresented areas in the ever-expanding literature dealing with
fascism. A number of interrelated factors can be cited to explain this circumstance, but
the chief reason appears to be that most scholars simply do not consider neo-fascism
politically important or intellectually interesting enough to warrant their time and
attention, especially in comparison with the "fascist epoch" that supposedly ended in
1945. These issues need to be dealt with separately.

First of all, the political significance of neo-fascism has typically been
underestimated or ignored by academic analysts, most of whom have focused the lion's
share of their attention on the results of elections and other traditional indicators of
political power. Such a narrow focus is inadequate under the best of circumstances,
since even mainstream political parties in ostensibly democratic countries regularly
engage in quasi-legal or illicit activities via "informal" channels, both within and outside
of established institutional webs. But there is at least some justification for adopting this
standard approach in cases where the bulk of a political organization's efforts are geared
toward winning elections and, once its representatives are elected, legislative and
executive support for its programs. However, when discussing organizations whose
ultimate aim is to overthrow parliamentary democracy and which rely primarily on the
use of subversive extra-legal methods, it is absurd to believe that an apparently narrow
sociopolitical base or a poor electoral showing tells the whole story, or even the most significant part of the story. Imagine, for example, how unfruitful this sort of approach would have been if it had been applied uncritically to an assessment of the influence and potential of the Bolsheviks prior to the 1917 revolution. Lenin’s “combat party” would certainly have seemed less than threatening had it been evaluated solely on the basis of its electoral strength. When dealing with these kinds of conspiratorial groups, it is far more important to examine the clandestine organizational networks linking them to their counterparts abroad and to sympathetic factions within powerful private and public institutions, particularly the state apparatus. If this is not done, even the most careful observers can easily be misled about the potential strength and influence of neo-fascist formations.

In connection with neo-fascism, scholars have tended to overlook two crucially important points. The first is that even small groups of neo-fascist ultras, though politically marginal under "normal" conditions in countries with strong democratic institutions, have the potential to expand their base of social support geometrically under crisis conditions. As neo-fascist theorist Maurice Bardèche has rightly emphasized, fascism is the "party of the angry nation" which can only reach its full potential in periods of acute crisis. In that sense, it is no different than any other revolutionary movement whose appeals tend to fall on deaf ears when conditions are relatively stable and prosperous. This is borne out by the historical record, not only during the 1920s and 1930s, but also throughout the postwar period. Support for the radical right still tends to increase dramatically in times of crisis, as it did during the traumatic era following
decolonization in Belgium and France, in the midst of certain recurring periods of economic hardship, when scapegoating "out-groups" had more plausibility and greater emotional salience, and in the wake of the recent communist collapse, when general chaos and uncertainty about the future prevailed throughout the ruins of eastern Europe's bureaucratized "nanny" states. There is surely a correlation, for example, between the severe crises currently besetting the Russian Republic and the startling increase in the level of popular support for likeable demagogues like Vladimir Zhirinovsky. In short, it would be unwise to assume that the generally low level of support for fascist groups in Europe represents some sort of historical constant. The recent revival of the far right, which caught most scholars by surprise, bears witness to this variability.

The second point is that even in times of relative stability, small extremist organizations are often able to influence and condition political developments in democratic states. They cannot, it is true, hope to come to power on their own during such periods. But even if one considers only the overt and legal arena of political action, it often happens that popular themes promoted by "fringe" groups on the far right are adopted, usually with some modifications, by conservative or "respectable" rightist parties. These themes can also, if conditions are propitious, slowly permeate spheres of popular culture and thereby subtly influence mainstream values. There is no doubt, for example, that neo-Nazi sentiments are being very effectively transmitted to alienated youths through the medium of underground rock n'roll, specifically skinhead "Oi" music. And gradual penetration of this more or less natural sort is clearly not the entire story. Neo-fascist groups can also exert a barely noticeable but no less real political impact on
the covert level, especially when they secretly operate in conjunction with networks of supporters within the state apparatus and other powerful societal institutions. This circumstance will be thoroughly documented as this study proceeds.

Many researchers also apparently feel that neo-fascist ideology lacks intrinsic intellectual interest or, in its less crude forms, noteworthy behavioral significance. Neither of these assumptions is at all novel. Classical fascist ideologies have long been dismissed as hopelessly impoverished from a theoretical point of view, and Leonard Shapiro has gone so far as to claim that fascism is "without an intellectual framework". Such contemptuous assessments, which typically stem from a combination of intense a priori hostility toward fascism, an uncritical acceptance of the anti-rationalist and anti-programmatic bias exhibited by many fascist and Nazi ideologues, and the recognition that fascism lacked an all-encompassing, systematic, and fully articulated theoretical paradigm comparable to that of classical Marxism, can no longer be accepted at face value. While fascism may have had an ambiguous or even contradictory ideological foundation, it was neither incoherent nor simplistic, as less prejudiced historians like Zeev Sternhell have demonstrated. Indeed, it is now clear that fascism emerged out of the fin-de-siècle attempts to conjoin a radical, romantic, populist, and authoritarian current of nationalism with virulent anti-bourgeois and anti-democratic sentiments, and a revolutionary, voluntarist, elitist, and mythopoetic current of socialism with strong anti-rationalist and anti-materialistic sentiments. Although the resulting brew was volatile and unusually difficult to integrate, both of these components were themselves internally coherent and stemmed from fairly rich intellectual traditions.
Other critics have instead emphasized the often substantial divergence between fascist ideological pronouncements and actual fascist policies or practices, and have wrongly concluded that the former were merely demagogic propaganda pitches fashioned to meet the exigencies of the moment rather than sincere statements of fascist goals. This cynical logic, which has never been applied as consistently to communist or democratic ideologies no matter how little they are reflected in existing policies, has then been used as a pretext to ignore much of what fascists actually said about their beliefs and objectives. In other words, long-standing biases against classical fascist doctrines have simply been extended chronologically and applied to neo-fascism. Only one new assumption has been added—that neo-fascists have made no efforts to develop, refine, or modify the ideas bequeathed to them by their intellectual forebears. While this assumption may be valid for certain groups of "nostalgics" in the early postwar period, it is clearly inadequate to account for the complex evolution of neo-fascist ideology during the past forty years. Innovative neo-fascist theorists like Jean-François Thiriart, Franco Freda, and Henning Eichberg have all produced writings that in various ways go far beyond themes associated with classical fascism. Thus these standard rationales for belittling and ignoring neo-fascism cannot survive closer scrutiny.

Perhaps more importantly, in addition to their general aversion to the far right, scholars also seem to be averse to examining the activities of conspiratorial groups, a category within which terrorist organizations obviously fall. This general unwillingness to take the covert dimension of politics into account can be traced to many sources, not the least of which is a widespread ignorance about how clandestine groups actually
operate. To some extent this ignorance is a natural byproduct of the objective difficulties involved in obtaining reliable evidence about intentionally-concealed political activities, which is indeed a formidable problem. But it can also be traced to other causes that are far less easy to understand or justify, including the general tendency to confuse covert politics with "conspiracy theories" (in the perjorative sense of that term), the biased nature of the literature dealing with postwar terrorism, and the current prevalence of analytical and theoretical perspectives in academia which minimize the historical impact of individuals or small groups and exaggerate the role played by vast, impersonal structural forces which are seemingly beyond human control. All of these issues need to be considered further.

"Conspiracy Theories" and Clandestine Politics

Very few notions generate as much intellectual resistance, hostility, and derision within academic circles as a belief in the historical importance or efficacy of political conspiracies. Even when this belief is expressed in a very cautious manner, limited to specific and restricted contexts, supported by reliable evidence, and hedged about with all sorts of qualifications, apparently it still manages to transcend the boundaries of acceptable discourse and violate unspoken academic taboos. The idea that particular groups of people meet together secretly or in private to plan various courses of action, and that some of these plans actually exert a significant influence on particular historical developments, is typically rejected out of hand and assumed to be the figment of a paranoid imagination. The mere mention of the word "conspiracy" seems to set off an internal alarm bell which causes scholars to close their minds in order to avoid cognitive
dissonance and possible unpleasantness, since the popular image of conspiracy both fundamentally challenges the conception most educated, sophisticated people have about how the world operates and reminds them of the horrible persecutions that absurd and unfounded conspiracy theories have precipitated or sustained in the past. So strong is this prejudice among academics that even when clear evidence of a plot is inadvertently discovered in the course of their own research, they frequently feel compelled, either out of a sense of embarrassment or a desire to defuse anticipated criticism, to preface their account of it by ostentatiously disclaiming a belief in conspiracies. They then often attempt to downplay the significance of the plotting they have uncovered. To do otherwise, that is, to make a serious effort to incorporate the documented activities of conspiratorial groups into their general political or historical analyses, would force them to stretch their mental horizons beyond customary bounds and, not infrequently, delve even further into certain sordid and politically sensitive topics. Most academic researchers clearly prefer to ignore the implications of conspiratorial politics altogether rather than deal directly with such controversial matters.

A number of complex cultural and historical factors contribute to this reflexive and unwarranted reaction, but it is perhaps most often the direct result of a simple failure to distinguish between "conspiracy theories" in the strict sense of the term, which are essentially elaborate fables even though they may well be based upon a kernel of truth, and the activities of actual clandestine and covert political groups, which are a common feature of modern politics. For this and other reasons, serious research into genuine conspiratorial networks has at worst been suppressed, as a rule been discouraged, and
at best been looked upon with condescension by the academic community. An entire dimension of political history and contemporary politics has thus been consistently neglected. For decades scholars interested in politics have directed their attention toward explicating and evaluating the merits of various political theories, or toward analyzing the more conventional, formal, and overt aspects of practical politics. Even a cursory examination of standard social science bibliographies reveals that tens of thousands of books and articles have been written about staple subjects such as the structure and functioning of government bureaucracies, voting patterns and electoral results, parliamentary procedures and activities, party organizations and factions, the impact of constitutional provisions or laws, and the like. In marked contrast, only a handful of scholarly publications have been devoted to the general theme of political conspiracies—as opposed to popular anti-conspiracy treatises, which are very numerous, and specific case studies of events in which conspiratorial groups have played some role—and virtually all of these concern themselves with the deleterious social impact of the "paranoid style" of thought manifested in classic conspiracy theories rather than the characteristic features of real conspiratorial politics. Only the academic literature dealing with specialized topics like espionage, covert action, political corruption, terrorism, and revolutionary warfare touches upon clandestine and covert political activities on a more or less regular basis, probably because such activities cannot be avoided when dealing with these topics. But the analyses and information contained therein are rarely incorporated into standard works of history and social science, and much of that specialized literature is itself unsatisfactory. Hence there is an obvious need
to place the study of conspiratorial politics on a sound theoretical, methodological, and empirical footing, since ignoring the influence of such politics can lead to severe errors of historical interpretation.

This situation can only be remedied when a clear-cut analytical distinction has been made between classic conspiracy theories and the more limited conspiratorial activities that are a regular feature of politics. "Conspiracy theories" share a number of distinguishing characteristics, but in all of them the essential element is a belief in the existence of a "vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network designed to perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character", acts which aim to "undermine and destroy a way of life." Although this apocalyptic conception is generally regarded nowadays as the fantastic product of a paranoid mindset, in the past it was often accepted as an accurate description of reality by large numbers of people from all social strata, including intellectuals and heads of state. The fact that a belief in sinister, all-powerful conspiratorial forces has not been restricted to small groups of clinical paranoids and mental defectives suggests that it fulfills certain important social functions and psychological needs. First of all, like many other intellectual constructs, conspiracy theories help to make complex patterns of cause-and-effect in human affairs more comprehensible by means of reductionism and oversimplification. Secondly, they purport to identify the underlying source of misery and injustice in the world, thereby accounting for current crises and upheavals and explaining why bad things are happening to good people or vice versa. Thirdly, by personifying that source they paradoxically help people to reaffirm their own potential ability to control the course of future
historical developments. After all, if evil conspirators are consciously causing undesirable changes, the implication is that others, perhaps through the adoption of similar techniques, may also consciously intervene to protect a threatened way of life or otherwise alter the historical process. In short, a belief in conspiracy theories helps people to make sense out of a confusing, inhospitable reality, rationalize their present difficulties, and partially assuage their feelings of powerlessness. In this sense, it is no different than any number of religious, social, or political beliefs, and is deserving of the same serious study.

The image of conspiracies promoted by conspiracy theorists needs to be further illuminated before it can be contrasted with genuine conspiratorial politics. In the first place, conspiracy theorists consider the alleged conspirators to be Evil incarnate. They are not simply people with differing values or run-of-the-mill political opponents, but inhuman, superhuman, and/or anti-human beings who regularly commit abominable acts and are implacably attempting to subvert and destroy everything that is decent and worth preserving in the existing world. Thus, according to John Robison, the Bavarian Illuminati were formed "for the express purpose of ROOTING OUT ALL THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS, AND OVERTURNING ALL THE EXISTING GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPE." This grandiose claim is fairly representative, in the sense that most conspiracy theorists view the world in similarly Manichean and apocalyptic terms.

Secondly, conspiracy theorists perceive the conspiratorial group as both monolithic and unerring in the pursuit of its goals. This group is directed from a single
conspiratorial center, acting as a sort of general staff, which plans and coordinates all of its activities down to the last detail. Note, for example, Prince Clemens von Metternich’s claim that a "directing committee" of the radicals from all over Europe had been established in Paris to pursue their insidious plotting against established governments. Given that presumption, it is no accident that many conspiracy theorists refer to "the Conspiracy" rather than (lower case) conspiracies or conspiratorial factions, since they perceive no internal divisions among the conspirators. Rather, as a group the conspirators are believed to possess an extraordinary degree of internal solidarity, which produces a corresponding degree of countersolidarity vis-à-vis society at large, and indeed it is this very cohesion and singleness of purpose which enables them to effectively execute their plans to destroy existing institutions, seize power, and eliminate all opposition.

Thirdly, conspiracy theorists believe that the conspiratorial group is omnipresent, at least within its own sphere of operations. While some conspiracy theories postulate a relatively localized group of conspirators, most depict this group as both international in its spatial dimensions and continuous in its temporal dimensions. "[T]he conspirators planned and carried out evil in the past, they are successfully active in the present, and they will triumph in the future if they are not disturbed in their plans by those with information about their sinister designs." The conspiratorial group is therefore capable of operating virtually everywhere. As a consequence of this ubiquitousness, anything that occurs which has a broadly negative impact or seems in any way related to the purported aims of the conspirators can thus be plausibly attributed to them.

Fourthly, the conspiratorial group is viewed by conspiracy theorists as virtually
omnipotent. In the past this group has successfully overthrown empires and nations, corrupted whole societies, and destroyed entire civilizations and cultures, and it is said to be in the process of accomplishing the same thing at this very moment. Its members are secretly working in every nook and cranny of society, and are making use of every subversive technique known to mankind to achieve their nefarious purposes. Nothing appears to be able to stand in their way—unless the warnings of the conspiracy theorists are heeded and acted upon at once. Even then there is no guarantee of ultimate victory against such powerful forces, but a failure to recognize the danger and take immediate countervailing action assures the success of those forces in the near future.

Finally, for conspiracy theorists conspiracies are not simply a regular feature of politics whose importance varies in different historical contexts, but rather the motive force of all historical change and development. The conspiratorial group can and does continually alter the course of history, invariably in negative and destructive ways, through conscious planning and direct intervention. Its members are not buffeted about by structural forces beyond their control and understanding, like everyone else, but are themselves capable of controlling events more or less at will. This supposed ability is usually attributed to some combination of demonic influence or sponsorship, the possession of arcane knowledge, the mastery of devilish techniques, and/or the creation of a preternaturally effective clandestine organization. As a result, unpleasant occurrences which are perceived by others to be the products of coincidence or chance are viewed by conspiracy theorists as further evidence of the secret workings of the conspiratorial group. For them, nothing that happens occurs by accident. Everything is the result of
secret plotting in accordance with some sinister design.

This central characteristic of conspiracy theories has been aptly summed up by Donna Kossy in a popular book on fringe ideas:

Conspiracy theories are like black holes—they suck in everything that comes their way, regardless of content or origin...Everything you’ve ever known or experienced, no matter how "meaningless", once it contacts the conspiratorial universe, is enveloped by and cloaked in sinister significance. Once inside, the vortex gains in size and strength, sucking in everything you touch.23

As an example of this sort of mechanism, one has only to mention the so-called "umbrella man", a man who opened up an umbrella on a sunny day in Dealey Plaza just as President John F. Kennedy’s motorcade was passing. A number of "conspiracy theorists" have assumed that this man was signalling to the assassins, thus tying a seemingly trivial and inconsequential act into the alleged plot to kill Kennedy. It is precisely this totalistic, all-encompassing quality that distinguishes "conspiracy theories" from the secret but often mundane political planning that is carried out on a daily basis by all sorts of groups, both within and outside of government. It should, however, be pointed out that even if the "umbrella man" was wholly innocent of any involvement in a plot, as he almost certainly was, this does not mean that the Warren Commission’s reconstruction of the assassination is accurate.

However that may be, real covert politics, although by definition hidden or disguised and often deleterious in their impact, simply do not correspond to the bleak, simplistic image propounded by conspiracy theorists. Far from embodying metaphysical evil, they are perfectly and recognizably human, with all the positive and negative characteristics and potentialities which that implies. At the most basic level, all the
efforts of individuals to privately plan and secretly initiate actions for their own perceived mutual benefit—insofar as these are intentionally withheld from outsiders and require the maintenance of secrecy for their success—are conspiracies. The Latin word conspire literally means "breathe together", and need not suggest anything more sinister than people getting together to hold a private meeting. Thus every time officers of a company participate in a board meeting to plan a marketing strategy they are "conspiring", and in this sense there are literally millions of conspiracies occurring every single day.

Moreover, in contrast to the claims of conspiracy theorists, covert politics are anything but monolithic. At any given point in time, there are dozens if not thousands of competitive political and economic groups engaging in secret planning and activities, and most are doing so in an effort to gain some advantage over their rivals among the others. Such behind-the-scene operations are present on every level, from the mundane efforts of small-scale retailers to gain competitive advantage by being the first to develop new product lines to the crucially important attempts by rival secret services to penetrate and manipulate each other. Sometimes the patterns of these covert rivalries and struggles are relatively stable over time, whereas at other times they appear fluid and kaleidoscopic, as different groups secretly shift alliances and change tactics in accordance with their perceived interests. Even internally, within particular groups operating clandestinely, there are typically bitter disagreements between various factions over the specific courses of action to be adopted. Unanimity of opinion and complete solidarity are not possible in any organization, though ruthless purges can temporarily contribute to that impression.
Furthermore, the operational sphere of particular conspiratorial groups is invariably restricted in time and space, though the precise extent of those temporal and spatial boundaries can vary quite widely. There is probably not a single secret organization anywhere which has existed continuously from antiquity to the present, and only a small number could have had a continuous existence for more than a century. And, with the possible exception of those which are created and sponsored by the governments of major nations and the world’s most powerful business and religious institutions, the range of activity of specific clandestine groups is invariably limited to particular geographic or sectoral arenas.

Given these great disparities and divergences in range and power, it is obvious that actual conspiracies operate at varying levels of effectiveness. Although they are a typical facet of social and political life, in the overall scheme of things most conspiracies are narrow in scope, restricted in their effects, and of limited historical significance. But this is not always the case. It should be obvious that whenever powerful political figures engage in secret planning, the impact of their decisions on others will be correspondingly greater and more difficult to resist. Therefore, when such influential figures meet to hatch and coordinate plots, these plots may well have a disproportionate impact on the course of events, and hence a broader historical significance. There is nothing mysterious about this, however. It is simply a covert reflection of existing and sometimes readily visible power relations, and should be recognized as such.

Perhaps the easiest and quickest way to clarify the distinction between "conspiracy theories" and genuine conspiracies is by reference to the notorious anti-Semitic tract, the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This document, which purports to be the minutes from a secret meeting of a conspiratorial Jewish leadership group aiming to take control over the world, has played a major role in stirring up fears of a Zionist conspiracy and catalyzing repressive actions against Jewish communities throughout Europe and beyond since its appearance in the late nineteenth century. Even today, it continues to be cited by conspiracy mongers and anti-Semites of all stripes as proof that there is a secret Jewish cabal which is carefully planning and directing worldwide efforts to subvert and destroy all that is good in the world of the goyim. As such, it provides a perfect example of classic conspiracy theory literature, one which further exacerbated the "paranoid style" of thinking already characteristic of many of its readers. Of course, as Norman Cohn and others have conclusively demonstrated, the Protocols are not what they purport to be. Yet even though they are not ascribable to a hidden group of Jewish plotters, they are nonetheless the product of real conspiratorial politics, since they were forged by persons affiliated with the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana. In short, they were produced at the behest of a genuine clandestine agency in order to fan anti-Semitism and otherwise exploit and manipulate popular fears.

It is clear, then, that there are fundamental differences between "conspiracy theories" and actual covert and clandestine politics, differences which must be taken into account if one wishes to avoid serious errors of historical interpretation. The problem is that most people, amateurs and professionals alike, consistently fail to distinguish between them. On the one hand, the vast majority of the self-appointed "experts" who concern themselves with alleged conspiracies are in fact "conspiracy theorists" in the
negative sense outlined above. They seriously and passionately believe in the existence of vast, preternaturally effective conspiracies which successfully manipulate and control historical events behind the scenes, though they typically disagree with one another about exactly who is behind those conspiracies. This vocal lunatic fringe tends to discourage serious researchers from investigating such matters, in part because the latter do not wish, understandably, to be tarred by the same soiled brush. In the process, however, most have unfortunately failed to heed the important qualification that Richard Hofstadter made in his analysis of the "paranoid style" of political thinking—that real conspiracies do exist, even though they do not conform to the elaborate and often bizarre scenarios concocted by conspiracy theorists. How, indeed, could it be otherwise in a world full of intelligence agencies, national security bureaucracies, clandestine revolutionary organizations, economic pressure groups, secret societies with hidden political agendas, and the like?

There has never been, to be sure, a single, monolithic Communist Conspiracy of the sort postulated by the American John Birch Society in the 1950s and 1960s. Nor has there ever been an all-encompassing International Capitalist Conspiracy, a Jewish World Conspiracy, a Masonic Conspiracy, or a Universal Vatican Conspiracy. And nowadays, contrary to the apparent belief of millions, neither a vast Underground Satanist Conspiracy nor an Alien Abduction Conspiracy exists. This reassuring knowledge should not, however, prompt anyone to throw out the baby with the bathwater, as many academics have been wont to do. For just as surely as none of the above-mentioned Grand Conspiracies has ever existed, diverse groups of communists, capitalists, Zionists,
masons, and Catholics have in fact secretly plotted, often against one another, to accomplish various specific but limited political objectives. No sensible person would claim, for example, that the Soviet secret police has not been involved in a vast array of covert operations since the establishment of the Soviet Union, or that international front groups controlled by the Russian communist party have not systematically engaged in worldwide penetration and propaganda campaigns. It is nonetheless true that scholars have often hastened to deny the existence of genuine conspiratorial plots, without making any effort whatsoever to investigate them, simply because such schemes fall outside their own realm of knowledge and experience or—even worse—directly challenge their sometimes naive conceptions about how the world functions.

If someone were to say, for example, that a secret masonic lodge in Italy had infiltrated all of the state’s security agencies and was involved in promoting or exploiting acts of neo-fascist terrorism in order to condition the political system and strengthen its own hold over the levers of government, most readers would probably assume that they were joking or accuse them of having taken leave of their senses. Ten years ago I might have had the same reaction myself. Nevertheless, although the above statement oversimplifies a far more complex pattern of interaction between the public and private spheres, such a lodge in fact existed. It was known as Loggia Massonica Propaganda Due (P2), was affiliated with the Grand Orient branch of Italian masonry, and was headed by a former fascist militiaman named Licio Gelli. In all probability something like P2 still exists today in an altered form, even though the lodge was officially outlawed in 1982. Likewise, if someone were to claim that an Afrikaner secret society founded in the
second decade of this century had played a key role in establishing the system of apartheid in South Africa, and in the process helped to ensure the preservation of ultraconservative Afrikaner cultural values and Afrikaner political dominance until 1990, some readers would undoubtedly believe that that person was exaggerating. Yet this organization also existed. It was known as the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB), and it formed a powerful "state within a state" in that country by virtue, among other things, of its unchallenged control over the security services. There is no doubt that specialists on contemporary Italian politics who fail to take account of the activities of P2, like experts on South Africa who ignore the AB, are missing an important dimension of political life there. Nevertheless, neither of these two important organizations has been thoroughly investigated by academics. In these instances, as is so often the case, investigative journalists have done most of the truly groundbreaking preliminary research.

The above remarks should not be misconstrued. They are in no way meant to suggest that conspiratorial groups are the propulsive force of most historical change or that they alone are capable of controlling our destiny, as legions of "conspiracy theorists" would have us believe. For one thing, no group of individuals has that capability, no matter how powerful they are. Fortunately for the rest of us, even powerful human beings are inherently flawed creatures who regularly commit errors of judgement and other sorts of blunders. They not only have to cope with the formidable problem of unforeseen and unintended consequences, but also have to contend with other powerful groups who are likewise vying for influence, broader social forces which are difficult if not impossible to control, and deep-rooted structural and cultural constraints which place
limits on how much they are able to accomplish. Moreover, to attribute that degree of power and influence to secret conspirators would be to commit what David Hackett Fischer has dubbed the "furtive fallacy", that is, to embrace the idea that everything that is truly significant happens behind the scenes. On the other hand, Fischer goes too far in the other direction when he implies that only that which is aboveboard is worth considering and that nothing that happens in the shadows has real significance. To accept those unstated propositions uncritically could induce a person, among other things, to overlook the bitter nineteenth century struggle between political secret societies (or, at least, between revolutionaries using non-political secret societies as a "cover") and the political police of powerful states like Austria and Russia, to minimize the role played by revolutionary vanguard parties in the Russian and communist Chinese revolutions, or to deny that powerful intelligence services like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Komitet Gosudarst'vennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) have fomented coups and intervened massively in the internal affairs of other sovereign states since the end of World War II. In short, it might well lead to the misinterpretation or falsification of history on a grand scale.

It is easier to recognize such dangers when relatively well-known historical developments like these are used as illustrative examples, but problems often arise when the possible role played by conspiratorial groups in more obscure events is brought up. It is above all in these cases, as well as in high-profile cases where a comforting "official" version of events has been widely diffused, that commonplace academic prejudices against taking covert politics seriously come into play and can exert a
potentially detrimental effect on historical judgements. There is probably no way to prevent this sort of unconscious reaction in the current intellectual climate, but the least that can be expected of serious scholars is that they carefully examine the available evidence before dismissing these matters out of hand.

The Political Biases of "Terrorology"

A second major obstacle to the recognition of the importance of recent right-wing terrorism is the academic literature on political terrorism itself. From an historian’s point of view, this literature exhibits the same basic shortcomings as the social science literature in general—a penchant for excessive theorizing and speculation, an overabundance of abstraction and schematization at the expense of empirical detail, and an embarrassingly limited grounding in the relevant primary sources. These serious deficiencies are further compounded by a pronounced infusion of political bias, both unconscious and conscious. This sort of ideological contamination is perhaps to be expected, given the topic’s obvious public policy implications, but it is no less corrosive in its effects. Indeed, the "terrorology" literature is arguably among the least original and distinguished in all of academia. There are only a relative handful of studies that genuinely contribute to a greater conceptual understanding of the phenomenon, along with a number of others that provide valuable information about specific terrorist groups, but most works dealing with terrorism tend to endlessly recycle the same superficial or misguided notions, albeit in a variety of different contexts.\textsuperscript{27} Although these are rather harsh criticisms that deserve further discussion and analysis, a thorough dissection of the shortcomings of this vast literature would require another book-length study. All that can
be attempted here is to make a few observations about the literature on Italian terrorism, to note some specific biases in the general literature which affect our understanding of right-wing terrorism, and to clarify some basic definitional aspects of the subject.

As it happens, some of the shortcomings characteristic of the general literature on terrorism are also prevalent in the academic literature on Italian terrorism. Even though a number of excellent studies have been produced about aspects of this subject, especially in Italy itself, it cannot be said that an adequate explanation has yet been provided for the extraordinary prevalence and unusual virulence of political terrorism in that long-victimized country. In general, scholars have tended to limit their search for explanations to the national context, and within that delimited sphere to emphasize particular historical or structural interpretations. Among other things, they have attributed terrorism in Italy to a long tradition of political extremism, a gradual undermining of the traditional bases of authority in Italian society after World War II, the production of marginal social strata in the course of postwar modernization, a series of acute economic crises from the late 1960s on, and the structural dysfunctionality of the partitocrazia and the corruption and clientelism with which it was associated, which acted to "block" opportunities for significant reform and merit-based advancement within the system. Each of these developments contributed to social stress and frustration, and from that standpoint no doubt played some role in the catalyzation of political violence, but many other societies have undergone similar phenomena without giving rise to terrorism on such a grand scale.

One of the factors that has consistently been ignored or belittled by academics--in
marked contrast to journalists—is the impact of the bipolar rivalry between the Atlantic Alliance and the communist bloc on the domestic affairs of strategically important European states. In countries where a great deal of political polarization and instability is rampant, as in Italy, it often happens that the United States or the Soviet Union intervenes directly, if covertly, in local political affairs. In Italy this process began even before the 1948 elections, and has continued ever since to one degree or another. Such an emphasis on the foreign sources of Italian terrorism only constitutes a "conspiracy theory" if deep-rooted or contingent domestic factors are ignored and the superpowers are held responsible for everything of importance that happens, including developments they did not play any role in. Some authorities, left and right, have indeed gone much too far in accusing the superpowers of fomenting terrorism in the peninsula. But to claim that the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have created or made use of clandestine paramilitary and intelligence structures, some of whose elements have been directly involved in sponsoring or conducting terrorist activities, is most emphatically not a theory, conspiratorial or otherwise. It is a fact, as this study will in part document.

Nevertheless, these problems are relatively minor in comparison with those afflicting the general literature on terrorism. At present there are literally thousands of mainstream policy-oriented studies and only a few dozen "anti-establishment" works dealing with terrorism, but very few in either category which present a balanced picture. Most specialists on terrorism are conservatives or "Cold War liberals" who have more or less uncritically adopted the self-serving perspectives of Western governments.
concerning the origin and nature of terrorism. As a result they falsely portray modern terrorism as an essentially left-wing, anti-government phenomenon, and tend to assume a priori that Western governments are the "innocent" victims of a rash of terrorism sponsored by hostile enemy states and carried out by small groups of political extremists.\textsuperscript{31} This distorted but politically-convenient image derives from a number of interrelated factors. One of these is a widespread inability or unwillingness to make certain basic but crucially important analytical distinctions, for example, between terrorists in the strict sense and guerrillas, including those who do not rely primarily on terrorist methods. Another is a profound ignorance about, or perhaps merely a reluctance to acknowledge, the extent to which Western democracies, their right-wing client regimes in the Third World, and small groups of neo-fascist extremists have been involved in the promotion or initiation of terrorism. But these flaws can themselves be traced in large part to the pernicious cumulative impact of disinformation and propaganda disseminated by several ultraconservative terrorism "experts" who have, often consciously, promoted the interests of right-wing factions inside various Western intelligence agencies. A good deal has already been written about these individuals and the network of "think tanks" and institutions with which they are associated, but the essential point is that they have helped to contribute to the standard image of contemporary terrorism, which depicts communist regimes and their alleged surrogates as the primary disseminators of terrorism in the postwar world.\textsuperscript{32}

In response to this one-sided, simplistic, and often spurious "establishment" literature, several leftist academics and journalists have presented an alternative but no
less Manichean picture. In their view, right-wing governments and parastate apparatuses backed by the United States have been the main perpetrators of terrorism during the past forty years. While justifiably calling attention to the prevalence and importance of rightist terrorism, which has been consistently ignored by most terrorologists, they have tended to invert and reproduce mainstream biases rather than to eliminate or transcend them. Thus they have consistently minimized the extent and seriousness of leftist terrorism, and wrongly dismissed allegations about the documented support offered by certain East Bloc regimes to various terrorist networks, especially those operating in the Middle East.33

There is no doubt, for example, that the Soviet Union has supplied Palestinian terrorist groups with large quantities of sophisticated military equipment, some of which then managed to find its way into the hands of the Irish Republican Army or other Euroterrorist organizations. And it has now become apparent, in the wake of the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, that the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, or Stasi) provided some degree of shelter and other sorts of logistical assistance to wanted Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) terrorists, though apparently only after they had carried out independently-planned operations.34 Yet none of this new evidence has been incorporated into the left-wing literature on terrorism, any more than the fuller documentation concerning the links between various Western security forces and right-wing terrorists has had an observable impact on the views of mainstream researchers.

In other words, there is a perverse sort of symmetry observable in the extant literature on terrorism, a symmetry rooted in political partisanship. Both the establishment and anti-establishment "experts" on terrorism have consistently displayed
similar degrees of blindness, albeit in different eyes. With rare exceptions, neither has taken the time to seriously assess the evidence presented by the other. Their approach has either been to ignore one another entirely or to accuse each other of serving as conduits for propaganda generated by the other side, which has been true more often than one might think. They then stop, as if they have already proven their point, without actually examining and evaluating the substantive arguments or the evidence marshalled by their political opponents. After all, they (falsely) reason, if someone is thought to be a tool or a dupe of the KGB or CIA, there is no longer any real need to take what they have to say seriously. This sort of guilt-by-association smear, though perhaps serving their own short-term political interests, has had a very detrimental impact on the overall advancement of knowledge about this important topic. Moreover, given the enormous disparity between the numbers of mainstream researchers and their left-leaning counterparts, it has also had the effect of consolidating the conservative image of terrorism as a scourge visited upon the postwar world by the radical left. This has in turn helped to deflect the attention of researchers away from the role played by the far right and factions within various Western security services in fomenting political terrorism.

In order to avoid the temptation of ascribing the label "terrorist" to every group which resorts to violence whom one does not like, as is all too common, it is necessary to define the term accurately. All such formal definitions are bound to be awkward, but in this study the word terrorism applies to the use (or threatened use) of violence against victims selected for their symbolic or representative value as a means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting messages to, and/or manipulating the behavior of, a wider target
audience (or audiences). Terrorist acts are thus by nature triadic rather than dyadic. They invariably involve three parties—the perpetrator, the victim, and the target audience—and the key relationship is between the perpetrator and the target audience. Paradoxically, the person suffering the actual physical violence has the least intrinsic importance, and indeed is often selected at random. It is precisely this feature that differentiates acts of terrorism from simple assaults upon political enemies. To constitute terrorism, an act of violence has to be specifically intended by the perpetrator to manipulate the perceptions or behavior of a wider target audience. From this it follows that neither violent actions which inadvertently terrorize or alter the behavior patterns of a particular group (for example, a sequence of rapes in a given neighborhood), nor those aimed at physically eliminating a specific enemy (for example, an assassination) are examples of terrorism in the strict sense of the term—unless, of course, the perpetrators mainly intended to deliver some sort of message to a larger audience. A certain group might, of course, try to fulfill two objectives at once, such as eliminating a specific police official and transmitting a warning to other such officials, but the latter would have to take precedence for this action to be interpreted primarily as an act of terrorism.

Viewed in this way, terrorism is nothing more than a violent technique of manipulation. Like any other technique, it can be used by anyone, whatever their ideological orientation or relationship to the state. It can be employed on behalf of state power or in opposition to state power, by left-wingers, right-wingers, or centrists, and for an infinite variety of causes. It is for this reason that pithy phrases such as "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" are misleading, if not entirely mistaken,
except insofar as they reflect the generally partisan and unsystematic way that such labels are applied. From a technical point of view, "one man's terrorist" should invariably also be "another man's terrorist", since regardless of the cause involved a terrorist can be identified purely by the methods he or she chooses to employ. Whether or not one sympathizes with a given perpetrator's underlying political motives, every individual who commits an act of violence which is specifically designed to influence or manipulate a wider audience is, strictly speaking, a terrorist. Period. All other factors are superfluous, and indeed only serve to obscure this fundamental reality. To restrict the term solely to one's enemies is thus an error of the first order, one which reflects either a great deal of confusion and ignorance or the thematic requirements of propaganda campaigns.

The Systematic Denigration of the Individual Historical Actor

There may, however, be an even more fundamental reason for the scholarly neglect of right-wing terrorism and subversion. The currently dominant intellectual tendency is to devalue, if not to eschew altogether, detailed research into the actual decisions and actions taken by real individuals in concrete circumstances. The trend for some time has instead been to encourage theorizing about the larger, impersonal structures that condition the decision-making process and in general act to limit individual choices and options. This type of approach is characteristic of both Marxism and modern social sciences like anthropology, political science, and sociology, which tend to explain and rationalize all human behavior by reference to powerful, deeply-rooted structural and cultural forces which supposedly lie beyond the comprehension, much less the control, of human actors. The role of the individual has been correspondingly diminished, to the
point where even his or her autonomy and significance has been called into question or
denied. Even in the venerable discipline of history, which once concerned itself primarily
with reconstructing and explaining the complex, multifaceted actions of influential
historical actors, this allegedly superficial histoire événementuelle is now being
subordinated to the imperceptible longue durée, the history of collective mentalités,
quantitative analyses of selected data sets, empirically unverifiable speculations about
"discourse" and metahistory, and other highly-politicized theoretical and cultural-
linguistic approaches associated with "postmodernism".

No reasonable person would deny that a number of valuable insights into the
environmental and contextual limitations on human choices have stemmed from these
approaches, and for that we can be thankful that Fernand Braudel and other innovators
have extended the traditional boundaries of historical inquiry. At this point, however,
these new approaches to history have virtually displaced the older historical focus on
human actors and dramatic events. They have gradually moved from the periphery to the
center of our profession, and in the process have marginalized traditional political
history. In that sense they have undoubtedly acted to forestall or inhibit research into
areas where the older approaches and methods are particularly fruitful, including research
that is focussed on bringing the details of covert and clandestine political operations to
light with a view toward assessing their historical importance. This has in turn
contributed to the above-noted tendency to ignore or underestimate the important political
role that has sometimes been played by subversive radical rightist groups. Ironically, in
the hands of more reductionist thinkers these newer structural and cultural approaches
have more in common with the views of paranoid "conspiracy theorists" than the latter do with careful investigations into the activities of clandestine groups, since along with such theorists they suggest that vast, unseen forces are exerting enormous control over human actions and that no one can escape their influence. The chief difference is that these supposedly omnipotent and omnipresent forces are not personalized. Instead, they are typically nothing more than reified abstractions. Individuals, in this scheme, do not constitute independent actors who exercise varying degrees of free choice, but rather hapless and largely helpless prisoners of the constraints allegedly imposed upon them as members of particular ethnicities, social classes, and genders.

In marked contrast, serious researchers who delve into the minutiae of covert politics—like traditional political historians—must focus their attention on reconstructing the specifics of complex, small-scale events before attempting to undertake a broader analysis, which tends to sensitize them to the contingent aspects of individual choices and actions and to discourage them from adopting reductionist or deterministic models to explain human behavior. Therefore, this study explicitly breaks with current intellectual trends by seeking to restore the more or less autonomous individual, operating in concert with his or her peers, to a preeminent place in the making of history. It is based to a large extent on the traditional political historian's assumptions and methodological approaches. For example, it is firmly predicated on the belief that, although complete objectivity can never be attained, striving to be as objective as possible nonetheless remains a noble and worthwhile endeavor. To view the concept of objectivity as nothing more than an archaic technique of "bourgeois" social control which needs to be discarded...
is to open the door to total subjectivism and blatant politicization of the most transparent and abusive sort. The terrible consequences of this are nowadays sadly visible throughout the academy. In practice, trying to be objective means nothing more than keeping an open mind and describing the sequence of historical events as accurately and thoroughly as possible, despite the often daunting complexity and potentially sensitive political implications of those events. Then and only then can one honestly hope to assess the broader significance of the events in question. Thus the emphasis herein will be on empirical detail and narrative richness, as opposed to elaborate model-building, abstract theorizing, pseudo-scientific jargon, and sterile reflections on "discourse". For this, no apologies are offered. There are, alas, no short cuts to Paradise, either for the author or the reader.

Conclusions

Some final observations should perhaps be made about the nature of this study. In the first place, although much of the action takes place in postwar Italy, it is not a work that is narrowly concerned with Italian history or politics. Rather, it is a work of comparative contemporary political history, albeit one with a precise and rather unusual focus. It is concerned above all with the lesser known activities of the postwar radical right, both in Europe and other parts of the world. The goal throughout is not only to illuminate a dark but important corner in the history of neo-fascism, but also to show how this seemingly arcane subfield of history is related to highly sensitive aspects of the Cold War which have yet to be investigated thoroughly. Indeed, this study goes right to the corrupt, amoral heart of the Cold War. It is significant that hundreds of scholarly
books have been written about the Soviet-American rivalry after World War II, but not a single one of these deals specifically with the post-1960 links between the security agencies affiliated with NATO and the anti-constitutional operations carried out in Europe by neo-fascist paramilitary squads. Into the breach created by the precipitous retreat of historians and social scientists, only investigative journalists have thus far hastened to tread, and despite their general lack of historical perspective or familiarity with historical techniques of source criticism, some of them have produced studies which are light years in advance of anything previously written by an academic on this subject. It is a sad commentary on our profession that only journalists have had the courage to address such sensitive and important topics head on.

In any event, this study only attempts to fill in one small piece of a much larger puzzle. It exposes the partially visible tip of a veritable iceberg of anti-constitutional right-wing plotting, plotting which extends far beyond the Italian peninsula. Yet in the end it may reveal more about the real, behind-the-scenes nature of superpower politics in a bipolar world than dozens of standard books on postwar diplomatic history, which essentially concern themselves with the formal political relations between sovereign states. At the very least, by clearing a path through some particularly dense and tangled underbrush, it should contribute in some small way to the opening up of a vast but hitherto neglected area of recent European and world history.
1. These two may not actually have been the bombings that inaugurated the subsequent series. Thus, for example, it could be argued that the first in the series was the 15 April 1969 explosion in the Rector's office at the University of Padua. The initial blasts in this campaign could even be traced back to 1968, with the detonation of a number of devices in front of police stations and schools by members of the neo-fascist group Avanguardia Nazionale. For these April 1969 bombings, see Gianni Flamini, Il partito del golpe: Le strategie della tensione e del terrore dal primo centrosinistra organico al sequestro Moro (Ferrara: Bovolenta, 1981-5), volume 2, pp. 33-6, 41-2. Flamini's multi-volume study is a remarkable work of journalistic research, based on thousands of pages of largely inaccessible court documents and other primary materials.

2. For the 83% figure, see Ugo Pecchioli, "Prefazione", in Rapporto sul terrorismo: Le stragi, gli agguati, i sequestri, le sigle, 1969-1980, ed. by Mauro Galleni (Milan: Rizzoli, 1981), p. 19. This work provides an enormous amount of valuable statistical information about the number and types of attacks, the groups claiming responsibility, the targets, and other details concerning Italian terrorism, both rightist and leftist, in the period under consideration. Compare Donatella della Porta and Maurizio Rossi, Cifre crudeli: Bilancio dei terroristi italiani (Bologna: Istituto Cattaneo, 1984), for slightly different data.

3. For one of the few academic analyses of "false flag" operations in postwar Europe, see Philip Jenkins, "Under Two Flags: Provocations and Deception in European Terrorism", Terrorism 11:4 (1988), pp. 275-87.


5. Note, however, that scholars are belatedly beginning to take cognizance of the importance of the postwar right, both in Europe and beyond. In addition to a growing European literature, a number of English-language books have recently appeared on this very subject, including Klaus von Beyme, ed., Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1988); Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michalina Vaughan, eds., Neo-Fascism in Europe (London and New York: Longman, 1991); Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, eds., Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Paul Hainsworth, ed., The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA (New York: St. Martin's, 1992); and Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred:

6. The notion of a discrete and historically circumscribed "fascist epoch" is often associated with Ernst Nolte, and it is reflected in the original German title of his most famous work, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche: Die Action Francaise, der italienischer Faschismus, der Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Piper, 1963).

7. One indication that neo-fascism is not taken seriously is that in many studies devoted to general Italian politics, there is no separate section devoted to the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). See, for example, Donald Sassoon, Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy, and Society since 1945 (London: Longman, 1986). Even specialists who should know better often seem to employ similar reasoning, as the following remark by Christopher Seton-Watson demonstrates: "[the fascist hard core] is small and has so far been of negligible political importance". See his "Fascism in Contemporary Europe", in Fascism in Europe, ed. by S. J. Woolf (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 353. This is only true if one thinks exclusively in terms of conventional politics, and even in that case it would need to be qualified.


10. The best introductions to this subject are provided by an outstanding series of studies by Zeev Sternhell, the most recent of which (with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri) is The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994). Compare also Sternhell, Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français (Paris: A. Colin, 1972); idem, La droite révolutionnaire, 1885-1914: Les origines françaises du Fascisme (Paris: Seuil, 1978); and idem, Ni gauche, ni droite: L’idéologie fasciste en France (Paris: Seuil, 1983); Emilio Gentile, Le origini dell’ideologia fascista, 1919-1925 (Bari: Laterza, 1975); and A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale for Totalitarianism (New York: Free Press, 1969), though the latter focusses most of his attention on the codified fascist doctrine during the "regime" phase rather than the purer and more revolutionary doctrine of the "movement" phase. Also of great help in understanding the leftist components in the early fascist synthesis are Paul Mazgaj, The Action Frangaise and Revolutionary Syndicalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1979); and David D. Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1979). For the Nazi left, see especially Reinhard Kühnl, Die nationalsozialistische Linke, 1925-1930: Eine Untersuchung über Geschichte,


13. Compare Robin Ramsay, "Conspiracy, Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Research", Lobster 19 (1990), p. 25: "In intellectually respectable company it is necessary to preface any reference to actual political, economic, military or paramilitary conspiracies with the disclaimer that the speaker 'doesn't believe in the conspiracy theory of history (or politics)'." This type of disclaimer quite clearly reveals the speaker's inability to distinguish between bona fide conspiracy theories and actual conspiratorial politics.

14. The word "suppress" is not too strong here. I personally know of at least one case in which a very bright graduate student at a prestigious East Coast university was unceremoniously told by his advisor that if he wanted to write a Ph.D. thesis on an interesting historical example of conspiratorial politics he would have to go elsewhere to do so. He ended up leaving academia altogether and became a professional journalist, in which capacity he has produced a number of interesting books and articles.

15. Complaints about this general academic neglect have often been made by those few scholars who have done research on key aspects of covert and clandestine politics which are directly relevant to this study. See, for example, Gary Marx, "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant", American Journal of Sociology 80:2 (September 1974), especially pp. 402-3. One of the few dissertations dealing directly with this topic, though not in a particularly skillful fashion, is Frederick A. Hoffman, "Secret Roles and Provocation: Covert Operations in Movements for Social Change" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: UCLA Sociology Department, 1979). There are, of course, some excellent academic studies which have given due weight to these matters—for example, Nurit Schleifman, Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902-1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan/St. Anthony's College, 1988); and Jean-Paul Brunet, La police de l'ombre: Indicateurs et provocateurs dans la France contemporaine (Paris: Seuil, 1990)—but such studies are unfortunately few and far between.


18. Although conspiracy theories have been widely accepted in the most disparate eras and parts of the world, and thus probably have a certain universality as explanatory models, at certain points in time they have taken on an added salience due to particular historical circumstances. Their development and diffusion seems to be broadly correlated with the level of social, economic, and political upheaval or change, though indigenous cultural values and intellectual traditions determine their specific form and condition their level of popularity.

19. As many scholars have pointed out, if such ideas were restricted to clinical paranoids, they would have little or no historical importance. What makes the conspiratorial or paranoid style of thought interesting and historically significant is that it frequently tempts more or less normal people and has often been diffused among broad sections of the population in certain periods. Conspiracy theories are important as collective delusions, delusions which nevertheless reflect real fears and real social problems, rather than as evidence of individual pathology. See, for example, Hofstadter, "Paranoid Style", pp. 3-4.

20. See his Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried on in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies, Collected from Good Authorities (New York: G. Forman, 1798), p. 14. This exhibits yet another characteristic of "conspiracy theorists"--the tendency to overdramatize everything by using capital letters with reckless abandon.


22. Dieter Groh, "Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, Part I", in Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, p. 3. A classic example of conspiratorial works that view modern revolutionary movements as little more than the latest manifestations of subversive forces with a very long historical pedigree is the influential book by Nesta H. Webster, Secret
Societies and Subversive Movements (London: Boswell, 1924). For more on Webster's background, see the biographical study by Richard M. Gilman, Behind World Revolution: The Strange Career of Nesta H. Webster (Ann Arbor: Insight, 1982), of which only one volume has so far appeared.


24. For more on P2, see above all the materials published by the Italian parliamentary commission investigating the organization, which are divided into the majority (Anselmi) report, five dissenting minority reports, and over one hundred thick volumes of attached documents and verbatim testimony before the commission. Citations and precise references to these materials will be given, as appropriate, in the chapters below. Compare also Martín Berger, Historia de la lópia masonica P2 (Buenos Aires: El Cld, 1983); Andrea Barbieri et al, L'Italia della P2 (Milan: Mondadori, 1981); Alberto Cecchi, Storia della P2 (Rome: Riuniti, 1985); Roberto Fabiani, I massoni in Italia (Milan: L'Espresso, 1978); Gianfranco Piazzesi, Gelli: La carriere di un eroe di questa Italia (Milan: Garzanti, 1983); Marco Ramat et al, La resistabile ascesa della P2: Poteri occulti e stato democratico (Bari: De Donato, 1983); Renato Risaliti, Licio Gelli, a carte scoperte (Florence: Fernando Brancato, 1991); and Gianni Rossi and Francesco Lombrassa, In nome della "loggia": Le prove di come la massoneria segreta ha tentato di impadronarsi dello stato italiano. I retroscena della P2 (Rome: Napoleone, 1981). Pro P2 works include those of Gelli supporter Pier Carpi, Il caso Gelli: La verità sulla loggia P2 (Bologna: INEI, 1982); and the truly Orwellian work by Gelli himself, La verità (Lugano: Demetra, 1989), which in spite of its title bears little resemblance to the truth.


27. The ideal starting point for all those interested in the study of terrorism is Alex P. Schmid's massive work, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988), which provides a thorough introduction to the literature and every major aspect of the subject.

29. For a summary of some of these broader social science interpretations, see Weinberg and Eubank, *Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*, pp. 13-19.

30. For example, Marco Sassano has apportioned far too much blame to the United States for its role in the sponsorship of right-wing terrorism, whereas Vittorfranco N. Pisano has exaggerated the role played by the Soviet Union and other East Bloc states in supporting leftist terrorism. Compare Sassano, *SID e partito americano: Il ruolo della CIA, dei servizi segreti e dei corpi separati nella strategia dell'eversione* (Padua: Marsilio, 1975); and Pisano, *The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987).

Communist Connection (Washington, D.C.: American Council for World Freedom, 1978); Edouard Sablier, Le fil rouge: Histoire secrète du terrorisme international (Paris: Plon, 1983); and Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Berkeley, 1982). This simple-minded and largely propagandistic view of postwar terrorism as an exclusively leftist phenomenon is perhaps best expressed by Robert D. Chapman and M. Lester Chapman in The Crimson Web of Terror (Boulder: Paladin, 1980), p. 99: "Terrorists are very much alike. There is little difference between the terrorists of Iran and those of Italy or Germany. There are four characteristics which terrorists worldwide have in common: 1. They are young. 2. They are educated. 3. They are middle to upper-middle class. 4. They are Marxist-Leninist". No doubt that final assertion will come as a great surprise to victims of right-wing paramilitary squads in various parts of the world.

32. Among the many terrorism "experts" who have consistently recycled propaganda themes generated by hardline factions of Western intelligence, one many mention Claire Sterling, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Brian Crozier, Robert Moss, Pierre de Vilmarest, John Rees, and Michael Ledeen. For more information on this important disinformation network, which has done much to redirect attention away from right-wing terrorism, see Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, The "Terrorism" Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape our View of Terror (New York: Pantheon, 1989); and Philip Paul, "International Terrorism: The Propaganda War" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis: San Francisco State University International Relations Department, 1982). For a critique of both the disinformationists and their critics, see Jeffrey M. Bale, "The Ultranationalist Right in Turkey and the Attempted Assassination of Pope John Paul II", Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 15:1 (March 1991), especially pp. 1-20.

33. For examples of this leftist literature, see the works devoted by Noam Chomsky to terrorism, for example, The Culture of Terrorism (Boston: South End, 1988); and Pirates and Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World (New York: Claremont, 1986). Compare Edward S. Herman, The Real Terrorist Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End, 1982). Nevertheless, despite their obvious partisanship, these works make some devastating critiques of the myopic and uncritical establishment literature, and no one with an interest in this topic can afford to ignore them.

34. For the Stasi-RAF connection see Manfred Schell and Werner Kalinka, Stasi und kein Ende: Die Personen und Fakten (Berlin: Die Welt/Ullstein, 1991), pp. 225-8; Karl Wilhelm Fricke, MfS intern: Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1991), pp. 57-60; and a number of articles in the German newsweekly Der Spiegel, beginning in the Summer of 1990. Stasi’s reasons for establishing such a connection were far more complex than one might assume, however. Initially, they were supposedly worried that ultra-leftist, "pseudo-revolutionary" elements might at some point launch or provoke terrorist attacks in East German territory, or otherwise harm the interests of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR). Thus in
early 1978, they established the first direct contact with left-wing terrorists in West Germany, ostensibly in order to monitor them, obtain information about them, and manipulate them in such a way that they would pose no threat. This relationship then evolved over time, but it seems as though the RAF elements who later received "shelter" from the MfS's XXII Terrorabwehr section became gilded prisoners in East Germany. For more information on this complex situation, see Peter Siebenmorgen, "Staatssicherheit" der DDR: Der Westen im Fadenkreuz der Stasi (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), pp. 225-35. Note that left-wing terrorist groups like the RAF, the Revolutionäre Zellen (RZ), and remnants of the Bewegung 2. Juni were all among the organizations listed in a classified 15 February 1985 MfS report as "enemies" within the DDR's "operational area" who were capable of conducting "subversive activities" against the DDR and other communist regimes. See the reproduction in ibid., pp. 367-91. Whether this document reflected Stasi's actual sentiments or was purposely created in order to officially distance the service from such groups is unclear.

35. There are, of course, noteworthy exceptions to this general rule. See, for example, Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square, 1986), which was entirely devoted to evaluating and criticizing the standard view that the Soviet Union had sponsored the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II.

CHAPTER TWO: THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND

It is impossible to grasp the political impact or historical significance of the terrorist "strategy of tension" without recognizing the extent to which those who carried it out in Italy were linked in various ways to a number of clandestine international networks. Up until now this transnational dimension has generally been dealt with in a superficial fashion. On the one hand, mainstream commentators have tended to focus on the indigenous causes and sources of this particular right-wing campaign of terrorism, and in the process have failed to attach sufficient weight to international factors. On the other hand, radical leftist journalists have tended to reduce the overall complexity of the phenomenon by viewing it simply as a sinister local manifestation of the worldwide efforts by the United States to wage the Cold War and extend its sphere of political and economic influence. These two contrasting analytical approaches are not so much incorrect as they are monodimensional and incomplete. While it would be foolish to ignore the powerful national political forces that secretly sponsored or exploited the "strategy of tension" for their own ends, it would be equally simplistic to divorce those forces entirely from the postwar East-West conflict, which exercised a great deal of influence on the course of domestic politics in nations throughout the world. However, the complex relationship between the various international and national forces behind this campaign of violence in Italy cannot be clarified until the international forces are themselves delineated more precisely.

What needs to be recognized is that these overlapping transnational networks were
far more diverse than they have hitherto been depicted, and that each operated in accordance with its own particular political agenda. These agendas converged in certain fundamental respects, most notably around a vehement opposition to communism, but in other ways they were incompatible if not antithetical. The networks themselves fell into one of two basic categories. First, there were "internationals" created by neo-fascist and neo-Nazi extremists. These included Nazi escape organizations and "mutual aid" societies set up in the immediate postwar era, international neo-fascist liason and support groups founded in the early 1950s, and clandestine operational and paramilitary networks established in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, there was a vast array of ostensibly "private" anti-communist organizations which were either created or used instrumentally by the secret services of the United States and other NATO countries. These included paramilitary "stay/behind" networks, "countersubversion" training centers, propaganda and psychological warfare agencies, cultural associations, labor unions, policy-oriented "think tanks", investigative firms, secret societies, press agencies, export-import companies or other sorts of financial fronts, and lay religious organizations. Although such diverse organizations clearly had their own specific interests and different spheres of operation, in practice they played distinct but complementary roles in a coordinated overall Western strategy. More importantly, elements from the two basic types of networks—transnational neo-fascist groupings and Atlanticist intelligence fronts—were frequently interconnected, if not interdependent. As will soon be documented, neo-fascist ultras were often quietly recruited into these covert secret service-linked networks, and were thence typically employed to carry out particularly unsavory and "plausibly
deniable" jobs for their new employers. Despite these operational linkages, the two categories need to be examined separately. Herein, however, the focus will be primarily on transnational neo-fascist networks, except where these directly intersect with their secret service counterparts.

There are two salient characteristics of postwar fascism that at first glance may seem to be paradoxical. On the one hand, there was an extraordinary proliferation of small neo-fascist groups within every country of western and southern Europe after World War II. At the national level the omnipresence of divisive ideological conflicts, profound disagreements over political tactics, and contentious personal disputes between competing Führers made it virtually impossible for these sectarian and often insular groups to coordinate their activities in any meaningful way. The history of neo-fascism is therefore replete with a kaleidoscopic array and bewildering variety of organizations, personalities, and doctrines, many of which were the direct or indirect outgrowths of a complex process of fission and fusion precipitated by bitter internal struggles and rivalries. On the other hand, some of the very same groups which could not manage to find a basis for cooperation with similarly-minded organizations inside their own countries made strenuous efforts to "internationalize" and link up with their counterparts in other nations, both throughout Europe and elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, the significance of these frequent attempts to develop pan-European and international coordination, whether on an organizational, operational, or ideological basis, has not always been properly assessed by observers of the neo-fascist scene.

A certain degree of confusion, for example, is reflected in the following
comments by Giuseppe Gaddi, author of a book on neo-fascism in Europe:

One of the principal elements of differentiation between the old and the new fascism consists of the abandonment, or at least the attenuation, of traditional ultranationalist positions. Most of the current European neo-fascist movements have in fact substituted a "European" conception for the old concept of the nation.³

Although Gaddi correctly notes that the majority of post-World War II fascists have nourished a pan-European vision, he is wrong to suggest that this represented the abandonment of radical nationalism, which along with a voluntarist, elitist, and antimaterialistic form of "socialism" constituted one of the two key ideological components of classical fascism. The apparent contradiction is resolved if one recognizes that neo-fascist internationalism represented an extension rather than a rejection of nationalism, an attempt to transplant romantic radical nationalism onto the European plane. As neo-fascist theorists have repeatedly emphasized, however, their pan-European "international of nationalism" concept has nothing in common with the "anti-national" Europeanism advocated by social democratic and liberal proponents of a European Community.⁴

The conscious effort by many neo-fascists to repudiate or attenuate parochial forms of "national chauvinism" can be viewed as a perfectly rational response to the unfavorable political conditions in which the fascist diehards operated after 1945. For one thing, the vulnerability and weakness of neo-fascist radicals within their respective national milieus in the immediate postwar period caused them to establish links with like-minded groups abroad and attempt to create new "internationals" in order to augment their meager political influence.⁵ For another, "no European, however megalomaniacal, could even dream [that] his nation...[was] strong enough to challenge successfully the
two giants of the contemporary world", the United States and the Soviet Union. This "inescapable geopolitical fact" led the more perceptive neo-fascists to promote the idea of "a united nationalist Europe, a Nation Europa", which would oppose the imperialist designs of the triumphant and much-hated superpowers. On this level, too, overall political and military weaknesses compelled them to advocate a consolidation of Europe-wide forces.

In addition to these compelling practical reasons for adopting a pan-European perspective, neo-fascists believed—not without justification—that similar notions had been propounded by classical fascist and Nazi ideologues. A representative example is provided by the notorious Norwegian collaborator Vidkun Quisling:

We are living at a time when the countries of the world are uniting to form world empires. In the struggle for supremacy now being waged the smaller States have no prospect of continuing to live alone. Even Europe, with its impotence and divisions, is in danger of being crushed by the great powers which have grown up on either side. This danger has been averted thanks to the intervention of Germany, and with Germany as its pivot Europe is fast becoming the fifth great power in the world.

Moreover, even before the Nazi seizure of power, certain "conservative revolutionary" theorists in Germany had adopted analogous geopolitical conceptions which placed Germany at the center of a continental European Ordnungsmacht that could hold its own against the rising power of the Russian and Anglo-American peripheries. A number of other attempts to transcend nationalism by setting up "anti-Bolshevik" or fascist internationals were also made, such as the Anti-Komintern and the Ligue Internationale Anticommuniste. Even Mussolini, who had initially claimed that fascism was not something that could be exported, was later persuaded to sanction the efforts of radical
fascist youngbloods to create a multinational "universal fascist" movement.9

But it was the Nazi conception of a new European order that really captured the imagination of fascist radicals throughout the continent, both during and after the war. Although Hitler’s "new order" was based upon a racial (völkisch) rather than a national or genuinely pan-European conception, and both he and SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler ultimately envisioned the establishment of an Abendländische Reich Germanischen Blutes, that is, a European-wide empire under the absolute hegemony of the Teutonic peoples,10 many fascist intellectuals from other countries, including even non-Germanic left-wing fascists, managed to persuade themselves that the Nazis were leading a European social revolution that would guarantee a place in the sun to all the faithful, irrespective of their nationalities.11 Not surprisingly, Hitler and other Nazi leaders shamelessly exploited these romantic pan-European visions for propaganda purposes, to the chagrin of certain circles of chauvinistic ultranationalists and fanatical racists among their followers. Nevertheless, by an ironic twist of fate the Nazis were later compelled by adversity to adopt certain policies consonant with their own manipulative demagogic pronouncements. This will become clearer below, in connection with the Waffen-SS.

The Nation Europa concept thus represented a postwar revival and adaptation of certain ideas that had been promoted, however naively or cynically, by various fascist and Nazi leaders during the 1930s and 1940s. It should be pointed out, though, that the European radical right adopted two distinct and in many ways incompatible geopolitical perspectives in the period between the early 1950s and the collapse of communism, one
Western-oriented and the other Euro-centered. Moderate fascists and elements of numerous non-fascist far right currents, including Catholic integralists, monarchists, and certain sorts of ultranationalists, were politically wedded to the Atlantic Alliance and its major sponsor, the United States. This was because the latter entities, despite their manifest shortcomings, were viewed as the bulwarks of a Western civilization that was locked in a life-or-death struggle against an implacable communist adversary. In contrast to the more or less pro-American orientation of this numerically-dominant segment of the extreme right, most revolutionary neo-fascist factions advocated the establishment of a strong, united Nation Europa, which would constitute a "third force" opposed to the twin imperialisms of international communism and international finance capitalism, both of which were perceived as being materialistic, exploitative, dehumanizing, and—according to pro-Nazi elements—controlled by parasitic Jews. Variations on this theme appear in most neo-fascist ideological pronouncements, where bitter attacks on Anglo-American capitalism appear as frequently as attacks on communism. With this background, the early attempts to establish fascist-inspired transnational organizations can now be outlined.

Underground Nazi Escape and Action Organizations

The first "internationals" set up by fascists in the postwar era were underground networks designed to provide assistance to wanted Nazi fugitives who were seeking to elude Allied dragnets and escape, either into anonymity in their own homelands or to safe havens elsewhere. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the history of these shadowy networks, even in a summary fashion, since a plethora of sensationalistic
and rather speculative journalistic works have filled the void left by the current dearth of reliable documentary evidence. The brief overview which follows should therefore be regarded as tentative until such time as the relevant Allied intelligence archives are opened up to public scrutiny, a process which is already underway in the United States.

It appears, however, that many leading Nazi officials began planning for their postwar survival as soon as it became apparent that the Third Reich's days were numbered. A number of exiled anti-Nazi refugees and Allied propagandists began issuing warnings to this effect in popular works that were published as early as 1943. Although it is clear that the authors of these works often exaggerated for political effect, and that certain of their alarming claims owed more to personal paranoia or a feverish imagination than to reliable information, certain evidence subsequently surfaced which suggested that some of their general concerns about Nazi plans for the postwar world were quite justified. Among the documents later unearthed that supposedly provided details of such planning were handwritten minutes allegedly taken at a 10 August 1944 meeting held at the Hôtel Maison Rouge in Strasbourg. Almost all of the relevant secondary sources have accepted these details more or less at face value, but there are good reasons to be cautious, both on evidentiary and intuitive grounds. There is no guarantee that the minutes are genuine, and the ostensibly firsthand testimony is suspect. Beyond this, in the vengeful atmosphere following the 20 July assassination attempt on Hitler, it would have been foolhardy for Nazi hierarchs and businessmen to adopt a "defeatist" attitude by meeting to devise plans for their postwar survival.

According to the available accounts, however, such a top-secret meeting was in
fact organized, probably at the behest of Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) Secretary Martin Bormann himself, by the head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and unbeknownst to Hitler it brought top Schutzstaffel (SS) and party officials together with leading industrialists and bankers in order to develop or refine concrete plans for protecting Nazi functionaries and German economic assets following the now inevitable Allied victory. The civilian attendees reportedly included representatives from several firms which were heavily involved in key aspects of military production, such as I.G. Farben, Krupp, Thyssen, Rheinmetall, and Messerschmidt, as well as—according to some accounts—leading financial institutions like the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank. On the first day of the gathering, it was agreed that these German firms would accelerate the process of surreptitiously but systematically transferring large portions of their assets into secret bank accounts and businesses in friendly or neutral countries, utilizing dummy firms and foreign "front men" to conceal the ultimate source of the funds. The goal was not only to make it difficult for the Allies to trace and confiscate these assets once the war was over, but also to establish profitable business ventures abroad and thereby facilitate the provision of financial support to wanted Nazi officials who sought to take refuge overseas. A portion of the money was likewise to be used to offer legal assistance to less fortunate Kameraden who were captured and put on trial, to form mutual aid associations for veterans and former prisoners-of-war, and to launch campaigns to rehabilitate the Waffen-SS and challenge the theory of German war guilt. Although some of it may also have been earmarked for financing the creation of new
fascist groups or covertly influencing the political affairs of postwar Germany, only a handful of starry-eyed fanatics could have dreamed of using it to fund the establishment of an actual Fourth Reich.

Be that as it may, not long after the conference date classified U.S. intelligence reports began signalling that German businesses were shifting vast sums of money out of the "fatherland" and into countries throughout the world.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, a 1946 Treasury Department analysis revealed that they had already transferred 500 million dollars to bank accounts in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Austria, Portugal, Spain, and various South American nations, and that they had purchased a controlling interest in 214 firms in Switzerland, 158 in Portugal, 112 in Spain, 98 in Argentina, 35 in Turkey, and 233 elsewhere.\textsuperscript{17} In the first quarter of 1945, moreover, a large portion of the vast holdings accumulated by the state-owned Reichsbank and various Nazi bureaucracies, including looted treasure from all over Europe, was transported south and hidden in the mountainous region where the so-called \textit{Alpenfestung} was supposed to be prepared for the Third Reich's last stand. A good deal of this wealth was later recovered by the Allies, but nearly twenty million dollars' worth was never found. As will soon become clear, considerable sums eventually ended up in the hands of key organizers of the postwar Nazi underground.\textsuperscript{18}

Some of the money that had been invested overseas or hastily hidden in the Altaussee area was subsequently used to help set up and maintain underground escape and support organizations, which thence served as conduits for providing logistical and financial assistance to high-ranking party officials and SS men who were subject to arrest.
and stiff penalties. Unfortunately, so many sensationalistic and contradictory claims have been made about various clandestine Nazi networks—Die Organisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen (ODESSA), Die Spinne, Stille Hilfe, Die Schleuse, Das Kameradenwerk, and Die Bruderschaft—that to this day it remains difficult to distinguish between fact and fantasy, reconstruct their actual activities, and clarify the nature of the seemingly complex relationships between them. Some sort of SS underground undoubtedly existed in the postwar era, and it appears that some of the above-named organizations had a more or less important function within that underground. But there remain several unanswered questions about these organizations. One is whether the above rubrics all referred to different components of a single network, whether they applied to separate but parallel networks which in part overlapped with one another, or whether they were sometimes little more than the phantasmagoric products of disinformation campaigns designed to mislead and distract investigators. A second question has to do with just how extensive, powerful, and dangerous these networks really were. Alas, the sketchy and often contradictory descriptions of particular networks which appear in the available secondary sources make it impossible to resolve these central issues.

The most notorious of these secretive SS organizations was undoubtedly ODESSA, about which novelist Frederick Forsyth even wrote a best-selling political thriller. Nevertheless, there is little consensus about its historical role and significance. Some observers claim that ODESSA was an elaborate, highly-efficient, and powerful clandestine organization which provided wanted Nazis with false identity papers and carefully arranged their flight from the ruins of the Reich to havens in Spain, Latin
America, and the Middle East, whereas others assert that it was never a single coherent network, but rather a loose collection of small congeries of SS men who engaged in such activities. Nor is there any general agreement about the relationship between ODESSA and other groups like Spinne and Schleuse. Thus Spinne has been variously referred to as the immediate forerunner of ODESSA, the parent body from which ODESSA broke away as a splinter group, the "escape arm" of ODESSA (which was itself an outgrowth of the "Skorzeny Organization"), a more sophisticated version of ODESSA which was used solely for large-scale operations, a separate and relatively small network which originated as a "Werwolf" commando unit, a loose association of imprisoned SS officers who secretly maintained regular contacts with one another to plan breakouts, and a different name for the ODESSA organization. Not surprisingly, these authors cannot even agree about the date when Spinne was supposedly established. Two place its creation in the period just before the end of World War II and thus prior to the 1947 founding of ODESSA, another puts it in 1946 at Karlsfeld hospital, and still others put in 1948 at the Glasenbach POW camp in Austria. According to former OSS operative Ladislas Farago, Spinne was the only Nazi network that attained real importance after the war, and then mainly in South America. Die Schleuse, meanwhile, has been described by Michael Bar-Zohar as a Gestapo-created network that established escape routes similar to those Wiesenthal ascribed to ODESSA, whereas other authorities say little or nothing about such an organization.

Fortunately, more reliable information is available about the Kameradenwerk, Stille Hilfe, and the Bruderschaft. According to former Luftwaffe ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel,
a key figure in various postwar Nazi activities, the Kameradenwerk was a network set up by himself and other "patriotic" exiles in Buenos Aires. Its ostensible purpose was to raise money from German communities in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile for comrades in Europe who were having legal and financial problems, and it regularly sent clothing and goods it collected or purchased to Nazi fugitives and prisoners in West Germany, using a host of secretive far right organizations and "aid societies" for veterans and refugees as intermediaries. Rudel specifically noted that one such intermediary was "Mother" Helene Elisabeth, Princess von Isenburg, the official founder of the Stille Hilfe organization, upon which the Kameradenwerk was itself supposedly modelled. In addition to carrying out their "humanitarian" work, however, the leading members of Rudel's South American network also maintained close political relationships with unregenerate Nazi activists throughout Europe, so much so that at least one investigator has claimed that the Kameradenwerk was actually the organization that ODESSA purported to be.

For its part, Stille Hilfe was officially founded in 1951, and was perhaps modelled on the Soziale Friedenswerk association that had already been established in Austria. It helped several wanted Nazis to escape overseas in its earliest days, including SS Dr. Hans Eisele, formerly chief medical officer at the Buchenwald concentration camp, but later oriented its efforts toward providing logistical support to comrades who were in prison and legal aid to those who were on trial for various crimes. Among the latter were several SS guards who had been stationed at the Majdanak camp in Poland. Even as late as 1981, Stille Hilfe was looking after fifty imprisoned war criminals. More worrisome,
perhaps, was the support granted to the organization by high-ranking government officials, both during the Allied occupation and after the establishment of the Federal Republic. Thus Princess Elisabeth supposedly established excellent relations with U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy, the group was granted tax-exempt status in December 1951 by the Munich tax office, and its later president, Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer, had influential connections within the Ministry of Justice. And, as if to belie their claims to have constituted an apolitical "non-profit association", members of Stille Hilfe increasingly developed links with a number of neo-fascist and far right groups, not only in West Germany but also in other parts of the world. Among others, these included the Wiking-Jugend, the Deutsches Kulturwerk Europäischen Geistes (DKEG), the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), Dr. Gerhard Frey's Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), the Hilfsgemeinschaft Freiheit für Rudolf Hess, Thies Christophersen and his Bürger- und Bauerninitiative (BBI), Flemish fascists, South Tyrolean ultras, and the pro-Nazi Friends of Germany group in the United States. The funds used by Stille Hilfe to sustain and support imprisoned Nazis came from a variety of sources, including individual contributors, profits from a book on Adolf Eichmann published by Christophersen, other "aid" associations such as the Kameradenwerk, and--in all probability--portions of the Nazi treasure that were never accounted for.27

The Bruderschaft, on the other hand, was not an escape and support network at all, but rather a covert cadre organization operating in West Germany which aimed to infiltrate its members into established political parties and the state apparatus. Such an organization was first conceived in 1945 or 1946 by Major Helmut Beck-Broichsitter at
a British POW camp where members of the Wehrmacht's elite "Grossdeutschland" division were being held. However, it was not actually established until July 1949, a couple of years after Beck had joined forces with Alfred Franke-Gricksch, a former SS Standartenführer in the RSHA who was said to have worked for British intelligence in the immediate aftermath of the war.28 At its head was a so-called "Council of Brethren" (Bruderrat) consisting of six men, around which were arrayed—in a fashion reminiscent of classical secret societies—an "inner circle" and an "outer circle". The former consisted not only of former Nazi Gauleiters like Karl Kaufmann and Dr. Gustav Adolf Scheel, but also of high-ranking ex-military officers, including Wehrmacht Generals Heinz Guderian, Hasso von Manteuffel, and Kurt Student, as well as Waffen-SS Generals Paul Hausser, Herbert O. Gille, Felix Steiner, and Otto Kumm. The association of such prestigious figures with the Bruderschaft enabled the organization to establish a vast network of sub rosa contacts, both with influential figures associated with the West German political and economic establishments and with key activists from several very important right-wing or nationalist groups in Germany. Among these latter were the Deutsche Union (DU), a sort of elitist "gentlemen's club" which August Haussleiter established in January 1949 as a rallying point for "homeless" nationalist intellectuals; the Deutsche Gemeinschaft (DG), which succeeded the DU; the Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP); the Bund Heimattreuer Deutscher (BHD), which gathered together former members of the neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) after the German government outlawed the latter in October 1952; the underground Scheinwerfer publishing circle, whose bitterly anti-Western leader, former SS Hauptsturmführer Joachim Nehring, was
later tried and sentenced to four years hard labor for forging secret links with communist agents behind the "Iron Curtain"; and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nationaler Gruppen (ANG). More significantly, it has been reported that the Bruderschaft established a network of clandestine cells in all four zones of occupied Germany, that it gathered together enough former military personnel to staff both an infantry division and an armored division, that Beck secretly proposed to set up anti-communist shock troops in cooperation with the American military authorities (despite the Franke wing's philo-Soviet "nationalist-neutralist" public stance and the contacts initiated by elements from both factions with East Bloc officials), that it sponsored the creation of the paramilitary Freikorps Deutschland, and that it sought, apparently with some degree of success, to facilitate the passage of anti-democratic far rightists into mainstream conservative parties.29

Of greater relevance in this context, leading members of the Bruderschaft were closely linked to various clandestine SS escape networks and to neo-fascist activists elsewhere in Europe. Franke had appointed Wilhelm Kiefer and Colonel Gottlob Gehret as his foreign liason men, and they in turn relied upon Jean-Maurice Bauverd, a Swiss expatriate who lived in Madrid and had formerly worked for both Radio Damascus and the Egyptian government's press office in Cairo, to develop some of the Bruderschaft's overseas contacts. Bauverd, who was then responsible for organizing Islamic press centers in Rome, Paris, and Buenos Aires, was in regular contact with neo-fascist circles, and through him the Bruderschaft established connections with Maurice Bardèche and René Binet in Paris, Gaston-Armand ("Guy") Amaudruz in Lausanne, former SS officers
like Erich Kernmayr and Max Prantl in Austria, several unidentified members of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) in Italy, former employees of the Nazi Auslandsorganisation (AO) who still lived abroad, and pro-Nazi Austrian bishop Alois Hudal, rector of the Collegium Teutonicum Pontificum in Rome. As will soon become clear, these particular individuals were almost all stars in the firmament of the postwar radical right. Some played key roles in the creation of early "fascist internationals", whereas at least one among them assiduously helped to spirit thousands of wanted Nazi war criminals to safety. Other Bruderschaft-linked figures, such as the notorious Major Waldemar Pabst, engaged in arms-trafficking after World War II in order to finance the Bruderschaft's underground apparatus or new Anti-Komintern schemes. In Pabst's case this trafficking was apparently legal, since after 1951 he served as a representative of the Swiss armaments firm Oerlikon.

In the middle of 1951, the ever-growing hostility between Beck's increasingly pro-Western faction and Franke's overtly Russophile faction, coupled with adverse media publicity about the organization's role as a Nazi secret society, led first to the formal expulsion of the Franke faction and then, shortly thereafter, to the formal dissolution of the Bruderschaft. This, however, did not mean that all of its leading members suddenly became quiescent and abandoned political scheming. Rather, they entered into several smaller but equally elitist groups, the most important of which was the so-called Naumann-Kreis (or Gauleiter-Kreis), which was named after Dr. Werner Naumann, a former top official of Joseph Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry, SD man, and SS Brigadeführer. In order to expand their range of influence behind the scenes, Naumann
and his associates immediately began strengthening their links with top military circles and veterans organizations (including the Verband Deutscher Soldaten [VdS]), youth groups, the DKEG and other "cultural" associations, interest groups of all sorts, right-wing publishing houses (like ex-SS man Waldemar Schütz’s Plesse-Verlag in Göttingen and the international backers of the monthly Nation Europa journal), conservative industrialists such as textile manufacturer Gerd Spindler, and radical fascist rabblerousers like former Hitler Jugend (HJ) member Karl-Heinz Priester. Perhaps most significantly, Naumann was in contact with Dr. Eberhard Taubert of the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (VFF), and an entry in the former’s diary specifically related his own political plotting to that of some of the most important figures within the international SS underground, including SS commando leader Otto Skorzeny, Rudel, and Wilfred von Oven, formerly Goebbels’ personal adjutant. More will soon be said about the clandestine activities of Skorzeny.

But the circle’s chief efforts were devoted to infiltrating bourgeois rightist parties—especially the "liberal" Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE), and the Deutsche Partei (DP)—with a view toward eventually penetrating the entire state apparatus. Although later apologists for the Naumann-Kreis claimed that it constituted nothing more than a political "discussion group" which had been unjustly persecuted by the "victors", Naumann’s diary entries and secret speeches—which explicitly advocated the infiltration and takeover of respectable rightist parties—demonstrate the spuriousness of that claim. As it happens, members of Naumann’s entourage ended up controlling the North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower
Saxony branches of the FDP by placing unrepentent former Nazi officials in all the key party positions. Had Naumann and other circle leaders not been arrested in January 1953 by the British authorities for anti-democratic plotting, it is likely that this process of acquiring clandestine control over other party branches and organizations would have proceeded apace. The cases against the defendants were later discreetly dropped by the Justice Ministry, but the sensationalistic publicity surrounding the arrests and trial undermined their ability to reconstitute covert cadres and continue to manipulate other groups from inside.\textsuperscript{35}

In any event, despite lingering confusion about the exact nature of ODESSA, Spinne, and Schleuse, it is clear that certain postwar SS underground organizations facilitated the escape of wanted Nazi war criminals. Several routes were used to exfiltrate these fugitives, most of which were patterned on routes that had earlier been used by the OSS and certain Zionist organizations to exfiltrate their own agents and refugees from Axis-occupied Central and Eastern Europe. Many of these routes have been identified, at least in their general outlines. One led from Flensburg in Schleswig-Holstein northwards across the Danish border, from whence submarines, surface vessels, or aircraft could, with a modicum of luck, be surreptitiously boarded for Spain and Italy. One of the fugitives who escaped from the Allied dragnet in this way was Belgian Rexist and Waffen-SS leader Léon Degrelle, who first made his way to Oslo and thence commandeered a plane and flew to Spain. Some authors have also claimed that Bormann himself escaped by means of this route, but physical evidence seems to indicate that he was killed trying to make his way out of the ruins of Berlin. In any event, the more

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important and widely-used routes led southwards from the Memmingen or Aussee areas. From the former town they branched out in one of two main directions, either southwest to Lindau or Bregenz on Lake Constance and then into Switzerland, or southeast into the Allgäu, across the Austrian border to Innsbruck, and then on through the Brenner Pass into Italy. Another starting point leading to this latter escape route lay in the Altaussee region, where Hitler had originally hoped to establish his impregnable redoubt and where many Nazi officials and their families had taken temporary refuge. Along these border regions in the midst of the Alps, with their intricate web of mountain pathways, clandestine SS escape organizations apparently set up and maintained an elaborate network consisting of "safehouses" every fifty or so miles. Fugitives were provided with false papers, sheltered in safehouses, and thence led over those pathways by knowledgeable mountain guides until, at a certain point, they were passed along to experienced personnel associated with the well-organized exfiltration networks run by the Vatican or Allied intelligence.

Among the estimated thousands of wanted Nazis and East European collaborators who made their escapes along these southern routes were SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, one of Himmler’s chief subordinates who had earlier negotiated a "secret surrender" with Allen Dulles, then an OSS officer in Switzerland and a future head of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); SS Dr. Josef Mengele, who conducted horrific "scientific" experiments on prisoners at Auschwitz; SS Hauptsturmführer Klaus Barbie, the Gestapo "butcher" of Lyon; SS Sturmbannführer Friedrich Schwend, who helped launder forged British bank notes in connection with "Unternehmen Bernhard";
SS Standartenführer Walther Rauff, inventor of the mobile gas chamber; SS Obersturmbannführer Adolph Eichmann, head of the Jewish Affairs section of the Gestapo and a bureaucratic architect of the logistical aspects of the ENDLOSUNG; SS Hauptsturmführer Franz Stangl, commander of the concentration camp at Treblinka; SS Hauptsturmführer Alois Brunner, one of Eichmann’s key subordinates; Croatian Poglavnik Ante Pavelić, who was responsible for launching genocidal Ustaša anti-Serbian campaigns whose brutality even shocked the Nazis; and Horia Sima, leader of the fanatical Garda de Fier in Rumania following the death of Corneliu Codreanu. Once in Italy, under the protection of the Vatican’s refugee bureaus, it was relatively easy for these high-profile criminals to escape overseas. Ships regularly departed for the Iberian peninsula and Latin America from Genoa, Rome, and Naples, whereas from Bari they set sail to Middle Eastern countries like Egypt or Syria. All of these destinations provided relatively secure havens for Nazi fugitives. Spain and Portugal were still ruled by pro-fascist dictators despite their official maintenance of neutrality throughout World War II and their behind-the-scenes attempts to ingratiate themselves with the victorious Allies towards the end of the conflict. Furthermore, the Germans were widely admired throughout Latin America for their discipline, efficiency, and technical skills, and certain Arab nationalist regimes had no hesitation about welcoming and secretly employing unrepentant anti-Semites in various capacities.36

Three major qualifications nonetheless have to be made about the above sketch of the various components of the postwar SS underground. First of all, the reach and power of these Nazi networks seem to have been greatly exaggerated, both by vengeful
Nazi hunters seeking to bring war criminals to justice and by journalists hoping to sell books and articles by adopting a sensationalistic approach to the topic. It may be true, as Werner Brockdorff suggests, that ODESSA and Spinne were not functional escape networks at all, but rather elaborate fantasies concocted by paranoids, conspiracy theorists, or tellers of tall tales. On the other hand, it would be a serious mistake to view all of these reported SS escape networks as mere figments of someone’s overactive imagination, for it is apparent that a number of underground organizations were engaged in financing, sheltering, or protecting high-profile Nazi war criminals in various parts of the world.

Secondly, the postwar Nazi networks which actually existed and remained active soon became involved in a wide variety of clandestine political and paramilitary operations, most of which had an anti-democratic stamp. This can best be illustrated by sketching the postwar careers of Otto Skorzeny and certain members of the Kameradenwerk, although in these cases, too, heroic legends and disinformation are often difficult to separate from historical fact. Skorzeny was a colorful and important figure in the history of the Third Reich. Having established a close friendship with Ernst Kaltenbrunner in the late 1920s, joined the Austrian Nazi party in the mid-1930s, and displayed considerable initiative and boldness at the time of the 1938 Anschluss, he was recruited into the Waffen-SS and thence participated in the French, Yugoslav, and Russian campaigns before being wounded in the winter of 1941. In April 1943 Kaltenbrunner, who had in the meantime succeeded Reinhard Heydrich as head of the RSHA, put Skorzeny in charge of the top secret SS schools--located in Neustrelitz and,
later, the Hague and Heinrichsburg (near Belgrade)—where selected personnel were to be trained to carry out sabotage and other types of clandestine operations. These schools were officially under the organizational jurisdiction of Amt VI, the foreign intelligence section of the RSHA headed by SS Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg, but the VI-S "sabotage" subsection under Skorzeny's command also received direct orders from Hitler himself. Skorzeny established his headquarters at Friedenthal, converted the nearby Oranienberg SS battalion into Jagdverband 502, created a number of other battalion-strength Jagdverbände, and had the elite SS Kampfgeschwader 200 aerial group placed at his disposal by Himmler. After taking espionage courses from an Abwehr officer in Holland, Skorzeny took control over the German military intelligence service's "Zeppelin" networks, which had been established behind the lines on the eastern front, and commenced his extraordinary career as a leader of "special operations". Among his more notorious exploits were the daring rescue of Mussolini in September 1943, the recruitment of Dutch "double agents" to obtain information about British secret weapons, the 1944 kidnapping of the double-dealing Hungarian regent, Admiral Miklos Horthy, and "Unternehmen Greif", the generally unsuccessful attempt to pass infiltration teams through American lines during the December 1944 Ardennes offensive, some of which allegedly had been given the task of assassinating General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander on the Western front. 38

Of more direct relevance in this context were the activities undertaken by Skorzeny at the close of and after World War II. Admiring biographers of the huge Austrian with the prominent dueling scars on his face have tended to dismiss stories
about secret SS undergrounds as fanciful rumors or examples of Soviet disinformation, as well as to accept the former commando's own claims to have withdrawn from politics after 1945 in order to resume a normal life and establish a lucrative but "respectable" career as a businessman. In marked contrast, self-appointed "Nazi hunters" and communist-linked sources have portrayed him as the central figure in a vast international organization of unreconstructed Nazis who have sought to profit, promote their ideals, rehabilitate themselves, and lay the groundwork for their own return to the corridors of power in a new bipolar world. As usual, the truth lies somewhere in the middle, though it is certainly much closer to the latter interpretation than the former. This will become obvious when certain aspects of Skorzeny's postwar career are further elucidated.

First of all, it seems clear that "Scarface" helped to create and thereafter played a leading role in the postwar SS underground. Long before the war ended he had established close links with the special unit set up within Amt VI to produce forged documents, section F under SS Sturmbannführer Hermann Dörner. Among these documents were false identification papers and counterfeit bank notes which were circulated abroad to help undermine the Allied economies and exchanged for genuine foreign currency. Due to his connections with the officials responsible for this latter operation, codenamed "Bernhard", Skorzeny was later consigned a portion of the forged currency and the materials used to produce it and asked to sequester them in the Alps for possible future use. Kaltenbrunner, Bormann, and Eichmann also may have relied upon Skorzeny to bury valuable materials for them. In addition, after allegedly helping German industrialists transfer money overseas in the wake of the August 1944 Strasbourg
meeting, he was later given the important task of hiding a portion of the Reichsbank's Nazi treasure and various documentary records in the Toplitzsee area. Finally, since Hitler personally entrusted him with training the "Werwolf" stay/behind commando units, recruiting "sleeper" agents in France and Italy, and creating an SS Schutzkorps Alpenland for a last stand in the Alpine redoubt, he arranged for the burial of large stockpiles of weapons in that remote region. Access to these important materials and resources, as well as to complete lists of SD and Abwehr agents overseas, provided Skorzeny with the wherewithal to organize escape routes and logistical support networks which were thence used by many of his SS comrades and other wanted Nazis.

Elements associated with these underground networks appear to have been directly or indirectly involved in almost all of his subsequent social, political, and financial activities. To cite only a few examples, it should be noted that Skorzeny escaped from Darmstadt prison on 27 July 1948 with the help of a relatively extensive Nazi support network that operated both inside and outside of various prisons and detention centers. He then made his way to Argentina, where he probably renewed old contacts with Rudel and other key members of the Kameradenwerk. He was, after all, reputed to be in charge of underground networks in Germany and Austria which were in some way linked to their comrades in South America. According to U.S. intelligence reports, he later returned to Europe and secretly visited a number of German cities in order to recruit additional SS men into his existing clandestine networks, which apparently sought to make use of legal organizations like veterans' associations and right-wing parties as a "cover" for infiltrating Nazi sympathizers into the new West German state. As part
of this effort, he maintained close contact with Werner Naumann and other leaders of the Bruderschaft, who may have been in the process of carrying out some sort of "plan" Skorzeny devised prior to the exposure and formal dissolution of the group.

When he settled in Spain in the early 1950s, he was welcomed with open arms by activist members of the more than 11,000-strong fascist colony which had already been established there, including his old Belgian comrade-in-arms, SS Obersturmbannführer Léon Degrelle. Shortly thereafter, he held a series of meetings in Madrid with the banker Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s former financial advisor, with whom he had previously cooperated in efforts to transfer German assets abroad. He then founded an engineering firm whose offices were located on the luxurious Gran Via in the center of the Spanish capital. Through the good graces of Schacht, as well as the contacts with other German businessmen he had forged before the collapse of the Third Reich and while awaiting trial in prison, he became the Spanish representative for several leading industrial firms, including Klöckner AG, the [Otto] Wolff-Trust, the Feldmühle paper company, the Messerschmidt-Werke, Krupp, the H.S. Lucht company, and the Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- und Stahlwerke (VÖESi), formerly an integral component of the Hermann Göring-Werke. In this capacity, he engaged in a variety of business transactions, including worldwide arms trafficking, which netted him considerable profits. These more or less "legitimate" funds were in turn supplemented by the interest he collected from German overseas investments that he had earlier helped to arrange, the money he extracted from compromised German businessmen by means of blackmail, and portions of the secret Nazi treasure which he had helped to bury and

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now purportedly managed.\textsuperscript{50} With these multiple sources of wealth, Skorzeny was not only able to maintain a lavish lifestyle, but also to subsidize underground SS networks, the Bruderschaft, factions within Waffen-SS veterans' associations, ex-Nazi politicians, and other right-wing political groups. Although many of the specific details remain unclear or controversial to this day, the overall pattern of Skorzeny's associations and activities is scarcely in doubt.

To these persistent connections with unrepentant and activist Nazi circles must be added Skorzeny's links to various Western intelligence agencies. His wartime activities necessarily brought him into contact with key secret service personnel in Nazi Germany. The most important of these intelligence officers was undoubtedly General Reinhard Gehlen, head of the Oberkommando des Heeres' Fremde Heere Ost (FHO) organization, which was responsible for intelligence gathering and other types of special operations on the eastern front.\textsuperscript{51} Skorzeny and Gehlen probably began coordinating the launching of various ventures behind Soviet lines as early as the summer of 1943, by which time "Scarface" had been put in charge of Amt VI's Zeppelin saboteur groups. This pattern of collusion was intensified after the disbanding of the Abwehr as an autonomous organization and the incorporation of much of its operational apparatus into other security organs. The bulk of it was absorbed into the RSHA as the Militäramt, but Gehlen's FHO managed to obtain control over the Abwehr's "WALLI" intelligence networks in exchange for his agreement to assist the Zeppelin units. Toward the end of the war, Gehlen and Skorzeny worked closely together in an effort to combine the Zeppelin stay/behind resistance groups and the WALLI networks into a combined espionage
organization behind the Soviet front. Thus, although personal rivalries between the two
highly ambitious and headstrong men sometimes led to serious friction, especially after
Hitler had a falling out with Gehlen over his pessimistic situation reports, their
relationship survived the collapse of the Third Reich. Some of Gehlen's intelligence
files may have been consigned to Skorzeny for burial during the last days of the war.
Later, Gehlen intervened on behalf of the imprisoned SS man, and thence recruited him
as a contract agent for the West German intelligence service he had by then been
appointed to head, the so-called Gehlen Org, which later evolved into the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).

Both his wartime role in Nazi intelligence and his subsequent efforts to set up
clandestine SS support networks for wanted fugitives initially made Skorzeny the target
of a massive Allied dragnet. But it was not long before his erstwhile enemies in
American intelligence sought to enlist his services in the covert war against communism.
As early as May of 1945, General Edwin Sibert, Chief of Intelligence for the U.S.
Twelfth Army Group, was actively searching for Skorzeny and other German intelligence
specialists, including Gehlen and Kaltenbrunner, who could provide him with valuable
information about the Russians. That same month "Hitler's commando" surrendered
to the Americans and volunteered to participate in the impending struggle against the
Soviet Bloc, after which he was interrogated at length by the CIC. However, since he
was wanted for war crimes by other Allied agencies, he was transferred back and forth
from one prison to another and belatedly brought to trial in the late summer of 1947. As
the trial wore on the predicament of Skorzeny and his co-defendants seemed to be
worsening, but at the last minute a British intelligence officer appeared out of nowhere and unexpectedly came to his rescue. This was the famous "White Rabbit", Wing Commander Forest Yeo-Thomas, a special operations expert who had fought in occupied France with members of the Resistance before being captured and escaping from Buchenwald concentration camp. At the trial he testified--allegedly on his own initiative--that British commandos regularly carried out the same type of clandestine actions for which Skorzeny and his comrades were being tried, thereby destroying the prosecution's case in a single blow.55

From this point on, certain factions within U.S. intelligence appear to have secretly protected Skorzeny in order to make use of his specialized abilities, unbeknownst to other Allied security personnel without a "need to know", who tried to track his movements and prevent him from engaging in anti-democratic actions. This was a general pattern which has now been amply documented in the cases of many other high-profile Nazi figures, such as Barbie, Brunner, and Schwend. In this case the protective group issued a warning to their famous prisoner, who was then supposed to be writing an account of Mussolini's rescue for the U.S. Army's Historical Division, to the effect that continued Czech demands for his extradition could not be ignored or delayed indefinitely. In all probability they then facilitated his escape from the Darmstadt detention center by providing American military police uniforms for three former SS men, who were thereby able to dupe the German camp guards into releasing him into their custody. After a period of general confusion in which his whereabouts were known only to those who were actively involved in sheltering him, unsubstantiated stories appeared in the press
which claimed that Skorzeny had been flown to an American base in Georgia to help train U.S. paratroopers. In 1950 he was definitely spotted in Paris, where politically motivated rumors were circulated that he was engaged in gathering information about the Parti Communiste Français (PCF).^6^5

However propagandistic these specific claims may appear, a report prepared by the 66th CIC group admitted that he might have been working for U.S. intelligence since his escape from prison, and another by the 7970th CIC group suggested that he may have been aided by the Americans during his subsequent flight from France and his secret re-entry into West Germany.^5^7 There is no doubt, moreover, that Anglo-American intelligence personnel kept him under regular observation after he settled in Spain, since those outside the information loop did not know that he was working with certain other factions within their own organizations, and those affiliated with the latter were not yet entirely certain that he could be trusted. Finally, Skorzeny was at some point recruited as a contract agent by Gehlen, a convenient arrangement which provided the Americans with a degree of "plausible deniability" had anyone asked if they were making use of his services themselves. It was in part due to these very intelligence contacts that Skorzeny became actively involved in a number of terrorist and covert operations over the course of the next twenty years.

Some of these operations deserve to be highlighted, since they provide a good illustration of the postwar utilization of European right-wing extremists by elements of Western intelligence. Among other things, Skorzeny purportedly trained personnel from the Argentine secret police and the Buenos Aires police in torture and interrogation
techniques during his periodic stays with Juan and Eva Perón prior to the dictator's 1955 ouster and flight to Spain.\textsuperscript{58} In late 1952, in response to a request from Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, CIA chief Allen Dulles turned to Gehlen for help in recruiting personnel to train the Egyptian intelligence and security services. With Schacht's help, Gehlen persuaded Skorzeny to take the job after assuring him that the salary paid by Nāṣir would be supplemented by CIA funds laundered through the Org. So it was that the Austrian spent a total of eighteen months recruiting 100 German advisors from the SS underground and neo-fascist outfits, training Arab guerrillas in commando tactics, and protecting some of the ex-Nazi technicians working for Nāṣir from retaliation by Israeli "hit" teams.\textsuperscript{59} Furthermore, "Scarface" may have secretly met with three CIA officials, two West Germans, a Spaniard, and three French military officers on 12 April 1961. Among these Frenchmen were two experienced soldiers who were later to play a key role in the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS), General Paul Gardy, formerly Inspector General of the Légion Étrangère (LE), and guerre révolutionnaire Colonel Jean Gardes, the most highly decorated officer in the French Army in 1944-5 and eventually the head of its 5th (Psychological Warfare) Bureau in Algiers. Whether Skorzeny thereafter kept in contact with and provided operational or logistical assistance to elements of the OAS, as communist sources claim, is a controversial issue which deserves further study.\textsuperscript{60} In this connection, it should be pointed out that Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht veterans made up a large portion of the rank-and-file within the elite paratroop regiments of the Légion, the very units which were actively involved in the military revolts in Algeria.

It is also worth noting the existence of various direct and indirect personal links
between "Hitler's commando" and elements implicated in later acts of neo-fascist terrorist violence. For one thing, one of the key activists working for Aginter Presse, a bogus press agency in Lisbon which served to disguise the activities of an international center of right-wing subversion, was Robert Leroy, formerly an instructor at Skorzeny's school for saboteurs. For another, one of Skorzeny's chief patrons and associates in Spain, the Duke of Valencia, was the principal shareholder in the bank which owned a company that was used to "cover" the activities of the Exército de Libertaçao Português (ELP), a clandestine right-wing paramilitary group which sought to overthrow the post-1974 regime set up by leftist elements within the Portuguese armed forces. In this context, it may also be significant that General António de Spínola, the titular leader of the Portuguese counterrevolutionary forces which had created the ELP, received a visit from a representative of the arms-trading company Merex during a July 1975 trip he took to Paris to develop a European support network. Merex, some of whose profits allegedly went into the coffers of certain neo-fascist organizations, exhibited other unusual characteristics. It had been founded in Bonn in 1963 by former SS man and wartime Skorzeny collaborator Gerhard Mertins, was thereafter represented by some of "Scarface's" Nazi associates in various Latin American countries, and was reportedly a proprietary of Gehlen's BND. Last but not least, Skorzeny was apparently one of the key figures in Gerhard Harmut von Schubert's Paladin Group, which specialized in recruiting mercenaries and counterguerrilla specialists to undertake anti-communist operations in every part of the globe.

In 1970, after collaborating with his old Nazi Propaganda Ministry associate
Johannes von Leers, first in assisting Perón’s secret police and then in disseminating anti-Western and anti-Semitic propaganda for Nāṣir’s Egypt, von Schubert moved to Spain and set up the Paladin Group with Skorzeny’s help. Within a surprisingly short time they managed to recruit a cadre of experienced operatives with military and intelligence skills, in particular ex-Nazis, OAS veterans, members of the Service d’Action Civique (SAC) who had been purged from that notorious Gaullist parallel police organization by President Georges Pompidou, and younger ultras from various European and Latin American neo-fascist groups. Paladin’s headquarters and base of operations were located at Calle Albuferete 9 in Alicante, but the organization also opened branch offices in Zurich, Geneva, Paris, Brussels, Rome, and London. Over the years von Schubert had apparently developed close relations with a number of Western secret services, and according to a former OAS "Delta" commando who worked for the Spanish secret service, the unreconstructed Nazi placed his prodigious talent for unconventional warfare at the disposal of the Dirección General de Seguridad (DGS), which in turn fully "covered" all the actions his agency undertook in Spain. At first Paladin’s secret operations, like those of Aginter Presse in Lisbon, were directed primarily against "national liberation" movements in Africa and Maoist organizations in Europe, but the Madrid center’s sphere of action was soon greatly expanded. So it was that Paladin, which the very same OAS veteran described as "undoubtedly the most serious" of all the parallel intelligence and "action" services then in operation, carried out a series of covert, "plausibly deniable" tasks for clients as varied as the DGS, the Colonels’ Kratiki Ypiresia Pliroforion (KYP: State Intelligence Service) in Greece, the South Vietnamese
government, and multinational firms like Rheinmetall and Cadbury’s. Some of these manipulative, violent operations were temporarily hamstrung or derailed in the Spring of 1974, when a series of exposé’s appeared in the leftist French daily Libération and forced von Schubert to close all of Paladin’s existing offices and dismantle the formal structure of the organization. Even so, many Paladin personnel simply joined other clandestine right-wing networks and continued the struggle.

Nor, alas, was Skorzeny the only former SS man with links to intelligence or security agencies and groups of neo-fascist ultras. Other key figures in the postwar SS underground were also discovered to be engaging in arms- and drug trafficking, gathering intelligence, and training the secret police in various South American countries. These included several high-profile Nazis and war criminals who, despite being on Allied arrest lists, managed to escape overseas and establish themselves in countries which provided them with a safe haven. Among those who were able to find refuge and begin a new life abroad were Klaus Barbie in Bolivia, Friedrich Schwend in Peru, Walter Rauff in Chile, Josef Mengele in Paraguay, Dutch SS officer Willem (“Alfons”) Sassen in Ecuador, Alois Brunner in Syria, and Hans-Ulrich Rudel in Argentina, as well as a number of East European collaborators. Unlike most wanted Nazis who managed to elude capture, such as Adolf Eichmann until his 1961 seizure by Israeli commandos in Buenos Aires, these men were not satisfied to hide out and lead boring, unchallenging lives. They remained arrogant, unrepentent, manipulative, and opportunistic, and therefore engaged in a pattern of criminality that only differed from their former practices in terms of its scale and intensity.
The final qualification that needs to be made is that a number of the escape and evasion operations supposedly organized by these Nazi networks were in fact carried out secretly by the Catholic Church, the International Red Cross, and various Allied intelligence agencies. It seems probable, in fact, that many of the sensationalistic claims made about ODESSA and the others were primarily designed to distract attention from, and provide a cover for, clandestine operations which were being carried out by these more "respectable" institutions. This is a subject about which a good deal is now known. For example, virtually all of the major Allied powers, including the Soviet Union, secretly set in motion elaborate operations to recruit Axis personnel who possessed skills that were considered to be particularly valuable in the new postwar environment. It is hardly surprising to learn that both the Americans and Russians actively sought to locate and enlist the support of German physicists who were involved in the Nazi nuclear program, since tapping the knowledge of these experts offered each side enormous potential military advantages. Similar programs were soon activated to recruit other scientific experts, including Japanese biological warfare researchers and German rocketry specialists.

Not long afterwards hardliners in various Western government agencies, who rightly foresaw that the Soviet Union was about to become the new main enemy, began making strenuous efforts to attract Axis intelligence and military personnel, especially those with expertise on eastern Europe or extensive experience in unconventional warfare. So it was that many Abwehr, SD, and Waffen-SS veterans, as well as Nazi collaborators from eastern Europe, were secretly recruited and incorporated into U.S.,
British, Canadian, Australian, and French structures which were entrusted with carrying out intelligence, psychological, and paramilitary operations against domestic communists and their masters in Moscow. In the process, many wanted war criminals were offered protection and employment, unbeknownst to other Allied agencies whose mission was to hunt down such criminals and bring them to justice. The recruitment of high-profile criminals like Klaus Barbie was only the tip of the iceberg, whose submerged portions were made up of dozens of SS men, senior personnel from Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry, top collaborators from Nazi puppet states in Croatia, Hungary, Rumania, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia, and Japanese ultranationalists. To facilitate this difficult task in a devastated postwar environment, American intelligence had recourse to the Vatican, whose refugee associations and network of monasteries were ideally suited to provide "humanitarian assistance" to refugees of all nationalities. High-ranking Vatican officials, including Pope Pius XII, thus played a major role in helping Axis war criminals to elude their pursuers and thereby avoid punishment for their terrible human rights violations. Although SS underground networks undoubtedly facilitated the escapes of more than a few of these men, their efforts were clearly overshadowed by the top secret exfiltration operations mounted and run by elements of Western governments and the Vatican.70

The International Waffen-SS Support Network

Alongside these clandestine networks, Waffen-SS veterans organized themselves into a loose association of relatively undisguised "mutual aid" societies in countries throughout Europe. This image of fanatical German SS men forming an extensive international network with their "non-Aryan" comrades may seem incongruous to those
unfamiliar with the earlier historical development of the organization. After all, Hitler and Himmler originally conceived of the Waffen-SS as an elite corps of Aryan "political soldiers" which would constitute both the guardians of the Nazi state (Staatstruppenpolizei) and a microcosmic model of the ruling racial caste in the Gross-Germanisches Reich deutsches Nation that they planned to create.71

However, as Robert Koehl has pointed out, this exclusively "Germanic idea merged in 1942 with a pan-European concept of antibolshevism which survived the war..."72 As early as 1938, Hitler had in principle authorized the acceptance of "non-Germans of Nordic blood" into the ranks of the Waffen-SS, but the large-scale recruitment of Germanic northern and western Europeans and ethnic Germans from eastern Europe (Volksdeutsche) was not undertaken until late 1940 and early 1941. Although certain idealistic German SS officers were initially quite enthusiastic about extending Waffen-SS membership to foreigners and became even more so later, the main reason for this development was much more prosaic—manpower shortages.73 It was thus imperative for the imaginative SS officials attached to the newly-formed Germanische-Freiwillige Leitstelle to attract new sources of recruits. They resolved this problem in part by successfully creating a new myth about the nature of the Waffen-SS. Henceforth it was not so much a Germanic racial elite as a multinational "community of arms" (Waffengemeinschaft), a new pan-European warrior elite whose solidarity would be forged on the battlefield. Later, as brilliant German victories gave way to bloody defeats, it was this myth that provided the justification for opening up the ranks of the Waffen-SS to non-Germanic West Europeans (Walloys and Frenchmen), East European
Untermenschen (Balts and Slavs), and finally even non-Europeans (Turks). By the end of the war, the Waffen-SS contained over half a million troops from more than thirty countries, and afterwards the most active veterans from this corps formed an international network of more or less legal "mutual aid" societies.74

The flagship group and organizational hub of this postwar transnational network was the Hilfsgemeinschaft auf Gegenseitigkeit der ehemaligen Soldaten der Waffen-SS (HIAG).75 Local Waffen-SS support groups were first secretly set up in late 1949 or 1950, if not earlier, but HIAG itself was officially founded in Hamburg in the Spring of 1951 by SS General Otto Kumm and others. Within a few months, hundreds of HIAG branches had been established throughout West Germany and Austria, and in October 1951 it joined the aforementioned Verband Deutscher Soldaten (VdS), an umbrella association for veterans groups.76 HIAG originally consisted of a decentralized network of relatively autonomous local groups, but as time wore on the structure of the organization gradually solidified on the national level around high-profile "moderates" like Kumm and his fellow SS generals, Hausser, Gille, and Steiner. From the beginning, leading HIAG spokesmen declared that the group’s primary tasks were to promote camaraderie, provide social services to its imprisoned or destitute members and their families, help locate or otherwise account for missing Waffen-SS men, oppose the government’s discriminatory legal and economic policies against SS veterans (which were embodied in Article 131 of the Grundgesetz), and rehabilitate the tarnished image of their elite fighting corps. In order to reassure Bonn, Hausser and the others publicly professed loyalty to the postwar democratic order, repudiated the most horrendous crimes of the
Hitler regime, and refused to associate openly with neo-Nazi militants. They also incessantly campaigned to restore the reputation of the Waffen-SS, both at rallies and through HIAG’s successive publications, first *Der Wiking-Ruf* (which was founded by Gille in 1951) and later *Der Freiwillige* (which was edited by Austrian hardliner Erich Kernmayr from 1956 on).

Among other things, this campaign involved distorting history by falsely claiming that the Waffen-SS had been a "fourth arm" of the Wehrmacht, that it had no connection with the Allgemeine-SS, that it had not committed systematic atrocities, and that its ranks were filled with soldiers "like all the others". The Waffen-SS was also depicted, with somewhat more justification, as a multinational pan-European army united in the fight against "Asiatic" Bolshevism, and thus as a forerunner of the proposed European Defense Community, an image which appealed to Cold Warriors in the government and the mainstream political parties. The aim of this campaign was to gain a measure of respectability and thereby attract political support for their demands to be granted pensions, full legal rights, and—once that was accomplished—commissions in the newly-created and rearmed Bundeswehr. This strategy, coupled with the periodic threats issued by HIAG spokesmen to withhold members’ electoral votes or to turn to the East Bloc for tangible support, soon persuaded Bundestag deputies and local politicians to appear publicly and express solidarity, however limited, at HIAG’s periodic "search service meetings" (*Suchdiensttreffen*).

Even this degree of compromise with the Allied-imposed system was too much for the radicals within the organization, however. Although they too were authoritarian...
nationalists, Hauser and the other moderates were increasing attacked for betraying their fundamental principles, besmirching the Waffen-SS's elite status by equating its volunteers with conscripts in regular military units, and accepting, albeit only after certain conditions were met, the rearmament of West Germany within the "mercenary" framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In the face of this agitation from vocal elements of the rank-and-file, SS General Kurt ("Panzer") Meyer adopted a more aggressive public posture when he assumed a leadership position in HIAG following his 1954 release from prison. His more circumspect rivals, meanwhile, were pressured into resigning at an October 1955 meeting at Coblenz. Although Meyer made more fiery and belligerent public statements and was in general very popular, he too was considered a "sell-out" by the radicals for trying to solicit support from untrustworthy bourgeois parties, especially the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), as well as for making other opportunistic "tactical" compromises. In 1958, some of the leading radicals resigned in disgust from the organization's executive committee. Through intensive lobbying efforts Meyer ultimately managed to secure pensions and other rights for former SS men in a July 1961 Bundestag vote. Yet he and his successors nonetheless adopted an increasingly anti-democratic, right-wing, and unrepentant posture. Indeed, sections of HIAG tried to ally with the NPD and other rightist parties during the 1960s, and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) listed HIAG as a right-extremist organization in each of its annual reports between 1972 and 1983. 

This brief sketch of the factional infighting within HIAG during its formative years in and of itself demonstrates that the portrayal of the organization as the legal arm
of ODESSA or Spinne is a gross oversimplification of the real situation. HIAG only represented 20,000 of the 250,000 surviving Waffen-SS members in postwar Germany, and of those only a minority were political extremists who actively opposed the new government; fewer still dreamed of restoring the Third Reich's former glory. Like the bulk of the membership in most of Europe's veterans associations after 1945, the majority of HIAG's members sought above all to reestablish themselves in civilian life and obtain the basic rights and privileges they felt they were entitled to after having honorably served their country. However, the more intransigent, radical factions within HIAG were undoubtedly linked in various ways to the SS underground. It is known, for example, that selected HIAG members were specifically recruited to form a "shuttle service" for Stille Hilfe, and HIAG personnel also reportedly made use of contacts with ODESSA and Spinne in order to keep in touch with ex-SS men overseas. In all likelihood, then, key Nazi activists like Skorzeny and Rudel attempted to penetrate HIAG, secretly manipulate its political activities, and utilize it as a legal "cover" for some of their own clandestine and illicit operations.

What is true of HIAG likewise applies, at least in part, to many of its European branches or sister organizations, which were established in Austria, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Spain. In order to strengthen this international network, the German parent group assigned "liaison men" to maintain regular contacts with its foreign counterparts. The HIAG affiliate in Austria, whose liaison man was Karl Gherbetz, was known as Kameradschaft IV. It was founded in 1957 by Dr. Felix Rinner, Kaltenbrunner's former chief of staff in the RSHA. Rinner was later succeeded by Anton
Bergermayer, who was also the sales representative in Vienna for the Austrian Nationaldemokratische Partei’s publication, Die Wochenzeitung. The Kameradschaft IV group espoused a militant right-wing ideology, published a newsletter called Die Kameradschaft, and was linked to a number of far right and neo-Nazi organizations in Austria, including the paramilitary Kameradschaft Babenberg, the Ulrichsberggemeinschaft, the Verband Österreichischer Kameradschaften, Aktion Neue Rechte (ANR), and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ), as well as the German NPD and HIAG. Of particular interest here is the fact that Rinner allegedly worked together with Erich Kernmayr and former SS Standartenführer Pesendorfer in the clandestine Spinne network after the war, that members of the Salzburg branch of Kameradschaft IV later transported Skorzeny’s corpse from Spain to the "Lehener Hof" in their home town for a ceremony before bringing it to Vienna for burial, and that Bergermayer presented Kernmayr with a silver medal of honor on the latter’s seventieth birthday in order to thank him for his efforts to rehabilitate the honor of the Waffen-SS. It also appears that former SS men affiliated with Kameradschaft IV have periodically provided paramilitary training to young neo-Nazis.83

In the Netherlands, the HIAG branch was the association Hulp aan Invalide Oud-Oostfrontstrijders, Nabestaanden, [en] Politieke Gevangenen (HINAG), many of whose members had earlier been in the "political" faction of the satirically-named Stichting Oud Politieke Delinquenten (SOPD), a broader association of Nazi sympathizers, collaborators, and East Front veterans. HINAG was founded on 27 April 1955, three weeks after the dissolution of the Nationaal Europese Sociale Beweging (NESB), the
Dutch branch of the (soon to be discussed) international Mouvement Social Européen/Europäische Sozialbewegung (MSE/ESB). HIAG’s official liason man to HINAG was Heinz Mellinthin. The leading figures in the latter organization were Jan A. Wolthius and Paul Van Tienen, who had been active in both the SOPD and the NESB, as well as practically every other neo-fascist group in early postwar Holland.84

In Belgium, the comparable group was the Sint-Maartensfonds (SMF), which was established in 1953 to succeed the outlawed Vlaams Verbond van Oud-Oostfrontstrijders. Peter de Vuyst was its HIAG-appointed liason man. The SMF published the monthly Berkenkruis, whose animator was Toon van Overstraeten, and almost all of its sections were in Flanders, although after 1968 a Walloon section was created. The association established a social service fund and a search service, and maintained regular contacts with HIAG, as well as with groups of Flemish political refugees. Although the SMF claimed to eschew political action, it lent its electoral support to the rightist Volksunie (VU) and Berkenkruis was filled with radical right and Nazi-inspired "social racist" perspectives. Moreover, some of the personnel associated with the SMF later became notorious for their right-extremist activities. One important member of the SMF who broke away in 1969 and formed a rival publication aimed at East Front veterans, Piet Peeters, went on to become a leader of the reconstituted version of the Vlaamse Militanten Orde (VMO), an active neo-fascist paramilitary group with extensive connections to international fascist circles. Another breakaway faction, upset over the presence of members who were not East Front veterans and over the irregular financing of the SMF’s social service, formed a new group called the Hertog Jan Van Brabant,
which had its own publication (Periodiek Contact) and its own youth group, the Jonge Wacht. In 1979, elements of the latter attended a conference held by the "new right" Groupement de Recherche et d'Études sur la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE) in Paris.\footnote{85}

In Denmark, the HIAG affiliate was the Dansk Frontkämpfer Forbund. Over 6000 Danes had served in the Waffen-SS under Christian Frederick von Schalburg, who headed the Frikorps Danmarks until his death in 1942, and many of the survivors were later found in the ranks of the Frontkämpfer Forbund. The latter worked closely with certain neo-fascists involved in paramilitary and terrorist activities, for example Konrad Melsen, a member of the Danish branch of the Stockholm-based neo-Nazi Nordiska Rikspartiet (NRP).\footnote{86} In Norway, HIAG's counterpart was the Helporganisasjonen for Krigskadede, which was composed of some of the 8000 Norwegian veterans who had served in Waffen-SS units (like the "Norge" ski battalion and the "Nordland" division) and their supporters. Some members of the Helporganisasjonen later created the Institutt for Norsk Okkupasjonshistorie in Oslo, which glorified the Waffen-SS and sought to rehabilitate the memory of Vidkun Quisling. The Institutt was supported by Folk og Land, the monthly publication of Rolf Christiansen's neo-fascist Nordisk Front, which itself regularly lauded Quisling and Knut Hamsun, another leading collaborator.\footnote{87} Franz Krause was HIAG's liason man to both Denmark and Norway. In Finland, the HIAG branch was known as Veljesapu, and its HIAG liason man was a certain Henrikson in Helsinki.\footnote{88} Further information about this group is practically non-existent in non-Finnish sources.
As for Spain, Patrice Chairoff mentions an "Association of Volunteers for the Crusade", which supposedly comprised members of the División Azul who had fought on the Eastern Front and later in the SS. However, this particular association was not included in a fairly comprehensive listing of political organizations in Spain, so it is probable that either the División Azul veterans group, which formed part of the Junta Nacional de la Confederación de Ex-Combatientes (an umbrella organization for anti-Republican Civil War and World War II veterans), or José Antonio Girón’s Asociación Nacional de Ex-Combatientes was the HIAG affiliate in Spain. On the other hand, it may be that the Spanish branch was made up of German or East European SS veterans who had taken refuge in Spain rather than native Spaniards. This was certainly true of the HIAG branches allegedly founded in Argentina, South Africa, and Australia. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that certain members of this extensive HIAG network were in contact with a considerable array of international and local neo-fascist groups, even though it remains unclear how often they were involved in outright acts of subversion or terrorism.

The European Social Movement

It is now time to turn to some of the early postwar neo-fascist "internationals", transnational networks which made little attempt to disguise their pro-fascist or pro-Nazi sympathies. The initial impetus for re-establishing international fascist "fronts" came from the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), one of the largest and best organized neo-fascist electoral parties in Europe by the end of the 1940s. Certain elements within the MSI were assiduously working to establish contacts with former Nazi functionaries and
neo-fascist groupings throughout Europe, and to this end they had founded the internationally-oriented Centro Studi Europei in Trieste, which then began publishing the Europa Unità journal. In March 1950, a preliminary meeting was held in Rome between MSI representatives, British fascist leader Sir Oswald Mosley of the Union Movement, Falange observers from Spain, associates of Swiss neo-Nazi Guy Amaudruz, members of the Bruderschaft, and French collaborationist politicians like Georges Albertini and Guy Lemonnier. There it was decided to organize another gathering in the autumn, to which various far right European organizations would be invited to send delegates.91

Between 22 and 25 October 1950, this projected second meeting took place in the Italian capital, though it did so in the guise of a "youth conference" and under the formal auspices of the MSI's university student group, the Fronte Universitario di Azione Nazionale (FUAN). Several notorious fascists and collaborators who were soon to play a key role in the "internationalization" of postwar neo-fascism attended this meeting, including Per Engdahl, leader of the Nysvenska Rörelsens (NSR); Maurice Bardèche of the Comité Français National (CNF); Erwin Vollenweider, a Swiss Nazi who later co-founded the Volkspartei der Schweiz/Parti Populaire Suisse (VPS/PPS); Horia Sima of the Rumanian Garda de Fier, and Karl-Heinz Priester, at that time a leader of the radical wing of the NPD. These veteran activists were also joined and encouraged by a number of idealistic youthful sympathizers, including a contingent of FUAN members, as well as by Benito Mussolini's youngest daughter, Anna Maria, and Pierre Péan of the French Cercle International de Relations Culturelles.92 At that meeting, the participants agreed to organize a major conference in southern Sweden the following Spring, and in the
process proceeded to lay the groundwork for the first openly pro-fascist international in the period after World War II.93

In May 1951, between sixty and one hundred delegates from all over Europe gathered at Malmö, Sweden, for three days. Among the participants were Swedes like Engdahl and his chief NSR lieutenants, including Bengt Olov Ljungberg and Yngve Nordborg; Frenchmen like Bardèche, René Binet, Odette Moreau, Gringoire editor Henri Bernard, and Henri Bonifacio, chairman of the Front d’Action Communautaire and editor of La Victoire; Danes such as Arthur Kielsen of the Dansk Reform Bewegelse, Faedrelandet editor Frede Jordan, and Jens Kudsk; Norwegians like Franklin Knudsen and former Quisling associates Einar Jøntvedt and Hroar Hovden; Italians like MSI Deputy Secretary Arturo Michelini and FUAN activists Fabio Lonciari and Giuseppe Ciammarucconi; Mosley and some of his Union Movement comrades from England; Fritz Rössler (using the alias "Franz Richter") of the German DRP; the Swiss anti-Semite Theodor Fischer of the Verband Nationalsozialistischer Eidgenossen; and the Belgian art historian Johann van Dyck, who represented the Vlaams Blok.94 Their immediate practical goals were to rehabilitate the public image of fascism, devise an acceptable common program for all of the participating neo-fascist groups, determine an agreed-upon framework of action, and prepare a list of candidates for the upcoming elections that were planned—but later cancelled—for the European Parliament.95 After deliberating, they formally gave birth to the Mouvement Social Européen/Europäische Soziale Bewegung (MSE/ESB).

Engdahl was elected as the head of the MSE/ESB’s governing "four-man
council", which also originally included Bardèche, Priester, and moderate MSI leader Augusto De Marsanich. Later, this body was transformed into a "study commission", to which were appointed the same four council members, Ernesto Massi from the MSI's left wing, Manuel Ballasteros of Spain, Dr. Roland Timmel and Wilhelm Landig of Austria, Karel Dillen from Belgium, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gayre of Gayre and Nigg, a Scottish nobleman and Knight of Malta. MSE/ESB activists then went about the business of establishing various national branches for their pan-European umbrella organization. These eventually included Priester's Deutsche Soziale Bewegung (DSB) for Germany, Engdahl's NSR for Sweden, the Comité National Français for France, Landig's Österreichische Soziale Bewegung for Austria, the Nederlandse Sociale Beweging (successor of the Werkgemeenschap Europa in de Lage Landen) for Holland, the Norsk Reform Bevaegelse for Norway, the Dansk Reform Bewegelse for Denmark, the NESB for Flanders, the Mouvement Social pour les Provinces Romanes en Belgique for Wallonia, and the Suomen Sociaallinen Liike (SSL: Finnish Social Movement) for Finland. The MSI, in contrast, was only represented by individual members because the party leadership did not want to become officially entangled with a high-profile and potentially compromising international movement. Finally, the MSE/ESB established contacts with over forty non-affiliated extreme right organizations, including representatives of the Falange, various groups of East European refugees, the Asociación Argentina-Europea under the direction of Kameradenwerk chief Rudel, and Edward A. Fleckenstein's miniscule New Jersey-based Voter's Alliance for Americans of German Ancestry. Despite this wide range of associations, the number of MSE/ESB activists in
western Europe never surpassed 1000, and the organization laid no material foundations for the initiation of international action.98

What, then, was the new movement's political orientation? Like most postwar neo-fascist formations, it adopted a pan-European "third force" perspective. In practice, this meant advocating the formation of a federated, independent, and self-sufficient Europe freed from the domination of the two extra-European superpowers, the unification and rearment of Germany, the establishment of a united European army under European command in place of the Atlantic Alliance, the integration of Spain into this projected European federation, and the creation of a new regime which would promote social justice throughout the continent.99 That this regime would have had little in common with parliamentary democracy can be gleaned from the contemptuous dismissal of the latter by Engdahl: "democracy is that majority principle which holds that 51 idiots can get their way in relation to 49 others".100 In addition to formulating these general propositions, at Malmö the MSE/ESB approved a 10-point manifesto which advocated the defense of Western culture against communism, the creation of a Europe-wide empire, the establishment of standardized salaries throughout the continent, the submission of all national military forces to a centralized command structure, the restriction of immigration to those who had already attained "a certain economic and cultural level", the election of government leaders every seven years by means of a plebiscite, the creation of a corporatist state which would regulate economic and social life, the promotion of "strong" men and women through education, the enlisting of the cooperation of all the "idealists" who had fought on opposite sides of the barricades
during World War II, and the spiritual regeneration of man, society, and the state.\textsuperscript{101} Aside from its characteristic Nation Europa elements, this somewhat vague manifesto reflected the ideals of Mussolini or Salazar far more than it did those of Hitler.

Given the intention of the MSE/ESB to field candidates in the forthcoming elections for the European Parliament, it is not surprising that its programmatic statements were specifically moderated in order to attract a measure of popular support. To this end, controversial themes which could be expected to alienate the general European public were intentionally downplayed. The leaders of the new movement not only refused to invoke Mussolini and Hitler as their spiritual forefathers, but also sought to distance themselves from and partially disavow crucial aspects of the policies and criminal activities associated with the two dictators. As regards fascism and Nazism in general, Bardèche had this to say:

\begin{quote}
The MSE believes that fascism and national-socialism belong to the past. It refuses to bring upon them a judgement of condemnation, but it also refuses to revive or imitate political forms that are today superseded. Our ideal is the achievement of social justice and the construction of a social order founded on work: our doctrine can make use of all the experiments of the past, but our ideal is a new one which is only inspired by the present.
\end{quote}

On the subject of racism, the judgement was more severe but no less ambiguous:

\begin{quote}
The MSE condemns theories of racial persecution, but it desires that each race should be reintegrated into its own historic territory.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

Most outside observers have interpreted these quasi-"respectable" public pronouncements as little more than cynical, opportunistic ploys designed to alleviate legitimate public concerns, a view which is to some extent confirmed by the less diplomatic phraseology employed by many of the same MSE/ESB spokesmen in overtly neo-fascist or neo-Nazi
publications with relatively restricted circulations.\textsuperscript{103}

It can be argued, however, that the intellectuals at the helm of this particular "international" were faced with an insoluble political dilemma. It may be that they genuinely sought to divorce themselves from certain elements of classical Nazism which they believed had brought disaster upon the fascist cause, most notably biological racism and the genocidal policies it fueled, but were prevented from doing so because they could not afford to completely alienate their cadres of intransigent followers. It is nevertheless noteworthy that they stubbornly refused to abandon their moderate public stance, despite the fact that this very stance played a key role in precipitating subsequent schisms and the ultimate collapse of their movement.\textsuperscript{104}

Indeed, although the debut conference proved to be a great success on the symbolic level and thus fanned the initial hopes of many participants, the MSE/ESB soon lost the support of much of its own base. In a recent interview, Bardèche attributed the rapid decline of the organization to the failure of its component groups to develop as anticipated, the decision to cancel the elections for the European Parliament, which vitiated its electoral strategy, and the repressive actions and surveillance to which its members were subjected in various European states.\textsuperscript{105} These factors may well have played some peripheral role in the process, but it seems clear that the essential reasons for the failure of the MSE/ESB lay elsewhere. One problem was that not all the members were happy with the authority assumed by the four-man council, which in theory had the ability to override opposition within the national sections. Another had to do with the usual personality conflicts and petty bickering among would-be Führers, a constant
feature of the postwar neo-fascist milieu. Still another had to do with the formally "democratic" and legalistic methods adopted by the organization, which provoked dissatisfaction among groups of youthful ultras who longed to engage in direct revolutionary action. But the chief problem, which quickly became intermingled with and served to exacerbate all the others, was an irreconcilable ideological dispute over racial matters.

As noted above, the leaders of the MSE/ESB purposely downplayed racism and anti-Semitism in their efforts to obtain a new-found respectability. These tactical compromises were bitterly opposed by radical neo-Nazi or "social racist" elements within the rank-and-file. So it was that within a few months of the Malmö conference the racists, led by French neo-Nazi Binet and Swiss neo-Nazi Amaudruz, broke away from the parent organization and decided to form their own rival "international", one that gave explicit priority to racial matters. Thus was born the Nouvelle Ordre Européen/Europäische Neu-Ordnung (NOE/ENO), which soon completely overshadowed the MSE/ESB in practical importance.106 With the passage of time, more and more ultras affiliated with the latter’s component groups, who had previously had no qualms about using the parent body as a cover for their own anti-democratic plotting, became disillusioned with the legalistic and moderate approach adopted by Engdahl and Bardèche. After failing to radicalize the organization from within, these hotheads then followed the earlier schismatics out of the MSE/ESB and into more radical, activist-oriented international formations like the NOE/ENO, the Europäische Verbindungstelle, and Jeune Europe.
Although the MSE/ESB was increasingly riven by factional infighting, the movement did not immediately disappear. For several years it sought to recover from a succession of schisms and regain its earlier organizational influence. It continued the process of consolidating and coordinating the activities of its national branches, extended its network of international contacts further afield, and organized several international conferences in the wake of the successful Malmö gathering. Existing accounts provide contradictory information about the exact number and location of these conferences, but the last MSE/ESB gathering was held in Malmö in 1958. Despite the fact that it attracted 500 attendees, an overtly racist speech by Landig—which was thence harshly criticized by Bardèche in Défense de l'Occident—brought the underlying tensions between the remnants of the movement to a head. Two years later Priester made strenuous efforts to organize a new conference in Wiesbaden, but his death in April 1960 doomed that project, and with it the fate of the MSE/ESB. It is now time to turn to its rivals and successors.

New European Order

In September 1951, a mere four months after the close of the Malmö conference, Amaudruz and Binet presided over an international gathering of unrepentant Nazis and neo-Nazis in Zurich. In the course of this three-day conference, which was ostensibly a meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the so-called "national pioneers", the groundwork for a new fascist "international" was laid. Among the prominent attendees, other than Amaudruz and Binet, were a certain Berti from the Centro Studi Europei in Trieste, Vollenweider from the Volkspartei der Schweiz/Parti Populaire Suisse, and Fritz
Rossler from the German SRP. A delegation from Portugal arrived to "observe" the proceedings, and messages of solidarity were sent to the participants by militants from Belgium (Wallonia), Austria, Norway, Ireland, and England. At the conference, the various delegates worked to establish a rudimentary organizational structure and hammer out an ideological manifesto, and in the end both differed significantly from the approaches adopted by the MSE/ESB. Amaudruz was elected Secretary General of the organization, and several "adjunct secretaries" responsible for different language regions were appointed to assist him, including former Belgian SS man Jean-Robert Debbaudt, ex-SS man Jean Baumann, and several Italians. Unlike the MSE/ESB, however, the NOE/ENO made no attempt to set up its own national sections in different countries. Since new organizations of this type could be viewed as unwelcome rivals by existing neo-Nazi groups in each nation, the leaders of the new international decided to establish close working relationships with the latter, which later chose "national correspondents" to serve as liaisons to the loosely-structured parent body. By the early 1960s, these liaison men included Debbaudt in Belgium, Baumann in Germany, Van Tienen in the Netherlands, Clementi in France, Giuseppe ("Pino") Rauti in Italy, and Zarco Moniz Ferreira in Portugal.

From an ideological point of view, the chief element in the NOE/ENO's program was an explicit and pronounced emphasis on biological racism. This is hardly surprising, given the views of Amaudruz and Binet, its two main theorists. Amaudruz was born in Lausanne in 1920 and later became both a professor of languages and the personal adjutant of Colonel Arthur Fonjallaz, an admirer of Mussolini's who had founded the
Schweizerische Faschistische Bewegung in 1933. However, Amaudruz himself was not so much an enthusiast of Italian fascism as a racial extremist and an admirer of Nazism, and after the war he actively propagated "social racist" doctrines in a series of publications. Binet, whom his rival Bardèche later described as a "fascist of the puritan type", was born in Saint-Nazaire in 1914. He had been a militant in communist (Jeunesses Communistes) and Trotskyist (Groupes d'Action Révolutionnaire) circles during his youth, but between 1934 and 1939 he developed a bitter hostility toward both the Jews and the Soviet Union. After joining the French army and being captured by the Germans during the 1940 campaign, he voluntarily entered the ranks of the French 33rd SS "Charlemagne" Panzergrenadier Division. When the war ended, he was among the first of the diehards to form new fascist parties and publications, and even found the time to write three booklets outlining his biological racist viewpoints. These men helped to draft the ideological pronouncements of the NOE/ENO, which were codified in the so-called "Zurich Declaration" and the "Social-Racist Manifesto" which emerged in the wake of the organization's first congress.

An examination of the last two documents reveals that "defense of the race" was the central element in the NOE/ENO's platform. It occupied pride of place in the 1951 "Declaration", where it was discussed prior to the other announced goals of the organization, "social justice" and "European unity". Moreover, the preface of the "manifesto" began by insisting upon the fundamental importance of the racial struggle, which underlay all human conflict. Blood was viewed as a "primordial phenomenon" that not only served to link human communities "long before historical states", but also lay...
at the root of all civilizations. Since "Aryans", who were glorified as the "creators of all culture" and the "builders of all civilization", were locked in an unceasing life-or-death racial struggle with other, more numerous racial groups, it was necessary for a new European counter-elite to launch a "racial revolution" against the existing "plutodemocratic" regimes whose servile leaders were promoting racial suicide. The goal was to replace these decadent regimes with strong, independent "national worker's states" which would join together in a pan-European federation and adopt an explicitly "biological politics" in order to restore the health of the Aryan racial community. Among other things, this latter would include the regulation of marriages between Europeans and non-whites, the promotion of general population growth, the prevention of interbreeding between mental or physical defectives and healthy specimens, the repatriation of non-white foreigners, the semi-segregation of resident "whites" who belonged to degenerate interbred groups (such as Jews and Turco-Tatars), and the application of various "scientific" techniques to increase the overall quality of Aryan racial stock. Although there were some noteworthy differences, such as the inclusion of Slavs as an authentic branch of the Aryan race, this portion of the NOE/ENO's program nonetheless owed much to Hitler's race-based social Darwinist views.

All other social racist policies grew directly out of this overwhelming concern for the achievement of racial purity and the establishment of Aryan dominance within the confines of Europe, if not beyond. On the geopolitical plane, it led to the adoption of a militant "third force" perspective, in which a united and racially regenerated Europe would oppose the imperialistic designs of both the "Stalinist Mongol state" and "negroid"
or "Judeo-American" capitalism. Therefore, the NOE/ENO not only advocated the repudiation of the Atlantic Alliance, the overthrow of the pseudo-democratic regimes which were subservient to the interests of the Americans and Russians, and the creation of an independent and fully-armed pan-European confederation that could serve as a powerful counterweight to the two "materialist" superpowers, but also—somewhat paradoxically—an alliance between this confederation and non-Aryan peoples of the Near East, the Indies, and South America who sought to free themselves from U.S. and Soviet domination. In a bizarre effort to try and justify this latter policy, Amaudruz claimed that

the hierarchy of races can only be founded on their comparison and consequently on the respect for the peculiarities and the traditions of each. The re-establishment of a certain world equilibrium is only possible if one radically breaks with colonialism, [which is] founded solely on the exploitation of the colored races.

However, the overall flavor of the NOE/ENO's geopolitical appeals is perhaps better captured by Binet's following pronouncements:

Down with the Europe of Strasbourg, down with the Europe of the federalists, down with the Europe of the lackeys of Russian or American imperialism!...Liberate yourselves from the influence of Moscow and Washington!...Join with us to fight the Jewish capitalist, our exploiter, and his accomplice the Bolshevik, the Judaized instrument of a Jewish politics!

It is therefore clear that the "third force" view of these social racists was characterized by a pronounced biological emphasis.

The same was true of its proposed domestic policies. From the NOE/ENO's point of view, "social justice" meant permitting each individual to develop his capacities fully--as long as these were subordinated to and applied in the interests of the "racial
community". The achievement of this goal mandated the formation of new societal elites based upon talent and service to that community rather than ascriptive social status or wealth, the preservation of private property in so far as it was acquired legitimately and not at the expense of the needs of the community, the joint participation of workers and managers in the management of economic production, the provision of jobs to every European who was willing and able to work, the maintenance of healthy working conditions, and the elevation of the cultural standards of every productive member of the community. Although these tenets reflected the general fascist ideal of creating a harmonious and mutually beneficial form of organic class collaboration, one which in theory curbed both capitalist abuses and worker agitation, they were infused throughout with Nazi-style racial themes. These latter were exemplified by Binet's emphasis on the organization of an authoritarian party that would serve as the "vanguard or general staff" of the race, the systematic inculcation of racist and socialist values, and the above-noted measures designed to preserve or restore racial purity and health. The ultimate goal was the creation of a "racist and socialist society" throughout Europe which would be capable of successfully waging the never-ending struggle with other races. It was this brutal racial struggle, rather than the Marxist class struggle or the egocentric individualism promoted by capitalism, which was truly decisive. As Amaudruz put it, the "highest imperative is that of the race...not the current corrupt and degenerate race, but [the race] which we carry in our hearts and will forge in the course of struggle".

These relatively crude biopolitical themes, which reflected efforts by the NOE/ENO's chief theorists to adjust earlier Nazi concepts to the far less propitious
conditions that existed in a bipolar postwar world, nonetheless appealed to successive
generations of neo-Nazi activists. That this was the case, at least on a symbolic level, is
demonstrated by the organization's subsequent development and long-term survival.
Despite being frequently subjected to political and legal harassment by various European
governments, which resulted in several of its meetings being banned and some of its
activists being jailed, it has nevertheless held periodic meetings of its "technical
committee" and sponsored congresses every other year up to the present day. These have
usually been organized without fanfare, if not under "cover", and have only been open
to invited members since the organization achieved a certain level of notoriety and began
to attract the sustained attention of both the authorities and private "anti-fascist" groups.

The NOE/ENO also created a series of less successful and relatively transitory
satellite organizations which it vainly hoped would provide a rallying point for "third
force" activists throughout Europe. Among these were the aforementioned EVS, which
was founded in January 1953 after Binet provoked a schism within the CNF. Once
Bardèche and his more moderate followers had been driven out of the CNF, which was
not a single organization but rather an umbrella outfit that encompassed a plethora of far
right French groups, Binet and Amaudruz sought to establish the EVS as a new
coordinating body for "social racists" dissatisfied with the pusillanimity of the
MSE/ESB. The EVS held its own conferences between 1953 and 1955, which did in fact
succeed in attracting the support of several groups that had previously been affiliated with
the Malmö international, including the CNF itself, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire
Fasciste Belge (a renamed version of the Mouvement Social Belge), and Vollenweider's
But an irreconcilable dispute over the Alto Adige/Süd Tirol conflict, in which the Italian and French groups opposed the German and Austrian groups, led to the dissolution of the organization in 1955.\textsuperscript{123} Still another NOE/ENO project was the Junge Europäische Legion established in 1958, which sought to unite nationalist youth groups throughout western Europe in the struggle against communism and Americanism, but this particular initiative failed to attract widespread support and soon died with a whimper.\textsuperscript{124} Finally, the neo-Nazi international founded a "think tank" and publishing house in Montreal, the Institut Supérieur des Sciences Psychosomatiques, Biologiques et Raciales. This organization, which was headed by Dr. Jacques Baugé-Prévost, specialized in publishing "scientific racist" treatises by the Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Alfred Rosenberg, Georges Vacher de Lapouge, and French collaborator Father Georges Montandon, as well as the works by Binet and Amaudruz.\textsuperscript{125}

The real importance of the NOE/ENO did not lie within its own initiatives or organizational structure, however. Instead, it served as a convenient "umbrella" under which extremists affiliated with paramilitary groups from various nations could meet to plot subversive, violent actions aimed at undermining democratic regimes and eradicating their political opponents. As will become clearer, many leading NOE/ENO officers or "correspondants" were themselves members of such extremist groups, including Amaudruz, Rauti, and Moniz Ferreira. Three examples of this sort of secret operational planning can be used to illustrate what was in all probability a far more widespread practice. In March 1967, at the ninth NOE/ENO meeting held just outside Milan, there
was open talk of instigating a military coup in Italy.\textsuperscript{126} In April 1969, at the tenth NOE/ENO Congress in Barcelona, ON representatives advocated the operational unification (\textit{unione operante}) of European national-revolutionary groups and discussed subversive strategies with pro-Ustaša Croatian exiles.\textsuperscript{127} And in March 1975, at an international neo-fascist meeting in Lyon attended by Amaudruz and representatives of Ordine Nuovo, Avanguardia Nazionale, and Lotta di Popolo, a discussion about the tangible measures to be taken in response to a recent crackdown on right-wing ultras by the Italian authorities took place.\textsuperscript{128} This sort of practical plotting appears all the more ominous, given the fact that NOE/ENO-linked circles in Italy were directly involved in the "strategy of tension" and the likelihood that its supposedly secret gatherings were riddled with infiltrators manipulated by various Western secret services.\textsuperscript{129} The alleged involvement of Amaudruz, François Genoud, Bauverd, and Hubert de Bergard in arms trafficking, whether on behalf of the Algerian FLN, South Tyrolean terrorists, or other parties, should also be noted in this context.\textsuperscript{130} Thus, even if the NOE/ENO's earlier notoriety was in fact disproportionate to its "skeletal forces", it would be unwise to view it as an insignificant network made up of harmless fascist nostalgics until further research has been conducted on these lesser-known clandestine dimensions of its activities.\textsuperscript{131}

**Young Europe and its Offshoots**

Perhaps even more important in this regard was Jeune Europe (JE), an international neo-fascist network created by Belgian optician Jean-François Thiriart, one of the most interesting and intriguing figures associated with the postwar radical right. He began his political activism before the war in liberal left circles, specifically the Jeune
Garde Socialiste, but later embraced nationalism and joined the rightist Légion Nationale. During World War II, Thiriart—like so many other misguided left-leaning fascists—had become a member of the collaborationist Amis du Grand Reich Allemand (AGRA) organization, and as a result he was imprisoned and deprived of his civil rights for a number of years after 1945. Later, seeking to capitalize politically on the growing resentment in Belgium over the threatened loss of its Congolese colony, he joined an ultra-nationalist pro-colonial group that had been founded by respected but patriotic anti-Nazis, the Comité d'Action et de Défense des Belges en Afrique (CADBA). CADBA had been hastily organized in the wake of the 8 July 1960 mutiny of the colonial Force Publique in Leopoldville, the Congolese capital, and its headquarters were thence established at the "Tanganyka" café in Etterbeek. On 10 July it distributed thousands of leaflets to returning colonists at the Melsbroek aerodrome and sponsored a demonstration in support of military intervention together with an ad hoc Rassemblement pour la Défense de l'Oeuvre Belge au Congo, an offshoot of the Association des Fonctionnaires et Agents de la Colonie. Eleven days later the first edition of CADBA's new publication, Belgique-Congo, appeared, which mixed an intransigent pro-colonial stance with an anti-parliamentary and Poujadist-style domestic program. This populist but essentially conservative program did not satisfy the political longings of Thiriart and his cadre of radical supporters, including Paul Teichmann and Émile Lecerf, who then determined to recreate the movement in their own image. After a brief period of infiltration and behind-the-scenes manipulation, Thiriart and his faction skillfully managed to assume control over CADBA, which they then renamed the Mouvement d'Action Civique (MAC).
This revamped organization soon took on a number of overtly "fascist" trappings and characteristics. For example, MAC-Jeunes sections composed of university and high school students were formed and then outfitted with blue shirts bearing Celtic cross armbands, a symbol made popular in the postwar era by the Mouvement Jeune Nation in France and then adopted by the OAS. Special MAC shock troops were also recruited, largely from right-wing members of various paratrooper associations, such as the official Amicale des Parachutistes for post-World War II military veterans and the "private" Club National de Parachutisme, which also received funds from the Defense Ministry. Weapons were illegally hoarded, karate training was provided to the MAC-Jeunes, and paramilitary training camps were set up. Given the movement's involvement in these bellicose activities, it should come as no surprise to learn that the MAC increasingly had recourse to direct action. Its militants carried out a series of dramatic and spectacular protest actions, including one against the June 1961 summit meeting in Vienna between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev and several in support of the OAS and the Katangese successionist movement of Moïse Tshombe. As a result of its initial demands for the retention of European colonies in Africa, the MAC received funds from the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, Tshombe's forces, and later the OAS, along with unspecified "material assistance" from the Portuguese secret police. The MAC’s shock troops also engaged in a number of violent confrontations with left-wing demonstrators and counterdemonstrators, during one of which Thiriart himself was wounded. Finally, the MAC established links with a wide variety of right-wing groups, both nationally and internationally. In Belgium these included authoritarian corporatist
groups like the Parti National Belge, ultra-royalist outfits like the Organisation de Salut Public, the ultraconservative Rassemblement National, the pro-colonial Amitiés Belgo-Katangaises, and Pierre Joly’s subversive Jeunesse Nationales. Although the total number of hardcore MAC militants inside Belgium probably never exceeded 350, approximately half of whom were former colonists or paratroopers, the extensive network and dynamic leadership of the MAC lent it a degree of influence and power that was out of all proportion to its limited numerical strength.

However, it was the transnational contacts which the MAC fostered that accounted for the organization’s larger historical significance, especially in connection with the transmission of unconventional warfare techniques to new generations of neo-fascist extremists in western and southern Europe. Among the many organizations with which the MAC was linked were the Mouvement Jeune Nation, the Étudiants Nationalistes Français, Robert Martel’s Mouvement Populaire du 13 Mai (MP13), and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National pour l’Algérie Français in France, Mosley’s Union Movement in Britain, the anti-communist John Birch Society in the United States, diverse groups of ultras in Spain and Portugal, and above all the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète. Indeed, Thiriart went out of his way to forge intimate personal connections, not only to influential Nazi activists like Otto Skorzeny and Hans-Ulrich Rudel, but also to the most radical elements of the pro-Algérie Française movement in France, including OAS leaders like Colonel Antoine Argoud, Captain Pierre Sergent, and Captain Jean-Marie Curutchet, and in the process turned the MAC into the "principal agent" of the OAS in Belgium. The support which the MAC offered to the OAS took a number of different
forms, ranging from the relatively innocuous to the truly subversive. Thus the MAC’s journal Nation-Belgique—the successor to CADBA’s Belgique-Congo—regularly published the OAS’s bulletin, Appel de la France, as a supplement. On a more sinister note, it also published secret coded messages for clandestine OAS networks in Algeria. Thiriart’s friend Teichmann and Raoul Bauwens, one of the leaders of MAC-Jeunes, were apparently the operational chiefs of the MAC’s OAS support networks. In February 1962, growing indications that the MAC was providing tangible assistance to the OAS prompted the Belgian authorities to authorize a police raid on the former’s headquarters, its post office box, its bank accounts, and the homes of several of its leaders. The following month Thiriart and two other MAC members, Willy Godeau and Claude Dumont, were arrested along with an OAS agent named Maduche for stealing municipal employee identification cards from the town of Asse and passports from the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Although Thiriart was later released due to lack of evidence, the other three spent time in jail.

Moreover, the MAC did not only aid the OAS directly, but also provided logistical aid to OAS fugitives through the intermediary of other organizations or fronts. One of these was the Centre d’Études et de Formation Contre-Révolutionnaire, which had been founded at Tournai on 1 February 1961 by José Delplace and Jean-Claude Absil, two MAC activists. Not coincidentally, Tournai was one of the Belgian cities near the French border, along with Mons, Namur, and Profondeville, where the OAS had established bases and safe houses. The leaders of the center sought to establish a network of priories and claimed to be inspired by counterrevolutionary Catholic integralist
doctrines, not only those of long dead traditionalists like Joseph de Maistre and current dictators like Salazar, but also the modern, totalistic, activist variants promoted by Frenchmen such as Georges Sauge of the Centre d'Études Supérieures de Psychologie Sociale (CESPS) and Jean Ousset of Cité Catholique. It should therefore come as no surprise to learn that one of the main Belgian supporters of the Centre at Tournai was General Émile Janssens, former commander of the Congolese Force Publique and an open sympathizer of the OAS, that the center was used to smuggle OAS commandos across the Belgian border, or that on one occasion Delplace's girlfriend was stopped at the wheel of an automobile filled with OAS tracts printed in Belgium. Furthermore, according to leftist press accounts the Centre housed a radio transmitter that was used to send messages to OAS leader Joseph Ortiz in the Balearic Islands.

Perhaps even more important was the role played by Pierre Joly's Jeunesses Nationales. Joly began his political career as a member of the left-wing Étudiants Progressistes at the University of Liege in 1949 and 1950, but then quit and began actively collaborating with the Belgian branch of the Union Démocratique pour la Paix et la Liberté organization, an international CIA-funded anti-communist front created in Paris in March 1949. In 1952, he founded a short-lived École Internationale de Cadres Anti-Communistes and published a pamphlet praising Franco and Salazar. Later that same year he appeared in Algiers right around the time of the notorious bazooka attack on General Raoul Salan. Five years later he published an anonymous treatise on guerre révolutionnaire specialists within the French Army, such as Commandant
Jacques Hogard and Colonels Gabriel Bonnet, Charles Lacheroy, and Roger Trinquier, which soon became a sort of *vademecum* for right-wing subversives in Algeria and Europe.\(^{146}\) In May 1958, he participated in the Algiers demonstration which precipitated the collapse of the Fourth Republic alongside Pierre Lagaillarde, a right-wing student activist and future leader of the OAS. He then worked closely with the MP13, and became the Belgian spokesman for Joseph Ortiz upon his return home. Indeed, up until September 1961, Joly collected money for Ortiz using the Aide Mutuelle Européenne organization as a cover. Between 1960 and 1961, he helped sponsor and contributed to the monthly publication *Réac*, the organ of the Étudiants Nationales. His own Jeunesses Nationales organization was the first Belgian group to establish a close relation with French activists, and after the assassinations of FLN activist Akli Aissiou and pro-FLN professor René-Georges Laperches in Belgium by the so-called "Main Rouge", a front group created by the French secret service which was used to carry out politically sensitive *opérations ponctuelles*, Joly's organization was suspected of having lent its support to the killers.\(^{147}\) In January 1962, Joly and René Boussart were accused of sheltering General Salan in Liege, though this was never actually proven. Shortly thereafter, the MAC denounced Joly as a traitor to the OAS, a police informant, and a crook, but this did not prevent Teichmann from restoring and thence maintaining close personal relations with him.

Even so, Belgian journalist Serge Dumont is probably wrong to characterize the Jeunesses Nationales as little more than a convenient screen behind which the MAC carried out illegal or subversive actions.\(^{148}\) What appears more likely is that Joly was
seeking to manipulate various neo-fascist groups, including Thiriart’s organization, on behalf of certain intelligence agencies or parallel security services. His earlier connection to the Paix et Liberté organization certainly suggests this, as do his links to figures such as Roger Cosyns-Verhaegen and Suzanne Labin. Cosyns-Verhaegen, who was in contact with Joly in 1960, was the owner of the Les Ours publishing house in Brussels, which he used as a vehicle to publish a series of studies on communist subversion and counterrevolutionary warfare doctrine. In the mid-1960s, he appeared as an editor of Thiriart’s *Nation Européenne* publication, the organ of Jeune Europe’s successor organization, and together with Thiriart and Gérard Bordes he organized an international "work camp" at Torices in Spain in January 1966, whose participants placed flowers on the grave of martyred Falange chief José Antonio Primo de Rivera. A few years later, Cosyns-Verhaegen became a regular contributor and technical advisor to the Centre de Défense National, a right-wing "think tank" funded by the Ligue Internationale de la Liberté (LIL), the Belgian branch of the intelligence-linked World Anti-Communist League (WACL). Moreover, due to his connections with the Étudiants Nationales through Réac, Joly inevitably came into contact with Labin, an indefatigable anti-communist propagandist who was one of the founders of the Internationale de la Liberté organization—which was also known as the Union pour la Défense des Peuples Opprimés—and subsequently a leading LIL activist. She apparently served as the main liason between the latter and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), a key member of WACL which received funds from the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies.

Yet despite this intensive pattern of political activism, all was not well with the
MAC. Aside from being periodically subjected to harassment or crackdowns by the authorities, the movement was bitterly divided into a Belgian nationalist (belgiciste) faction and a pan-European "third force" faction. Thiriart was the animator and chief representative of the latter, and as time wore on he adopted an increasingly radical, left-leaning fascist position, largely due to the influence exerted by syndicalist Henri Moreau and René Dastier. As a result of these developments, the more conservative members of the MAC began drifting away and joining moderate organizations like the Parti National Belge, which had long been denounced by the MAC for being too "soft". In April 1962, as if to symbolize his organization's ever-growing radicalism, Thiriart renamed it Jeune Europe (JE) and reorganized it into a clandestine network of localized communist-style cells. One month earlier, he had met in Venice with leaders of the MSI, Adolf von Thadden of the German NPD, and Oswald Mosley of the Union Movement in an attempt to organize a continent-wide National Party of Europe (NPE), but this effort had quickly been derailed because the leaders of the German and Italian parties clearly had no real intention of subordinating the autonomy of their own organizations to a larger entity under someone else's control. In the meantime, Thiriart made contact with a number of smaller and more radical neo-fascist groups, as well as with famous World War II figures like Kameradenwerk chief Rudel, in an effort to enlist their support for the creation of local branches of JE in every European country. This effort met with considerable success, since JE soon founded branches in countries all over the world, including Jong Europa in Flanders, Jong Europa in Holland, Jovem Europa in Portugal, Joven Europa in Spain, Giovane Europa in Italy, Junges Europa in Austria, Junges
Europa in Germany, Young Europe in Britain, Eurafrika in South Africa, Jeune Europe in Switzerland, Europan in Brazil, Unga Europa in Sweden, the exile Rumanian Europa Tanara, and Joven América groups in Argentina, Columbia, Uruguay, and Ecuador. It could be, however, that in some cases these foreign affiliates consisted of little more than a handful of individuals who had set up a post office box, as opposed to a bona fide branch with a well-organized structure.\textsuperscript{153}

Ideologically, Thiriart was one of the first fascist leaders to attempt to jettison and replace the nostalgic Nazi-inspired concepts which served to rally so many neo-fascist extremists in the early postwar period. As early as August 1961, in an editorial he wrote for the MAC's weekly, \textit{Nation-Belgique}, he declared that fascism had perished in 1945 and insisted that "the members of the MAC are not Fascists, if for no other reason because we have not the slightest desire to have any contact with a corpse, however skilfully it may have been embalmed".\textsuperscript{154} But this was merely the opening salvo in a succession of increasingly radical and original assaults on conventional neo-fascist views, a developmental process that was uneven and not always consistent. Take, for example, the "Manifeste à la Nation Européenne", a document prepared by Thiriart and other would-be leaders of the National Party of Europe in the wake of the aforementioned 4 March 1962 meeting in Venice. Therein it was argued that the Frenchmen who were fighting to maintain control over Algeria were fighting on behalf of all Europeans, a standard right-wing view which clashed sharply with Thiriart's later expressions of sympathy toward anti-colonialist struggles and "national liberation" movements. Nevertheless, some themes which appeared in this manifesto prefigured his subsequent
ideological formulations, and undoubtedly reflected his own unique contribution. The
document began with the now familiar "third force" slogan, "neither Moscow nor
Washington", and went on to promote the establishment of a united "communitarian"
Europe armed with its own nuclear weapons and capable of liberating eastern Europe
from the grip of the "Bolshevik dictatorship". In contrast to the decadent, subservient
Europe that then existed, a virile new Europe would "carry on the struggle against both
Communist and American imperialism", replace "chattering and corrupt
parliamentarianism" by a "direct, hierarchical, stable, and LIVE democracy", abolish the
class struggle, and tolerate capitalism only if were "civic, disciplined and controlled by
the nation".155 Thiriart's advocacy of a Nation Europa, like that of Mosley and other,
more farsighted fascist leaders, was based upon the recognition that older, parochial
forms of nationalism could only provide a "cardboard barrier" against Soviet and U.S.
power in the post-1945 world.156

These increasingly frequent attacks on national chauvinism and Nazi-style racism,
which reflected Thiriart's adoption of various left-leaning geopolitical and syndicalist
concepts, helped to bring the underlying conflicts between different factions of JE to the
surface. This process was exacerbated by other, more prosaic factors, such as the drying
up of sources of external funding following the "loss" of Algeria, the bitter
disagreements between different JE sections over the Alto Adige/Süd Tirol question,
Thiriart's decision to run electoral candidates in 1964, and the growing personal friction
between the vainglorious and authoritarian Thiriart and other leading JE figures like
Teichmann. The result of all these stresses and strains was a series of expulsions and
schisms which frittered away the numerical strength, internal cohesion, and overall influence of this activist "international". For example, the Flemish Jong Europa section was expelled by Thiriart in May 1963 for exhibiting "neo-Nazi" tendencies, prompting its leaders to create the rival Europafront with some German and Austrian comrades. In November, former MAC-Jeunes leader Bauwens quit and went on to form the Belgian branch of the German Stahlhelm organization. In 1964 Teichmann, Moreau, and Lecerf broke away, together with the Fédération Général des Étudiants Européens, JE’s student wing, and thence established a succession of rival entities which incorporated some of Thiriart’s social and economic themes, including Révolution Européenne and the Front National Européen du Travail. That same year, in September, the racist and philo-German extreme right wing of JE in Wallonia was expelled. Thirteen months later Jean Van den Broeck, who was then serving as the head of JE’s labor union, the Syndicat Communautaire Européen, quit and founded the Union des Syndicats Communautaires Européens. These major breakaways were emblematic of a more diffuse process of fission that increasingly afflicted JE. Although this process severely undermined the organizational integrity and effectiveness of JE, it did not deter Thiriart from moving further and further to the left. This was reflected not only in a process of continued ideological radicalization, but also in a pattern of tangible collusion with certain far left regimes and groups.

In October 1965, Thiriart dissolved JE and incorporated the rest of his loyal followers into a new organization, the Parti Communautaire Européen (PCE). The PCE in turn gave birth to a new publication in January 1966, La Nation Européenne. But the
key works delineating Thiriart's increasingly radical ideology are *Un empire de 400 millions d'hommes*, which offered an elaborate extension of many of the positions he had already set forth in the 1962 "manifesto", and *La grande nation*, a more concise version arranged in programmatic form. The essential purpose of these works was to generate a new myth, in the Sorelian sense of the term, capable of galvanizing all those Europeans who felt frustrated by the prevailing weakness and humiliation of their own nations in relation to the two superpowers. Thiriart hoped to create a new European consciousness by promoting the revolutionary myth of a greater Europe united by its traditions, its culture, its history, its current circumstances, and above all its future destiny. His Europe had nothing in common with the Europe of the "conventional nationalists [who] are against Europe...[or] the democratic Europeanists [who] are for a Europe without nationalism"—it was "a Europe with a pan-European nationalism", one which ranged from Brest to Bucharest. This would be a well-armed, powerful, and neutral Europe that would develop a mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship with Africa, an alliance with Latin American countries which were struggling against both "Yankee imperialism" and "communist subversion", a friendship with the Arab world on the basis of vaguely-defined "parallel interests", a relationship of equality with the United States once Europe had been freed from "Yankee economic and military tutelage", and "neighborly" relations with the Soviet Union after the Red Army had withdrawn from eastern Europe and agreed to re-establish the frontiers of 1938. Thiriart felt that Europe should be prepared to take any steps necessary to accomplish these grandiose schemes, even if it meant "allying itself with the Devil". In the end, he had no
qualms about urging an alliance with communist China so as to enable Europe to "settle accounts with America and its accomplices from Moscow". This pro-Beijing and Third World orientation represented quite an innovation within neo-fascist circles at the time.

The internal institutional arrangements Thiriart envisioned for his Nation Europa were naturally geared toward achieving and maintaining these geopolitical aims. His proposed "communitarian" alternative evoked the standard "neither communism nor plutocracy" slogan and presented itself as a "third way" that would transcend the manifest shortcomings of those twin materialist evils. However, the creation of such an alternative depended upon a "radical transformation of [Europe's] political and social structure". The first step would be the building of a European "combat party" with a "centralized, [highly-]structured, and hierarchical" clandestine apparatus, which would foment, organize, and eventually lead a series of popular revolts all over Europe. This revolutionary vanguard party would then form the nucleus of an authoritarian state ruled by an "authentic chief" with foresight, decisiveness, and charisma. Only such a powerful pan-European regime would be capable of protecting the new "national-communitarian" society, and once established it would embark upon its economic and social program.

This program was predicated upon the absolute subordination of economic activity to greater Europe's political aims. The scheme to be adopted was a corporatist structure characterized by class collaboration, private ownership of light or service industries, joint worker-owner management of the less important heavy industries, and direct government management of critical large-scale industries. Activities which would be forbidden
included the exploitation of workers by bosses, strikes, the extraction of wealth for speculative rather than direct use, business interference in politics, collusion with foreign capitalists, and anything else that might weaken the state or the solidarity of the national community. Thiriart was insistent that the only way for nationally-oriented socialists on the continent to avoid being dominated by U.S. multinationals was to create an autarchic and highly-productive economic unit on a Europe-wide scale. In the wake of Yalta, he felt that it was no longer possible to build and sustain "true socialism" in smaller, traditional nation-states. Finally, racism of all sorts was downplayed, though not entirely suppressed, in Thiriart's convoluted and grandiloquent schemes.

The PCE carried the left-wing elements of this program to their logical conclusions, and its anti-Americanism began to overshadow even its anti-communist sentiments. One very important reflection of this was the establishment of tangible links between the group and the People's Republic of China. Thiriart had begun promoting the idea of a European alliance with communist China as a counterweight to U.S. and Soviet power even before the transformation of JE into the PCE, but, perhaps taking to heart his own admonition that allying with the Devil would be preferable to remaining under the yoke of American and Soviet imperialism, he began trying to translate these abstract geopolitical notions into reality. In 1966, after making contact with the Beijing government through the intermediary of the Rumanian Departamentul de Informatii Externe (DIE), Thiriart travelled to Bucharest to meet with Zhou Enlai. Shortly thereafter, he began exchanging information about the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and NATO installations in Belgium with Yang Xiaonong, chief
of the Parisian bureau of the Xinhua news agency, and Wang Yujiang in Brussels, both of whom were operatives of the Chinese secret service (Tewu). Needless to say, this created consternation among many of his followers, a growing number of whom decided to abandon the movement. In late 1968 the PCE was officially dissolved, after which Thiriart seems to have withdrawn from politics altogether for a number of years.

In the early 1980s he resurfaced, without having tempered his iconoclastic approaches to political action in the intervening years. During this period, Thiriart began openly praising features of the Soviet Union. In the July 1984 issue of Conscience Européenne, a new Thiriart-inspired publication, he expressed his preference for the Komitet Gosudarst'vennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) over both the Catholic Church and Lech Walesa of Solidarnosc, and then went on to make these equally provocative remarks:

The USSR displays other very positive facets: its centralism, its size, its totalitarianism [and] its army...If Moscow wanted to create a Russian Europe, I would be first to recommend resistance to the occupier. [But if] Moscow wanted to build a European Europe, I would promote total collaboration with the Russian venture. In that case I would be the first to place a red star on my helmet. A Soviet Europe, yes, without hesitation...We have the temperament of Stalinists, but of Stalinists who are familiar with Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Pareto. We want to open up the way for a new Stalin. A European Stalin.

Besides revealing that Thiriart was foolishly repeating the very same errors he had earlier committed when he had naively supported the creation of a united, Nazi-dominated Europe, these statements represented a complete reversal of his previous views about the optimum pattern of geopolitical alliances for his beloved Nation Europa. Taking cognizance of the immense, geometrically-expanding population of communist China, as well as its opportunistic improvement of relations with the United States, he now argued
that Europe needed to ally with the Soviet Union in order to free itself from continued American domination and defend itself against the Asian masses that ultimately threatened to swamp the continent's ethnic integrity. His new European empire would extend from Reykjavik to Vladivostok, not merely from Brest to Bucharest!170

Even more interestingly, he began to express open solidarity with left-wing terrorist groups, in particular the Belgian Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC), whose chief fault, in his eyes, lay in the fact that they had initiated armed struggle against NATO and its American backers prematurely. He also chided them for their lack of a pan-European ideology and their failure to adopt a Leninist-style method for seizing power. Nor did he refrain from lauding the Libya of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and other anti-American regimes in the Third World.171 French journalist René Monzat has expressed doubts about whether these attempts to display solidarity and promote joint actions with the far left were genuine. He suggests that the apparent lack of interest displayed by Western security agencies in Thiriart's recent pro-communist and anti-Atlantic activities would be inexplicable--unless he was working as some sort of double agent on their behalf.172 Such neglect is all the more peculiar given Thiriart's earlier "collusion" with communist Chinese intelligence operatives and his subsequently acknowledged links with certain East Bloc secret services, especially since it contrasted markedly with the attention the Belgian police had paid to the MAC's earlier activities in support of the OAS. There are thus some legitimate grounds for suspicion, and if it could be shown that Thiriart's espousal of leftist ideas and establishment of links to leftist groups or regimes represented an attempt to infiltrate that milieu and launch
provocations, a large portion of the history of neo-fascism and postwar right-wing terrorism might have to be rewritten.

However, this sinister interpretation fails to give sufficient weight to the flowering of genuine left-leaning tendencies within a number of radical neo-fascist groups in the late 1960s and 1970s. Although this development occurred during the very same period in which Western intelligence agencies began to make extensive use of right-wing agents provocateurs, especially in the period after the dramatic events of 1968, these parallel trends need to be separated analytically and distinguished from each other in order to grasp the complexity of the history of neo-fascism in that era. It is all too easy to conflate or confound the two processes, particularly in the absence of clear evidence, an error that is even easier to commit since in practice the former development greatly facilitated the success of the latter. In other words, the fact that a number of neo-fascist grouplets existed whose political views had honestly been influenced by some of the ideas associated with the New Left made it easier for right-wing provocateurs working for the state to penetrate and manipulate both left fascist groups and actual left-wing organizations. It would be hasty, then, to claim that the promotion of certain leftist notions by the leaders of Jeune Europe and the PCE was not genuine, especially since their stubborn adherence to these notions precipitated major internal divisions, schisms, and defections which seriously weakened their own organizations. Indeed, to argue that Thiriart had been serving as a double agent or provocateur all along would be to deny that he was a genuine iconoclast and a pioneer in the postwar ideological development of fascism, an assessment which is certainly not warranted given the current state of the
There can be no doubt at all, however, that JE played a crucial role as an intermediary in the process of transmitting various unconventional warfare techniques, specifically French counterinsurgency doctrines and methods, to neo-fascist activists throughout the European continent. To some extent this was an organic process which stemmed naturally from two interrelated characteristics of the organizations under Thiriart’s control. On the one hand, the MAC had developed close operational linkages with various clandestine OAS networks, especially those operating in Europe. On the other, JE served as the chief organizational hub around which radical neo-fascist activists from all over the world gravitated during the mid-1960s. Some cross-fertilization of ideas and techniques between disaffected military personnel and their right-wing civilian supporters was therefore probably inevitable. But it was the willingness of Thiriart to experiment with novel left-leaning concepts, coupled with his enthusiasm for aspects of the revolutionary methods employed by experts such as Lenin, Hitler, Mao, and the OAS, which really accounted for Jeune Europe’s importance in connection with the subsequent evolution of right-wing subversion and terrorism. Had he not argued, at one point, that “plastic explosives will be the megaphone of anti-Communism in the latter half of the twentieth century”? Indeed, in addition to serving as a cadre training school for militants who exerted an enormous influence on the later development of almost every Belgian far right organization, it was precisely this predilection for clandestine operations which lent Jeune Europe its overall historical significance and differentiated it from the largely symbolic, talk-oriented "internationals" like the
MSE/ESB. In this sense JE was a sort of forerunner of Aginter Presse, the front organization which functioned as a key transmission belt for guerre révolutionnaire techniques to Italian extremists who were later implicated directly in the "strategy of tension".

Aginter Press and the OAS International

Of all of the postwar right-wing "internationals", none was as important as the decentralized network of "action" groups established by former members of the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète, most of whom had taken refuge in foreign lands following the failure of their efforts to preserve French control over Algeria and topple the Fifth Republic. This OAS diaspora had an enormous impact on the subsequent campaigns of violence carried out by extreme right paramilitary groups, not only in Europe but also throughout areas of the "Third World" where bitter colonial and anti-communist struggles were being waged. Between 1966 and 1974, the Lisbon-based Aginter Presse was the primary vehicle through which intransigent OAS veterans and their neo-fascist supporters launched counterrevolutionary and counterguerrilla operations. The personnel who carried out these operations more or less consciously sought to apply certain techniques that were associated with the politicized French counterinsurgency doctrines subsumed under the name guerre révolutionnaire. Therefore, a brief summary of the development of these doctrines needs to be provided before Aginter Presse can be considered.

Following the traumatic defeat of the French expeditionary corps in Indo-China at the hands of the Vietminh, certain of France’s most brilliant and battle-hardened junior
officers became obsessed with trying to understand how a relatively ill-equipped peasant army had overcome one of the most experienced and professional fighting forces in the world. As a result, they immersed themselves in the military writings of Mao Zedong and other communist theorists in order to acquaint themselves further with the enemy's techniques of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.\textsuperscript{175} On the basis of these studies and their own first-hand experiences in southeast Asia, they developed a potent counterrevolutionary doctrine which eventually came to dominate French military thought in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{176}

Put simply, guerre révolutionnaire wedded a simplistic and Manichean geopolitical conception to a fairly sophisticated array of operational techniques. In regard to the former, it held that the Third World War between the West and its intransigent communist foe had already begun, but under a new guise. Nuclear weapons had made large-scale conventional war impractical and potentially suicidal, so the communists had devised and launched a new type of "subversive warfare" to destroy Western civilization. Rather than engaging in a direct confrontation, the Soviet Union was waging "remote control" or "surrogate" war by stirring up discontent in the Third World, particularly within the territories of colonial empires. The ultimate goal was to strip the West of its resources and isolate Europe geopolitically, thereby creating the preconditions for its total defeat. From this perspective, all so-called decolonization or national liberation struggles were seen as being communist-inspired and serving Soviet ends.\textsuperscript{177} Moreover, this Third World War was viewed as a total war being waged on all fronts. It was no longer possible for Western nations to concern themselves solely with military measures, for in
communist subversive warfare such measures were inextricably linked with political, social, psychological, and especially ideological elements. To protect themselves from this multidimensional assault, the West had to rally behind a coherent, monolithic doctrine that could successfully oppose the totalitarian doctrine of the communists on equal terms.

From an operational standpoint, the guerre révolutionnaire theorists described communist revolutionary strategy as a combination of partisan (guerrilla) warfare and psychological warfare. According to their analysis, its primary objective was to "conquer" the population, not to seize strategic territory as in conventional war. They had been amazed at the extent to which the Vietminh had retained the support of the population of Vietnam, but rather than examining the underlying historical and social causes of this allegiance, they focussed on the organizational and psychological techniques used by the guerrillas to assert their control. These were identified as the creation of "parallel hierarchies", clandestine cross-cutting vertical and horizontal organizational networks that tightly enmeshed each person in an elaborate, all-encompassing infrastructure geared toward exerting social control, as well as providing an alternative to the existing governmental institutions; the skillful and systematic application of action psychologique, which included both mass propaganda directed at groups and "thought reform" employed against particular individuals, and the ruthless but controlled utilization of terrorism, whether selective or indiscriminate, to intimidate the population and complete its psychological separation from the incumbent regime. However, it is important to note that the French theorists did not see these as
discrete or successive processes, but rather as different components of a single coordinated effort to gain control of the population; indeed, they felt that it was precisely this fusion of methods that made subversive war so dangerous and effective.

Having thus defined enemy techniques, the proponents of guerre révolutionnaire sought to devise ways of countering or neutralizing them. Most concluded that to gain the upper hand in the struggle against international communist subversion, it was necessary to adopt the enemy's totalitarian methods and turn them against their creators. Therefore, the young colonels experimented with varying combinations of these techniques to keep Algeria French and, in the process, avenge the army's earlier humiliations in Indo-China, Morocco, Tunisia, and at Suez. But their zeal to apply totalitarian solutions throughout Algeria was not shared by the majority of the Army, the government, or the French population. As a result, despite some notable successes achieved with guerre révolutionnaire methods, for example the destruction of the rebel Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) network in Algiers in 1957, the bitter war dragged on without definitive resolution, causing the government to waiver in its commitment to Algérie Française. This official vacillation completed the alienation of the guerre révolutionnaire officers, who had already become deeply estranged from the French public and regime due to the apathy and pusillanimity the latter groups had displayed during the Indo-China war. Feelings of betrayal and abandonment again welled up inside them, and many decided that the only way to retain control of Algeria and recover their lost honor was to apply guerre révolutionnaire techniques against their own countrymen and thereby morally regenerate France itself, a subversive attitude fanned
by extremist groups in both Algeria and the métropole. ¹⁸⁸

The stage was thus set for the fateful alliance between the disaffected practitioners of guerre révolutionnaire, especially those within the Army's 5th (Psychological Action) Bureau or commanding elite paratroop or Légion Etrangère units, and civilian pied noir ultras, an alliance that soon bore fruit in a series of insurrections in Algiers—the 13 May 1958 coup, "barricades" week in January 1960, and the "general's putsch" of late April 1961—which brought down the Fourth Republic and threatened the political survival of its Gaullist successor. ¹⁸⁹ Eventually, elements of the same forces joined together in the clandestine OAS, which applied numerous guerre révolutionnaire techniques, first to prevent France from abandoning Algeria and later to overthrow the Fifth Republic and replace it with an état musclé capable of rallying the nation behind its efforts to confront international communism. ¹⁹⁰

What needs to be emphasized here is how this alliance between anti-democratic military personnel and civilian ultras affected both groups and thereby provided a foundation for subsequent right-wing terrorism. The rebellious colonels, who had been seeking to develop a powerful counterrevolutionary ideology capable of resisting communism on its own fertile terrain, were offered several by civilian extremists. The most important of these were "national Catholicism", which was promoted in slightly different versions by militant far right lay organizations like Ousset's Cité Catholique and Sauge's CESPS, and "national communism", a doctrine promoted by radical neo-fascist groups like Jeune Nation (JN). Both doctrines had their adherents within the armed forces and thence within the OAS, which was divided between an integralist wing led by
Colonel Pierre Château-Jobert and a fascist wing dominated by Colonel Argoud.

On the other hand, right-wing extremists throughout the world were galvanized by the exploits of the seditious guerre révolutionnaire officers who led the military revolts in Algeria, and those in the superheated Algerian milieu were indoctrinated with the theory's tenets and more or less systematically trained in their application by elite, battle-hardened military personnel. To be sure, many pied noir and even metropolitan ultras had already developed strong links with official security agencies. For example, some had been recruited into the "Main Rouge" or its parent organization, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), in order to eliminate the FLN's support network in Europe and prevent supplies from reaching rebel forces in Algeria, whereas others had provided services for the Army's 2nd (Intelligence) Bureau or various police apparatuses. Moreover, the Algerian colons had established several paramilitary "counterterrorist" groups on their own, most of which were later incorporated into the OAS. But at that point they were directly exposed to the most advanced techniques of clandestine organization, action psychologique, and above all terrorism. OAS experts were even sent elsewhere to help European supporters of the organization accomplish various tasks. In the end, however, the suppression of the OAS forced many of its members to flee abroad where, in return for asylum and other amenities, they offered their considerable skills to help train foreign counterinsurgency and parallel police units. This is why many have viewed the OAS as the embryo out of which emerged a number of later right-wing terrorist internationals.

As noted above, Aginter Presse was itself a product of the OAS diaspora. Its
founder Yves Guillou, alias "Ralf Guérin-Sérac", was a veritable prototype of the "lost soldier". He was a French Army veteran who had fought in Korea, where he received a United Nations medal and the American Bronze Star and allegedly served as a liaison man between SDECE and the CIA, as well as in Indo-China, where he was wounded twice and awarded other medals for bravery. After being promoted to Captain in 1959, he was assigned to the 11th Demi-Brigade Parachutiste de Choc, a special "dirty tricks" unit under the direct control of SDECE, which was then stationed in Oran. He subsequently deserted and became the leader of an OAS commando unit in the Oran area. Upon the declaration of Algerian independence in June 1962, he took refuge in Spain, where he helped Chateau-Jobert form the Mouvement de Combat Contre-Révolutionnaire and then became a member of the directorate in Georges Bidault's Conseil National de la Résistance, an offshoot of OAS-Métro. At the end of 1962 he moved to Portugal, the last colonial empire that appeared to be willing to defend Western civilization, in order to continue the struggle against communist imperialism. Upon his arrival in Lisbon, he established contact with old Vichy period exiles and other OAS fugitives, and was introduced to the Portuguese authorities by former Pétain supporter and ultra-nationalist pro-Salazar editorialist Jacques Ploncard d'Assac. Guillou was thence hired as an instructor for the paramilitary Legião Portuguesa, and later employed to train counterguerrilla units of the Portuguese Army. Meanwhile, several of his former OAS comrades had made their way to Lisbon, and together they decided to form an international anti-communist organization of their own. Fortunately for them, the Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direcção Geral de Segurança (PIDE/DGS)
was then attempting to set up covert intelligence networks using foreign personnel in various African countries. So it was that this much-feared secret police agency, utilizing complicit officials within the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Affairs Ministry as intermediaries, began financing Guillou to the tune of 2 million escudos per month. Thus was born Aginter Presse and its satellite organizations.

Most of our knowledge about Aginter Presse derives from one of those fortuitous accidents of history that periodically permits the general public to obtain a brief but tantalizing glimpse of the clandestine and covert operations which are an omnipresent feature of modern political life, in both authoritarian and democratic states. Indeed, had the leftist military personnel in the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) not succeeded in overthrowing the Portuguese dictatorship in April of 1974, it is doubtful whether the operations of Aginter would ever have come to light. After seizing control of Lisbon and other key areas of Portugal, with the enthusiastic support of considerable sections of the population in the central part of the country, one of the MFA’s first goals was to dismantle the repressive apparatus of the former regime. On 26 April a contingent of MFA troops broke into the main PIDE/DGS headquarters on Rua António Maria Cardoso in the capital, where they found a vast archive chronicling fifty years of authoritarian rule. On 21 May, in the course of their interrogation of a PIDE/DGS agent, MFA soldiers learned about the existence of a certain press agency which had closely collaborated with the secret police. The following day they searched a recently abandoned office at Rua das Praças 13, where they discovered the archives and technical support section of Aginter, which allowed the agency to produce false identification papers and
documents from different nations, radio equipment, explosives, and specialized weaponry. Shortly thereafter, they raided its deserted headquarters at Rua de Campolide 27, also in Lisbon. The materials they found at these two offices provided them with an enormous amount of information about right-wing intelligence-gathering, subversion, and terrorism in various parts of the world. A contingent of soldiers then transported this mass of documents to the fortress at Caxias, which had long been used to intern the political prisoners of the regime, both during the period of the Estado Novo and after. A team of investigators, headed by Commander Abrantes Serra and a naval infantry Captain named Costa Correia, was then entrusted with conducting a detailed examination of this material. On this basis, a number of intelligence reports were prepared by the post-coup Portuguese security service, and copies of selected documents from the hoard at Caxias were provided to judicial authorities in Italy and a handful of journalists specializing in the study of neo-fascism. It is on the basis of these documents, whether directly or indirectly, that the following account is based.

The Agence Internationale de Presse, or Aginter Presse, was apparently named after a 1930s anti-Komintern organization headed by Armand Bernardini. The new version was formally established in September 1966 and did in fact serve as an actual press agency. Among other things, it syndicated articles in various right-wing media outlets and published its own bi-monthly bulletin called Veritas Ubique, which was originally printed in Lisbon but later published in Dieppe by ex-OAS man Jean Vannier. According to the header of this bulletin, whose motto was "It's better to light a candle than curse the darkness", Aginter had correspondents in Algiers, Bonn, Buenos Aires,
Brussels, Geneva, La Haye, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Praetoria, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Saigon, Taipeh, Stockholm, Tel-Aviv, Tokyo, and Washington. Much of the "news" disseminated by its correspondents, however, contained a certain amount of intentionally misleading disinformation. But the agency's main function was to camouflage the activities of what French journalist Frédéric Laurent referred to as a "center of international fascist subversion" which was divided into several interlinked components, including:

* an espionage office "covered" by the PIDE/DGS and purportedly linked, through that agency, to the U.S. CIA, the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Spanish Dirección General de Seguridad (DGS), the Greek KYP, and the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS),

* a unit that specialized in recruiting and training mercenaries in the arcane arts of modern unconventional warfare, in this case based upon guerre révolutionnaire concepts,

* a strategic center for coordinating "subversion and intoxication operations" that worked in conjunction with right-wing regimes and politicians on every continent, and

* an international "action" organization called Ordre et Tradition, which had a clandestine paramilitary wing known as the Organisation d'Action contre le Communisme International (OACI).

Most of the personnel recruited for this organizational complex consisted of OAS veterans, former military officers, neo-fascist ultras, and rightist intellectuals.
Among these the most important, aside from Yves Guillou himself, was Robert Leroy, who had an extraordinarily lengthy career as both a right-wing political activist and a specialist in intelligence and covert operations. He had formerly been a member of Charles Maurras' Action Française, the prewar Cagoule terrorist underground, the Carlist Requeté militia forces during the Spanish Civil War, Vichy intelligence, the Waffen-SS's "Charlemagne" division (with the rank of Hauptsturmführer), and Otto Skorzeny’s commando force, for which he served as an instructor. After the war he spent seven years in prison for collaborating with the enemy, but following his release he went to work for both NATO intelligence and the BND in the period between 1958 and 1968. From 1968 to 1970, according to his own admission, Leroy collaborated with Guillou at Aginter until his left-wing cover was "burned" by various journalists and he lost his ability to continue conducting "infiltration and intoxication" operations. Others who formed the core group of the action-oriented Ordre et Tradition were Jay S. Sablonsky (alias "Castor", "Jay Salby", "Hugh Franklin", and several other pseudonyms) of Philadelphia, who apparently was affiliated in some way with American intelligence; ex-paratroopers Jean Vallentin (Aginter’s legal director), Guy Mathieu, and Jeune Nation activist Jean-Marie Laurent (alias "Jean-Marie Lafitte"); Army veteran Guy d’Avezac de Castera (alias "the Baron" and "the Vicount"); Aginter’s general administrator; former infantry officers Jean Denis Raingeard de la Bletière (alias "Jean Denis"), Alain Moreau, Jean Emmanuel Justin, and Pierre-Jean Surgeon; Alain Gauthier, who had been appointed by Sergent as the Conseil National de la Résistance's representative in Spain; Jean-Marie Guillou, Yves’ brother; pied noir activists Georges Cot, an Army veteran, and Jean
Brune, an ex-OAS man and author of several books; corporatist theoretician Henri Le Rouxel; Hugues Stéphane Hélie, a former activist in the Fédération des Étudiants Nationalistes (FEN) and the Comité Tixier-Vignancourt; nationalist theoretician Jacques Ploncard d'Assac; mercenary chief Jacques Depret; José Vicente Pepper, former Information Minister of the Dominican Republic under the dictator Rafael Trujillo; and four Portuguese ultras, specifically José de Barcellos, José Valle de Figueiredo, Armando Marques de Carvalho, and Zarco Moniz Ferreira, leader of the neo-fascist Jovem Portugal group.  

Moreover, shortly after the agency’s creation, its operatives made extensive efforts to establish links with extreme right organizations and personalities throughout the world. In both January and April of 1967, Ordre et Tradition hosted meetings in Lisbon which were attended by representatives of neo-fascist organizations from various countries in Europe and South America, with the aim of enlisting their support for the creation of a worldwide network of "correspondents". Close links were thereby solidified with extremist neo-fascist groups such as Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale in Italy, Ordre Nouveau and the FEN in France, the Kinema tes 4 Augoustou (K4A: 4th of August Movement) in Greece, Jeune Europe and its successors in Belgium, Jovem Portugal and Ordem Novo in Portugal, Fuerza Nueva and the Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa (CEDADE) in Spain, and elements of both the NOE/NEO and the World Union of National Socialists (WUNS), an international neo-Nazi umbrella organization. But Aginter did not restrict its efforts to making contact with youthful neo-fascist ultras, it also established liaisons with Catholic integralist and ultraconservative
forces, including some that were linked to various Western secret services. Among the agency’s foreign contacts, for example, were Suzanne Labin and her husband Eduard, Belgian right-wing activist Florimond Damman, the editors of Rumanian and Ukrainian exile publications, and a number of right-wing Italian journalists connected to the Italian security and intelligence organizations, including Giano Accame of the Roman daily Il Tempo and Giorgio Torchia of Agenzia Oltremare. Due to these far-reaching connections and the strength of its institutional base of support in Lisbon, Aginter exerted an influence far beyond its own limited numerical strength.

The history of Aginter Presse can be divided into two major phases. In the first, which began in 1966 and ended in 1969, the agency initiated a series of operations aimed at weakening and destroying guerrilla groups operating in Portuguese Africa. These were undertaken at the behest and with the direct assistance of the PIDE/DGS and other organs of the Portuguese government. In the second phase, which lasted from 1969 until Aginter’s formal dissolution in 1974, agency personnel offered their specialized guerre révolutionnaire training to a number of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, and were in fact hired to provide it in Guatemala and post-Allende Chile. During this period, the organization was no longer subsidized by the Portuguese state, although its Lisbon apparatus was still "covered" by the PIDE/DGS. Following the April 1974 leftist coup and the dismantling of both the secret police and Aginter, many of the two services’ former operatives later resurfaced in clandestine paramilitary organizations like the ELP, the Frente de Libertação das Açores (FLA), Antiterrorismo ETA, the Soldat de l’Opposition Algérienne (SOA), and the Organisation de l’Afrique Libre.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to delve into the entire history of Aginter Presse, it is necessary to focus attention on two of its activities that shed considerable light on features of the "strategy of tension" in Italy. As noted above, one branch of Aginter was charged with the training of mercenaries and terrorists. To accomplish this task, the agency set up facilities at specially-designated Legião Portuguesa and PIDE/DGS training camps, and offered an intensive three-week course that included both theoretical instruction in the tradecraft of unconventional warfare (including methods of action psychologique, intelligence gathering, clandestine communication, and infiltration) and hands-on training in sabotage and urban terrorist techniques (including the use of explosives and other specialized weaponry). For this purpose, Guillou prepared a mini-manual for the "perfect" terrorist, Missions spéciales. Among the key subjects covered in this manual were the purposes of subversion and terrorism, sabotage methods, the use of explosives, the handling of weapons, special operations, maintaining security, surveillance, liaison techniques, conducting and resisting interrogations, the administering of poisons, sedatives, and hallucinogenic drugs, and other sorts of lessons for secret agents. The following passages have particular relevance in connection with the types of terrorist actions that characterized the "strategy of tension":

*Subversion acts with appropriate means upon the minds and wills in order to induce them to act outside of all logic, against all rules, against all laws: in this way it conditions individuals and enables one to make use of them as one wishes.

*Action psychologique [is] a non-violent weapon [used] to condition public opinion through the use of the press, the radio, conferences, demonstrations, etc...with the goal of uniting the masses against the authorities.
*Terrorism breaks the resistance of the population, obtains its submission, and provokes a rupture between the population and the authorities... There is a seizure of power over the masses through the creation of a climate of anxiety, insecurity, and danger. *Selective terrorism...destroys the political and administrative apparatus by eliminating the cadres of those organs. *Indiscriminate terrorism...destroys the confidence of the people by disorganizing the masses so as to manipulate them more effectively.  

According to Guillou, there was a logical progression of terrorist acts from the elimination of individuals in order to stun public opinion to the elimination of important officials in order to destabilize the administrative apparatus, the elimination of lesser officials and natural elites in order to disrupt society, the destruction of infrastructures in order to disorganize the economy, and, finally, the carrying out of attacks and general sabotage in order to provoke the paralysis of a given region. Not surprisingly, most of those who passed through Aginter's guerre révolutionnaire course were drawn from the ranks of European neo-fascist organizations, and some of these were later implicated in bloody terrorist actions.

Perhaps even more importantly, "the infiltration of pro-Chinese [Maoist] organizations and the use of this [leftist] cover was one of the great specialties of Aginter". Such methods were explicitly advocated by Guillou in his terrorist manual. In the section on violent demonstrations, for example, the former OAS man recommends that "the infiltrators at a demonstration should situate themselves strategically within the midst of it in order to cause it to disintegrate". From this choice position, "they can carry out violent provocations against the forces of order, thereby inciting the cycle of action-repression-reaction". In the section on covert operations, he insists that selected personnel should scrupulously observe the rules of "cover" by adopting false identities...
as journalists, identities that could be lent credence through the use of skillfully-forged documents or genuine documents that had been surreptitiously acquired.\textsuperscript{220} Although Guillou and Leroy both later denied—vehemently but falsely—that they had anything to do with terrorist atrocities, the latter openly bragged about the agency's success in carrying out infiltrations and provocations.\textsuperscript{221} His evident pride in these accomplishments was hardly misplaced. At the end of 1965, even before the creation of Aginter, Guillou and his men commenced operations in Portuguese Africa with the objective of liquidating guerrilla leaders, installing informants and provocateurs in genuine resistance groups, and setting up false national liberation movements that were roughly analogous to the pseudo-Mau Mau "countergangs" that Brigadier General Frank Kitson had earlier formed in Kenya.\textsuperscript{222}

Somewhat later, Aginter found the perfect vehicle to use as a front for its operations—the Parti Communiste Suisse/ Marxiste-Leniniste (PCS/ML), an ostensibly Maoist organization headed by Gérard Bulliard. The Aginter man responsible for arranging this was Robert Leroy. With support from the communist Chinese embassy in Berne, which not coincidentally provided a convenient cover for the Tewu's main headquarters in Europe, he persuaded Bulliard to hire him and other Aginter personnel as correspondents for the PCS/ML's paper, \textit{L'Étincelle}.\textsuperscript{223} Armed with these credentials, Leroy and Jean-Marie Laurent were able to penetrate "liberated territory" in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique in order to "interview" several African guerrilla leaders. After doing so, they engaged in intoxication operations to provoke dissension within the resistance movements, and Leroy's machinations may have played
some role in the bombing that killed Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) leader Eduardo Mondlane. In addition to their African ventures, Aginter "correspondents" also infiltrated the Portuguese opposition in western Europe by posing as Maoist journalists. These examples, which could doubtless be multiplied, provide a general indication of the important role played by Aginter Presse in utilizing and thence in transmitting guerre révolutionnaire methods to the European extreme right. It now remains only to reveal the link between former OAS or Aginter personnel and leading members of the Italian neo-fascist organizations which carried out the "strategy of tension".

The Italian Components of the "Black International"

The three main neo-fascist groups that were repeatedly implicated in terrorist massacres in Italy were Pino Rauti's Ordine Nuovo and its offshoots, Stefano Delle Chiaie's Avanguardia Nazionale, and the Padua cell headed by Franco Freda. In 1954, Ordine Nuovo was established as the organizational base of the ultra-rightist faction within the Movimento Sociale Italiano, which was then divided into a radical right inspired by the example of the Waffen-SS and the elitist ideas of Italian "traditionalist" philosopher Giulio Cesare ("Julius") Evola, a centrist, pro-Atlantic conservative majority which sought to obtain a much-needed legitimacy within the postwar parliamentary system, and a radical left which looked for its inspiration to "fascism of the first hour" and the quasi-socialist Verona Charter promulgated in 1944 by Mussolini's Salò rump regime. In 1956, having been thoroughly disgusted and disillusioned by the close victory of the centrist "double-breasted suit" faction at the party's congress, the leading
members of the Centro Studi Ordine Nuovo officially broke with the MSI and transformed the center into an autonomous extraparliamentary cadre organization. From that point on, Ordine Nuovo served as a rallying point for intellectuals and youthful militants who received paramilitary training and regularly engaged in direct actions against the radical left, disorderly protests against the bourgeois system, and—as would later become clear—terrorist provocations. The group’s ideological views, which initially consisted of a relatively vulgarized mixture of neo-Nazi "social racist" and elitist Evolan conceptions, were disseminated by a bimonthly journal, Ordine Nuovo, as well as other bulletins like Noi Europa and Corrispondenza Europea, which had a decidedly internationalist bent. In the Fall of 1969, Rauti’s decision to bring Ordine Nuovo back within the fold of the MSI, then led by a sympathetic Giorgio Almirante, led to a schism within the former and the creation of the Movimento Politico Ordine Nuovo by intransigent elements headed by Clemente Graziani, the son of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. Several years later, in 1973, the MPON was belatedly banned by the government for attempting to "reconstitute the fascist party", a course of action which was in theory prohibited by the so-called Scelba Law.226

The founder and principal leader of Ordine Nuovo throughout most of its history was Pino Rauti. At the age of seventeen Rauti enlisted in the "M[ussolini]" battalion of the Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana, the militia of the Republic of Salò, and the following year was promoted to Second Lieutenant. After being captured in combat on the Po front, he was imprisoned in a series of Allied internment camps and ended up at POW Camp 211 at Algiers, where he made contact with former veterans of the "Giovani
Fascisti" battalion of the Bir el Gobi unit. He subsequently managed to escape from the camp and enroll in the Falangist "El Tercio" unit in Spanish Morocco before being recaptured by the English and returned to Algiers. In February 1946 he was imprisoned in Camp S at Taranto, but was released at the end of the year. He then joined the newly-created MSI and became a national youth leader and member of the party's Central Committee. This, however, was not enough to satisfy his craving for activism. In 1948, he helped Enzo Erra give birth, first to the fortnightly La Sfida, and later to the publication Imperium, both of which were inspired primarily by the doctrines of Evola. By the end of 1949, he was among the chief activists in the clandestine Fasci di Azione Rivoluzionaria (FAR), a neo-fascist paramilitary group which was subsequently involved, sometimes beneath the façade of Legione Nera, in a series of terrorist attacks in the early 1950s. He was then arrested and tried, along with Evola himself, Clemente Graziani, Fausto Gianfranceschi, and several others for forming a criminal gang, trying to reconstitute the fascist party, and carrying out acts of violence. Following his release from prison ten months later, he returned to the ranks of the MSI. Shortly thereafter he helped to consolidate, with the encouragement of Evola and Almirante, the intransigent radical right corrente within the MSI by establishing the Centro Studi Ordine Nuovo. He was later implicated, along with many other Ordine Nuovo militants, in serious incidents of right-wing violence, the most important of which was the December 1969 Piazza Fontana bomb massacre.

For its part, Avanguardia Nazionale Giovanile was founded in 1959 by Stefano Delle Chiaie and other extremists who considered both the MSI and Ordine Nuovo too...
tame. Like ON, AN arrayed itself on the radical Evolan wing of the neo-fascist spectrum and bitterly denounced the moderate bourgeois elements at the helm of the MSI, although its ideological views were less sophisticated than those propounded by Rauti’s group and it attracted more marginal social elements. It was, even more than ON, a group geared toward direct action rather than sterile philosophizing. As one early AN militant later claimed, "we didn’t give a fuck for ideology, we were just angry...and wanted to hit back".\textsuperscript{229} A later AN pamphlet had this to say: "We are for man-to-man engagements...Before setting out our men are morally prepared, so that they learn to break the bones, even of someone who gets down on his knees and cries".\textsuperscript{230} From the very outset the organization was prominently involved in a series of street battles with the left, particularly when communist-sponsored events or workers’ demonstrations were organized. As early as 1962, the judicial authorities nearly imprisoned and fined Delle Chiaie, but the sentence was overturned the following year. This omnipresent threat from the judiciary nonetheless prompted Delle Chiaie to dissolve the group in 1966 and return to the protective shelter provided by Almirante’s faction within the MSI.

But AN’s sudden disappearance was more \textit{pro forma} than real, since its "former" members and cadres kept in regular clandestine contact with one another and continued to participate, ostensibly as isolated individuals, in political demonstrations, paramilitary training camps, and acts of political violence. In other words, the group merely went further underground in order to avoid being banned outright. As the 1960s wore on and political tension and polarization proceeded apace, however, personnel from AN became increasingly involved in infiltration and provocation operations designed to manipulate...
and discredit the far left. In late 1970 Adriano Tilgher formally revived AN at the behest of Delle Chiaie, who had been temporarily forced to take refuge in Spain to avoid being arrested in connection with the Piazza Fontana bombing, but six years later the group was officially banned by the Italian government after its members were found guilty of reconstituting the fascist party.²³¹

Stefano Delle Chiaie, the charismatic founder of AN, was undoubtedly one of the world’s most dangerous right-wing terrorist leaders during the 1960s and 1970s. In spite of being nicknamed "il Caccola", Roman slang for "shorty", his career was so much larger than life that a brief summary barely does it justice. He began his political career at a very young age as a militant in the local MSI Appio section in Rome, which he became the Secretary of in 1957. One year later, however, he had grown so disillusioned with the party’s moderate orientation that he led some of his loyal followers out of the MSI and formed a short-lived group called the Gruppi di Azione Rivoluzionaria. When this effort failed to take off, he temporarily joined Ordine Nuovo and managed to lure several sympathizers away from Rauti’s organization. Within a short time he broke away from ON and created AN, which quickly gained notoriety for launching brutal "punitive expeditions" and, toward the end of the 1960s, various sorts of covert operations against the extraparliamentary left.²³² After being implicated in the Piazza Fontana affair, he became a fugitive in Spain but continued to visit Italy at regular intervals even though he was wanted by the Italian police. In early 1971 he was directly implicated in Prince Junio Valerio Borghese’s abortive December 1970 coup, after which he again fled to Spain along with Borghese and several Italian neo-fascists.
Delle Chiaie's original patrons in Iberia included the Duke of Valencia, the very same nobleman who had earlier welcomed and thereafter maintained close personal relationships with Degrelle and Skorzeny; Falangist ultra and former Labor Minister José Antonio Girón, who was later involved in anti-constitutional efforts to maintain "pure" Francoism in the period leading up to the Caudillo's impending death; Mariano Sánchez Covisa, head of the paramilitary GCR; and perhaps Skorzeny himself. Soon after he managed to open up a restaurant in Madrid, "El Apuntamiento", which served as a gathering place for right-wing extremists, especially for fugitive Italian terrorists who were later recruited to carry out covert operations against anti-Franco Spaniards and Basques sympathetic to the ETA. This phase of Delle Chiaie's career was interrupted when a Spanish journalist exposed his association with the restaurant in 1976. One year later, in the wake of a police raid on a neo-fascist weapons factory run by Italian fugitives and owned by Sánchez Covisa on Calle Pelayo in Madrid, Delle Chiaie left Spain and spent several years living in various South American countries before being captured and extradited to Italy from Venezuela in 1987. Throughout much of this period in exile, however, he travelled to and from Italy with relative impunity and masterminded a number of terrorist operations in the peninsula.

As for Giorgio ("Franco") Freda, the young lawyer began his political activities in the 1950s as an MSI member and local Fronte Universitario di Azione Nazionale (FUAN) leader in Padua. In 1963 he abandoned the overly tepid MSI, then joined ON and went on to form his own study circle and publishing house, the Gruppo di Ar, which held regular gatherings, published a number of anti-Semitic and fascist tomes, and from
1965 on served to provide cover for a loosely organized "action group" that carried out acts of political violence. Given his activist orientation, it was only a matter of time before Freda gravitated toward other like-minded extremists, including Giovanni Ventura, who edited the journal Reazione. Freda was formally introduced to Delle Chiaie in 1965, and by August of the following year had become Ordine Nuovo's representative in Padua. These links with AN and ON were further strengthened in subsequent years, and in the process Freda became increasingly involved in acts of violence and outright terrorism. Throughout the course of 1969, his Padua cell carried out a series of operations aimed at manipulating Maoist groups, as well as an ever-growing number of terrorist bombings which culminated in the terrible 12 December massacre at a bank in Milan's Piazza Fontana. After initially focussing their attention almost exclusively on a number of anarchist bands, the police arrested Freda in 1970 for his involvement in these bombings after a friend of Ventura's made some startling revelations to the authorities.

In addition to being extremely active and linked to one another in myriad ways, each of these key neo-fascist groups shared three important characteristics. First of all, they established an extensive network of contacts with neo-fascist paramilitary groups and far right organizations throughout the world. Secondly, they worked in close cooperation with hardline elements from a number of Western secret services. Third, as a result of these contacts they were indirectly or directly exposed to the full spectrum of techniques associated with French counterrevolutionary warfare doctrine, including the use of systematic terrorism, psychological warfare, and different types of "false flag"
operations, techniques which they later applied with varying degrees of success during several phases of the "strategy of tension" in Italy. Indeed, it was precisely these sub rosa institutional connections and their familiarity with sophisticated unconventional warfare methods which differentiated such groups from garden-variety neo-Nazi thugs and lent them a degree of historical importance out of all proportion to their numerical strength.

Ordine Nuovo was undoubtedly the most assiduous of the three organizations in seeking to establish links with right-wing extremists abroad. Rauti began making contact with neo-fascist groups in other countries even before the official creation of ON, and by the end of the 1950s his organization served as the contact point in Italy for radical neo-fascists from all over the world. He was among those ultras who supported the activities of Amaudruz’s Lausanne-based "international", the NOE/ENO, and by the early 1960s—if not earlier—he became its "national correspondent" for Italy. In addition to attending or sending representatives to virtually every NOE/ENO Congress from the mid-1950s on, Rauti made certain that the NOE/ENO’s pronouncements were regularly reprinted in Ordine Nuovo and Noi Europa and also arranged for ON to host Amaudruz’s 1958 and 1967 Congresses in Milan. In this way, ON's leaders were able to establish closer connections with other extremist groups affiliated with the NOE/ENO, including the Portuguese organizations headed by Zarco Moniz Ferreira and similar groups in Spain, West Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland, as well as various associations of pro-fascist East European refugees. It is thus not surprising to discover that Rauti periodically wrote articles for the Coburg-based Nation Europa journal, which

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served as an important forum for diverse neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups throughout the European continent, many of which were affiliated with the NOE/ENO.\textsuperscript{237}

But it was not until the renewed outbreak of anti-colonial strife in Africa, the seditious French military revolts in Algeria, and the formation of the OAS that these contacts took on real operational importance, since at that point ON and other Italian neo-fascist groups began actively supporting the OAS’s desperate struggles against both Algerian nationalists and the government of the Fifth Republic. Indeed, Rauti personally organized public demonstrations on behalf of the OAS, and certain key ON personnel were identified by the Italian secret service as being among the principal agents of the OAS in Italy. For example, Rauti’s ON co-leader Clemente Graziani later proudly admitted that he had carried an OAS membership card and had helped procure large quantities of weapons for the organization.\textsuperscript{238} It was through these activities, and the shelter ON ultras secretly provided to OAS fugitives in Italy, that they came into contact with other activist groups like Jeune Europe. ON was undoubtedly in close touch with the succession of Belgian neo-fascist groups headed by Thiriart, since articles by key figures associated with JE appeared regularly in its main publication, \textit{Ordine Nuovo}.\textsuperscript{239} Moreover, in return for promoting the maintenance of Belgian control over the Congo, ON allegedly received funds from Thiriart and various powerful financial institutions, including the Union Minière de Haut-Katanga, which still had extensive economic interests in that vast, mineral-rich country. Even more significantly, groups of young ultras from ON and the Italian section of JE, which was itself composed of elements from Giovane Nazione and ON, visited special training camps in Belgium and West
Germany to "learn techniques of OAS and Nazi propaganda", and the OAS also set up bases in Italy in order to give them "refresher courses". In this way, members of Rauti’s organization were exposed early on to guerre révolutionnaire techniques, whether directly by OAS personnel or indirectly through the intermediary of JE.

The OAS connection also accounted for the later development of links between ON and Aginter Presse, about which there is some reliable documentary evidence. Among other things, a file card for Rauti was found in the section of the Aginter archives which contained materials relating to the agency’s Italian "correspondents". Moreover, numerous letters were found therein that had been written to Yves Guillou, apparently on Rauti’s behalf, by Armando Mortilla, director of the FIEL Italiana-Notizie Latine press agency in Rome. Despite Rauti’s later denials, these letters provided evidence, not only of collaboration on the informational and moral levels, but also in the operational sphere. In 1967, for example, Mortilla wrote a letter to Guillou concerning the organization of "recreational and instructional camps" designed to facilitate a vast collaboration between like-minded European groups, a letter he closed by asking for suggestions about what sorts of actions to undertake. And at the end of 1968, Rauti and his organization allegedly cooperated with Aginter operatives in a joint project to recruit several Italian neo-fascists into the Portuguese Army. Most importantly of all, it was in the midst of the materials submitted to Aginter by Mortilla that a vitally important document was found which appeared to be a veritable blueprint for the forthcoming "strategy of tension", "Notre action politique", whose contents will be divulged and assessed below. Nor did ON look only to western Europe for such international
allies. Rauti also developed very close contacts with Plevris' K4A after the 1967 coup in Greece, so much so that he subsequently became one of the key intermediaries between Italian and Greek ultras.243

Initially, Delle Chiaie seems to have been less interested in making contacts with neo-fascist groups abroad, but his attitude must have changed around the time that he joined ON. During the early 1960s, he made several visits to Spain, Austria, and West Germany in order to solidify his international connections, and in 1962 he may have attended the neo-Nazi conference in Cotswald, where British National Socialist Movement chief Colin Jordan and American Nazi Party leader George Lincoln Rockwell signed an agreement setting up the World Union of National Socialists. It was also around this time that AN personnel began making regular appearances at NOE/ENO Congresses.244 But, as in the case of ON, it was the OAS that acted as the medium through which AN attained a greater degree of operational significance. In the early 1960s one of Avanguardia Nazionale's key militants, Serafino Di Luia, risked his own safety to shelter OAS fugitives in his home.245 Nor, in all probability, was he the only AN member who offered tangible support to the OAS at this time. Later, following the formal dissolution of AN in 1966, Delle Chiaie and his lieutenant Mario Merlino were often seen in the company of an ex-OAS man named "Jean"--apparently Jean-Marie Laurent of Aginter Presse--who described himself as a military instructor and an explosives expert. From at least that point on, Delle Chiaie remained in close contact with Aginter, a relationship which must have grown closer when he took refuge in the Iberian peninsula. Indeed, in 1973 Delle Chiaie travelled to different countries in Latin
America, including Columbia, Panama, and Costa Rica, relying upon his credentials as an Aginter "correspondent". This formal association was confirmed in September 1977, when an Aginter press identification card in the name of "Giovanni Martelli" with Delle Chiaie’s picture on it was discovered in the Roman apartment of a couple who had temporarily put up the "black bombadier". Three years earlier, a 1000 dollar Banco de Panama check signed by Guillou was found made out to AN member Fausto Fabruzzi, which the latter indicated was to be used to set up a branch of Aginter in Italy.246

In April 1968, several AN members were among the Italian neo-fascists who participated in a "tour" of Greece organized under the auspices of the Ethnikos Syndesmos Hellenon Spudaston Italias (ESESI: League of Greek Nationalist Students in Italy), which also brought them into contact with the K4A’s Plevris.247 And after settling in Spain, Delle Chiaie quickly fell in with operatives of the GCR, the Paladin Group, Jorge Mota’s CEDADE, pro-fascist East European émigrés, right-wing followers of Perón who had taken refuge in Spain, anti-Castro Cubans, and other elements of the "Black International", with whom he subsequently collaborated in launching anti-Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA: Basque Fatherland and Freedom) operations. Later, during his many visits or sojourns in South and Central America, he invariably made contact with neo-fascist paramilitary groups, such as the Frente Nacional Patria y Libertad in Chile, the Milicia in Argentina, the Frente Bolivia Joven (also known as the "Novios de la Muerte") in Bolivia, the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional in Guatemala, and militant factions of the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) in El Salvador.248

Freda likewise developed links with various international neo-fascist groups,
though these were by no means as extensive as those established by ON and AN. His roommate was Claudio Orsi, one of the founders of Giovane Europa, which probably brought him into peripheral contact with elements from the central Belgian branch of Jeune Europe, especially given his keen interest in both action and the fascist intellectual tradition. Nor was it an accident that a report of the proceedings at the NOE/ENO’s April 1969 Barcelona Congress was found during a 1971 search of his home. Four months later, on 17 August 1969, Freda presented an initial draft of his famous booklet, La disintegrazione del sistema, at a Fronte Europeo Rivoluzionario meeting in the Bavarian city of Regensburg.²⁴⁹ It remains to be determined whether the strikingly innovative concepts he expressed at that conference, which included advocating an operational alliance between right- and left-wing revolutionaries, exerted any significant influence on the ideas or behavior of those in attendance who were not Italian. Finally, his close working relationship with Guido Giannettini during the whole of 1969 must have brought him, however tangentially, into the latter’s extensive web of international right-wing connections. This will become clearer below.

Even more disturbing is the extent to which leading personnel from these three radical neo-fascist groups collaborated with factions within a variety of Western security and intelligence services. This certainly applies to Rauti and other Ordine Nuovo leaders. According to Italian secret service reports, he and Clemente Graziani travelled to Portugal and Spain in March 1963 in order to enlist political support for the establishment of "intelligence centers" (centri informativi) in Rome and other Italian cities. In Portugal they met with "high-ranking officials" of PIDE to negotiate the
possible acquisition of weapons. They then went on to Madrid, supposedly to attend the national congress of Falangist corporations, but really to meet with officials of the Spanish political police and PIDE (who had in the meantime arrived from Lisbon) to discuss the neutralizing of anti-Franco and anti-Salazar propaganda disseminated by the communists in Italy. After meeting with Moniz Ferreira and General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, a powerful Franco confidant, they were assured of a "major financial contribution" so that ON could develop these various initiatives. The end result may have been the establishment of an export-import firm in Italy that specialized in arms trafficking.250 ON’s subsequent connections to Aginter Presse could only have strengthened the group’s contacts, whether directly or indirectly, with the Portuguese and Spanish security services. And there is no doubt that wanted ON and MPON militants who later took refuge in Spain, such as Elio Massagrande and Pierluigi Concetelli, were later recruited by the Spanish secret police to carry out "counterterrorist" operations against the ETA. It is also noteworthy that even though the authors of the two Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate (SIFAR) reports expressed some concern about Rauti’s 1963 meetings in Spain, within three years he was placed, if only temporarily, on the payroll of the Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID), SIFAR’s immediate successor.

It is difficult to say exactly when Rauti began actively collaborating with elements of the Italian security services. Some left-wing commentators have suggested that he was recruited by the special operations section within the Ministry of the Interior, the Ufficio Affari Riservati (UAR), but little or no evidence has emerged to substantiate this claim.251 There is no doubt, however, that Rauti became a minor protagonist in the
bitter internecine quarrel within the armed forces general staff between General Giovanni De Lorenzo and General Giuseppe Aloja, which beyond the usual personal rivalries concerned practical matters such as the desirability of establishing elite special forces units to counter subversion and the best type of main battle tank to purchase.252 It seems that Rauti and Guido Giannettini, an important ON member and author specializing in military affairs who contributed off and on to the official Rivista Militare journal, jointly directed Agenzia D, a press agency linked to the "private" Istituto di Studi Storici e Militari "Alberto Pollio" and financed in part by Colonel Renzo Rocca, head of SIFAR's Ricerche Economiche e Industriali (REI) section. Agenzia D vociferously backed Aloja's plans for the armed forces, and may even have been created to serve as his mouthpiece. Both ON militants were also among the speakers at the Istituto's SIFAR-funded conference on "revolutionary war" in May of 1965.253

A little over one year later, Aloja approached right-wing journalist and military intelligence service collaborator Eggardo Beltrametti—one of the organizers of the 1965 conference—to obtain some advice about how to counteract the De Lorenzo-sponsored campaign against him. Beltrametti suggested that Aloja respond to these attacks in the form of a book. After Aloja assented, Beltrametti asked his friend Rauti, a journalist for the rightist daily Il Tempo and a very fast writer as well as a co-director of Agenzia D, to produce such a work together with his associate Giannettini. The latter was to prepare the quasi-technical chapter in support of the German "Leopard" battle tank, which Aloja favored purchasing instead of the American M-60, and Rauti was to compose the rest, including a chapter promoting the creation of "politicized" elite units capable of
defending the nation against communist subversion. The resulting book, *Le mani rosse sulle Forze armate*, was completed in just over one week. After a few copies were distributed to military commands, Aloja was persuaded that it would be better to recall the book, which accused De Lorenzo of being a virtual communist, so as not to create an irreparable schism within the armed forces. He duly asked Rauti to suspend the diffusion of the book, which the ON leader agreed to do provided that he was adequately recompensed. Ultimately, Aloja paid Beltrametti between 3 and 5 million lire for his efforts, and Rauti and Giannettini both received some financial compensation. Shortly thereafter, the latter became a paid operative of SID.254

Rauti, meanwhile, established close links with members of the Greek military junta in the wake of the 1967 coup. According to KYP operative Plevris, Rauti came to Greece in his capacity as a journalist to interview him shortly after that coup. During the course of that visit Rauti also met officially with representatives of the new Greek government, including Interior Minister Stylianos Pattakos.255 From that point on, the ON leader became a vocal supporter of the junta in Italy and a key liason man between right-wing radicals from the two countries. So it was that he helped to organize a "tour" of Greece in April 1968 for 51 "students" affiliated with ON, AN, Nuova Caravella, and Europa Civiltà, all of whose expenses were paid for by the Greek military regime. On 16 April, along with 59 members of ESESI and the cultural attaché at the Greek embassy in Rome, Michael Poulantzas, the Italians embarked from Brindisi on the motorboat "Egnatia" and landed in Epirus the following morning. After a brief visit to some tourist sites they arrived in Athens, where they were put up in housing placed at their disposal.
by the student federation in that city. Officially, this trip was made to celebrate the Orthodox Church's Easter ceremony, but the dates likewise coincided with the celebrations surrounding the one-year anniversary of the 21 April 1967 seizure of power by the junta. The Italian "students" subsequently held meetings with their Greek counterparts, and on 21 April they were formally wined and dined at two military barracks, together with numerous high-ranking Army officers. Later in the evening, Pattakos made a public presentation and then personally welcomed his foreign guests. A few days later, they returned to Italy.256

The participants on this "tour" later testified that they had engaged in no political discussions or activities while in Greece, but there are good reasons to doubt this innocent version of events. Indeed, it seems probable that the neo-fascists met with their Greek camerati and official security personnel for a very specific purpose—to receive instruction in the techniques of infiltration and provocation, which the Colonels had applied to good effect as a pretext for launching their own coup.257 The chief instruments used by the armed forces to precipitate the activation of the anti-subversive "Prometheus Plan" were various right-wing paramilitary groups, including Plevris' K4A, which carried out a series of bombings during and after the so-called "night of fire", terrorist actions which were then blamed on the radical left.258 The Greek military had already had extensive first-hand experience in applying the arcane techniques of unconventional warfare, including "false flag" operations, during the 1944-1947 Civil War against communist guerrillas, and these techniques were further refined in the course of the anti-British revolts on Cyprus. Many Greek Army officers therefore developed a
keen interest in *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine, and Colonel George Papadopoulos was himself apparently an avid reader of works by leading French counterinsurgency theorists. Furthermore, Papadopoulos was reportedly the KYP’s chief liaison man to the CIA, which had played an integral role in organizing, financing, and training personnel for the KYP. Given this background, and the junta’s apparent desire to export its "revolution" to Italy and certain other nearby countries, it should come as no surprise to discover that after their trip to Greece many of the Italian "tourists" rather abruptly abandoned traditional squadrist tactics and thence embarked upon a series of subtler operations designed to infiltrate and manipulate Maoist and anarchist groups.

Moreover, Rauti and three MSI officials followed up this 1968 tour by arranging to shuttle groups of Italian neo-fascists to the island of Corfu, ostensibly for a series of "camping trips" but in all probability—if similar outings in Italy provide any indication—to receive paramilitary or unconventional warfare training. All this is suggestive enough, but looming over the entire matter of Rauti’s relationship to the Colonels is the so-called "Signor P" affair. On 7 December 1969—only five days before the Piazza Fontana massacre—the English journalist Leslie Finer published an article in the *London Observer* that summarized the contents of an ostensibly top secret 15 May 1969 letter, to which was attached a report purportedly prepared by Greek government informants in Italy. This report, which allegedly outlined Greek plans to promote covert anti-constitutional actions in Italy, had then supposedly been forwarded to the Greek ambassador in Rome, Antoine Poumpouras, by the Foreign Affairs Minister in Athens, Michael Kottakis. Some of the information that was included in this document concerned
the role that was being played by an agent of the junta in Italy, identified only as "Signor P", who was said to be the liaison man between the Greek government leaders and representatives of the Italian Army and the Carabinieri. On the basis of the numerous references to this person in the document, leftist journalists in Italy quickly concluded that "Signor P" was probably a reference to Pino Rauti, an identification that was also accepted by SID in an 8 April 1975 report. If this was in fact the case, it would have confirmed that the ON leader was actively working on behalf of a dictatorial foreign power in order to subvert democracy in Italy, which in turn would have offered more fuel for the "anti-fascist" press campaign against Rauti and his organization.

Alas, it now seems that the document published by Finer was a forgery, whether or not he was aware of this from the outset. For one thing, all of the post-junta Greek officials questioned by the Italian judicial authorities insisted that it was not genuine. In and of themselves, such denials are meaningless, since government officials typically engage in "damage control" to preserve the image and prestige of their own bureaucratic institutions. But there are other, more serious objections to accepting the bona fides of the document and the guilt of Rauti. As the rightist press hastened to point out, it was premature if not absurd to jump to the conclusion that the "P" referred to "Pino", especially in lieu of any hard evidence, and indeed that designation could just as easily have referred to a number of other individuals, such as right-wing journalist Guido Paglia. Be that as it may, the burden of proof that the document is genuine and that the "P" stands for "Pino" is—as always in such cases—on those who are making positive claims, and in the end Finer was unable to provide any evidence verifying its
If it was an outright forgery or a clever piece of disinformation, it was probably produced and disseminated by the far left in order to cast suspicion on the Greek regime and its Italian supporters, such as Rauti. Alternatively, the right could have done so in order to increase the general level of political tension and/or destroy the credibility of left-wing journalists who could be expected to accept it as genuine and publish it for political reasons. These considerations do not, however, alter the fact that ON's chief was closely linked to the Colonels' regime, or that their documented collusion had an operational dimension.

But if Rauti and other ON bigwigs had relations with a number of secret services and can legitimately be suspected of acting as their agents in certain contexts, there can be little doubt that Delle Chiaie carried out "plausibly deniable" covert operations at the behest of such services for at least ten years. He has been frequently accused, both by left-wing and neo-fascist sources, of having been recruited as an informant and provocateur for the UAR, in all probability by Federico Umberto D'Amato at some point during the first half of the 1960s. The "black bombadier" has always vehemently denied these charges in public forums, and has gone so far as to challenge one of his chief accusers, MSI Senator Giorgio Pisanò, to a duel. Given the lack of hard evidence, it remains possible that over the years such charges have been disseminated primarily by certain factions within the security forces, the left-wing opposition, or rival elements within the contentious neo-fascist milieu.

Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of circumstantial evidence which tends to buttress these accusations. Shortly before the abortive De Lorenzo "coup" in
1964, Delle Chiaie bragged to some of his avanguardisti that contacts inside SIFAR had alerted him that something big was brewing and that they should prepare themselves for action. It is also undeniable that heavily-armed AN militants often attacked left-wing demonstrators under the benevolent gaze of the riot police. On one occasion in 1963, after being armed with official-issue police truncheons, they fought side by side with the non-uniformed Squadre Speciali of the police against students protesting Moise Tshombé’s meeting with the Pope. Even more tellingly, an AN radical who threatened to expose Delle Chiaie’s links to the Interior Ministry, Antonio Aliotti, was first threatened and later found dead in a car laden with explosives. It is also the case, as will be amply documented in Chapter Three, that one of D’Amato’s deputies secretly admitted Delle Chiaie and a contingent of his men into the armory of the Interior Ministry in connection with the December 1970 Borghese coup.

Indeed, during a 1 December 1972 meeting in Barcelona, Delle Chiaie explicitly told an officer of SID, Captain Antonio Labruna, that in return for protection and funding he could "ruin the heads of the UAR and some functionaries of the Interior Ministry" within ten days if SID wanted him to, thereby implying that he could prove that the UAR was complicit in at least some of his anti-constitutional activities. When Labruna reported this to his Ufficio D superior, General Gianadelio Maletti, and proposed establishing a working relationship between SID and Delle Chiaie, Maletti told him to forget it, apparently feeling that it was too dangerous to use the AN leader as a "double informant" given his group’s existing contacts with the UAR. Finally, the alleged protection provided by high-ranking Interior Ministry officials, regardless of

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whether this stemmed from genuine feelings of loyalty or fears about being blackmailed or publicly implicated in terrorist crimes, could help to explain why Delle Chiaie was able to enter and leave Italy almost at will despite having several warrants out for this arrest.

The best argument in favor of the thesis that Delle Chiaie was collaborating with or working for elements of the Italian secret services is provided by his modus operandi in other countries. Like Rauti, Delle Chiaie and his lieutenants had established links to the Greek secret services through Plevris. For example, Merlino and several ON ultras reportedly met with Colonel Ioannis Ladas, the Minister of Public Order, on more than one occasion in 1968, and three years later Delle Chiaie and other key AN figures were provided with training in guerrilla warfare and sabotage techniques in courses organized in Greece by Ethniki Stratiotiki Astinomia (ESA: National Military Police) chief Dimitrios Ioannides through the intermediary of Plevris and World Service.271 Later, AN militant Roman Coltellacci helped to set up two export-import companies that traded with Greece, Mondial Import-Export in December 1969 and the Centro Italiano di Sviluppo Economico e Sociale (CISES) in September 1972. Finally, Delle Chiaie’s collaborators, Elio Massagrande of the MPON, fled to Greece in 1974 to evade arrest with funds provided by the Greek government.272 This was only the beginning.

After arriving in Spain, Delle Chiaie at once made contact with various diehard fascists and neo-fascists, many of whom were working closely with the DGS or other Spanish security agencies.272 It was not long before he and other Italian exile terrorists were recruited into right-wing commando groups which were secretly employed, perhaps
through the intermediary of the Paladin Group, by those same security agencies to eliminate domestic opponents of Franco and to assassinate ETA terrorists and their supporters. Among the cover names adopted by these ostensibly autonomous paramilitary squads were the Batallón Vasco-Español (BVE), Antiterrorismo ETA (ATE), Lucha Española Antimarxista (LEA), the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL), the Organización de Voluntarios Antiterroristas (OVA), the Grupos Armados Revolucionarios (GAR), and the Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista de España (AAAAE), which was modelled on the notorious Argentine parallel police apparatus, the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA or "Triple A"). Despite this plethora of cover names, the personnel in these bands were drawn from the usual sources, including former OAS men, ex-Nazis, members of the SAC, anti-communist émigrés from eastern Europe, disgruntled military veterans, off-duty policemen, neo-fascists from all over Europe, anti-Castro Cubans from the United States, mercenaries, adventurers of all sorts, and members of various Latin American "death squads" who had taken refuge in Spain. Over the years these ad hoc groups were collectively responsible for dozens of violent assaults on Spanish leftists and hundreds of clandestine "counterterrorist" operations in the Basque country, both inside Spanish territory and across the border in southern France.

Several Italian neo-fascists who had taken refuge in Spain later testified that Delle Chiaie was directly involved in these activities, and evidence exists to support their claims. "Il Caccola" himself later admitted that he had been granted a personal audience with Franco, an extraordinary privilege that would hardly have been granted to a garden-variety fugitive from Italian justice. Nor was this the only "privilege" he was offered
by the Spanish authorities. Among other things, he did not have to apply for a residence permit, his name did not appear on the Spanish police’s list of resident foreigners, and his Madrid restaurant was not entered on the commercial register, as required by law.\textsuperscript{277} On 9 May 1976 he participated, together with right-wing Carlists under the direction of Sixto Enrique de Borbón-Parma, ex-PIDE/DGS officers from Portugal, and members of the GCR and the Argentine Triple A, in a brutal attack on left-leaning Carlists at the movement’s holy site at Montejurra, which left two people dead and three gravely wounded. There is no doubt about his presence, since photographers on the scene managed to snap pictures of him along with several other Italian squadristi, including Augusto Cauchi. In that incident, officers of the Guardia Civil who were present on the scene failed to prevent the attack and then belatedly intervened to protect the sixtinos from reprisals.\textsuperscript{278}

Several months later, on 23 January 1977, Delle Chiaie was among the ultras who launched an assault on a leftist demonstration in Madrid’s Plaza de España which led to the fatal wounding of Arturo Ruiz, a member of the communist labor union, the Comisiones Obreras. It was later discovered that the AN leader was himself one of the principle culprits, along with two Spaniards affiliated with the paramilitary ATE and Jorge Cesarsky, a member of the Argentine Triple A and an operative of the Spanish Servicio Central de Documentación de la Presidencia del Gobierno.\textsuperscript{279} The very next night, a neo-fascist commando unit broke into the Calle Atocha offices of the Comisiones Obreras and opened fire on its occupants with automatic weapons. This massacre, which resulted in the deaths of five union officials and the serious wounding of four others, was
the most dramatic and bloody single act of rightist violence -- outside of the Basque country -- in the history of postwar Spain. Whether Delle Chiaie had a hand in planning it is unclear, but such an operation would certainly not have been out of character for him. According to Italian neo-fascist pentiti, many of these anti-leftist activities in Iberia were carried out at the orders or with the tacit sanction of high-ranking personnel within various intelligence and police agencies. There is, indeed, at least one piece of material evidence that reflects Delle Chiaie's intimate association with elements of the Spanish security forces. It turned out that the Ingram MAC-10 machine pistol and silencer which was used by Delle Chiaie's lieutenant Concetelli to assassinate Judge Vittorio Occorsio had previously been consigned to the AN leader, for use in anti-ETA operations, by Spanish police officials. Nevertheless, the "black bombadier" was compelled to leave post-Franco Spain a few months after the Calle Atocha massacre, in the wake of the discovery of the elaborate Calle Pelayo arms factory run by Sánchez Covisa and fugitive Italian terrorists.

His destination was Chile. In April 1974, a few months after the coup that brought General Augusto Pinochet to power, Delle Chiaie and Prince Borghese had visited that country in order to propose the establishment, in Spain, of an import-export agency that would exchange Chilean for European goods and provide other, non-economic, services to the junta. This proposal was made directly to Pinochet and Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Carrasco of the Brigada de Inteligencia Civil, and in diary entries dated 29 April and 5 May 1974, the AN leader revealed that he was very impressed with both men and anticipated working with them in the future. Although
this export-import scheme apparently never got beyond the planning stages, one year later an American-born "special operations" officer for the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) named Michael Townley was sent to Europe. Although he was also assigned other tasks, his primary mission was to recruit European ultras and arrange for the "neutralization" of high-profile Chilean exiles who opposed the junta. After picking up Virgilio Paz of the violently anti-Castro Movimiento Nacionalista Cubana (MNC) in the United States, Townley flew to Rome and conferred with "DINA’s most enthusiastic Italian contact", Delle Chiaie (codename "Alfa"). The latter agreed to put his network at the disposal of the Chilean secret police by collecting intelligence on anti-Pinochet exiles and providing DINA operatives in Europe with weapons. The agency’s number one target was the unpredictable, well-guarded socialist leader Carlos Altamirano, who resided in Germany, but Delle Chiaie instead recommended assassinating Partido Demócrata Cristiano leader Bernardo Leighton, who lived in Rome and usually went about unguarded. After Townley received the go-ahead, the operation was contracted out to Delle Chiaie and his men. Shortly after 8 PM on 6 October 1975, Pierluigi Concutelli gunned down Leighton and his wife Anita outside their Via Aurelia apartment and wounded them so severely that he mistakenly left them for dead without finishing the job. Despite this error, which Concutelli later described as the worst cock-up he ever committed, DINA paid Delle Chiaie 100,000 U.S. dollars.

The survival of the Leightons, though a source of temporary annoyance to DINA hardliners, did not cause them to abandon their working relationship with Delle Chiaie. Indeed, on the occasion of Franco’s funeral in November 1975, the AN leader secretly

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conferred with DINA chief General Juan Manuel Contreras and Pinochet in the latter’s hotel room. At that meeting it was agreed that Delle Chiaie’s network would continue to gather information about Chilean exiles in Europe, and perhaps also to carry out covert, "plausibly deniable" assignments there for the junta.\textsuperscript{285} Given this agreement, it was perfectly natural that he would later decide to take refuge in Chile when he was suddenly compelled to leave Spain in 1977. Once in Santiago, with the financial and logistical support of DINA, he set up the Agencia Internacional de la Prensa (AIP), which was named after and clearly modelled on Aginter Presse. The AIP, which only operated for a relatively brief period of time, occupied a large apartment equipped with a telex machine and other communications equipment. In return for this official protection, Delle Chiaie and his Italian associates carried out covert missions for DINA, in conjunction with Townley and his men, in Argentina and Peru.\textsuperscript{286} However, Delle Chiaie’s activities on behalf of the Pinochet regime were abruptly brought to a close in 1978 due to the political fallout from the DINA-backed assassination of Orlando Letelier, Salvador Allende’s former Foreign Minister, which had been carried out in Washington, D.C. on 21 September 1976. In the face of heavy pressure from the United States government, Pinochet was ultimately forced to extradite Townley, the organizer of the Letelier "hit", and transform the increasingly discredited DINA into the ostensibly less brutal Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI), which in practice led to the replacement of Contreras and the fall from favor of his murderous retinue within the service. Thereby deprived of his chief institutional protectors, Delle Chiaie was constrained to leave Chile and move to Buenos Aires.
This, too, was hardly inexplicable. While residing in Spain, Delle Chiaie had already established contacts with right-wing elements inside the exiled dictator Perón’s circle. Among these ultras was Perón’s personal secretary José López Rega, a sinister figure who was soon to acquire the nickname "El Brujo". When the dictator made his triumphal return to Argentina in June 1973, López Rega was appointed Social Welfare Minister and went on to establish the dreaded Triple A paramilitary squad. Some have even suggested that the brutal terrorist actions carried out by the AAA reflected the application of the guerre révolutionnaire techniques which "El Brujo" had been introduced to in Spain by Delle Chiaie or other personnel associated with the "Black International". Although this cannot be conclusively demonstrated, López Rega could hardly have avoided being exposed to the cross-fertilization of various countersubversion doctrines in the hothouse of Madrid, which three generations of specialists in the anti-communist struggle had made their home. Be that as it may, Delle Chiaie had forged close links with exponents of the Argentine paramilitary right, links which survived the death of Perón and the subsequent ouster of López Rega from positions of power. The latter then returned to Spain with several members of the AAA in tow, including Eduardo Almirón, who afterwards became a bodyguard for Alianza Popular leader Manuel Fraga. In this connection, it is worth recalling that some of these AAA "specialists" later participated in both anti-ETA campaigns and the 1976 assault at Montejurra.

When the Argentine military junta headed by General Roberto Viola seized power in March 1976, many civilian extremists were incorporated into parallel security apparatuses and used as assassins, torturers, kidnappers, and provocateurs in the regime’s
guerra sucia against the domestic opposition. Delle Chiaie and other fugitive Italians had resided in Argentina at various times during the mid-1970s, and had collaborated there with Townley and the Milicia, a pro-Nazi offshoot of the Triple A which received funding from the Argentine Servicio de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE). Through this connection the Italians were likewise recruited as contract agents by SIDE, initially to monitor the activities of Argentine exiles in Europe. After being equipped with Argentine passports and American dollars provided by that service, he and Pierluigi Pagliai returned to Europe and recruited neo-fascists for this purpose. During this period Delle Chiaie also visited other parts of Latin America, probably on behalf of the Argentine military, to help coordinate transcontinental right-wing collaboration. He made a number of trips to Central America, where he advised right-wing leaders such as Roberto D'Aubuisson of El Salvador's ARENA party about the best techniques to employ in order to defeat communist subversives. In this sense, too, he and his associates were following directly in the footsteps of Aginter's operatives. Not long afterwards the "death squads" in Central America stepped up their grisly work, with the help of indigenous U.S.-trained security personnel.

This intensification of hemisphere-wide countersubversive operations was also facilitated by a series of meetings between right-wing military and civilian personnel. Among the vehicles that helped to generate improved operational coordination were the conferences held under the auspices of ostensibly "private" anti-communist organizations, in particular the World Anti-Communist League and its offshoots. One of the most noteworthy features of WACL was the extent to which various Western secret services
were covertly involved in sponsoring its activities. Another was the degree to which the organization’s European and Latin American affiliates had been infiltrated by extremist neo-fascist circles. In 1979 Delle Chiaie may have accompanied MPON ideologist Elio Massagrande to the Twelfth Congress of the World Anti-Communist League in Asunción, Paraguay, which was hosted by President Alfredo Stroessner, and in September 1980 he definitely attended the annual conference of the extremist Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamérica (CAL), a regional WACL subgroup, in Buenos Aires. Perhaps most importantly, in November 1979 Delle Chiaie allegedly attended a top secret meeting of high-ranking South American military and intelligence officers in Bogotá, Columbia, which was probably linked to "Operación Cóndor", the cooperative arrangement between their respective services to crush "Marxist" subversion throughout the continent. It may be that the Bolivian coup was agreed upon at this meeting.

In November 1979 SIDE sent the AN leader and his lieutenant Pagliai to Bolivia to supplement a group of 70 Argentine intelligence officers whose mission was to install General Luis García Mesa and his crony, Colonel Luis Arce Gómez, in power. This, however, was not Delle Chiaie’s first contact with right-wing elements in Bolivia. For example, he had previously met with ousted General Alfredo Ovando Candía in Spain, and in 1978 he and Pagliai had visited La Paz to consult with Klaus Barbie, the Kameradenwerk representative in Bolivia and a key operative within the Bolivian Army’s 2nd (Military Intelligence) Department. Shortly before the coup, he met with former military strongman Hugo Bánzer Suárez and other Bolivians in the Buenos Aires
apartment of Argentine Major Hugo Raúl Miori Pereira. Miori was the liason man between the Argentine operatives in Bolivia, most of whom were veterans of the "dirty war", and one of their key sponsors, General Alberto Valín, the head of SIDE.\textsuperscript{294} After his arrival in Bolivia in the months leading up to the coup, the "black bombadier" formed a mixed Italo-Argentine paramilitary group parallel to the Novios de la Muerte headed by West German neo-Nazi Joachim Fiebelkorn, whose base was located in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Both worked under the aegis of Department 2, where Barbie occupied an important position and was entrusted with supervising their activities.\textsuperscript{295}

On 17 July, the day when the so-called "Cocaine Coup" was launched, Delle Chiaie was reportedly one of the organizers of a Department 2-sponsored attack on the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) headquarters in La Paz, where leaders of the opposition had gathered to discuss how to respond to the military coup. During this action three unarmed but uncooperative labor leaders were murdered in cold blood, and the others present were then arrested, imprisoned, and brutally tortured. This was only the beginning of a wave of Argentine-style repression in Bolivia, in which the civilian paramilitary squads played a particularly vicious role. To the chagrin of the less bloodthirsty Bolivian Army officers, Delle Chiaie himself advocated using the pitiless, fear-inducing methods perfected by the Argentine security forces, including the systematic carrying out of kidnappings, torture, and executions by hooded civilian gangs using unmarked vehicles or--irony of ironies--ambulances marked with the red cross symbol. In the wake of the coup, such actions commenced in earnest, and within a few weeks dozens of people had been "disappeared" and thousands had been arrested and...
herded into sports stadiums, a policy devised by the Chilean junta after the 1973 coup. Interior Minister Arce Gómez sounded an appropriately ominous tone when he announced that all those who dared to violate the new National Security laws should "walk around with their last will and testament under their arm".  

Once resistance had been broken, Delle Chiaie and his men assumed positions of authority within the state's security apparatus. The "black bombadier" was himself entrusted with undertaking international propaganda activities designed to improve the public image of the junta, an extraordinarily difficult if not impossible task considering that only Argentina and South Africa officially recognized the new regime. To this end he was provided with an advance of 50,000 dollars and sent to Europe to set up Europe-Bolivia Associations in Lausanne, Madrid, Paris, and Rome. Pagliai, meanwhile, became the head of the misnamed Bolivian drug control agency, whose real mission was to eliminate the small producers of coca in order to help concentrate the entire cocaine trade in the hands of the five major drug trafficking padrinos, including Roberto Suárez, the chief backer of García Meza and Arce Gómez. Sometime later, neo-fascist pentito Aldo Tisei told an Italian judge that Delle Chiaie was the chief intermediary between these South American "Godfathers" and the Sicilian Mafia, though this has not been confirmed. In the end it was the clear participation of the new government in the international drug trade, coupled with its blatant violations of human rights inside Bolivia, that prompted the international community to apply sanctions and otherwise work to get rid of the new junta. In response to international pressure, García Meza forcibly disbanded the Novios in April 1981, but its members were allowed to depart quietly
despite the havoc they had joyfully wreaked.

On 10 October 1982, the very day that the Bolivian junta was reluctantly compelled to cede power to a new government, the Italian and American secret services mounted an incredibly inefficient operation designed to capture Pagliai and, ostensibly, Delle Chiaie. Both neo-fascists were warned ahead of time by friends that something was in the works, and the latter wisely took these warnings seriously and thereby managed to avoid capture. But the arrogant Pagliai ignored the rumors and was caught in a daytime ambush in the streets of Santa Cruz, in the course of which he was shot and severely wounded by Italian policemen. Due to a bizarre combination of circumstances, which were either the result of a series of amazing blunders or a complex plan designed to ensure that the victim would never talk, Pagliai's condition worsened and he never came out of the coma he fell into after briefly showing signs of a recovery. He died in Rome in early November, approximately three weeks after his forcible repatriation.299

Delle Chiaie, meanwhile, escaped across the Argentine border with the help of some Bolivian and Argentine comrades. For several years he apparently hid out in various areas of South America, where he was probably sheltered at a fascist colony in the hinterlands or by some parallel security apparatus, but was eventually captured by the Venezuelan police in 1987. However, even his arrest and extradition to Italy did not result in any real punishment for il Caccola. He was extended special judicial privileges and, perhaps in exchange for keeping quiet about his links to various high-ranking intelligence personnel, was eventually cleared of all criminal charges.300 Such a lenient fate provides mute evidence, if any were still needed, of that continued "untouchability"
for which he had already become justly famous.

The nature of Freda's relationship to the secret services, in contrast to those entertained by Rauti and Delle Chiaie, is more difficult to clarify. Recently published materials suggest that in the mid-1960s he was among the right-wing civilians who were employed by the 4th Alpine Army Corps, a unit stationed in the Alto Adige/Süd Tirol region that was specifically responsible for conducting counterguerrilla operations in conjunction with NATO. To carry out this task it was organized as a mixed force consisting of personnel from the Army, SIFAR, the Carabinieri, and the Pubblica Sicurezza corps, to which were attached parallel structures made up of civilians. A few years later, two close associates of Freda were identified by Benito Zappulla as having served, respectively, as the director and instructor at a camp near Bolzano where neo-fascists and members of U.S.-sponsored paramilitary "stay/behind" networks received training in guerrilla warfare and sabotage techniques. If Freda was in fact involved in these activities, the case for viewing him as a government provocateur is certainly strengthened. And there is no doubt that by the late 1960s he had established a close working relationship with SID operative and fellow ON activist Guido Giannettini, or that he played an important role in the campaign of violence and provocation that culminated in the Piazza Fontana massacre.

Yet all along Freda's behavior was characterized by a host of ambiguities, and his true motives remain difficult to disentangle even today, twenty-five years after that bloody act of terrorism. The basic question is whether he sought to exploit the protection and logistical support offered by Giannettini in order to carry out a revolutionary design

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of his own, whether he was being manipulated by Giannettini in ways he was not aware of, or whether he was knowingly acting as the agent of conservative political forces whose interests were in most ways antithetical to his own proclaimed goals. Unfortunately, there is no way to resolve this convoluted matter without examining the Piazza Fontana case in great detail, something that will not be attempted in this study. But the issue may be elucidated somewhat by outlining the career of Giannettini, in connection with which all of the international fascist and secret service strands enumerated above intersected.

Like Rauti and Delle Chiaie, Giannettini had both extensive contacts with the international far right and close links to a number of Western secret services. He never made any secret of his pro-fascist and pro-Nazi views, and in his personal diary many dates with significance for the history of fascism were specially marked. He himself admitted having fascist associates and friends all over Europe, including Skorzeny and many other ex-Nazis. These associations were by no means purely social in nature. In 1961 Giannettini reportedly met with OAS leader Pierre Lagaillarde in Madrid, and upon his return to Italy became one of the "principal agents" of the OAS in the peninsula. Since he was suspected of supporting or undertaking subversive anti-Gaullist activities, using the cover provided by the Formazione Nazionale Giovanile, an organization he founded for this purpose, the UAR felt it necessary to keep him under surveillance for several years. After the defeat and dispersal of the OAS, he began to write regularly for several right-wing publications in Italy, including Roma, the MSI’s Secolo d’Italia, and Pino Romualdi’s L’Italiano, and by 1965 he had joined Ordine
Nuovo and become a national leader of the MSI.

Giannettini was also later identified by the police as a member of Avanguardia Nazionale's "national directorate", but he emphatically denied being a member of AN or ever meeting Delle Chiaie, accusations he attributed to disinformation promoted by the UAR. These claims are scarcely believable, as are his denials about having links to Aginter Presse or the Paladin Group, which he himself admitted was an "espionage and terrorist organization made up of ex-Nazis". According to former Spanish intelligence operative González-Mata, Giannettini visited Spain three times during June and October of 1973, and met there with von Leers, von Schubert, Skorzeny, and Guillou. Later, he was forced to return to Italy from Argentina after some former Nazis attempted to kidnap him in Buenos Aires in an effort to keep him from revealing any sensitive information about their activities. He did, however, admit to being a close friend of Franco Freda's, along with whom he was later indicted for sponsoring the 1969 campaign of terrorism, but claimed he first entered into direct association with Freda three years after their probable initial contact. He also acknowledged, with some degree of pride, that he had created an elaborate international intelligence network with branches in Italy and several other countries.

Giannettini's connections with various security services were no less extensive. He first became associated with the armed forces when he served in a mechanized artillery unit in the aftermath of World War II, and--according to his own testimony--he initiated his long career as an intelligence agent in 1947. Between this period and the early 1960s, almost nothing is known about his activities, sub rosa or otherwise.
However, his file card found in Aginter’s Lisbon archives indicates that in 1962-63 he entered into contact with the intelligence chief of the Legião Portuguesa, Gomes Lopes. Also in 1962, apparently at the invitation of the commander of the U.S. Marine Corps training school, a fundamentalist Christian General named Pedro Del Valle, he offered a three-day course at Annapolis on "Opportunities [possibilità] and Techniques for Coups d'Etat in Europe". Shortly thereafter, he began publishing specialized articles for the official journal of the Italian Army’s general staff, Rivista Militare. During this same period he allegedly attended various NATO conferences and manuevers, perhaps as General Aloja’s representative, including the second "Corazza Alata" exercise conducted in August 1964 by the Italian 3rd Army Corps. That same year, he and certain unidentified Frenchmen founded the Appareil Mondial Secret d’Action Révolutionnaire (AMSAR), an international fascist network supposedly funded by the Spanish and Portuguese secret services, which may be identical to the international intelligence organization mentioned above. In any event, it is likely that two of the Frenchmen involved in AMSAR were the representatives of the "international right" whom Giannettini later identified as recipients of all the information his network collected on the far left, Dominique De Roux and Jean Parvelesco. Both of these men turned out to be important operatives for SDECE, the French foreign intelligence agency.

There is no doubt, moreover, that Giannettini was a long-term operative of Italian intelligence. This was implied by his presence at various NATO affairs, his participation at the 1965 SIFAR-funded Istituto Pollio conference, his contribution to the Mani rosse project sponsored by Aloja, and his association with Agenzia Oltremare, which was
linked to Aginter Presse and also received financial subsidies from the service. In June 1974 his presence on SID's payroll was revealed publicly by Defense Minister Giulio Andreotti, a revelation which constrained the heads of SID, however reluctantly, to acknowledge to the judicial authorities that Giannettini had in fact been employed by their agency. Officially, Giannettini had first been hired in October 1966 by Ufficio R (Research and Analysis) of SID at the request of General Aloja, then chief of the Defense General Staff, but his association with military intelligence probably dated back at least to the period when Aloja was head of the more narrowly focussed Servizio Informazioni Operative e Situazione (SIOS)-Esercito. In August 1967, despite the replacement and transfer of Aloja during the interval, Giannettini was shifted to a higher paying position under the jurisdiction of Ufficio D (Counterespionage), which was the SID section entrusted with protecting internal security. Although intelligence officials affiliated with that service tried to minimize his importance by testifying that all he did was submit a handful of useless reports based on information he obtained from open journalistic sources, this does not explain why they continued to employ him and later helped him escape arrest by aiding and abetting his April 1973 flight to Paris. Indeed, Giannettini continued receiving payments from the agency until April 1974, after which he felt it necessary to flee, first to Spain and then to Argentina. This is why the state prosecutor concluded that from the beginning his work for the military intelligence service exhibited a number of "singular characteristics".

Furthermore, Giannettini seems to have played a pivotal role in the transmission of guerre révolutionnaire doctrine to the Italian right. In a number of different forums,
he explicitly advocated the adoption of the type of violent, manipulative, and provocative tactics that later became characteristic of the "strategy of tension". As was the case with many of the speakers, the views he expressed in his presentation at the 1965 Istituto Pollio conference were almost identical to those found in La guerra non ortodossa, a three-part SIFAR manual that had been prepared one year earlier. He argued there that the West had to adopt communist methods of revolutionary warfare aimed at controlling the population, which in practice meant the application of scientifically devised techniques of propaganda, the establishment of a series of parallel and "camouflaged" organizations to infiltrate and manipulate the enemy's forces, and the possible recourse to guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Yet his sources of information were certainly not restricted to Italian studies of unconventional warfare. His presentation at the conference was derived primarily from portions of a small manual he had just written himself, entitled Tecniche della guerra rivoluzionaria, which contained some perspectives on terrorism that also conformed precisely to the ideas championed by Guillou in his mini-manual for the perfect terrorist. Among other things, Giannettini focussed specifically on the uses of terrorism:

As far as terrorism is concerned, it should be specified that it can be of two types: indiscriminate terrorism and selective terrorism. The first involves making bombs explode in public offices or locales, in the street, at the gatherings of crowds, or randomly shooting down people with firearms...In contrast, selective terrorism is carried out by eliminating certain carefully selected persons, for a variety of reasons: either because they could be of use to the enemy; or because their death would paralyze (or impede) the adversary's organizational machine; or because, being moderates or moderators, they would inhibit the other side from intensifying the struggle; or, finally, because their elimination would provoke harsh retaliations that would further increase tension, creating an irreversible phenomenon which could lead to civil war.

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In this connection, it is worth noting that AN militants who later took a series of guerrilla and psychological warfare training courses reportedly utilized Giannettini’s manual as a sort of textbook. Nor should it be surprising that the self-described “Nazifascist” was later accused of planning acts of indiscriminate terrorism designed to push political tensions past the breaking point. Although it is not possible to delve further into the 1969 bombings in this study, the judges at the Catanzaro trial concluded that Giannettini served as the key intermediary between factions of SID and the Padua cell led by Freda, whose members had actually planted the bombs in an effort to implicate and thereby scapegoat the extraparliamentary left.

The account above should make it clear that leading Italian neo-fascists, the very ones who were repeatedly implicated in the terrorist operations associated with the “strategy of tension”, were neither acting alone nor in an insular, parochial manner. They had forged close links, not only with their activist-oriented comrades in other parts of the world, but also with hardline factions within various secret services. In the process, they were exposed to a wide array of countersubversive techniques, especially those associated with French guerre révolutionnaire doctrine. To some extent this should already be clear, and it will be illustrated further in the case studies in Chapters Three and Four. But in addition to this documented web of connections, there is other evidence which explicitly reveals that these same Italian ultras had enthusiastically embraced the concepts developed by French counterinsurgency specialists. They then adapted those concepts to their own environment and began to have systematic recourse to them, thereby turning Italy into a terrorist killing ground.
The best indication of this doctrinal link is that Rauti, Giannettini, Delle Chiaie, and the latter's lieutenant Mario Merlino were all among the participants, either as speakers or members of the audience, at the infamous conference on guerrà rivoluzionaria held at Rome's luxurious Parco dei Principi hotel in early May 1965. As noted above, this conference was officially sponsored by the newly-formed but short-lived Istituto di Studi Storici e Militari "Alberto Poilio", which had been founded in 1964 by Enrico de Boccard and Gianfranco Finaldi, who were later joined as directors by Eggardo Beltrametti.319 Behind the scenes, however, it was financed primarily by SIFAR, with the help of funds solicited by Rocca’s REI from various defense-related firms for subscriptions to the news bulletin produced by Agenzia D, an offshoot of the institute.320 On the surface the aim of the conference was simply to introduce those present to the ideas developed by French experts concerning the nature of communist revolutionary warfare, and for this purpose the speakers may have been granted access to restricted documentation prepared by the Defense Ministry’s Centro Alti Studi Militari and the Armed Forces General Staff.321 Among the attendees were high-ranking politicians with close links to the security forces of NATO and the United States, top military officers, a bevy of right-wing journalists, twenty carefully-selected "students", and some intransigent anti-communists from academia, the business world, and other influential sectors of Italian society. But behind this innocuous and purely "educational" façade the real goal was to mobilize a coalition of influential military and civilian activists who would henceforth combine forces to counter Marxist subversion, as well as to expose them to the most advanced methods for accomplishing that objective. Note,
for example, that conference coordinator Finaldi specifically indicated that the institute was in the process of forming "study groups" which would be given the task of conducting further research into revolutionary warfare techniques, and that one such group composed of the twenty students invited to the conference had already been set up under the direction of Dr. Dorrello Ferrari to carry out this sort of research. The fact that Delle Chiaie and his lieutenant Merlino were among those students could easily lead one to suspect that such "research" may well have included practical training. Although it may be overstating the case to claim that this conference lay the theoretical and organizational groundwork for the terrorist "strategy of tension", there is no doubt that many of the concepts elaborated there were later put into practice by Italian neo-fascists and their secret sponsors within various security apparatuses of the state.

It is not necessary to analyze the themes propounded by the speakers at this conference in detail, since the proceedings were later edited and published. A few that have particular relevance for the "strategy of tension" deserve further emphasis, however. The first basic idea was that World War III had already begun. The communists had long been successfully waging subversive warfare against the West, in accordance with the doctrines of Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong, and the situation had already reached the critical phase. The West supposedly had very little time left, so it had to respond collectively and energetically without further delay in order to avoid an otherwise imminent defeat. Second, guerra rivoluzionaria was a total war being waged on all fronts--political, military, social, psychological, economic, and cultural--and hence could not be won by relying entirely on traditional, narrowly-focussed military
action. In such a war, there were neither visible fronts nor any legal and moral limits. The enemy was slowly infiltrating and taking control over every sphere of human action, and in this way it was undermining existing institutions and "conquering" the minds of the population, its central aim. Third, from this it followed that revolutionary war could only be waged effectively by adopting and perfecting the very same methods devised and employed by the enemy, including psychological warfare, parallel hierarchies, infiltration, provocations, and terrorism. Indeed, the West had to abandon its hopelessly anachronistic humanitarian scruples, which provided the enemy with a great advantage, and begin to apply those methods as ruthlessly and instrumentally as the communists. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that these basic tenets were all derived directly from French guerre révolutionnaire doctrine, and indeed the OAS was explicitly held up as a model to be emulated and improved upon by several of the speakers.

Altogether more ominous were some of the concrete suggestions for countering communist aggression. Perhaps the most significant presentation from an operational point of view was that made by Count Pio Filippiani Ronconi, who argued in favor of creating an elaborate counterrevolutionary organization, ideally on the international level, which would be capable of neutralizing communist initiatives and taking the offensive. According to Ronconi, a Professor of Sanskrit and a translator for the Defense Ministry, what was needed was a three-tiered organization. The first level would consist of patriots who were only suited for "purely passive" actions that did not involve great risks. This category included, in his opinion, the majority of government officials and bureaucrats.
Their tasks would be to impede enemy initiatives inside the administrative apparatus, build a network of reliable anti-communists who would assist each other, and serve as a "security screen" behind which elements of the other two levels could operate. The second level consisted of those forces, such as retired military personnel and members of nationalist, irredentist, or sporting associations, who were willing and able to take action by organizing demonstrations, pressure groups, and "civil defense" organizations which would assist the security forces should communist-inspired riots break out.\textsuperscript{328}

However, it was the third level that was considered most important in Ronconi's general plan of "defense and counterattack". It was to consist of smaller but "much more qualified and professionally specialized" forces whose members would remain anonymous and be trained to carry out "counterterrorist" operations and other actions which would, if necessary, be capable of rupturing the existing political equilibrium and establishing a different constellation of forces in power. Their personnel would be recruited from among those brave youths—no doubt neo-fascists and assorted radical rightists—who were currently wasting their time, energy, and anonymity by carrying out "noble" symbolic gestures, gestures which generally fell on deaf ears in an Italy already poisoned by communist subversion. The activities of these cells, which were to be rigorously compartmentalized, would be coordinated with those of the other two levels by a mixed civilian-military general staff.\textsuperscript{329} This projected third level corresponded, in its general outlines, to various organizations that were later implicated in political violence and abortive coups, such as the Rosa dei Venti group.

Nor was Ronconi the only presenter who made concrete suggestions of this type.
Beltrametti likewise emphasized the need to create "civilian self-defense groups" and "commando groups" which would collaborate with the armed forces in periods of emergency, a theme that was even more pronounced in a paper prepared by ON leader Clemente Graziani for the Istituto Pollio conference. According to Graziani, the counterrevolutionary movement must provide itself with an organization structured along the same lines as the enemy’s. Counterrevolutionary cadres consisting of well-trained and morally prepared soldiers and civilians had to be formed, and their activities then needed to be coordinated by a central organism composed of counterterrorism specialists. Apparently, the kind of moral preparation advocated by Graziani was that which accepted that "every type of response [was] permissible and legitimate" in the life-or-death struggle against communism. The ends of war could be evaluated in moral terms, but not war in and of itself, which might even help to develop a higher human type who was divorced from bourgeois sentimentalism and inspired by heroic values.

These carefully recruited cadres had, moreover, to adopt the very same techniques utilized by the communists, including the setting up of "small autonomous units" capable of living off the land and conducting unrestricted terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear, the formation of a network of parallel hierarchies and front groups, the systematic employment of psychological warfare with the goal of winning the support of the population, and the infiltration of left-wing organizations, especially unions, in order to manipulate or control them. However, the success of such methods ultimately depended upon a direct intervention and the assumption of political responsibilities by the armed forces, and he urged the latter to act quickly in order to safeguard the nation’s
destiny and ensure Italy’s continued participation in NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. Here that perverse logic ridiculed by Vinciguerra, the all too common neo-fascist tendency to view the Italian army and police as the guarantors of a revolutionary program, can be observed with all of its inherent contradictions.\textsuperscript{333} However that may be, when Graziani’s prescriptions were combined with De Boccard’s advocacy of "preventative counterterrorism", the result was an volatile witches’ brew which could easily catalyze the type of terrorism embodied in the "strategy of tension".\textsuperscript{334}

The final link in this chain of documentary evidence is a November 1968 report that was found in the Lisbon archive containing materials sent in by Aginter Presse’s Italian "correspondents". This report explicitly referred to the actual application in Italy of some of the key unconventional warfare techniques that were discussed at the Istituto Pollio conference and applied so consistently by Aginter’s own operatives. It was written in French and entitled "Notre action politique", and deserves to be quoted at length:

\begin{quote}
We think that the first phase of our political action should be to promote chaos in all the structures of the regime...This will create a situation of great political tension, of fear in the world of industry, of antipathy toward the government and all the parties, with the goal of readying an efficient organization capable of rallying and restoring to us the malcontents of all social classes in order to gather this vast mass to make our revolution. In our opinion the first action that we should undertake is the destruction of the institutions of the state under the cover of communist and Maoist actions; we already have elements infiltrated into all these groups...and obviously we will have to adapt our actions to the ambience of that milieu (propaganda and forceful actions of the sort that seem to emanate from our communist adversaries)...This will create a feeling of hostility towards those that threaten the peace of each and every nation [the communists], and on the other hand will place a burden on the national economy. Along with this we should renew our action within the cadres of the Army, the judiciary, [and] the Church, [and] work on public opinion to demonstrate the failure and incapacity of the legally-constituted apparatus, making ourselves appear as the only ones who can furnish a
\end{quote}
social, political, and economic solution adapted to the moment. At the same time we should raise up a defender of the citizens against the disintegration provoked by subversion and terrorism. Hence a phase of infiltration, intelligence, and pressure by our elements on the vital nuclei of the state. Our political group should be extremely clever, [and] capable of intervening and displaying its force; it should form cadres and leaders and at the same time carry out a massive and intelligent propaganda operation. This propaganda should exert psychological pressure on both our friends and our enemies...attract international political and economic support, and persuade the Army, the judiciary, the Church, and the world of industry to act against subversion...To carry this action to its conclusion, it is clear that we need a lot of money...The introduction of provocateur elements into the circles of the revolutionary left is merely a reflection of the wish to push this unstable situation to the breaking point and create a climate of chaos...Maoist circles, characterized by their own impatience and zeal, are [especially] suitable for infiltration.335

Although it is not entirely clear who wrote or prepared this report, it is apparent from both the content and the context that it was from an Aginter correspondent in Italy with links to Ordine Nuovo or Avanguardia Nazionale, if not one or more secret services.

In this chapter it has been demonstrated, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the Italian neo-fascists who carried out the "strategy of tension" were linked to an extensive network of far right groups all over western Europe and Latin America. These linkages were both geographical and genealogical, in the sense that younger generations of ultras were able to "study" under past masters in the use of terrorism from both the Nazi period and the heyday of the OAS. More ominously, they were also supported behind the scenes by factions inside a number of Western intelligence and security agencies, as well as by the dictatorial regimes in southern Europe prior to their mid-1970s collapse. By means of these connections they were first introduced to and then trained to make use of the most sophisticated unconventional warfare techniques that existed at the time. It hardly matters whether particular neo-fascists were exposed to such methods in Italy, Greece,
Portugal, Spain, or Latin America. The essential point is that they were exposed to them, probably from several interconnected sources, and that they then sought to apply them more or less systematically in the Italian peninsula and beyond. This complex process will soon become even clearer, when certain emblematic operations associated with the "strategy of tension" are described in detail and analyzed.
NOTES: CHAPTER TWO


3. See *Neofascismo in Europa* (Milan: La Pietra, 1974), p. 188.

4. See, for example, the speech made by former Hitler Jugend member Karl-Heinz Priester at an October 1950 conference of veteran fascist and neo-fascist activists in Rome, quoted in Kurt P. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, 1967), volume 1, pp. 208-9.


11. See, for example, Marcel Déat's extraordinarily naive remarks shortly after the crushing defeat of the French army in 1940: "We [French fascists] are not going to construct a new kind of France; we are going to build up a France which will be
integrated into the new Europe and will have its own important and legitimate role. Is not the Nazi Weltanschauung anti-capitalist, anticlerical, and Socialist?" Cited by Jean Plumyène and Raymond Lasierca, *Les fascismes français, 1923-1963* (Paris: Seuil, 1963), p. 155. For other such examples, see Del Boca and Giovana, *Fascism Today*, pp. 56-61. In marked contrast, among conservatives and right-wingers, "rambling talk of a 'new order' had never aroused much enthusiasm, or even qualified approval. For them the 'new order' was just a barricade against the Communists, a form of political authoritarianism under which the iron fist of the police state would crush all opposition and popular demands, and at the same time safeguard the capitalist system and the hegemony of the traditional castes." See ibid, p. 62.

12. See, in particular, Giorgio Galli, *La crisi italiana e la destra internazionale* (Milan: Mondadori, 1974), p. 60. There were also a few "national Bolshevik" and "nationalist neutralist" groups in postwar Germany which promoted an alliance with the Soviet Union against the West, but these were relatively insignificant from a numerical point of view. For the latter, see especially Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, volume 1, pp. 147-203.


14. The Maison Rouge meeting was first publicized by postwar Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal, a former concentration camp inmate who was employed for several months by U.S. Army intelligence and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) following his liberation and release in 1945. Shortly thereafter, he set up his Dokumentationszentrum in Austria for the express purpose of gathering information about Nazi crimes and, in the process, help bring escaped war criminals to justice. See his *The Murderers Among Us: The Simon Wiesenthal Memoirs*, ed. by Joseph Wechsberg (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), pp.83-7. For further details about the meeting, based upon the suspect account provided to U.S. Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel by an alleged Gestapo participant, Manfred Uhrig, see Victor Alexandrov, *La Mafia des SS* (Paris: Stock, 1978), pp. 45-61, 77-80. Therein it is claimed that additional discussions were held at the hotel on 11 August between Kaltenbrunner and several of his top Sicherheitsdienst (SD) subordinates. Like the meeting supposedly organized to safeguard German industrial secrets the day before, this may have been designed as a "cover" to satisfy Himmler that they were getting together to discuss future SD-coordinated guerrilla operations in Allied-occupied France and Belgium, the ostensible reason for organizing the second meeting, rather than their own survival in the wake of the impending Nazi defeat. In any event, the importance of this 1944 meeting is almost invariably emphasized in journalistic accounts of postwar Nazi activities. Compare Philippe Aziz, *Les criminels de guerre* (Paris: Denoël, 1974), pp. 114-16 (who denies, unconvincingly, that Himmler was kept...
in the dark); Michael Bar-Zohar, The Avengers (New York: Hawthorn, 1967), pp. 92-5; Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, p. 78; Glenn B. Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), p. 179; Jürgen Pomorin et al., Blutige Spuren: Der zweite Aufstieg der SS (Dortmund: Weltkreis, 1980), pp. 60-7; idem, Geheime Kanäle: Der Nazi-Mafia auf der Spur (Dortmund: Weltkreis, 1981), pp. 72-5; and "Patrice Chiaroff" (pseudonym for Ivan-Dominique Calzi), Dossier néo-nazisme (Paris: Ramsay, 1977), pp. 4, 465-6. According to the latter source, the RSHA spent over two years preparing escape and evasion networks in anticipation of Germany's ultimate defeat. This task was supposedly assigned to Walter Schellenberg, head of SD-Ausland, the section responsible for foreign intelligence. To carry out this enormous task, Schellenberg in turn relied upon a number of other RSHA officials, including SS Standartenführer Walter Huppenkothen of Amt IV/A; Humber Achaner-Pifrader of Amt IV/B, who furnished a portion of the necessary false identity documents; W. Götsch; Herbert Rossner; Hermann Bielstein; Otto Skorzeny, chief of Amt VI/S, which handled special operations and sabotage (about whom much more will soon be said); Heiko Oetker, a colleague of Skorzeny's and a future leader of the postwar Wiking-Jugend; and SS Hauptsturmführer Ziedler, the head of Amt VI/WI, which was responsible for maintaining links with the top economic circles of the Third Reich. Between January and September of 1943, over 1.1 million Reichsmarks were allegedly placed at the disposal of the Freundeskreis der Reichsführer SS (a group created in 1938 to solicit financial support for the Nazi security apparatus)—for "special tasks"—by leading industrial firms. See Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 3-4. It should be noted, however, that Calzi was in fact a neo-fascist linked to various Western secret services who was posing as a left-wing journalist, probably to gather intelligence on "anti-fascists" and disseminate disinformation, which means that his specific claims should not be accepted at face value unless they are corroborated by other sources.

15. Compare Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, p. 79.

16. Four such documents have been cited in the secondary sources, a November 1944 Army intelligence report, an early 1945 State Department report, a March 1945 OSS report, and a 1946 Treasury Department report. All of these claimed that German industrial firms were buying up foreign companies, transferring money to secret accounts in "neutral" financial havens, and/or employing "front men" to launder money overseas to forestall the Allied seizure of their holdings. See, for example, Bar-Zohar, Avengers, pp. 93-4; William Stevenson, The Bormann Brotherhood (New York: Bantam, 1974), pp. 81-5; and Wiesenthal, Murderers Among Us, pp. 84-6. It is difficult to be certain whether or not the information contained in those reports was accurate, since intelligence reports are often only as reliable as the informants and sources upon which they are based. For examples of problematic Allied intelligence reports about purported Nazi plots in Argentina, see Newton, 'Nazi Menace' in Argentina, passim. Note also that some observers have claimed that Nazi preparations for postwar survival went back to 1943, following the German defeat at Stalingrad. See Stevenson, Bormann Brotherhood, p. 66.
17. Cited by Wiesenthal, Murderers Among Us, p. 84.

18. Important details about aspects of the elaborate attempt to hide and thereby prevent the Allies from seizing control of Germany's wealth, including the Third Reich's ill-gotten gains, can be found in Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, Nazi Gold: The Story of the World's Greatest Robbery—and its Aftermath (London: Panther, 1984), a well-researched journalistic account. For the listing of unrecovered funds, which would nowadays be worth over ten times that amount, see pp. 291-2. Compare the account of East German propagandist Julius Mader, Der Banditenschatz: Ein Dokumentarbericht über Hitlers geheimen Gold- und Waffenschatz ([East] Berlin: Deutscher Militär, 1965), passim, although like all of his works it should be used with a great degree of caution and supplemented with less partisan sources.


20. For the idea that ODESSA constituted a vast underground network, see Wiesenthal, Murderers Among Us, pp. 78-83; Bar-Zohar, Avengers, pp. 122-3; Stevenson, Bormann Brotherhood, pp. 69-70; Pomorin et al, Geheime Kanäle, pp. 57, 66-7; Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, pp. 79-80; and Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 6-16. Those who think it was largely a mythical entity include ex-OSS officer Ladislas Farago, Aftermath: Martin Bormann and the Fourth Reich (New York: Avon, 1975), p. 185; "Werner Brockdorff" (pseudonym for former Hitler Jugend leader Alfred Jarschel), Flucht vor Nürnberg: Pläne und Organisation der Fluchtweg der NS-Prominenz im "Römischen Weg" (Munich and Wels: Welsermühl, 1969), p. 20; and Magnus Linklater, Isabel Hilton, and Neal Ascherson, The Fourth Reich: Klaus Barbie and the Neo-Fascist Connection (London: Coronet, 1985), pp. 174-5.

21. See, respectively, Pomorin et al, Geheime Kanäle, p. 60; Bar-Zohar, Avengers, p. 122; Infield, Skorzeny, p. 182; Stevenson, Bormann Brotherhood, p. 70; Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 12-13; Brockdorff, Flucht vor Nürnberg, p. 19; and Michael Schmidt, The New Reich: Violent Extremism in Unified Germany and Beyond (New York: Pantheon, 1993), p. 42. According to Chairoff, the "Werwolf" unit that later developed into Spinne had earlier been responsible for the 18-19 May 1945 surprise attack on the Weihmolen internment camp, which resulted in the escape of seventeen Flemish SS officers and NCOs, as well as other commando actions at Lüneburg and Ehrenfeld. In January 1946, after its local logistical base was dismantled by the Allies, the group decided to give up direct action tactics and transform itself into an escape network. Among the leading figures in Spinne—assuming that this account of Spinne is accurate, which is by no means certain—were former SA men Ernst Löcke and Rudolf Maikowski, Klaus Imberger of the Abwehr, and three ex-SD officials, Böhmke, Henkel, and Langue.

22. Pomorin et al, Geheime Kanäle, pp. 57, 60; Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 12; Infield, Skorzeny, p. 181; Bar-Zohar, Avengers, p. 120; and Brockdorff, Flucht vor Nürnberg, p. 19.
23. **Bormann Brotherhood**, p. 185. Here Stevenson seems to be confusing Spinne with the Kameradenwerk. But compare also Claudio Díaz and Antonio Zucco, *La ultraderecha argentina y su conexión internacional* (Buenos Aires: Contrapunto, 1987), p. 68, who claim that both Spinne and the Kameradenwerk were Latin American affiliates of ODESSA. Note, however, that the latter work is filled with errors, both minor and major.

24. **Avengers**, pp. 113-19, 122-3. According to Chairoff, Schleuse was especially active in Austria, and its last action involved helping ex-Arrow Cross members to flee from Hungary in the wake of the 1956 Soviet invasion. See *Dossier néo-nazisme*, p. 12.

25. For Rudel’s own account of the activities of the Kameradenwerk, and of its links to Stille Hilfe, see *Zwischen Deutschland und Argentinien: Fünf Jahre in Übersee* (Göttingen: Plesse, no date), pp. 147-51, 159-61. Compare the more critical version of "Michael Frank" (pseudonym), *Die letzte Bastion: Nazis in Argentinien* (Hamburg: Rütten & Loening, 1962), pp. 116-21, 141. Wiesenthal later claimed that the Kameradenwerk enjoyed close contacts with the Argentine government—especially prior to Perón’s ouster in 1955—and with sympathetic personnel in the Buenos Aires embassies of West Germany, Austria, and Italy. See *Murderers Among Us*, p. 306. This seems entirely believable, given the later history of the Rudel network.


For the DVU, a far right party which attracted many former NPD supporters following the disintegration of the latter, see Dudek and Jaschke, Entwicklung und Entstehung des Rechtsextremismus, pp. 52-4; Wer mit wem?, pp. 20-1.

28. For Franke's alleged work for British intelligence, see the magisterial study by Kurt P. Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, 1967), volume 1, p. 123. Franke's prewar and wartime activities were equally suggestive. He had earlier been a member of the "left" wing of the NSDAP, and had followed Strasser and other uncompromising "socialists" out of the party and into exile, first to Vienna and then to Prague, where he edited newspapers published by the Schwarze Front. At some point during this period, he was apparently recruited as a double agent by the Gestapo. In June 1934, he returned to Germany and divulged detailed inside information which enabled the Gestapo to penetrate and liquidate Strasser's underground network of anti-Hitler cells. Franke thereafter experienced a meteoric rise through the ranks of the SS. See ibid, pp. 122-3; and Reinhard Opitz, Faschismus und Neofaschismus 2: Neofaschismus in der Bundesrepublik (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1988), pp. 20-1. The latter author and his publishing house were both closely linked to the outlawed Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP).

29. For details about the Bruderschaft, see especially Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, pp. 122-32, 160-71, 272-4, and volume 2, p. 1116, note 181. Compare Opitz, Faschismus und Neofaschismus 2 pp. 17, 21-9; Hirsch, Rechts von der Union, pp. 198-200; and Jenke, Verschwörung von rechts?, pp. 285-8. The extent to which the Bruderschaft was engaged in outright subversive activities—and for whom—remains a matter of debate, but there is no doubt that some of its members were involved in covert political operations and linked in unclear ways to various security agencies. Leftists claim that the Bruderschaft worked in cooperation with Western intelligence organizations, whereas Jenke suggests that it was a vehicle for Soviet penetration of the West. My own view is that the organization probably contained agents for both sides within its ranks. For additional information about the DU, see Richard Stöß, "Die Deutsche Gemeinschaft", in Parteien-Handbuch, ed. by idem, volume 1, pp. 879-81. For the DG, see ibid, pp. 877-900; and especially idem, Vom Nationalismus zum Umweltschutz: Die Deutsche Gemeinschaft/Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutscher im Parteisystem der Bundesrepublik (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1980). For the DRP, see Horst W. Schmollinger, "Die Deutsche Reichspartei", in Parteien-
Handbuch, ed. by Stöss, volume 1, pp. 1112-91; and Dudek and Jaschke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus, volume 1, pp. 181-279. For the Scheinwerfer group, see especially Ewald Hippe, ed., Joachim Nehring—Neo-Nazismus? Der "Scheinwerfer" Prozess vor der Hauptspruchkammer München (Munich: Hippe, 1950), a partisan defense of Nehring; and Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, p. 200, and volume 2, pp. 1081-2, note 220. For the ANG, see the latter source, pp. 771-8.

30. See Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, p. 240.


32. For more on the Nation Europa and Plesse publishing groups, see Jenke, Verschwörung von rechts?, pp. 370-3, 377-80. Priester was an important figure, both in the German and international radical right after World War II. See Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, passim.

33. See especially Opitz, Faschismus und Neofaschismus 2, pp. 41-3. In one of Naumann’s diary entries the following notation appeared: "He has a liking for Skorzeny’s plan. He will support it". See ibid, p. 156, note 969. Compare also Mader, Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht, pp. 241-5, for the Skorzeny-Naumann link. Taubert was a former official in Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry who was entrusted with promoting Nazi propaganda in the occupied territories on the Eastern Front. In 1950 he created the VFF, the German branch of the international Paix et Liberté association, which received funding from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the case of the VFF, this was probably disbursed through the intermediary of the Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen. For more on Tauber and the VFF, see Hirsch, Rechts von der Union, pp. 218-22, 453. For more on the VFF’s Paix et Liberté parent body, see below, note 145.

34. Compare the Naumann quotes cited by Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, pp. 134, 136, 140-1, which directly conflict with the partisan account of the case by one of Naumann’s lawyers, Nazi sympathizer Friedrich Grimm, Unrecht im Rechtsstaat: Tatsachen und Dokumente zur politischen Justiz, dargestellt am Fall Naumann (Tübingen: Deutsche Hochschullehrer-Zeitung, 1957). Therein (pp. 217-18), Grimm approves of Naumann’s description of the Naumann-Kreis as an innocuous Stammtisch.

35. For more details about the Naumann-Kreis, see Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, pp. 132-46, 274-5; Opitz, Faschismus und Neofaschismus 2, pp. 37-52; and Jenke, Verschwörung von rechts?, pp. 161-79. For the legal actions taken (and not taken) against Naumann and other members of his circle, see Grimm, Unrecht im Rechtsstaat; and Hans Kruse, Besatzungsmacht und Freiheitsrechte: Rechtsgutachten [zum Naumann Fall] nebst Anhang (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1953).
36. For the details enumerated in the above two paragraphs, compare the relevant sections of the sources listed in notes 14 and 20.


39. See, for example, Foley, Commando Extraordinary, pp. 6-11, 183-9. Foley’s contemptuous dismissals of reports of SS undergrounds should be viewed with a grain of salt, given the numerous mistakes which can be found elsewhere in his brief account of Skorzeny’s postwar activities. After all, Foley likewise dismissed claims about the Austrian’s provision of training to the Egyptian security services, claims which were later found—as we shall soon see—to be accurate, and gave an entirely misleading account of his 1948 escape from Darmstadt prison, one which omitted the role of both elements of the SS underground and the U.S. authorities in the affair. This may have had something to do with the fact that for pertinent information Foley relied upon CIA director Allen Dulles and various Allied military personnel who had personally intervened to save Skorzeny from being convicted at his war crimes trial. See ibid, pp. i-ii (author’s note). Whether he did so disingenuously or was part of a planned, intelligence-linked "cover-up" is unknown. Another author who dismisses accounts of Skorzeny’s involvement in postwar undergrounds or subversion is the philo-fascist amateur historian Jean Mabire, who for years has specialized in writing books glorifying the wartime exploits of the various Waffen-SS formations, especially those made up of French and Belgian volunteers. See his Skorzeny, pp. 315-33.

40. See especially the book by East German propagandist Mader, Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht, passim. Although this work contains some very interesting material about Skorzeny’s career, it adopts the usual uncritical "Stamokap" interpretation regarding Nazi-Big Business links and is filled with minor errors and tendentious, unsubstantiated claims. To provide just one salient example, Mader confuses—intentionally or not—the U.S. Army officer who testified on behalf of Skorzeny at the latter’s trial, Lieutenant Colonel Donald McClure of the War Crimes Group, with Brigadier General Robert McClure, head of psychological warfare operations in the European theater during World War II and future head of the U.S. Army’s Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. See ibid, pp. 165-9. For more on Robert McClure’s postwar activities, which played a
key role in legitimizing and laying the groundwork for American special operations, see Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1982), pp. 151-4. Mader’s ulterior motives for accusing this particular McClure of aiding Skorzeny are thus transparent. Ironically, the “anti-fascist” Mader was himself a former leader of the Hitler Jugend who later offered his services to the communists. He was also supposedly a “personal enemy” of Skorzeny’s. See Mabire, Skorzeny, p. 314.

41. The false money was actually produced by special sections under the jurisdiction of Amt VI-F, in particular subsection 4 under Sturmbannführer Bernhard Krüger, after whom the operation was named; the misleadingly-named Sonderstab 3rd Germanische Panzerkorps under Sturmbannführer Friedrich Schwend, which also reported directly to Obersturmbannführer Wilhelm Höttl, then head of the Balkan SD station; and the SD’s production facility located at Friedenthal, which was under the supervision of Krüger and Skorzeny. For the complicated chain of command behind “Bernhard”, see Pomorin et al, Blutige Spuren, pp. 27-49, especially the chart on p. 25. Compare the chart in Mader, Banditenschatz, p. 81. For more on “Bernhard”, see Wilhelm Höttl, Hitler’s Paper Weapon (London: Hart-Davis, 1955), a translation of his Unternehmen Bernhard; Eberhard Frowein, Wunderwaffe Falschgeld (Kreuzlingen: Neptun, 1954); and Anthony Pirie, Operation Bernhard: The Greatest Forgery of All Time (New York: Morrow, 1962). Most of these sensationalistic works cannot be relied upon.

42. Mader, Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht, pp. 149-52, 239-41.

43. Ibid, pp. 149-54; Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 97-9.

44. Compare Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 100-1, 116, 122, 179; and especially Sayer and Botting, Nazi Gold, pp. 42-7, 291. The key figure involved in arranging for these last minute Reichsbank transfers and burials was SS Brigadeführer Josef Spacil, head of Amt II of the RSHA, the section responsible for economic affairs. On 22 April 1945, acting on Kaltenbrunner’s orders even as the Russians were closing in on Berlin, Spacil and a contingent of SS troops had stolen what remained of the Reichsbank’s funds—valued at over 9 million dollars’ worth—at gunpoint. They then rapidly made their way south toward the Alpine redoubt area, near Rauris, where Spacil buried some of the loot and distributed a portion to other SS men. On 27 April, he met with Skorzeny’s chief subordinate, SS Hauptsturmführer Karl Radl, and provided him with over 8.5 million dollars’ worth of gold and securities. Shortly thereafter, Skorzeny and Radl buried this treasure at an unknown location near Radstadt.


47. For Skorzeny’s intermittent visits and activities in Argentina between 1949 and 1955, see Infield, *Skorzeny*, pp. 191-204. Infield claims that most of the Austrian’s efforts were directed at recovering the remnants of the Nazi treasure deposited by Bormann in Argentine banks and later confiscated by Perón and his ambitious wife, Evita. After several years of playing a cat-and-mouse game, especially with Evita, Skorzeny won their confidence and thereby managed to recover the bulk of the treasure for the use of his SS comrades. But there is a variety of circumstantial evidence which, when combined with logic, suggests that the commando leader strengthened his connections with Nazi networks while in South America. Note, for example, his reported contacts with Georg Mapusch, a former NSDAP Auslandsorganisation (AO) official who became the leader of a postwar Nazi underground group in Chile. See Dennis Eisenberg, *The Re-Emergence of Fascism* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1967), pp. 273-4. Compare Chairoff, *Dossier néo-nazisme*, p. 403.

48. For this recruitment, see Infield, *Skorzeny*, pp. 161-3. For his connections in Germany and support of efforts to rehabilitate Waffen-SS and infiltrate Bonn government with Nazi sympathizers, see ibid, pp. 170-1, 189-90, 238. Compare Mader, *Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht*, pp. 213-17, 230-6, 269-81.


50. For details about Skorzeny’s economic transactions and sources of funds, see Infield, *Skorzeny*, pp. 163, 169-75, 183-4, 202-4, 209-10, 213-15. Compare Mader, *Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht*, pp. 209-12, 236-9, 241, 247-59. Note that the H.S. Lucht export-import company in Düsseldorf was directed by Werner Naumann of the Bruderschaft, which provides further evidence of a connection between Skorzeny and the titular head of that anti-democratic cadre organization. According to a U.S. intelligence report, the company itself served as a "cover" for Skorzeny’s contacts and movements throughout the world. It also had contacts with the Wolff-Trust, which engaged in extensive trading with the East Bloc. See Infield, *Skorzeny*, pp. 210-11.

For more details about the wartime interaction between Skorzeny and Gehlen, see Cookridge, Gehlen, pp. 72, 79, 93-5, 107-10; Höhne and Zolling, Network, pp. 41-4. Amt VI’s Zeppelin units were made up of selected Russian POWs who had been trained as saboteurs and infiltrated behind Soviet lines. The recruitment for these units was dependent upon the Abwehr’s WALLI units, front line reconnaissance detachments which were responsible for intelligence gathering, including the interrogation of Russian prisoners before they were sent on to POW camps. Once Gehlen was placed in charge of the WALLI units, then, he determined which Russian prisoners were transferred from Army control to that of the SD. Furthermore, the Zeppelin groups were forced to consult FHO for intelligence before undertaking particular actions, since their own intelligence-gathering capacities were limited. For more on the original division of labor between the Zeppelin and WALLI groups, see Höhne and Zolling, Network, pp. 15-21, 39-41.

For the burial of some of Gehlen’s files by Skorzeny, see Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 96-7. However, Gehlen seems to have personally arranged for the burial of most of his valuable material. For Gehlen’s efforts to get Skorzeny out of jail between 1946 and 1948, see ibid, pp. 155-6. His recruitment of the former commando as a contract agent will be discussed below.

See Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen, p. 43. Sibert was the senior officer responsible for the operation of Camp King, near Oberusel, an interrogation center used to house the highest ranking enemy prisoners, including Gehlen and Skorzeny. Along with Captain John Bokor, the CIC officer who was assigned to be Gehlen’s interrogator, Sibert knowingly but surreptitiously defied official Allied policy for dealing with captured Nazis, and in the process played a key role in recruiting ex-Nazis who were interested in working for the Americans. It was he who arranged for Gehlen’s later transfer to the United States, which was carried out with the knowledge of future CIA chief General Walter Bedell Smith, then chief of staff of the supreme allied command; future CIA head Allen Dulles, then working in Switzerland for the OSS; and General William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan, then head of OSS. See Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Weidenfeld and

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Nicolson, 1988), pp. 41-3, 71-3. Indeed, according to one East Bloc source of dubious reliability, Donovan had already tried to contact Skorzeny in 1944, using intermediaries in Spain, and had then personally visited him in prison. See Mader, Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht, pp. 162-3.

55. For Yeo-Thomas’ testimony, see Foley, Commando Extraordinary, pp. 178-83. An American army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Donald McClure, also testified on behalf of Skorzeny, saying that he would be proud to have had the Austrian and his co-defendants under his own command. See ibid, p. 169. For Yeo-Thomas’ own exploits, see Bruce Marshall, The White Rabbit (New York: Evans Brothers, 1952). William Stevenson implies that British military intelligence intervened intentionally to save Skorzeny, as they also supposedly did later to protect Schacht. See Bormann Brotherhood, p. 151.

56. For Skorzeny’s alleged training of paratroopers in the United States, see Mader, Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht, pp. 180-1, citing a 3 September 1948 Associated Press story. His subsequent presence in Paris is more certain, since it was inadvertently confirmed by a photograph which appeared in the 13 February 1950 edition of the communist daily, Ce Soir. Nevertheless, even though the extreme left sought to create a scandal and exploit it politically, it remains unclear just what Skorzeny was actually doing in France. See further ibid, pp. 183-4; Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 157, 159.

57. Cited by Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 157-8, 160. Infield adds that the author of the 66th CIC group report knew that there was more than a "possibility" that the Austrian was being used by American intelligence, since a team of agents from his own unit had monitored a Bavarian meeting between Skorzeny and a Captain from the U.S. Military Attaché’s office in Madrid only a few days earlier.

58. See Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 197-200.

59. For Skorzeny’s activities in Egypt, see ibid, pp. 206-9, 213, 215-17; Cookridge, Gehlen, p. 353; Stevenson, Bormann Brotherhood, pp. 151-61; former high-ranking CIA officer Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), p. 104 (who offers some interesting insights into American rationalizations for recruiting ex-Nazis); and especially Simpson, Blowback, pp. 249-52, who provides the most reliable details based upon primary U.S. documents he obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. Simpson considers this material to be merely the "tip of a much larger iceberg". See ibid, p. 347, note 10. A good deal more information can be found concerning the large-scale recruitment of former Nazis by King Fārūq, General Naguib, and Nāsir in Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 449-60, who claims that many leading members of the Egyptian Society of Free Officers had earlier been Nazi sympathizers or agents, that several ex-SS men had participated at a January 1952 meeting with the future coup leaders to plan the operation beforehand, and that some wanted war criminals and high-ranking Nazi officials were among those hired to perform important tasks in the new government. The most important of these were former Goebbels adjutant Johannes von
Leers, alias "Umar Amin", who directed the Egyptian Propaganda Ministry and the "Voice of the Arabs" radio broadcasts, which he used to disseminate anti-Jewish materials of the most vulgar sort, as well as to establish a worldwide web of contacts; Gerhard Harmut von Schubert, another ex-Goebbels subordinate who was put in charge of the Mukhabarat, the Egyptian intelligence service; Franz Bünsch, a third propagandist from Goebbels' ministry who thence served as Gehlen's chief of station in Cairo and directly assisted Skorzeny; Alois Brunner, a notorious war criminal responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths who became Gehlen's chief of station in Damascus and was temporarily assigned to work for the Egyptian Army's psychological services section; former paratroop General Wilhelm Fahrmacher, an advisor to the Egyptian armed forces who played the key role in recruiting Nazi scientists and technicians to help develop Nasser's rocketry weapons; and an unidentified ex-SS man using the alias "Maljmud Salih", who founded an Anti-Zionist Society which linked up with affiliated groups all over the world, including the Comité Europe-Islam in France, the Deutsche-Arabische Gesellschaft in Germany, the Society for Combating Zionism in Great Britain, two anti-Zionist organizations in the United States, and the Centre Eurafrique d'Études et de Réalisations (CEDER). The key figures associated with CEDER were Jean-Maurice Bauverd, a former collaborator of the Grand Mufti's and later a counselor at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Madrid; Hubert de Bergard, editor of La Documentation de Tanger; Paul-Yves Rio; and Otto Karl Düpow, at various times a member of Otto Strasser's postwar Deutsche Soziale Union (DSU), the Europäische Verbindungstelle (EVS), and Theodor Soucek's Sozialorganische Ordnungsbewegung Europas (SORBE) in Austria, which simultaneously promoted both "Eurafrica" conceptions and Nordic racism. Chairoff suggests that the last two men played a role in the abduction of Ahmad Ben Bella, but this scarcely seems likely given the vehemently anti-French and pro-FLN stance of the above group. For more on CEDER and Düpow, who was in contact with Skorzeny, see especially Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, pp. 234-5; volume 2, pp. 1104-6, notes 135 and 143. Ironically enough, Chairoff does not even mention Skorzeny in connection with the Egyptian affair, which can only be intentional since he names so many other infamous Nazis and Nazi collaborators who were recruited to work there. Among these were SS Hauptsturmführer Hans Eisele, a doctor who conducted medical experiments at Buchenwald; SS Sturmbannführer Eugen Eichberger, a battalion commander in the "Dirlewanger" penal brigade; Willi Berner, an SS officer at the Mauthausen concentration camp; SS Obersturmbannführer Leopold Gleim, previously head of the Gestapo in Warsaw; SS Gruppenführer Alois Moser (alias "Hasan Sulaymân"), a war criminal involved in the extermination of Ukrainian Jewry; and a host of others (including several non-Germans). Compare ibid, volume 2, pp. 1113-16, notes 178-9; and a number of European newspaper articles which appeared in the first half of the 1950s. To these relatively sober treatments one can add sensationalistic conspiratorial accounts, such as that by Irving Sedar and Harold J. Greenburg, Behind the Egyptian Sphinx. Nasser's Strange Bedfellows: Prelude to World War III? (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton, 1960), pp. 57-79.
For this April 1961 meeting in Madrid, see the account of Mader, Jagd nach dem Narbengesicht, pp. 285-6. Not surprisingly, the East German polemicist argues that Skorzeny later provided tangible assistance to the French military plotters. It would appear, moreover, that the Austrian's close associate Degrelle was an avid supporter of the OAS. See his remarks in the neo-fascist journal, L'Europe Réelle, quoted by Jean-Raymond Tournoux, L'Histoire secrète: La Cagoule, le Front populaire, Vichy, Londres, Deuxième Bureau, l'Algérie française, l'OAS (Paris: Plon, 1962), p. 291.

But as yet no actual evidence that Skorzeny aided the OAS has surfaced, and there are some good reasons to doubt it. For one thing, more reliable researchers who place Skorzeny at that same meeting indicate that he was skeptical of the putschist's plans because he did not trust generals in the regular army—in this case Gardy and Raoul Salan—after his experiences rooting out the anti-Hitler conspirators in 1944. See Paul Henissart, Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), p. 69. More importantly, like many of his old Nazi comrades Skorzeny may have been philo-Arab due to feelings of antipathy toward Jews. Several of the men he worked with during his stint in Nasser's Egypt, including Gerhard Harmut von Schubert and Johannes von Leers, were active supporters of the sort of Arab nationalism being espoused by the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). The same was true of certain of Skorzeny's probable business associates, such as François Genoud in Switzerland. According to one less than trustworthy source, while in Egypt Skorzeny trained bands of FLN terrorists to fight against the French Army in Algeria. See Seder and Greenburg, Behind the Egyptian Sphinx, p. 63. However that may be, the alleged presence of CIA representatives at this Madrid meeting, and the possibility that they encouraged and offered to support the conspirators, was a well-circulated story at the time. See, for example, Le Procès des généraux Challe et Zeller: Textes complets des débats, réquisitoires, plaidoiries, annexes (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1961), p. 95; Alexander Werth, "The CIA in Algeria", The Nation 192 (13 May 1961), pp. 433-5; Orville D. Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1967), p. 216, note 109; and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., De Gaulle and the French Army: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964), pp. 53-4. Despite a lack of documentary evidence and the possibility of communist-inspired disinformation, there is nothing inherently implausible about CIA participation in a secret meeting at which conspiratorial French officers and Skorzeny were present. After all, they had already hired the latter to help train the Egyptian security forces. The crucial question concerning the April 1961 meeting is whether the CIA operatives—if actually present—were feigning support for the French putschists in order to gather additional information, supporting them on their own initiative, or carrying out policies formulated by higher-ranking members of the Kennedy administration, a question that no one can hope to answer until the relevant U.S. archives are opened up to public scrutiny.

See Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 154, for this important bit of information. Both Leroy and Aginter Presse will soon be discussed in much greater detail. One Belgian journalist goes so far as to claim that Skorzeny was one of the founders, along with Yves
Guillou, of Aginter Presse, but he provides no evidence at all for this assertion. See Hugo Gijsels, L’Enquête: 20 années de déstabilisation en Belgique (Brussels: Longue Vue, 1990), p. 261.

62. For these connections, see Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 317-18. The bank in question was the Banco de Avila, the company Technomotor, which was located in Madrid. Note that another company which served as a legal "cover" for the ELP—the Sociedade Mariano Lana Villacampa, also in Madrid—was owned by Mariano Sánchez Covisa, a former member of the División Azul and leader of the Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey (GCR), a right-wing paramilitary organization founded in 1968 which was thereafter involved in both systematic anti-leftist violence and covert "counterterrorist" operations against Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) militants. Furthermore, this very same Duke also served as the patron and host for other leading fascist exiles in Spain, including Degrelle and Italian prince Junio Valerio Borghese, who had been forced to take refuge in Spain after his unsuccessful 1970 attempt to organize and launch a coup in Rome had come to light. This coup will be discussed at great length in Chapter Three. Not coincidentally, the Duke’s wife was involved in the preparation of a book glorifying Degrelle and whitewashing his ideas. See the Duquesa de Valencia, Degrelle m’a dit (Paris: Morel, 1961). For more on the ELP, see Günter Walraff, Die Aufdeckung einer Verschwörung (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1976), which appeared after left-wing investigative journalist Walraff had successfully infiltrated the organization; former Spanish intelligence agent Luis González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional: La extrema derecha, la extrema izquierda, y los crímenes de estado (Barcelona: Argos, 1978), pp. 139-52; Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 315-37; Ernesto Cadena, La ofensiva neo-fascista: Un informe sensacional (Barcelona: Acervo, 1978), pp. 253-9; and Carlos Dugos, M.D.L.P.-E.L.P.: O que são? A Verdade sobre os dois movimentos clandestinos (Alfragides: Acropole, 1976), especially pp. 91-113. For a listing of the violent actions reputedly carried out by the ELP and other ultra-rightist groups in Portugal up until March of 1977, see [Partido Comunista Portugués, ed.], Dossier terrorismo (Lisbon: Avante, 1977), passim. For more on the GCR, see Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 166-70; Cadena, Ofensiva neo-fascista, pp. 173-4; Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 311, 356-66; Alejandro Muñoz Alonso, El terrorismo en España: El terror frente a la convivencia pluralista en libertad (Madrid: Planeta/Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1982), pp. 37-8; Chairoff, Dossier neo-nazisme, pp. 169-70; and Gerardo Duelo, Diccionario de grupos, fuerzas y partidos políticos españoles (Barcelona: Gaya Ciencia, 1977), p. 71.

63. For this and other information about Merex, see González-Mata, Terrorismo international, pp. 146-51, who quotes a 13 September 1975 telegram prepared by an official at the Portuguese embassy in Paris for the details concerning Spínola’s contacts. Among the other persons with whom Spínola supposedly met during his summer visits to several European countries were Franz-Josef Strauss of the CSU; Sánchez Covisa of the GCR; billionaire Jorge Jardim, an ex-Secretary of State appointed by Salazar and a
key financial backer of anti-independence organizations in Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies; Hermann Josef Abs of Krupp, previously head of the Deutsche Bank under the Nazi regime; leaders of the ELP; John McCone, formerly CIA director and at that time head of ITT, which had previously played a key role in anti-Allende subversion in Chile; several CIA officials, including an adjutant of Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, then Deputy Director of the agency; and representatives from a number of other multinational companies and arms trafficking firms, including Belgium's Société Général, Petrofina, ELF (an oil company which was involved in the so-called "sniffer planes" scandal in France), MGM (an arms trading company linked to incidents of right-wing terrorism in Italy), and Permindex (a Swiss-based CIA proprietary company which had earlier been linked, probably without justification, to the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy).

64. However, the exact nature of Skorzeny's role in Paladin is difficult to clarify. Some authors do not even mention his name at all in connection with Paladin, whereas others claim that it was "Scarface" rather than von Schubert who was the real leader of the organization. See, for example, Henrik Krüger, *The Great Heroin Coup: Drugs, Intelligence, and International Fascism* (Boston: South End, 1980), pp. 113-14, 209; British anarchist Stuart Christie, *Stefano Delle Chiaie: Portrait of a Black Terrorist* (London: Anarchy/Refract, 1984), p. 73, who claims that Paladin was set up with the authorization of the Spanish Interior Ministry; and the study by communist propagandist Wilfred Burchett and Derek Roebuck, *The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 158. Although not every sinister activity in Spain during this period should be attributed to Skorzeny, it is impossible to believe that he had no connection with the activities of Paladin given the nature of its personnel, its clients, and its activities. In any event, the first public notice of Paladin's existence lay in the periodic advertisements that the organization took out in various European newspapers between the summer of 1971 and 1974. These ads, which were written in poor quality English, were provocatively worded: "Danger no Objection [sic]! The Paladin Group carries out YOUR orders on National and International scale, including behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains, with complete confidence guaranteed. Fully trained experts in many fields are at YOUR disposal and willing to go anywhere in the world to bring YOUR order to a successful end. All replies and orders will remain fully confidential and will never be available to third parties. Reply to: The Paladin Group, c/o Dr. G.H. v. Schubert, "El Panorama", De Albuferete, Alicante, Spain." A copy of this ad is reproduced in Sandro Ottolenghi, "I rapporti tra Giannettini e la CIA", *L'Europeo* 30:36 (5 September 1974), p. 21. Another Paladin ad placed a request for a pilot with a commercial license, a ship captain, a navigator, two explosives experts, two electronics experts, three photographers, six sailors, two camouflage experts, two experts in the Chinese language, two experts in the Vietnamese language, one psychologist, and four others with open specialties. The monthly pay was listed as over 3000 dollars. It should also be noted that many key Paladin personnel were also affiliated with Aginter Presse, which has led a number of observers to conclude that there was an organic relationship between the two organizations. See González-Mata, *Terrorismo internacional*, pp. 129,
162; and José Goulão, O labirinto da conspiração: P2, Mafia, Opus Dei (Lisbon: Caminho, 1986), p. 107. If so, this would further suggest that Skorzeny maintained close connections with Aginter, especially since it has been claimed that representatives from the Portuguese secret police—Aginter’s immediate organizational patron—frequently visited Paladin’s offices in Spain, along with Italian intelligence personnel and an assortment of fascists. Compare Guido Gerosa, "Ecco i documenti", L’Europeo 30:36 (5 September 1974), p. 24, citing a Spanish secret service document; González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, p. 162.

65. For more information on the Paladin Group, see Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 326-9; Krüger, Great Heroin Coup, especially pp. 209-10; and González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, especially pp. 164-7. Note that Paladin’s Zurich office was shared with—and "covered" by—the arms trading company Worldarmco (which was registered in von Schubert’s name), that its Paris office was shared with the International Business Offices Service (an umbrella group which sheltered several companies controlled by the networks of Jacques Foccart, a central figure in the creation of SAC-linked parallel apparatuses, which were then carrying out a vast range of covert operations in every corner of the world), that its London affiliate was none other than the "private" Watchguard organization headed by Colonel David Stirling, the former commander of Britain’s elite Special Air Services (SAS) commando regiment, and that the individual in charge of its Brussels office was ex-SS man Debbaudt, the well-known fascist activist who headed the Belgian branches of the MSE/ESB and, later, of the NOE/ENO. For more on the multifaceted activities of Foccart, see the recent study by Pierre Péan, L’Homme de l’ombre: Éléments d’enquête autour de Jacques Foccart, l’homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la Vème République (Paris: Fayard, 1990). For more on the SAC, see Chairoff, Dossier B...comme barbouzes; Serge Ferrand and Gilbert Lecavelier, Aux ordres du S.A.C. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982); and especially Assemblée Nationale, Commission d’enquête sur les activités du Service d’Action Civique, Rapport [le 17 juin 1982] (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1982), 2 volumes.

66. Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 328-9. Among others, Paladin’s operations included "counterterrorist" campaigns against the ETA in Spain and France, special interventions in support of pro-Western forces in the Congo, Benin, Angola, Guinea, Cabinda, Mozambique, and Algeria, terrorist actions in Italy, and attempts to overthrow the new Portuguese regime. See González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, pp. 166-7. The anti-ETA campaigns, which were carried out by right-wing paramilitary groups using a variety of different cover names, were allegedly coordinated by Paladin operatives at the behest of the DGS during much of the 1970s. See Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, p. 74. (It should be noted, however, that Christie was himself arrested by the Spanish authorities, supposedly with explosives in his possession.) Paladin also did business with and carried out operations for the Libyan government and other Arab regimes, and its facilities were even used to plan Arab terrorist attacks. For examples involving the 17 December 1973 massacre at Fiumicino airport and the kidnapping of a Libyan exile in Liege, see Gerosa, "Ecco i documenti, pp. 22-4. Compare Giuseppe De Luttiis, Storia
dei servizi segreti in Italia (Rome: Riuniti, 1984), pp. 170-3, where the foreknowledge and seemingly scandalous inactivity of the Italian secret service in the former case is summarized.

67. See, for example, Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 274-411; Didier Epelbaum, Alois Brunner: La haine irréductible (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1990), pp. 14-23, 253-319; Stevenson, Bormann Brotherhood, passim; Peter Dale Scott, "How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other", Covert Action Information Bulletin 25 (Winter 1986), pp. 4-14; and Farago, Aftermath, passim. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that many of the secondary sources dealing with purported Nazi activities since 1945 have proven to be untrustworthy, in part because the entire subject was exceptionally difficult to obtain accurate information about until various European governments began to request extradition in certain high-profile cases. Nevertheless, the reasonably well-documented postwar careers of Barbie, Schwend, and Brunner alone demonstrate that a number of unrepentant ex-Nazis engaged in covert political operations and highly-profitable illegal activities after reaching secure havens abroad.

68. See, for example, Chairoff's characterization of Ustaša prelate Krunoslav Draganović as ODESSA's chief representative in Genoa until 1960. Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 7-8. While this is by no means unlikely, leaving the matter at that obscures the fact that the Croatian cleric's success in spiriting thousands of wanted Nazis and Nazi collaborators out of harm's way derived primarily from his key position in the Vatican's refugee relief administration and his close ties to U.S. intelligence. Likewise, Brockdorff's portrayal of Rauff as the mastermind of the "Roman" escape route, albeit with the help of pro-Nazi prelates and American Catholic refugee organizations, minimizes the decisive role played by the Vatican hierarchy and secret American intelligence networks. See Flucht vor Nürnberg, pp. 68-92. Note also that the organizational and financial role of the most important Nazi activists is almost entirely ignored in the latter book. Skorzeny is not even mentioned, and Rudel barely makes an appearance.


70. For the protection and recruitment of Axis intelligence and military personnel, see Simpson, Blowback; John Loftus, The Belarus Secret: The Nazi Connection in America (New York: Paragon House, 1989); Tom Bower, The Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master Coup (London: Aurum, 1989); David Matas, Justice Delayed: Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Toronto: Summerhill, 1987); Mark Aarons, Sanctuary: Nazi Fugitives in Australia (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1989); idem and John Loftus, Unholy
Trinity: How the Vatican’s Nazi Networks betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991); David Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain became a Refuge for Nazi War Criminals (London: Heinemann, 1992); and Alain Guérin, Les commandos de la guerre froide (Paris: Julliard, 1967). Aside from the latter book, which depends largely on Soviet and communist sources, the above studies all are based upon the results of parliamentary investigations and declassified documents obtained in their respective nations. Loftus and Cesarani actually helped to prepare official government legal cases or/reports.


76. For more on the VdS, its components, and its organizational rivals, see Dudek and Jaschke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus, volume 1, especially pp. 83-9; and Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, pp. 291-8.

77. Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, pp. 354-6.

78. Among these HIAG radicals were Erich Kernmayr, Lothar Greil, Otto Weidinger, and Bernd Linn. See ibid, pp. 360-2.


80. For these reductionist claims, see Infield, Skorzeny, pp. 182-3; and Schmidt, New Reich, p. 42.


83. For Kameradschaft IV, see Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 100; and Dokumentationsarchiv, ed., Rechtsextremismus in Österreich, pp. 145, 204. The latter is still the most complete survey of right-wing extremism in Austria after World War II. For the Kameradschaft Babenberg, see ibid, pp. 144-5. For the Nationaldemokratische Partei, see ibid, pp. 149-52. For For ANR, see ibid, pp. 134-5; and Alexander Mensdorf, Im Namen der Republik: Rechtsextremismus und Justiz in Österreich (Vienna: Löcker, 1990), pp. 50-68, 73-9.

84. For HINAG, see especially Jaap van Donselaar, Fout na de oorlog: Fascistische en racistische organisaties in Nederland, 1950-1990 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1991), pp. 80-92. For the SOPD, see ibid, pp. 28-50. For the NESB, see ibid, pp. 51-79.

85. For the SMF, see Etienne Verhoeyen, L'Extême-droite en Belgique (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politiques, 1974), volume 2, p. 44; idem and Frank Uytterhaegen, De kreeft met de zwarte scharen: 50 jaar rechts en uiterst rechts in België (Ghent: Masereelfonds, 1981), pp. 86-7, an updated and modified Dutch version of the former.

86. Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 269-70. For the NRP, see ibid, pp. 275, 280-1; Hans Lindquist, Fascism i dag: Förtrupper eller efterslänntrare? (Stockholm: Federativs, 1979), pp. 24-30; and Dennis Eisenberg, The Re-Emergence of Fascism (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1968), pp. 224-5. The NRP was founded in 1956 by Göran Assar Oredsson, originally as the Sveriges Nationalsocialistiska Kampförbund, but the name was later changed and branches were established in other Scandinavian countries.


88. For Veljesapu, see Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, p. 453, note 5. For Henrikson, see Dokumentationsarchiv, Rechtsextremismus in Österreich, p. 204.

89. Compare Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 167; and Duelo, Diccionario de grupos, p. 52. More information on Giron will be provided below.

90. For an indication that these branches existed, see the list in Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, p. 453, note 5.

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91. For this initial March meeting in Rome, see especially Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, p. 208. Compare Hans Jaeger, The Reappearance of the Swastika: Neo-Nazism and Fascist International. Comprehensive Survey of all Organisations, Leaders, Cross-Connexions and their Ideological Background (London: Gamma, 1960), p. 27, for a list of the Rome attendees. It should be pointed out that some secondary sources containing information about the so-called "Malmö international" either telescope the two 1950 preparatory meetings or reverse their temporal sequence. Thus, for example, Jaeger (and, following his lead, Algazy) make it seem as though the March meeting attracted the older fascists, not the October "youth" meeting. See ibid, p. 27; Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste en France, p. 294. However, this conflicts with other, more complete accounts.

92. The background of some of these activists is worth noting. Engdahl, who was 57 in 1951, had been in a succession of far right organizations in Sweden since age 17, including the Sveriges Nationella Förbund. He had earlier been a rabid anti-Semite who had publicly applauded the Nazi persecution of the Jews, and during the 1930s he began his lifelong working relationship with Carl Enfrid Carlberg, the anti-Semitic millionaire who played a key role in bankrolling fascist organizations in Sweden, both before and after World War II. After the Axis defeat, Engdahl wrote that Nazism would live again, but in a different form. In 1946, perhaps in an effort to make good on his own prediction, he publicly repudiated anti-Semitism, which he now argued was responsible for the disasters which had befallen the fascist cause. In 1950 he founded the NSR. For more on Engdahl, see Lindquist, Fascism i dag, pp. 31-3; Armas Sastamoinen, Ny-nazismen: Tillägnas alla bortglömda antinazistiska kämpar (Stockholm: Federativs, 1962), pp. 53-62, 102-31; and Smoydzin, Hitler lebt!, pp. 70-3. Bardèche was a self-described "fascist writer" who had befriended Robert Brasillach and other fascist intellectuals at the École Normale Superieure in the 1930s and had become a supporter of the Vichy government following the French defeat. After the liberation of Paris he was arrested for collaborationism and imprisoned for several months, and was traumatized both by the arbitrary brutality of the purge and the February 1945 execution of Brasillach (whose brother-in-law he had become in 1936). Upon his release he began publishing books defending Vichy and criticizing the "justice" of the victors, including Lettre à François Mauriac (Paris: Penseé Libre, 1947) and Nuremberg ou la terre promise (Paris: Sept Couleurs, 1948), one of the first works to argue that the Endlösung was not a plan to exterminate the Jews. He later became the first editor to publish the "revisionist" books of Paul Rassinier, who denied that the Holocaust had taken place. Thus acquiring a position of authority in neo-fascist circles, Bardèche was asked to head the French delegation at Malmö, and thereafter took a great interest in these attempts to form an "international of nationalism". His views concerning Nation Europa and other matters were regularly outlined in a monthly publication he founded in 1951, Defense de l’Occident, as well as in the fascinating book he wrote a decade later, Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?. For an excellent overview of his postwar activities and attitudes, see Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste en France, pp. 199-221. Priester authored the pamphlet Deutschland, Ost-West Kolonie oder gleichberechtigt in einem freien Europa?
(Wiesbaden: Europäische Nationale, 1951), which provides a clear indication of his radical "third force", Nation Europa perspective.

93. For the October 1950 meeting, see Smoydzin, Hitler lebt!, pp. 58-60; Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 1, pp. 208-10. The vast gulf between the conservative leaders of the MSI, who sought to organize an "international" under their own direction, and the radical youths, who sought, without success, to produce a manifesto which would rally their foreign counterparts and simultaneously satisfy both the "socialist" leftist and the aristocratic and philo-Nazi rightist factions, is described by Mario Giovana, Le nuove camicie nere (Turin: Albero, 1966), pp. 79-84.

94. For a listing of these participants, see Jaeger, Reappearance of the Swastika, p. 28; Sastamoinen, Nynazismen, pp. 109-10. Note that Priester and members of his entourage were denied visas by the Swedish authorities. For the Vlaams Blok, see Hugo Gijsels and Jos Vander Velpen, Het Vlaams Blok, 1938-1988: Het verdriet van Vlaanderen (Berchem: EPO/Halt, 1989), although no mention of Van Dyck is made therein. For Fischer, who sought vainly to get the delegates to adopt his radical anti-Semitic program, see Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 2, p. 1089, note 30. According to the May-June 1956 issue of Signes, the publication of the French section of the World Jewish Congress, Skorzeny and Mosley were expected to attend the conference, but did not. Cited in ibid, volume 2, p. 1088, note 19.

95. See Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste en France, p. 295.

96. For this list of "study commission" members, see Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 437. Massi was a key leader of the MSI's left-wing who later broke away from the party when the moderates led by Michelini and De Marsanich seized control over it. For a clearer idea of his notions, see the collection of his articles in Nazione sociale: Scritti politici, 1948-1976, ed. by Gianni S. Rossi (Rome: Istituto di Studi Corporativi, 1990), pp. 87-609. Also of interest is the MSI left's motion at the party's Fourth Congress at Viareggio, reprinted in ibid, pp. 713-25. Timmel was an early member of the Austrian Nazi Party and a former SS Sturmbannführer who was associated with various right-wing groups after the war, including the Ring Vertrauen Verbände (RVV), the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Freiheitlichen Akademikerverbände Österreichs, and the Union für Südtirol. He has been described as "one of the most important activists in the radical right scene in Austria", and was awarded the "Freedom Prize" by the rightist Deutsche National-Zeitung in 1976. See Rechtsextremismus in Österreich, pp. 137, 157, 182, 202, 346, 380 (quote). Dillen was the founder of the [Belgian] Jong-Nederlandse Gemeenschap in 1949, a member of the Volksunie party’s council, and later the President of the [Belgian] Verbond van Nederlandse Werkgemeenschappen (Were Di), an extremist pan-Netherlands group established in 1962. He later went on to play an important role in the paramilitary VMO and the Vlaams Blok. See Verhoeyen, Extrême droite en Belgique, volume 2, pp. 32-7; and Gijsels and Vander Velpen, Vlaams Blok, passim. Gayre, an expert on heraldry, served as a military intelligence officer during World War II and subsequently became a vociferous proponent of "scientific" racist ideas. Because
of this, he became involved with a variety of neo-Nazi organizations and publications, including the Northern League. See further Kevin Coogan, "The Importance of Robert Gayre", Parapolitics U.S.A. 2 (May 1981), pp. 44-51. Landig was an ex-SS officer who was also linked to the Northern League, and in 1978 he attended the World Anti-Communist League conference in Washington, D.C. See Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of how Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads have infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League (New York: Dodd Mead, 1986), pp. 94, 97-8. I have not been able to acquire further information about Ballesteros.

97. Compare Smoydzin, Hitler lebt!, pp. 61-2; and Sastamoinen, Nynazismen, pp. 109-10, for the list of MSE/ESB branches.


100. Cited by Smoydzin, Hitler lebt!, p. 82.


103. Compare, for example, Carlberg’s "Dreizehn Thesen" in Nation Europa 12 (1954), pp. 42-3, as well as some of Engdahl’s articles in various Swedish publications cited by Sastamoinen, Nynazismen, pp. 55-7, 126-30.

104. For the MSE/ESB’s repudiation of racism and anti-Semitism as a self-serving political ruse, see Smoydzin, Hitler lebt!, pp. 68-9; Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste en France, pp. 295-6. Chairoff (Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 437) disagrees.

105. See Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste en France, p. 301, citing interviews he conducted with the fascist intellectual on 7 December 1980 and 31 January 1981.

106. For the overshadowing of the MSE/ESB by the NOE/ENO, see Brigouleix, Extrême droite en France, pp. 220-1.

107. For the gradual dissolution of the MSE/ESB, compare Smoydzin, Hitler lebt!, pp. 81-4; and Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste en France, pp. 301-2. Note, however, that the DSB continued to exist until 1977, and some of its other branches may have outlived the parent body as well.
108. For the participants and well-wishers, see Chairoff, *Dossier néo-nazisme*, p. 439.

109. For the organizational structure and leaders of the NOE/ENO, see ibid, p. 439; Verhoeven, *Extrême droite en Belgique*, volume 1, pp. 42-3.


113. See the "manifesto", reprinted in ibid, pp. 188-206. Compare also the French edition reprinted (with glosses) in Amaudruz, *Nous autres racistes*, pp. 57-77. Hereafter, the latter version of the "manifesto" will be cited. The quotes appear, respectively, on pp. 193 and 63.


115. For the need to carry out a "racial revolution", unite the nations of Europe, and initiate a continent-wide "biological politics", see the "declaration", quoted in Smoydzin, *Hitler lebt!*, pp. 179-84.


117. See the declaration, quoted in Smoydzin, *Hitler lebt!*, pp. 180-1.

119. See the March 1951 and September 1953 issues of *La Sentinelle*, cited by Algazy, *Tentation néo-fasciste en France*, pp. 80, 89. The Europe of "the federalists" or "Strasbourg" refers to the efforts by social democratic leaders to create a federal European system which would eventually supplant old-fashioned nation-states.


121. See his *Théorie du racisme*, p. 38.


123. For more on the EVS, see Smoydzin, *Hitler lebt!*, pp. 82-6; Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, volume 1, pp. 212-14. The NOE/ENO was in fact the parent organization of the EVS, with whom it shared most of its own personnel, but the former long survived its ephemeral offspring.

124. See Smoydzin, *Hitler lebt!*, p. 96. The JEL's rather convoluted slogan was "Neither War nor Peace, Revolution! The JEL, A Bomb-Proof Shelter for the Europe of Tomorrow!" Even so, the organization established contacts with a wide array of neo-fascist youth groups. In Germany alone, members of the JEL were linked to the Bund Heimattreuer Jugend, the Bund Nationaler Studenten, the Jugendbund Adler, the Deutsch-Wandervogel, the KDJ, and the Wiking-Jugend.

125. For this particular Institut, see Chairoff, *Dossier néo-nazisme*, p. 441. The decision to create it was made in 1969, following a suggestion to that effect by representatives of the Mouvement Celtique, at the Tenth NOE/ENO gathering in Barcelona. See Amaudruz, *Nous autre racistes*, p. 11.


128. Compare *ibid*, volume 4:1, p. 50; and Brigouleix, *Extrême droite en France*, pp. 222-3. Later, Amaudruz and Pierre Clementi both denied that this meeting was sponsored by the NOE/ENO, whether the parent body or its French branch, claiming instead that France was represented by members of the radical Peuple et Nation organization. But the members of the latter group, which published a "national revolutionary" monthly bulletin and were purportedly linked to pro-Ustaša Croat exile organizations, the West German Aktion Oder Neisse (AKON), and the World Union of National Socialists (WUNS), may also have been joined at the conference by adherents of the "national populist" wing of the NOE/ENO. For the AKON and WUNS connections, see Joseph Algazy, *L'Extrême...*

129. See Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 245, 442. He specifically mentions the CIA, the BND, the French Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), and the Italian Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID) as being among those services.

130. Ibid, pp. 245, 440. It should be recalled that Bauverd was the international liaison man for HIAG. For the involvement of Amaudruz and Genoud, both residents of Lausanne, in arms trafficking, see idem, Dossier B... comme barbouzes (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1975), pp. 403-4, 409. Genoud was a Swiss financier whose role as an intermediary between factions of the European extreme right, Arab nationalists, international criminal organizations, and several Western secret services has yet to be fully elucidated. He was born in 1915, and was personally introduced to Hitler while matriculating in Germany during the early 1930s. He then joined the pro-Nazi Front National upon his return to Switzerland, and—like Bauverd—became a close associate of al-Hajj 'Amin al-Husaynî, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, while on an excursion to Palestine. In 1940 he was recruited by the Abwehr, and was thereby brought into contact with important Nazi leaders, including SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, who together with Allen Dulles secretly negotiated the surrender of German forces in Italy at the end of World War II. After the war, Genoud seems to have managed a portion of the Nazi funds deposited in Swiss banks by elements of the SS underground, which he used to provide assistance to Germans who were being held in Allied prisons. He also acquired the posthumus publication rights to Hitler's "political testament" (which had supposedly been dictated to Bormann) and Josef Goebbels' diary, and undoubtedly made use of the money he obtained by selling those rights in the service of his Nazi and Arab associates. In the mid-1950s he began working for Nāṣir's Egyptian intelligence service, created the Arabo-Afrika export-import company to disseminate anti-Semitic propaganda and sell weapons, founded the Banque Commerciale Arabe in Geneva in 1958, secretly helped finance the Algerian FLN in their war against the French (although after independence was won he was accused of stealing 15 million dollars from the FLN's coffers), and made financial investments for friends like Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's former finance minister who—as noted above—was himself linked to other key figures in the SS underground, including Skorzeny. Later, Genoud subsidized the defense of a number of Arab terrorists, and ended up doing the same for Klaus Barbie when the latter was arrested in Bolivia and extradited to France in the 1983. For more on Genoud's background, see Edna Paris, Unhealed Wounds: France and the Klaus Barbie Affair (New York: Grove, 1985), pp. 139-45.

131. There is some difference of opinion about just how "skeletal" those forces were, however. According to Chairoff, the total number of NOE/ENO activists was around 100, but others claim that it could rely on several thousand activists throughout the world. Compare Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 442, citing Amaudruz himself; and Laurent, Orchestre Noir, p. 88, note 1. This apparent discrepancy can be reconciled if the first estimate is taken to apply solely to the NOE/ENO's own militants, whereas the latter
applied to members of other right-wing groups who were also associated or affiliated with the neo-Nazi international.

132. For Thiriart's earlier career, see Verhoeyen, *Extrême droite en Belgique*, volume 1, p. 21; Chairoff, *Dossier néo-nazisme*, pp. 442-3; Del Boca and Giovana, *Fascism Today*, p. 87. According to Thiriart's associate Marcel Ponthier, the future JE leader was born into a wealthy Liegeois family but was early on influenced by the ideas of Bertrand De Jouvenal, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Roberto Michels, James Burnham, José Ortega y Gasset, José Antonio Prima de Rivera, and Vladimir Lenin. See Thiriart, *La grande nation: L'Europe unitaire de Brest à Bucharest* (Brussels: Parti Communiste Européenne, 1965), p. 73.


134. Géoris-Reitshof, *Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique*, pp. 71-2. Among the MAC's main supporters within the Club Nationale de Parachutisme was Colonel Cassart, who had been involved in the struggle for the Congo as a trainer of Tshombe's paratroopers.


137. For the MAC's connections with other right-wing groups in Belgium, see Géoris-Reitshof, *Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique*, pp. 29-30, 33-4, 39-40, 42, 64-6. However, the MAC also considered the more conservative groups too "soft". See Dumont, *Brigades noires*, p. 100.

138. For these international links, see Géoris-Reitshof, *Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique*, p. 62.


141. For these police crackdowns and arrests, see Dumont, *Brigades noires*, pp. 100-1; Géoris-Reitshof, *Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique*, pp. 57, 59.


144. For the information in the following paragraph dealing with the background and activities of Joly and the nature of the Jeunesses Nationales, see Géoris-Reitshof, *Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique*, pp. 64-6; Dumont, *Brigades noires*, pp. 96-7.

145. For the origins of Paix et Liberté, see Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), pp. 150-1, 293; and René Sommer, "Paix et Liberté? La Quatrième République contre le PC[F]", *L’Histoire* 40 (December 1981), pp. 26-35. Under the leadership of Jean-Paul David, the French branch engaged in both extensive anti-communist propaganda activities and in various lesser-known covert operations. The same was true of its other branches, including the German Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit headed by Eberhard Taubert, a former high-ranking official in the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, and the Italian Pace e Libertà organization, headed by Edgardo Sogno and Luigi Cavallo, both of whom were later implicated in violent provocations and abortive coups.
146. See Contre Révolution: Stratégie et tactique. De la "guerre révolutionnaire" à la "guerre de libération nationale" (Liege: Pierre Joly, 1957), which appeared in at least two editions.

147. For more on the "Main Rouge" organization, see "Pierre Genève" (pseudonym for Kurt-Émile Schweizer, a spy novelist born in Monaco), La Main Rouge: Reportage (Paris: Nord-Sud, 1960), a work filled with SDECE disinformation; and Joachim Joesten, The Red Hand: The Sinister Account of the Terrorist Arm of the French Right-Wing "Ultras"—in Algeria and on the Continent (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1962). For the organization's Belgian operations, see ibid, pp. 166-92; and Genève, Main Rouge, pp. 159-66. There was also a "Main Rouge" assassination attempt against another pro-FLN professor in Belgium, Pierre Legrève, but it failed due to his wife's alertness. All of the intended victims were apparently activists in a secret group opposed to French rule in Algeria, known as the Jeanson Network to its supporters and La Jeune Résistance to the public. Along with Joly, a member of the Algiers Sûreté who had been seconded to the French Army's 5th (Psychological Action) Bureau--Jean-Louis Bovagnet--was implicated in these operations, and it may also be that personnel from the Belgian Sûreté provided some assistance to the killers. Compare Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 74; and Joesten, Red Hand, p. 190.


149. For Cosyns-Verhaegen, see Dumont, Brigades noires, p. 26; Verhoeven, Extrême droite en Belgique, volume 1, p. 23; Géoris-Reitshof, Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique, p. 73. His publications include La guerre subversive, de l'approche indirecte à la résistance totale (Brussels: Ponant, 1963); Guerres révolutionnaires et subversives: Sélection bibliographique (Brussels: Ours, 1967); Guerres subversives et questions connexes: Sélection bibliographique compilée et commentée (Wavre: Centre d'Information et de Documentation, 1972); and Théorie de l'action subversive, au delà de la légalité et en deça de la violence (Brussels: Ponant, 1963). For the Torices "work camp", which was to include cultural activities, ideological discussions, and "sports activities", see the announcement from an issue of Vrij Europa, reproduced in P.R. A. van Iddekinge and A. H. Paape, Ze zijn er nog...: Een documentatie over fascistische, nazistische en andere rechtsradicale denkbeelden en activiteiten na 1945 (Amsterdam: Bezige Bij, 1970), p. 292.

150. For Labin's role in the Étudiants Nationales, see Géoris-Reitshof, Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique, p. 67. For her other activities, see Verhoeven, Extrême droite en Belgique, volume 1, p. 11 and note 2. The ABN was an umbrella group that coordinated the activities of various anti-communist émigré organizations from eastern Europe and other "Captive Nations" of the Soviet Union, but it was dominated by former Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. For more on the ABN, see Anderson and Anderson, Inside the League, pp. 20-5, 33-8; Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 420-1; and Simpson, Blowback, pp. 269-70.
151. For the internal divisions in the MAC, which continued even after it was reorganized and renamed JE, see Dumont, *Brigades noires*, p. 98. For the communist-like cellular structure, see Géoris-Reitshof, *Extrême droite et néo-fascisme en Belgique*, p. 58. Note that although the MAC was officially renamed JE in the Spring of 1962, JE sections began to be constructed in other countries in late 1961, which suggests that Thiriart was already drawing together a network of international support for a new pan-European organization. Oddly enough, some JE sections were also established abroad even after the main Wallonian branch of JE had again been officially renamed in 1965.

152. For this abortive NPE effort, see Smoydzin, *Hitler lebt!*, pp. 111-14.

153. For lists of JE’s branches, see Dumont, *Brigades noires*, pp. 98-9; Del Boca and Giovana, *Fascism Today*, pp. 454-5, note 20. Note that are some minor discrepancies in the two lists, but that the latter is more complete. Some of the organizations listed were not actual branches of JE, but rather autonomous but interlinked neo-fascist movements: among these were Ordine Nuovo, Giovane Nazione, and the Centro Quaderni Neri in Italy, Fiatal Europa in Columbia, SAC in Canada, and the Runebevægelse in Denmark. The latter authors also claim that JE was in touch with organizations of Bulgarian, Slovak, and Ukrainian refugees with headquarters in West Germany, the United States, and South America. It would be interesting to determine whether or not the Munich-based Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) was among these refugee groups, since it was directly or indirectly involved in a number of intelligence-linked ventures and covert operations. In any event, the major branches of JE were those in continental Europe. For Flanders, where the branch was established in December 1961 by Fred Rossaert, Karl Van Marcke, Werner Caluwe, and future nouvelle droite luminary Luc Pauwels, all of whom—together with Debbaudt—went on to found the Europafront after their expulsion from JE, see Verhoeyen, *Extrême droite en Belgique*, volume 2, pp. 47-8. For Holland, where a group of fifty militants led by ex-Nationaal Socialistische Beweging man Tijmon Balk existed until Balk broke with Thiriart in 1963 and joined the Europafront, see van Donselaar, *Fout na de oorlog*, pp. 135-6. For Italy, where the ostentatiously anti-American branch grew directly out of an October 1963 fusion between Giovane Nazione, the Perugia branch of Ordine Nuovo, the Federazione Nazionale Giovanile from La Spezia, and the Gruppo IV Catullo from Venice, and was headed by Pier Franco Bruschi (former chief of Giovane Nazione) with the help of Claudio Mutti and Claudio Orsi, two future "Nazi-Maoists" linked closely to Franco Freda, see Giovana, *Nuove camicie nere*, pp. 112-13; and Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, pp. 181-4. It is worth noting here that many Giovane Europa militants were affiliated, before, during, or after their involvement with JE, with Ordine Nuovo, Avanguardia Nazionale, the Organizzazione Lotta di Popolo, or the MSI, and that in the audience at a 26 January 1968 Giovane Europa conference in Ferrara, where Thiriart himself made a presentation, was Dr. Giorgio Vitangeli, a member of Randolfo Pacciardi’s unabashedly pro-American and Atlanticist Nuova Repubblica movement. For France, where groups of "national-European" militants from Europe-Action and the Fédération des Étudiants Nationalistes created a fifty-man branch, compare the sketchy


155. Ibid, pp. 88, 228, citing *La Révolution nationale européenne* (Brussels: Jeune Europe, no date), wherein the "manifesto" was reprinted.

156. See Dumont, *Brigades noires*, p. 102, note 140.


158. See *Un empire de 400 millions d'hommes: L'Europe* (Brussels: Jeune Europe, 1964); and *La grande nation: L'Europe unitaire de Brest à Bucharest* (Brussels: Parti Communautaire Européen, 1965).


160. See Thiriart, *Empire de 400 millions*, pp. 22-6. Later, Thiriart tried to form an operational alliance with elements of certain Middle Eastern regimes. In 1967 and 1968 he contacted Arab leaders in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine with an offer to launch future direct actions against the Americans in Europe, help create a transcontinental intelligence service in order to carry out clandestine operations in both European and Arab countries, and organize paramilitary formations made up of European volunteers that would directly participate in the Palestinian resistance struggle. See Monzat, *Enquêtes sur la droite extrême*, p. 55, citing an April 1968 "Mémorandum à l'intention du gouvernement de la République Algérienne" and the November 1968 issue of *Nation Européenne*.


162. Thiriart, *Empire de 400 millions*, pp. 29-30. Chairoff views this as the forerunner of Italian "Nazi-Maoism", an ideology espoused by Franco Freda and other neo-fascist
activists in Italy during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. See Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 444. But Thiriart's pro-Chinese statements were essentially a product of his geopolitical concerns, whereas the so-called "Nazi-Maoists"—assuming that they were not mere provocateurs attempting to disrupt and discredit genuine Maoists with slogans such as "Hitler and Mao united in the struggle"—appreciated Mao for his alleged advocacy and successful creation of an ascetic warrior mystique among his followers.

163. Thiriart, Grande nation, p. 16. For the "third way" emphasis, see idem, Empire de 400 millions, pp. 99-104.

164. Thiriart, Empire de 400 millions, pp. 207-13, 223-63. His ideas about organizing a revolutionary vanguard owed much to both Lenin and the OAS.

165. For the most thorough discussion of Thiriart's proposed domestic programs, see ibid, pp. 99-153. Compare Grande nation, pp. 37-8, 41, 48, 50-1, for the specific points emphasized in my summary.

166. Both Tauber (Beyond Eagle and Swastika, volume 2, pp. 1098-9, note 9) and Del Boca and Giovana (Fascism Today, p. 230) claim that Thiriart's public criticism of racism was "tactical", and there is indeed some clear evidence of barely-disguised antipathy toward "inferior" races and the promotion of pro-white policies. See, for example, Thiriart, Empire de 400 millions, pp. 56-9, 225-6. Compare Dumont, Brigades noires, p. 116; Monzat, Enquêtes sur la droite extrême, pp. 56-7. Nevertheless, Thiriart was certainly not overly concerned with racial issues and may have even included these offhand remarks in order to attract or maintain the support of other neo-fascists.

167. Indeed, paeans to communist China appeared with increasing frequency in the pages of JE's publications. See, for example, the 15 October 1964 issue of Jeune Europe: Organisation Européenne pour la Formation d'un Cadre Politique—the internal bulletin of JE which was sent exclusively to the organization's militants—which attacked the idea of an "Atlantic Europe" and argued that Europe had to support Chinese imperialism against Russian and American imperialism. In the 27 October 1964 issue of the same bulletin, he went so far as to praise the development of an atomic bomb by China, presumably as a counterweight to the nuclear monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union. A limited selection of JE publications can be consulted at the Hoover Institution library on the Stanford University campus.


169. Quoted in Monzat, Enquêtes sur la droite extrême, pp. 51-2.

170. Ibid, pp. 55-6, in part citing L'Empire euro-soviétique de Vladivostok à Dublin: L'après-Yalta (Charleroi: Machiavel, [1985 or 1986?]).
171. Ibid, p. 52, citing the March 1985 issue of Conscience Européenne. For more on the CCC, which began to launch terrorist attacks against NATO bases and other targets in 1984, see Jacques Offergeld and Christian Souris, La Belgique étranglée: Euroterrorisme (Montigny-le-Tilleul: Scaillet, 1985); and Jos Vander Velpen, Les CCC: L’État et le terrorisme (Anvers: EPO, 1988). For a collection of CCC communiques and documents, see Cellules communistes combattantes: Textes de lutte, 1984-1985 (Brussels: Ligne Rouge, 1988). Note that certain journalists suspect, albeit on the basis of sketchy and circumstantial evidence, that the ostensibly ultraleft CCC was manipulated and used as an instrument for provocations by elements of the far right and the state security apparatus. If so, Thiriart’s efforts may have played some as yet unclear role in this process.

172. This is clearly the implication in ibid, pp. 55-6, though Monzat never actually claims that Thiriart was an agent.

173. One of the first to emphasize this crucial point was Galli in his pioneering study, Crisi italiana e la destra internazionale, pp. 25-6.


178. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, p. 17; Menard, Army and the Fifth Republic, p. 91.

179. For this formula, see Colonel Gabriel Bonnet, Les guerres insurrectionnelles et révolutionnaires de l’Antiquité à nos jours (Paris: Payot, 1958), p. 60.

180. This theme appears throughout all of the writings of the guerre révolutionnaire theorists. See, for example, ibid, pp. 7-8, 266; "Ximenès" (pseudonym for a group of officers), "La guerre révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales", Revue Militaire d’Information 281 (February-March 1957), pp. 17-19; [Colonel] Roger Trinquier, Guerre, subversion, révolution (Paris: Laffont, 1968), pp. 34-5; and Michel Déon, L’Armée d’Algerie et la pacification (Paris: Plon, 1959), pp. 16-20. Compare Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, pp. 11-12; de la Gorce, French Army, p. 401; Kelly.


183. For more on "psychological action", see Maurice Megret, *L'Action psychologique* (Paris: Fayard, 1959). This general term was further subdivided into guerre psychologique, operations directed against the enemy, and action psychologique propre, operations directed against elements of one's own population. The techniques utilized were derived from different sources, including the direct experience of French troops captured and "brainwashed" by the Viet-Minh and the writings of various Pavlovian psychological theorists, particularly Serge Chakotin, author of *The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda* (New York: Alliance, 1940).

184. Ambler, *French Army in Politics*, pp. 301, 316-18. While Lacheroy focussed his attention primarily on the establishment of parallel hierarchies, Colonels Argoud and Trinquier emphasized the employment of "adapted justice"—torture and terrorism—whereas others, particularly 5th Bureau personnel, concentrated on mass propaganda and individual re-education.


188. For the OAS’s plan to use intoxication in the métropole, see OAS parle (Paris: Julliard, 1964), document 48, pp. 225-6, wherein the organization’s objectives were listed as 1) the "paralysis of Gaullist power", 2) the "creation of a climate of generalized insecurity", and 3) the "total paralysis of the country". Compare also the remarks attributed to General Salan in the course of his trial. As he expressed it to his fellow
OAS conspirators, their mission was to create a "climate of generalized insecurity by spreading false new...We must inflame all sectors". See Le procès de Raoul Salan: Compte rendu stenographique (Paris: Albin Michel, 1962), p. 457. Naturally, systematic terrorism also played a major role in OAS operations, both in Algeria and France. See [Captain] Pierre Sergent, Ma peau au bout des mes idées 2: La bataille (Paris: Table Ronde, 1968), pp. 315-18, 328-37.

189. On these insurrections, see, respectively, Merry and Serge Bromberger, Les 13 complots du 13 Mai (Paris: Fayard, 1959); Merry Bromberger et al, Barricades et colonels: 24 Janvier 1960 (Paris: Fayard, 1960); and Henri Azeau, Révolte militaire: Alger, 22 Avril 1961 (Paris: Plon, 1961). The term pied noir, which means "black foot", referred to persons of European descent who were born in Algeria, the bulk of whom were the offspring of French colonists. Since they desperately sought to remain in their North African homeland without turning over power to the Arab majority, they flocked to the ranks of right-wing organizations that actively fought to keep Algeria under French control.


191. For the impact of the military revolts on the international right, see Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, p. 88; and Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 99.


193. See Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste, pp. 228-30; Duprat, Mouvements de l'extrême droite en France, pp. 103-4; Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, pp. 194-6. One of the key figures in the establishment of right-wing paramilitary groups in Algeria was Robert Martel, a wine producer in the Mitidja region, who was one of the founders of the Union Français Nord-Africaine and was later involved in the so-called "Grand O" plot of May 1958. For a better indication of Martel's ideas, see the book he authored under the pseudonym "Claude Mouton", La contrerévolution en Algérie de...

195. To provide only one example, former OAS operatives, including ex-Delta Commando François Chiappe and *guerre révolutionnaire* practitioner Colonel Jean Gardes—one of the officers who supposedly met with Skorzeny in 1962--may have played an important role in the massacre of left-wing *peronistas* by their rightist Peronist counterparts at Argentina’s Ezeiza airport on 20 June 1973. See Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Perón: Argentina’s Montoneros* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), p. 153, note 69, citing the Peronist left publication *El Descamisado* 7 (3 July 1973). Compare Díaz and Zucco, *Ultraderecha argentina*, pp. 105 and 175, note 3. The Frenchmen were apparently employed as trainers and operatives in Argentine Social Welfare Minister and Propaganda Due (P2) brother José López Rega’s Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA), a particularly vicious right-wing "death squad" (a popular term for a parallel terrorist apparatus sponsored by one or more state security agencies). See Krüger, *Great Heroin Coup*, pp. 113, 165. Other OAS veterans served in similar capacities elsewhere in Latin America, Africa, and the Iberian peninsula, a subject which remains to be investigated fully.

196. For the following biography of Guillou, compare Laurent, *Orchestre noir*, pp. 120-2; and Chairoff, *Dossier néo-nazisme*, p. 158.


198. For the role played by Ploncard d’Assac—a French-language broadcaster for the international "Voix de la Occident" program on Radio Portugal—as an intermediary between Salazar’s entourage, the Portuguese government, and both Guillou and Aginter, see the ELP Relatório, Número 2: *Aginter Presse* prepared by the Serviço do Descobrimento e da Coordenação da Informações (SDCI) [hereafter cited as SDCI, Relatório 2], the new intelligence service set up by leftist military officers who engineered the April 1974 overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship in Portugal, p. 22. Indeed, a note from Fernando Silva Pais, Director General of the Portuguese secret police, to Alvaro Pereira de Carvalho, the intelligence director and number three man within the organization between 1962 and 1974, described Aginter as a "news agency (D’Assac)". The secret police identification cards for Silva Pais and Pereira de Carvalho are reproduced in "Repórter Sombra", *Dossier PIDE: Os horrores e crimes de uma "policia"* (Lisbon: Agencia Portuguesa do Revistas, 1974), pp. 162, 184. Those interested in Ploncard d’Assac’s political views can consult his numerous publications, among which are *Doctrines du nationalism* (Meaux: Fuseau, 1965 [1959]); *L’État corporatif: L’Expérience portugaise. Doctrine et législation* (Paris: Librairie Française, 1960); *Manifeste nationaliste* (Paris: Plon, 1972); and, perhaps most

199. For the Legião Portuguesa, see Josué da Silva, Legião Portuguesa: Força repressiva do fascismo (Lisbon: Diabril, 1975). Compare the illustrated paean to the Legião, Legião Portuguesa: Expressão da consciência moral da Nação (Lisbon: Empresa Norte, 1966). The Legião, which was created by Salazar’s 30 September 1936 Executive Decree, was divided into a number of different components, including a territorial militia; a mobile Força Automóvel de Choque (FAC); a command unit later known as the Grupo de Intervenção Imediata (GII); a naval infantry brigade; a previously established youth group known as Mocidade Portuguesa, which was later incorporated into the Legião; a number of university and student organizations, including the Frente de Estudantes Nacionalistas; a civil defense group known as the Defesa Civil do Território; and a social services auxiliary. Although the militia was not considered an effective military force, the Legião did create an efficient Serviço de Informações, which built up a large number of informants and exchanged intelligence with the secret police. See da Silva, Legião Portuguesa, pp. 13-17, 45-52.

200. For the PIDE/DGS’s financing of Aginter, see SDCI, Relatório 2, pp. 1-2. The Defense Ministry officials involved were General Deslandes, General João Paiva de Faria Leite Brandão, Major António César Lima Gata, and Captain João Alves Martins; those from the Foreign Affairs Ministry were ambassadors João Hall Themido and Caldeira Coelho. Compare Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 123-4. For more on PIDE, which Caetano "reorganized" and renamed the DGS, see Associação de Ex-Presos Políticos Antifascistas, ed., A PIDE e as impresas (Lisbon: AEPPA, 1977); Tom Gallagher, "Controlled Repression in Salazar’s Portugal", Journal of Contemporary History 14:3 (July 1979), pp. 385-403; Alexandre Manuel, Rogério Carapinha, and Dias Neves, eds., PIDE: A história da repressão (Fundão: Jornal do Fundão, 1974); Fernando Luso Soares, PIDE/DGS: Um estado dentro do estado (Lisbon: Portugalía, no date); "Repórter Sombra", Dossier PIDE; and especially Nuno Vasco, Vigiados e perseguidos: Documentos secretos da PIDE/DGS (Lisbon: Bertrand, 1977).


203. I managed to obtain copies of some of these reports and documents, but unfortunately this process of disseminating Aginter documents for public scrutiny was soon interrupted, allegedly in response to heavy behind-the-scenes pressure placed on the new Portuguese regime by the American government. Had all of the extensive Aginter files been made available, much more could undoubtedly be said about international
right-wing subversion during the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

204. Compare Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 120, note 1; González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, p. 162.

205. For Aginter’s press activities, see Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 120; González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, p. 154.

206. The evidence of Aginter links to these foreign intelligence services is, quite naturally, sketchy. There are clear indications that the agency’s personnel had contacts with personnel from the DGS, BOSS, and the KYP, though similar links to the BND and CIA are harder to document. Chairoff claims, not only that Guillou had been the liaison man between SDECE and the CIA during the Korean War, but also that he had established close relations with high-ranking American intelligence agents while assigned to the 11th Choc—including Lisbon Chief of Station Fred E. Hubbard, Robert H. Flenner, Charles Evan Higdon, Dr. William Howard Taft, and Dr. Wallace Walter Atwood, Jr.—and that Aginter operatives helped the CIA to train counterguerrilla forces in Guatemala. See Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 158-9. Moreover, a left-wing Portuguese author, citing the 20 November 1975 issue of O Século, states that Guillou and his associate Jay Salby were "deep cover" agents of the CIA who were entrusted with maintaining links between the ELP and the international far right, as well as with Mozambique financier Jorge Jardim and the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. See João Paulo Guerra, Os "Flechas" atacam de novo (Lisbon: Caminho, 1988), p. 102. To these unsubstantiated claims one should add a documented fact of great potential significance. In 1957, logistical cooperation between PIDE and the CIA was formally initiated by means of a secret protocol which stipulated the responsibilities of each agency in connection with the global anti-communist struggle. As a result, the Director of PIDE at the time, Captain António Neves Graça, went to Washington to discuss the details with Allen Dulles and other CIA officials. This led to an arrangement whereby selected personnel from PIDE would attend two-month or four-month courses in the United States to obtain advanced training in intelligence work. In the next two years alone, thirteen PIDE officers (including ten from the Investigation Department, which was in charge of political prisoners) received such training, and among them was the pro-American Pereira de Carvalho, who collaborated with CIA case officer Diego Cortes Asensio and later aided Aginter operatives in his capacity as intelligence chief. A few of these trainees, such as Abílio Pires, Ernesto Lopes Ramos, and Miguel da Silva, were even recruited as contract agents by the CIA. For example, it turned out that Pires, who later became known as the CIA’s "man" inside PIDE, was paid a monthly stipend of 500 dollars. From 1958 to 1962, elements of the two services worked in close cooperation with one another. Thereafter, the Kennedy-initiated policy of official American support for decolonization in Africa strained relations between the agencies. But since this policy coexisted awkwardly with the de facto support offered by various CIA right-wingers to the Portuguese cause in Africa, factional infighting broke out between both hardline and moderate CIA case officers and between pro-American and anti-American PIDE personnel. How the clandestine alliances between these shifting, interconnected factions
worked themselves out in operational terms is impossible to determine on the basis of the currently available evidence. For details about the CIA-PIDE connection, see the thoroughly researched historical study by José Freire Antunes, Os Americanos e Portugal: Os anos de Richard Nixon, 1969-1974 (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 1986), especially pp. 52-8; and Vasco, Vigiaes e perseguidos, pp. 115-18, which publishes an important 27 August 1974 document on this subject. For Pereira de Carvalho’s provision of assistance to Aginter personnel operating in Angola during the Spring of 1967, see Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 141. Finally, although Guillou claimed that he was still being hunted by elements of the French secret service because of his role in the OAS, a perceptive Italian neo-fascist terrorist who had temporarily taken refuge in Lisbon became convinced, after becoming acquainted with him, that Guillou was still working for the “destabilization” section of SDECE. See Vincenzo Vinciguerra, Ergastolo per la libertà: Verso la verità sulla strategia della tensione (Florence: Arnaud, 1989), p. 20. This would not be at all surprising given the reconciliation between the Gaullist security forces and former members of the OAS that took place in the wake of the events of May 1968, if not before.


208. For summaries of Leroy’s checkered career, see SDCI, Relatório 2, p. 4; Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 154-6; and several interviews he provided to the press, including one with Sandro Ottolenghi, “L’uomo del rapporto segreto”, L’Europeo 30:27 (4 July 1974), pp. 28-31. For the Action Française, a pseudo-fascist Catholic integralist organization in prewar and interwar France, see especially Eugen Weber, Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France (Stanford: Stanford University, 1962), which is still the standard work on the subject. For the Cagoule (“Hooded Ones”) organization, which was officially known as the Comité Secret d’Action Révolutionnaire, see Philippe Bourdrel, La Cagoule: Histoire d’une société secrète du Front populaire à la Vème République (Paris: Albin Michel, 1992); and ”Dagore” (pseudonym for Aristide Corre), Les carnets secrets de la Cagoule (Paris: France-Empire, 1977), a more sympathetic treatment by a former member. For the Requeté, which was merged with the Falangist militia in 1937, see Rafael Casas de la Vega, Las milicias nacionales en la guerra de España (Madrid: Nacional, 1974), passim. For general histories of the Carlists, see Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1975); and José Carlos Clemente, Historia del Carlismo contemporáneo, 1935-1972 (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1977). The French term intoxication, which in general means “poisoning”, is used by Leroy and other guerre révolutionnaire proponents to refer to the “poisoning” of the mind. Specifically, it signifies the manipulation of the political environment by means of the systematic dissemination of false or misleading information to a targeted group (or groups), the purpose of which is to paralyze or otherwise influence that group’s subsequent actions. The targeted group can be relatively small or encompass an entire society. For further discussion, see Pierre Nord, L’Intoxication: Arme absolue de la
guerre subversive (Paris: Fayard, 1971), especially pp. vii-x (from Gabriel Veraldi’s preface) and pp. 5-7.

209. For the chief Aginter and Ordre et Tradition operatives, see SDCI, Relatório 2, pp. 13-21; Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 122-3, 126-7; González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, p. 153, who also adds the names of André Fontaine, António Kilby, and the Italian Silvio Morani.

210. Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 129.

211. For Aginter’s links to the international right, see SDCI, Relatório 2, pp. 25-34; the list appended to idem, ELP Relatório 3 entitled "Aginter Presse e Ordre et Tradition", pp. 1-5; Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 128-34; González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, p. 154; and Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 159. Note that Otto Skorzeny was one of the co-founders, a major subsidizer, and the "technical advisor" of CEDADE, a Barcelona-based neo-Nazi liaison organization established in the mid-1960s. This organization, which was allegedly set up with the help of former Hamburg Deutsche Arbeitsfront chief Friedrich Kuhfuss and Spanish Eastern Front veterans Miguel Ezquerra (ex-SS) and Tomás García Rebull (ex-División Azul), was closely linked to the NOE/ENO and is still active today. Compare Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 170-1; and Wolfgang Purscheller, Aufbruch der Völkischen: Das braune Netzwerk (Vienna: Picus, 1993), p. 34. According to a team of Swiss investigative journalists, Guy Amaudruz of the NOE/ENO was also a member of Ordre et Tradition, and Roland Gueissaz of the Swiss section of Jeune Europe was an Aginter correspondent. See Frischknecht et al, Unheimlichen Patrioten, p. 475. For more details concerning Aginter contacts in Belgium, see Serge Dumont, Les mercenaires (Berchem: EPO, no date), pp. 174-8. In this context, Aginter materials were regularly reprinted by Labin in the Ligue Internationale de la Liberte’s bulletin, Damocles. As noted above, the LIL was the Belgian section of the World Anti-Communist League. Perhaps more importantly, Guillou established personal contacts in 1969 with Damman, who was a key intermediary in Belgium between activist but "respectable" elements of the pro-Atlantic right or center-right—including Otto von Habsburg’s Paneuropa Union, Franz Josef Strauss’s CDU, the Cercle Pinay, and several other international networks with overlapping personnel—and a number of radical neo-fascist groups (including Jeune Europe and its offshoots). For further information and source references concerning some of these influential anti-communist networks, see the conclusion to Chapter Three below. For more on Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale, see immediately below. For more on the WUNS, an offshoot of earlier pro-Nazi "pan-Nordic" organizations like the Northern League and the Northern European Ring, see Smoydin, Hitler lebt!, pp. 135-74; Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 446-7; Algazy, Tentation néo-fasciste en France, pp. 312-21; and Cadena, Ofensiva neo-fascista, pp. 231-44. For the funding of 81 right-wing Italian journalists, including Accame and Torchia, by the Italian secret service, see De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 189-90, note 99, citing a 1976 article by Lino Jannuzzi in Il Tempo. Aginter’s file cards on these two Italian correspondents were also
quite revelatory. Thus Accame, who for many years served as the editor of Randolfo Pacciardi’s "presidentialist" Nuova Repubblica publication, was described as an informant for a branch of the BND in Rome, a regular correspondent to Franz Josef Strauss, and an admirer of Argoud and the OAS. For his part, Torchia was identified as an agent of the Italian secret service who also had close links to the American embassy and the Italian Army. Indeed, his Agenzia Oltremare was subsidized by the military intelligence service. See Tribunale di Catanzaro, Giudice Istruttore Gianfranco Migliaccio, Sentenza-ordinanza n. 14/75 del 31 luglio 1976 nel procedimento penale contro Giannettini, Guido + 16 [hereafter Sentenza 31 VII 76 contro Giannettini], p. 59. Their Aginter fiches are quoted in González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, pp. 160-1. Last and certainly least, Aginter made an effort to contact former CIA agent and National Review editor William F. Buckley, Jr., but nothing seems to have come of this. See Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 133-4. In the final analysis, setting off bombs and developing torture techniques, even for a "good" cause, apparently does not mix well with genteel pursuits like yachting.

212. See especially SDCI, Relatório 2, pp. 2-12; and Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 139-56. Compare Debreton, Coup d'État à Brazzaville, passim. The role of Guillou is briefly noted on pp. 31-4, and Aginter operative Jean-Marie Laurent—who also writes the preface—makes frequent appearances throughout the narrative.

213. Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 156-65.

214. For more on the clandestine activities of these groups (except the ELP, which has already been discussed above), see ibid, pp. 337-55; and González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, pp. 175-89. For the abortive FLA plot, see especially the article by Fred Strasser and Brian McTigue, "The Fall River Conspiracy", Boston Magazine (November 1978), pp. 121-4, 175-84, in whose stateside planning and financing Victor Fediay, an aide to conservative Senator Strom Thurmond (Republican-South Carolina) and a former employee in a top secret Air Force intelligence program, was personally involved. A more complete version of this article appeared in the 4 November 1978 issue of Lisbon's O Expresso, "1975: Americanos, OAS e Almeida reúnem-se em Paris para negociar a independência dos Açores", pp. 1R-3R.


216. These and other excerpts from Guillou’s manual can be found in González-Mata, Terrorismo internacional, pp. 155-6; "Une 'OAS' internationale", Libération (12 December 1974), p. 8; and Roger-X. Lantéri, "L'Internationale noire", L'Express International 1337 (21 February 1977), p. 34. The apparent title of the manual is identified by Antonio Cipriani and Gianni Cipriani in Sovranità limitata: Storia dell'eversione atlantica in Italia (Rome: Associate, 1991), p. 109, though perhaps they are confusing the heading of a particular section of it with the title.


221. See, for example, the interview with Leroy published by Sandro Ottolenghi, "L'uomo del rapporto secreto", *L'Europeo* 30:27 (4 July 1974), pp. 28-30.


The story here is a rather complex one. It has sometimes been suggested that Bulliard’s party was a genuine Maoist organization which was manipulated by Leroy into providing Aginter operatives with legitimate left-wing credentials. This is what Bulliard himself claimed after the activities of Aginter were exposed. See his letter to the post-coup Portuguese authorities, which was appended to the 11 April 1975 letter cited above. But it now seems clear, as I myself suggested in a 1987 article, that Bulliard was himself a neo-fascist provocateur who had consciously established a phony Maoist party which could be used as a cover for the far right. See Jeffrey M. Bale, "Right-Wing Terrorists and the Extraparliamentary Left in Post-World War II Europe: Collusion or Manipulation?", *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32 (1987), pp. 205 and 226-7, note 108.

Among other things, he was in contact with Manuel Coelho da Silva (alias "Manuel Rios"), a PIDE/DGS informant within the major anti-Salazarist opposition group, the Comité Portugal Libre in Paris. In other words, Bulliard was undoubtedly a "player" rather than a dupe. Note, for example, that a recent Swiss book provides evidence that he was working as a paid informant for Marc-Edmond Chantre's virulently anti-communist Aktion freier Staatsbürger organization in 1964, the very same year he formed the PCS/M-L (which was renamed the Parti Populaire Suisse in 1967). See Claude Cantini, *Les ultras: Extrême droite et droite extrême en Suisse. Les mouvements et la presse de 1921 à 1991* (Lausanne: En Bas, 1992), p. 161, note 136. For Chantre, a former member of the Action Nationale, and his postwar group, which compiled a large archive of files on suspected leftists in Switzerland prior to its dissolution, see ibid, pp. 89-91; and Frischknecht et al, *Unheimlichen Patrioten*, especially pp. 113-34. The role of the Chinese embassy at Berne in this affair likewise remains unclear, though it was far from innocent. In the wake of the Sino-Soviet split, the government of communist China expended increasing efforts to neutralize Soviet influence in Africa, and as noted above the Tewu had also established collaborative relations with Thiriart and his organizations. Indeed, according to Swiss journalist Serge
Niklaus of the *Nationalzeitung*, it was Thiriart himself who originally brought Leroy together with Bulliard. See *ibid*, p. 476. Since the Chinese must have known that Thiriart and his associates were neo-fascists, their efforts to help them establish a Maoist cover could hardly have been accidental. The only real question is whether they did so simply because they shared the same goal of resisting the extension of Soviet and American power, whether they sought to conceal their own initiatives behind a network of neo-fascists, or whether they sought to utilize and manipulate neo-fascist groups covertly for entirely different purposes. It may also be that Leroy and his comrades were seeking to discredit or gather information about the Chinese apparatus in Europe at the behest of NATO and other Western secret services. These are important questions which deserve further consideration.

224. For these African and European operations, see SDCI, *Relatório 1*, p. 8; idem, *Relatório 2*, pp. 2, 4-13, 23-4; and Laurent, *Orchestre noir*, pp. 148-9, 151-4.


30; Ferraresi, "Destra eversiva", pp. 55-7; Weinberg, After Mussolini, pp. 14-16; Del Boca and Giovana, Fascism Today, pp. 131-2; and Barbieri, Agenda nera, pp. 18-23. For more on the FAR, the most important neo-fascist group of this type prior to the formation of Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale, see especially Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Ministero dell'Interno, Pubblica Sicurezza, 1951, Prima Sezione, busta 34, fascicolo K8/A: "Movimento FAR", passim; Mario Tedeschi, Fascisti dopo Mussolini (Rome: Arnia, 1950), passim; and the fascinating series of articles by P. F. Altomonte, "Fascisti dopo Mussolini: Storia del FAR", in the left fascist publication Il Pensiero Nazionale between February and August 1958, which adopt a harshly critical posture towards both Evola and Tedeschi, who is openly suspected of having intentionally "burned" the fascist radicals by publishing his historical exposé. There are good reasons to consider this possibility, given Tedeschi's later pro-Atlantic, conservative, and "respectable" public stance, which was anathema to both the national syndicalist left and the Evolan right within the MSI.

228. For biographical material on Rauti, see Marco Sassano, La politica della strage (Padua: Marsilio, 1972), pp. 41-2; Marco Revelli, "La nuova destra", in Destra radicale, ed. by Ferraresi, pp. 189-90, note 5. More information about Rauti can be found throughout all the studies on the postwar Italian radical right.


231. For more on AN, see Minna, "Terrorismo di destra", pp. 33-5; Ferraresi, "Destra eversiva", pp. 66-71; Gaddi, Neofasismo in Europa, pp. 33-5; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, pp. 76-7 and passim; and Strage di stato: Vent'anni dopo, pp. 37-9.

232. For Delle Chiaie's early career, see Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, pp. 18-23, 33-4, 36-9, 43-55, 61-8; Strage di stato: Vent'anni dopo, pp. 178-96; Ferraresi, "Destra eversiva", pp. 66-8. Compare also [Stefano Delle Chiaie], La lotta politica di Avanguardia Nazionale (Rome: Avanguardia Nazionale, no date [1974 or 1975], pp. 2-5, for his own defense of AN's ideals and violent behavior.

233. Strage di stato: Vent'anni dopo, p. 47 (editors' introduction). According to this source, after his arrival in Spain Delle Chiaie was put up for a time by Girón at his villa in Fuengirol. This is not surprising, for both were men of action. Among other things, Girón was directly implicated in the organization of a brutal assault on Carlos Arias Navarro, who had been compelled to undertake some minor democratic reforms after succeeding hardline Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco as Prime Minister. (Carrero Blanco, it will be recalled, had been assassinated by the ETA at the end of 1973.) Not coincidentally, the attack on Arias, which was known as the Gironazo, took place three days after the 25 April 1974 revolution in Portugal, and was linked to parallel efforts by military hardliners to secure key operational posts from which they could control developments following Franco's death. See, for example, Preston, Politics of Revenge,
pp. 160-1, 172-3. Note also that Delle Chiaie was personally introduced to Degrelle by Borghese, who characterized the AN leader as a "man of action". See Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, p. 260.

234. For the later phases of Delle Chiaie’s checkered career, see Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 260-73; Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, pp. 71-128. Further information will very soon be provided about its more sinister aspects. Among the Italians who worked at the Calle Pelayo factory were Delle Chiaie collaborators and MPON militants Elio Massagrande and Eliodoro Pomar, a nuclear engineer who had been earlier been involved in a plot to contaminate Roman reservoirs with radioactive material. In addition to this arms fabrication factory, a neo-fascist production facility for false identification papers was discovered in an apartment on Calle A. del Barco, where stolen documents had been modified by attaching the photos of leading neo-fascist figures like Clemente Graziani (MPON), Pierluigi Concutelli (MPON), Salvatore Francia (MPON), Flavio Campo (AN), Mario Tedeschi (MSI), and others. See Corte d’Assise di Firenze, Presidente Pietro Cassano, Giudice estensore Francesco Carvisiglia, Sentenza n. 1/85 del 21 marzo 1985 nel procedimento penale contro Graziani, Clemente + 18 [hereafter Sentenza 21 III 85 contro Graziani], pp. 19-20; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 4:2, pp. 353-4.

235. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, pp. 79, 100-1, quoting directly from Italian secret service reports. Compare Sassano, Politica della strage, pp. 40-1.

236. These 1969 provocations and acts of terrorism are described in considerable detail in several judicial sentences and a host of mostly partisan secondary sources, and will be analyzed in detail in the final version of this study. For an overview of this complex series of events, see Giorgio Boatti, Piazza Fontana, 12 dicembre 1969: Il giorno dell’innocenza perduta (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1993).

237. For the close links between Rauti and the NOE/ENO, see Giovana, Nuove camicie nere, pp. 106, 110; Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, pp. 80, 88. Further evidence of this can be found in the reciprocal publication of articles in each other’s journals. For ON’s links to other interlinked European neo-fascist groups, see Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, p. 23.

238. See Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 103-4, 174. One of the "principal agents" of the OAS who was affiliated with ON was Guido Giannettini, who will be discussed in more detail shortly.

239. See, for example, the short notes by "Coriolano" in Ordine Nuovo 10:1-2 (January-February 1964), p. 52; ON 10:3 (April 1964), p. 61; and ON 10:5-6 (June-July 1964), p. 75. "Coriolano" was the alias used by Émile Lecerf, one of Thiriart’s key associates. See Dumont, Brigades noires, pp. 116 and 179, note 161. According to one less than reliable left-wing journalist, Rauti was among the Italians who attended the 1962 Venice conference organized by Mosley and Thiriart. See Sassano, Politica della strage, p. 42.

241. This is noted by a variety of Italian journalists, including some who had access to a larger sample of Aginter documents than I was able to obtain. See, for example, De Lutis, *Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia*, p. 166. However, Rauti’s name does not appear in the corpus of Aginter documents in my possession.


243. For Rauti’s contacts with Plevris, see *Sentenza 31 VI 76 contro Giannettini*, pp. 132 (citing an 8 April 1975 SID report), 140 (citing a 7 May 1975 KYP report), 144 (testimony of Greek official Kalamakis, who also confirmed Rauti’s links to former Interior Minister Stylianos Pattakos and ex-Military Police chief Ioannis Ladas). Only George Antonopoulos, head of the Ministry of Public Order’s National Security Service, said he could find no evidence concerning the activities of Italian neo-fascists in Greece. See *ibid*, p. 141. Plevris himself noted that Rauti and other Italians actively sought out his aid and advice, but he considered ON to be the only truly “serious” Italian group. See his interview with Oriana Fallaci, “Si farà il colpo di stato in Italia?”, *L’Europeo* 30:39 (26 September 1974), pp. 30-2. Many leftist secondary sources in Italy also emphasize Rauti’s role as an intermediary between Italian and Greek neo-fascists, for example, *Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo*, p. 245; and De Simone, *Pista nera*, pp. 16-19. Specialists familiar with Greek sources, including some who are quite conservative (like former British MP C.M. Woodhouse), also note that Rauti had close links to the Colonels’ regime, in particular its intelligence services through the intermediary of his neo-fascist counterpart Plevris. Compare Solon Gregoriades, *Historia tes diktatorias* (Athens, 1975), volume 2, pp. 88-101; and Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), p. 61. Vassilis Kapetanyannis also highlights the links between Italian and Greek neo-fascists (and, through the latter, between the Italians and the Greek security services) in his article “Neo-Fascism in Greece”, pp. 199 and 209, notes 33-5, citing the investigative journalistic publication of the Greek left, ANT1. However, he does not specifically mention Rauti, but focusses instead on his ON lieutenants Clemente Graziani and Elio Massagrande. For his part, Lentakes does not mention Rauti by name, but emphasizes Plevris’ links to Italian neo-fascist groups. See *Parakratikes organoseis kai eikostes prote Apriliou*, p. 359.

244. For Delle Chiaie’s travels and liaison work in different European countries, including Britain, see *Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo*, p. 187. He also made personal appearances at the 1965 Milan Congress and the 1969 Barcelona Congress of the NOE/ENO, in all probability together with other members of AN. See Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, pp. 79-80, 82; and volume 2, p. 25.
245. *Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo*, p. 187. Note also that De Luia lived in Munich, a center of right-wing activity, between the Fall of 1967 and the Spring of 1968, and that afterwards he took a trip to the Colonels’ Greece. See *ibid*, p. 238.

246. For these AN contacts with Aginter, see *ibid*, pp. 186-7; Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 3:2, pp. 498-9 (Guillou check to Fabruzzi) and volume 4:2, pp. 377-8, citing a 28 September 1977 intelligence report (documents found in Rome apartment); Linklater et al, *Fourth Reich*, pp. 263, 271. Flamini identifies the occupants of the Rome apartment, which was located in the Tuscolano neighborhood, as Silvio Paulon, his wife Antonella, and her brother Vincenzo Modugno, all three of whom were AN members. Among the other materials found there inside Delle Chiaie’s briefcase were various airline tickets between Spain and Latin America, London, and Paris, a photograph of Ustasa general Luburic signed by Spanish secret service officer Luis García Rodríguez, and a Costa Rican Dirección de Seguridad Nacional identification card in the name of “Francisco Alenzo”, but with Delle Chiaie’s picture on it. Note also that the Banco de Panama check made out to Fabruzzi was issued by a Spanish branch of the bank. For more on García Rodríguez, see Laurent, *Orchestre noir*, pp. 292, 295, 356; Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 3:2, pp. 741-2; and Muñoz Alonso, *Terrorismo en España*, pp. 39, 246. Aside from working for the Spanish secret service, he was a leader of the Hermandad de la Guardia de Franco organization who attended several international neo-fascist meetings—including a December 1974 NOE/ENO gathering in Lyon (along with Guillou) and a March 1976 summit meeting in Barcelona (along with Sánchez Covisa of the GCR, Blas Piñar of Fuerza Nueva, some former PIDE/DGS officials, and assorted Frenchmen and Argentines)—and seems to have been linked behind the scenes to the 23-24 May 1981 assault on the Banco Central de Barcelona. He was in fact a key figure in the “Black International”. In this connection, an arrest warrant was issued for him on 29 July 1974 by Turin judge Luciano Violante, who accused him of having furnished arms to a group of Italian neo-fascists who were planning an October coup, through the intermediary of the “Europreminent” export-import company owned by Salvatore Francia, an MPON leader. Francia then took refuge in Spain, initially at García Rodríguez’s home in Barcelona. See Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 3:2, pp. 574, 603-4; and Laurent, *Orchestre noir*, p. 309.

247. For more on ESESI, see *Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo*, pp. 244-9. The “tour” itself will be described below.


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found in the files of a group close to Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, an ARENA activist and a key "death squad" coordinator (El Salvador). The Spanish contacts will be enumerated further below.

249. See Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, pp. 27, 79-82. I have not been able to uncover any further information about an organization called the Fronte Europeo Rivoluzionario. Either the meeting was held under the auspices of another organization, or this Fronte was unusually ephemeral, even by neo-fascist standards. As for Freda's involvement with Giovane Europa, Claudio Mutti later testified that he first encountered Freda at the organization's Bologna headquarters in 1963-64. See *Sentenza 31 VII 76 contro Giannettini*, p. 26. Orsi also presented themes from *La disintegrazione del sistema* at a Congress of Giovane Europa, and later was himself involved in infiltrating small leftist groups. See Procura di Catanzaro, Pubblico Ministero Mariano Lombardi, *Requisitoria del giugno 1976 nel procedimento penale contro Giannettini, Guido + 16 [hereafter Requisitoria VI 76 contro Giannettini]*, p. 21.

250. These reports are directly quoted by Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, pp. 20-1. For the creation of an ON export-import firm that specialized in arms trafficking, compare Sassano, *Politica della strage*, p. 43, who claims it was named "Mondial Import Export" and was set up in 1964; and Flamini, who identifies an ON-linked firm called "Mondial Export Import" which was not established until 1 December 1969, although it did in fact specialize in arms trafficking to the Portuguese colony of Angola, as well as to South Africa and Rhodesia. See *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, pp. 104-5. Whether Sassano is simply incorrect, which is probable given his general imprecision, or whether we are here dealing with two successive or separate ON firms with similar names and business partners, is unclear. In any event, the conspicuous presence of Moniz Ferreira at these secret high-level negotiations in Spain suggests that he was a PIDE operative rather than a mere neo-fascist leader. For more on Muñoz Grandes, who went on to create a potent Servicio de Información for the General Staff in 1968, and his role in postwar military politics, see Preston, *Politics of Revenge*, pp. 142-58. The general's political views can be gleaned from the fact that he sent a telegram expressing his support to the neo-fascists assembled at the April 1969 NOE/ENO Congress in Barcelona. See Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, p. 25. Among the other noteworthy persons that Rauti and Graziani met with in Madrid was Leo Negrelli, head of the Italian section of the Asociación Cristiana Ecuménica and ON's chief correspondent in the Spanish capital. Negrelli later moved to Lisbon and became an Italian-language broadcaster for "La Voix de l'Occident", the international program on the official Radio Portugal station, in which capacity he may have transmitted coded messages from Aginter's central headquarters in Madrid to its agents in Italy. In 1967 he wrote to Guillou, informing him that two Italian comrades would be arriving in Portugal "for an exchange of ideas that can lead to interesting results" and reminding him that his own goal was still to organize operational connections on a supranational level. Compare ibid, volume 1, p. 171, and volume 2, p. 27. For the possible transmission of coded messages, see De Lutiis, *Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia*, p. 166.
251. Nevertheless, even if Rauti himself did not work for the UAR, some of his men probably did. Thus Flamini indicates, without any equivocation, that Rauti's liaison man to Aginter, Armando Mortilla, was a "valued informant" of that organization. See Partito del golpe, volume 1, p. 171.

252. For this struggle between the two generals, see Virgilio Ilari, Le Forze armate tra politica e potere, 1943-1976 (Florence: Vallecchi, 1979), pp. 67-78; De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 76-80; and the account by MSI moderate Mario Tedeschi, La guerra dei generali (Milan: Borghese, 1968), especially pp. 105-41.

253. For Agenzia D, see De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 77-8. The 1965 conference will be discussed below.

254. For the preparation and publication of Le mani rosse, compare Sentenza 31 July 76 contro Giannettini, pp. 56-62; Tedeschi, Guerra dei generali, pp. 110-11; and Guido Giannettini and "Flavio Messala" (pseudonym for Pino Rauti), Le mani rosse sulle Forze armate (Rome: Savelli, 1975), pp. 7-49 (introduction by far left Lotta Continua commission). Note that the latter work was published by the left in order to illustrate the extremist views of the Aloja faction within the armed forces, as well as to embarrass all the parties involved in sponsoring and producing that divisive and paranoid treatise.

255. For the meetings with Plevris and the Corfu training camps, see the interview with Plevris by Fallaci, "Si farà il colpo di stato in Italia?", p. 32. For Rauti's reception by Pattakos, a Brigadier General and former head of the Armored Training Center (KET), see Strage di stato: Vent'anni dopo, p. 179. It should be pointed out that Plevris, aside from being the leader of the neo-fascist K4A, was the private secretary of Colonel Ladas, the former head of the ESA who was appointed Secretary-General of the Ministry of Public Order after the coup. See Woodhouse, Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, p. 61. He was also affiliated with Calzi's ("Chairoff's") World Service press agency, a front organization for the KYP which was funded in part by the CIA, and was allegedly the head of the KYP's Italian desk. Compare Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, pp. 39, 42; Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, pp. 293-8; and the interview with "Chiaroff" (Calzi) in Frédéric Laurent, "Un agente della CIA parla dal carcere", L'Europeo 32:21 (21 May 1976), p. 38. Calzi was himself the person selected to serve as the titular head of the World Service agency, in connection with which he decided to adopt another pseudonym, "Dr. Siegfried Schönenberg".


257. Compare Barbieri, Agenda nera, pp. 115-16; De Simone, Pista nera, pp. 15, 52-4; and Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, pp. 189-90.
258. For the Greek "strategy of tension", see Lentakes, Parakratikes orgonoseis kai eikoste prote apriou, pp. 46-68, 140-1; Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 236-8; Barbieri, Agenda nera, pp. 115-17; De Simone, Pista nera, p. 18; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, pp. 147-8; Jean Reynaud, Rapport sur l'abolition de la démocratie en Grèce (Montreal: Bibliographie Nationale du Quebec, 1970), pp. 221-31. Some important Greek works, which are unfortunately inaccessible to me at present, are Gregorides, Historia tes diktorias, 3 volumes; Kyriakos I. Diakogiannes, Giati pera meros ste synomosia tes chountas kai tes CIA kata tou Andreou Papandreou kai tes Hellenikes demokratias (Montreal: Patris, 1968), written by a former KYP officer; and George Karagiorgas, Apo ten IDEA sten chounta (Athens: Papazisis, 1975). Documentary material from the trials of government and military functionaries accused of crimes against the Greek people after the collapse of the Colonels’ regime can be found in Perikles Rodakes, ed., Oi dikes tes chountas (Athens: Demokratikoi Kairoi, 1975-1976), 9 volumes.


260. For the close links between the CIA and KYP and/or Papadopoulos, see "Athenian" (pseudonym), Inside the Colonels' Greece (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972), p. 73; Maurice Goldblum, "United States Policy in Postwar Greece", in Greece under Military Rule, ed. by Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos (New York: Basic, 1972), pp. 734-5; John Iatrides, "American Attitudes toward the Political System of Postwar Greece", in Greek-American Relations: A Critical View, ed. by Theodore A. Couloumbis and John Iatrides (New York: Pella, 1980), pp. 66-7; John A. Katris, Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power (St. Louis: New Critics, 1971), pp. 44-6; Meynaud, Rapport sur la abolition de la démocratie en Grèce, pp. 249-51, 312-14; Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front (Garden City: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 221-2, 226-30; Laurence Stern, The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy (New York: NY Times, 1977), pp. 13, 18, 23-4, 35-46; and Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York: Columbia University, 1982), pp. 299-301, 305-6. Compare Chairoff, Dossier néo-nazisme, p. 292; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, pp. 147-8; and Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 238-41. Other experts express doubt about Papadopoulos’ alleged links to the CIA and deny that the agency played any role at all in the coup or the anti-constitutional events leading up to it, for example Woodhouse, Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, pp. 7, 9-10, 20, 23, 27-8. However, his arguments seem rather naive, and even he is forced to admit that the CIA helped to set up the KYP in the early 1950s, that it had a relationship of "great intimacy" with the KYP, and that it exerted a "powerful influence" on its Greek counterpart. See ibid, pp. 6-7. If that was in fact the case, which presupposes that the agency had some well-placed informants within the KYP, how can one honestly believe that American intelligence knew nothing whatsoever about the coup beforehand?

262. Plevris interview in Fallaci, "Si farà un colpo di stato in Italia?", p. 32.

263. See, for example, De Simone, *Pista nera*, p. 26; and Sassano, *Politica della strage*, p. 44. Compare *Sentenza 31 VI 76 contro Giannettini*, p. 132, for SID's report supporting that conclusion. However, a subsequent SID report, dated 5 June 1975, claimed that the Finer document was not genuine on the basis of the Greek government's denials. Note, however, that Army officer Dimitrios Bikos claimed that if the secret report published by Finer had been genuine, it would not have been found in the archives. See *ibid*, p. 139. For the article itself, see Finer, "Greek Premier plots Army coup in Italy", *London Observer* (7 December 1969), pp. 1-2.

264. *Sentenza 31 VI 76 contro Giannettini*, pp. 136-44.


266. The reason why some suspect a right-wing forgery is that the report had originally been provided to Finer by Elena Vlachos, editor of the conservative daily *Kathimerini*, who continued to insist that the document was genuine. Compare *Sentenza 31 VI 76 contro Giannettini*, pp. 141-2; Laurent, *Orchestre noir*, p. 210. But Vlachos was herself bitterly anti-junta, having been placed under house arrest following the coup. She thence escaped and emigrated to London, from where she served as an outspoken critic of the Greek regime's press censorship. See, for example, Helen Vlachos, "The Colonels and the Press", in *Greece under Military Rule*, pp. 59-74; and *ibid*, *House Arrest* (Boston: Gambit, 1970).

267. D'Amato was the son of a Naples police chief who followed in his father's footsteps and joined the Pubblica Sicurezza corps during World War II. In June 1944, he was among the police officers sent northwards by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to make contact with, and obtain the cooperation of, high-ranking police officials of the Republic of Salò, including Guido Leto, head of the fascist secret police. Between 1945 and 1957 D'Amato worked at the Rome Questura, mainly in the Ufficio Politico (which he headed from 1950 on). In 1957 he was assigned to the UAR, and rose rapidly through the ranks until becoming its second-in-command in 1969 and its commander in 1972. In this capacity he directed various covert operations, served as the UAR's liason to NATO's security services (and, allegedly, to the CIA), and later became a member of Licio Gelli's Propaganda Due (P2) masonic lodge. For his early career, see De Lutiis, *Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia*, pp. 48-9 and 54, note 46. In Chapter Three, he will reappear in connection with the "strategy of tension".

268. Many of these accusations against Delle Chiaie have come from within the ranks of his own neo-fascist milieu. Thus in 1972, after Delle Chiaie submitted supportive declarations by five MSI members on his behalf to investigating magistrates, party chief
Giorgio Almirante said he was sick and tired of being continually burdened with people paid by the Interior Ministry’s UAR. Later that same year Mario Tedeschi argued in the weekly Il Borghese that if fascists were involved in the Piazza Fontana bombing, certain Interior Ministers, chiefs of police, and Prime Ministers should be in the dock with them. See De Simone, Pista nera, pp. 50-1. Compare Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, pp. 189-90 (editors’ note), where it is noted that in 1976 former members of the neo-fascist Organizzazione Lotta di Popolo in Naples accused both AN and ON leaders of being at the service of the corpi separati of the state, which in turn provided them with cover and financing. Therein it is also pointed out that in 1978 members of an international Freda solidarity committee referred to Delle Chiaie as a secret service provocateur, an adventurer, and a professional assassin. MSI Senator Giorgio Pisanò also levelled harsh criticisms against the AN leader. See, for example, "Stefano delle Chiaie: Una 'sfida' da baraccone", Candido, new series, 8:1 (9 January 1975), p. 7, and another article in the 13 February 1975 issue of that publication. For AN’s vitriolic and vulgar responses to Pisanò, see Avanguardia Nazionale, Settore Stampa e Propaganda, ed., Cronistoria di un’infamia (Rome: Avanguardia Nazionale, no date), passim. For examples of Delle Chiaie’s denials of these charges, see Sergio Zavoli, La notte della Repubblica (Rome and Milan: Nuova Eri/Mondadori, 1992), pp. 64-7; and the January 1983 interview he granted to journalist Enzo Biagi, portions of which are quoted by Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, pp. 130-1. One of the few principled revolutionary rightists to defend Delle Chiaie was self-confessed Peteano bomber Vincenzo Vinciguerra. According to the latter, Delle Chiaie was the target of a state-sponsored disinformation campaign designed to attribute all of the massacres from 1969 through 1980 to him. To make this convincing, they persuaded certain younger left fascist proponents of "armed spontaneanism" that the older generation of neo-fascists, especially Delle Chiaie and AN, were not genuine revolutionaries but tools of the hated bourgeois state. These attacks on Delle Chiaie by the ultras from within his own milieu helped add credence to the state’s case, particularly since it conformed closely to his image as a provocateur in the far left journalistic literature. See Vinciguerra, Ergastolo per la libertà, pp. 56, 63-4, 66-9. Although the latter author is a very intelligent and knowledgeable insider, his assessment of Delle Chiaie, though rightly highlighting certain partisan political machinations and secret service manipulations in the 1980s (for example, Elio Ciolini’s bogus revelations about Delle Chiaie and the "Organizzazione Terrorista" supposedly sponsored by P2 chief Licio Gelli), does not appear to accord with the facts. In his narrative virtually every neo-fascist but Delle Chiaie is portrayed as a squalid, unprincipled lout who willingly sold his services to the security forces. Vinciguerra fails to note that radical members of AN had angrily complained about Delle Chiaie’s links to the state apparatus as early as the mid-1960s—long before the government sought to discredit him and use him as a scapegoat for the yet to be launched "strategy of tension"—and he completely glosses over masses of evidence about the AN leader’s work at the behest of foreign secret services, as will soon become clear.


271. See, respectively, De Simone, *Pista nera*, p. 54, citing a 6 April 1972 article in *Panorama*; and Chairoff, *Dossier néo-nazisme*, p. 296. The latter author also emphasizes the close links between Guillou and these same Greek security agencies. See ibid, pp. 296-7.

272. Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, p. 191. For CISES, see ibid, p. 178. Mondial was apparently the same company, discussed above, that engaged in arms trafficking with Portugal.

273. For the different branches of the Spanish intelligence and security services, see Luis González-Mata, *Cygne: Mémoires d'un agent secret* (Paris: Grasset, 1976), annex 2, pp. 362-9. The most important of these were the DGS, the Servicio de Información de la Guardia Civil (SIGC), the Servicio Central de Documentación de la Presidencia del Gobierno (SECED) and its attached Servicio de Coordinación Organización y Enlace (SCOIE), and the Servicio de Información del Ejército de Tierra (SIE). The Falange also had its own intelligence service, the Servicio de Información del Movimiento. Aside from this work, the only book which deals specifically with the activities of the Spanish intelligence services is José Ignacio San Martín, *Servicio Especial: A las órdenes de Carrero Blanco, de Castellana a El Aaiún* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1983), a top SECED officer who was subsequently involved in the rightist "23F" coup of 23 February 1981. According to Chairoff, the head of the SIGC was none other than Salvador Bujanda, a high-ranking member of the far right Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey, whose paramilitary training camps at Onteniente (near Alicante), Mairena, Piedralaves (Madrid), and Iscar (near Valladolid) therefore operated without being disturbed by the security forces. See *Dossier néo-nazisme*, p. 170. It will be recalled that the GCR was one of the Spanish organizations that was linked to the Portuguese ELP and thus, however indirectly, to the Paladin Group.

274. For this host of Spanish paramilitary squads, which were composed of the usual assortment of neo-fascists and counterguerrilla specialists, see Muñoz Alonso, *Terrorismo en España*, pp. 75-6, 80-1, 241-4, etc.; Cadena, *Ofensiva neo-fascista*, pp. 173-4; and several articles in the Spanish newsweekly *Cambio 16* from the latter half of 1976 on up through the 1980s.

275. A partial listing of these right-wing terrorist actions can be found in José Luis Piñuel, *El terrorismo en la transición española, 1972-1982* (Madrid: Fundamentos, 1986), pp. 142-52. It is likely, however, that some terrorist actions attributed to Basque separatists or extreme left groups, particularly the Grupos de Resistencia Antifascistas Primero de Octubre (GRAPO), were rightist provocations. For details concerning the anti-ETA actions carried out by the GAL, typically at the behest of the security services, see Javier García, *Los GAL al descubierto: La trama de la "guerra sucia" contra ETA* (Madrid: El País/Aguilar, 1988). For the political and terrorist activities of the


278. For the assault of the sixtinos at Montejurra, see especially Josep Carles Clemente and Carles S. Costa, *Montejurra 76* (Barcelona: Gaya Ciencia, 1976), pp. 101-30, which provides both a detailed account of the events and photographic evidence of the presence of Cauchi and other Italians. Additional information about the identities of the attackers later appeared in the Spanish and Italian press.


280. For the Atocha massacre, see ibid, pp. 80-1; and especially *La matanza de Atocha* (Madrid: Akal, 1980), which provides an abundance of details drawn from trial documents and testimony. Those who were brought to trial for having carried out the attack included Fernando Lerdo de Tejada, the son of an ex-secretary of Blas Piñar (a División Azul veteran and head of the right-wing Fuerza Nueva party); José Fernández Cerrá, an ATE member who was also implicated in the murder of Arturo Ruiz; Carlos García Juliá, a Fuerza Nueva dissident; and Leocadio Jiménez Caravaca, a weapons expert and also a División Azul veteran.

281. For Delle Chiaie as an operative for the DGS, see the testimonies of Aldo Tisei, Paolo Bianchi, Giorgio Cozi, and Sergio Calore, summarized in *Sentenza 21 III 85 contro Graziani*, pp. 270-80. After examining the evidence the judges likewise concluded that Delle Chiaie and Concutelli had worked for the Spanish secret services against the ETA, and that those services had provided them with several MAC-10s, including the one used to kill Judge Occorsio. Delle Chiaie was reportedly the intermediary between those services and the Italians who had taken refuge in Spain, all of whom were recruited for this "dirty" work at one time or another. According to Calore, in January 1977 Massagrande told him that he could procure two other MAC-10s for comrades in Italy, and that these weapons had been among those employed in the Calle Atocha massacre. See ibid, p. 274. The MAC-10 later used by Concutelli to assassinate Occorsio—serial #2/2000381—had been shipped to the DGS, with the permission of U.S. authorities, from the Military Armaments Corporation factory in Marietta, Georgia. This particular company was owned by a CIA contract agent, manufacturer of exotic weaponry, and alleged drug trafficker named Mitchell WerBell III. Compare Linklater et al, *Fourth Reich*, pp. 269-70; and Laurent, *Orchestre noir*, reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

282. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, pp. 559-60.


284. For the Leighton assassination attempt and its results, see Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 4:1, pp. 145-6; Dinges and Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row, pp. 158-63; Branch and Propper, Labyrinth, pp. 307-9; and Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 272-3. Note that the MNC’s clandestine terrorist wing, known as Cero, claimed responsibility for the attack in a series of communiques, making use of inside information provided to Townley by Delle Chiaie, in order to throw investigators off the track.


286. For the AIP and/or some tantalizingly brief glimpses of Delle Chiaie’s work for DINA in Latin America, see Branch and Propper, Labyrinth, p. 314; Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 348, 358; Harrington and González, Bomba en una calle de Palermo, pp. 380, 383-4; and Dinges and Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row, p. 177 and note.

287. González Janzen, Triple-A, pp. 93-106, though he also identifies one of those who exerted a baleful influence on López Rega as former Ustaša secret service official Mile Ravlić (alias "Milosz de Bogetich"), who settled in Argentina after World War II and later formed part of Perón’s inner circle in Spain. See ibid, pp. 77-85.

288. For the Milicia, see Dinges and Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row, pp. 140, 184; Anderson, Dossier Secreto, pp. 146, 241-3, 353-4, note 16. For Delle Chiaie’s collusion with elements of this group, in particular Martín Ciga Correia, see Dinges and Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row, p. 177; and Harrington and González, Bomba en una calle de Palermo, pp. 379, 384-94.

289. Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 358-60.

290. For more on WACL, see especially Anderson and Anderson, Inside the League, the only full-length study of this important international organization.

291. For the participation of Massagrande and Delle Chiaie, respectively, at the 1979 WACL and 1980 CAL gatherings, see Anderson and Anderson, Inside the League, pp. 101, 147. Others have claimed that Delle Chiaie also made an appearance at the WACL conference, though this remains uncertain.
292. Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, p. 97. For "Operación Cóndor", see Andersen, Dossier Secreto, pp. 228-30; Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End, 1982), pp. 69-73; Alfonso Lessa, Los espías de la basura (Montevideo: Monte Sexto, 1988); and Soviet propagandist Valentin K. Mashkin, Operación Cóndor: Su rastro sangriento (Buenos Aires: Cartago, 1985), which should be used with the degree of caution befitting such polemical works.

293. Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, p. 271. Note also that Ovando Candía had formerly been involved in Barbie's abortive Transmaritima Boliviana project. See ibid, p. 289.

294. See Andersen, Dossier Secreto, p. 290.

295. For the Novios de la Muerte, see Latin America Bureau, ed., Narcotráfico y política, pp. 112-25, 137-44; Carlo Rossella, "Un uomo in vendita", Panorama 20:857 (27 September 1982), pp. 82-91; Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 350-7, 371-9; and Kai Hermann, "Eine Killer-Karriere [part 5]", Der Stern 37:24 (6 June 1984). Among the personnel in this undisciplined paramilitary squad were Fiebelkorn himself, a Bundeswehr deserter and ex-member of the Kampfbund Deutscher Soldaten who had also served for a time in the Spanish Legión Extranjera; former Gestapo officer Hans Stellfeld; Adolfo Ustares Ferreira, a Bolivian lawyer linked to the drug barons; Fernando "Mosca" Monroy, an ex-Falange Socialista Boliviana militant; Waffen-SS veteran Herbert "Ike" Kopplin; Manfred Kuhlmann, a German from Rhodesia; Hans-Jürgen Lewandowski, another Waffen-SS veteran; Austrian mercenary Wolfgang Walterkirche; and ex-OAS man Jacques "Napoleon" Leclerc. A four-man Belgian paramilitary group headed by the notorious mercenary Jean Schramme was also incorporated into Barbie's Servicio Especial de Seguridad. See Latin America Bureau, ed., Narcotráfico y política, pp. 122-3.

296. For the coup and Delle Chiaie’s role in it, see Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 362-9; Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, pp. 97-107; and Latin America Bureau, ed., Narcotráfico y política, pp. 136-7.

297. Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 369-71.

298. For the active role of the new Bolivian junta, and the Novios themselves, in drug trafficking, see Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 371-7; Latin America Bureau, ed., Narcotráfico y política, pp. 46-100.

299. For the fates of Pagliai and Delle Chiaie in Bolivia, see Linklater et al, Fourth Reich, pp. 383-98; Christie, Stefano Delle Chiaie, pp. 124-8.

300. See, for example, Sandro Acciari, "L'imputato speciale", L'Espresso 33:14 (12 April 1987), pp. 24-6.
301. Cipriani and Cipriani, *Sovranità limitata*, pp. 54-5, 65-6. Note that other rightists associated with the 4th Alpine Army Corps also became key protagonists in later acts of terrorism, for example Elio Massagrande (ON), Massimiliano Fachini (Freda cell), Sandro Rampazzo (Rosa dei Venti), Eugenio Rizzato (Rosa dei Venti), and former "white" partisan Carlo Fumagalli (Movimento di Azione Rivoluzionaria). The director of the Passo Pennes paramilitary camp near Bolzano was Fernando Petracca, a former MSI member who headed the Volontari Nazionali; the instructor there was former paratrooper Giuseppe Brancato. It turned out that Zappulla was himself a member of the "Gladio" stay/behind network.

302. See, for example, the interview with him in Sandro Ottolenghi, "Il fascista Giannettini confessa", *L'Europeo* 30:26 (27 June 1974), pp. 40, 44. For the revealing diary, see *Sentenza 31 VII 76 contro Giannettini*, p. 299, note 1.


304. Ottolenghi, "Il fascista Giannettini confessa", pp. 42, 44. There he claimed that he had conducted an investigation into Guillou on behalf of SID, but discovered that the latter was nothing more than the director of a press agency! This alone should make one leery about his testimony.

305. See the interview with González-Mata in Ottolenghi, "I rapporti tra Giannettini e la CIA", pp. 20-1. It should also be recalled that a file card on Giannettini was found in the Aginter archives.

306. Ottolenghi, "Il fascista Giannettini confessa", p. 41. But compare *Sentenza 31 VII 76 contro Giannettini*, pp. 74-5, where the judges conclude that Giannettini and Rauti probably entered into contact with Freda and the latter's associate Giovanni Ventura in 1966, since the two Padua-area residents were found to have distributed some anti-constitutional Nuclei per la Difesa dello Stato flyers; and Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, p. 60, wherein it is noted that Freda's name appeared in Giannettini's diary entry for 8 August 1964.


310. Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, pp. 59-60. It should be noted that the 3rd Army Corps was charged, among other tasks, with conducting anti-subversive operations under the aegis of NATO. Some of its personnel were later implicated in various incidents of anti-constitutional right-wing violence, so much so that the corps was officially disbanded due to its growing notoriety. This is a topic worthy of further examination.

311. For AMSAR, see De Lutiis, *Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia*, p. 164. Giannettini specifically identified these two men in his testimony to the Italian judicial authorities. See *Requisitoria VI 76 contro Giannettini*, p. 47; *Sentenza 31 VII 76 contro Giannettini*, pp. 35, 169 (an allusion to SDECE). From other sources, we learn that De Roux was the scion of an aristocratic family and a senior French intelligence officer who, among other things, served as Jonas Savimbi's chief advisor in his struggle against the Marxist regime in Angola. See Faligot and Krop, *La Piscine*, pp. 340-1; Gordon Winter, *Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), pp. 539-40; Monzat, *Enquêtes sur la droite extrême*, pp. 36-41. According to an "informed observer" quoted in the first of these sources, De Roux "took a wicked pleasure in carrying out covert agitation and devising clandestine operations". He was also closely linked to neo-fascist "solidarist" circles in France. For his own response to the embarrassing Giannettini revelations, see the interview in Ferdinando Scianna, "Un editore di destra", *L'Europeo* 31:4 (23 January 1975), pp. 26-7. Therein he expressed doubts that someone named "Guérin-Sérac" [Guillou's pseudonym] even existed, but acknowledged that Aginter Presse was a "section* (ufficio) of PIDE. Perhaps more importantly, he admitted that every country has "parallel espionage sections like that agency which are attached to the official secret services". See ibid, p. 27. His friend Parvelesco, a Rumanian émigré who specialized in writing books about the occult, was also affiliated with French intelligence.

312. For details about Giannettini's employment by SID, see *Requisitoria VI 76 contro Giannettini*, pp. 28-81; *Sentenza 31 VII 76 contro Giannettini*, pp. 53-72; Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, pp. 125-6, 129, 132-3, 179, 185-6, 199. A number of things are worth noting here. First of all, Giannettini was first hired by Ufficio R, the analysis branch of SID concerned with foreign intelligence. This makes sense, given Giannettini's special interests in geopolitical affairs. His transfer to Ufficio D, the action arm of SID which was primarily concerned with internal security, therefore suggests that the nature of his work for SID had shifted. In the earliest phases, he had essentially done public relations work by writing articles in the rightist press which Aloja's faction wanted published, but his later tasks seem to have involved, not only the gathering of intelligence on the Italian far left--as he claimed--but also the manipulation of neo-fascist and Maoist formations in accordance with the tenets of unconventional warfare. Moreover, he claims to have submitted hundreds of reports to SID, whereas officials of the service insisted that he only provided them with a few reports of scarce intelligence value. Those that later became public are rather bizarre and seem to conform to the latter description,
although they were probably designed for the purposes of infiltration and provocation rather than to provide serious information to SID itself, but it could well be that these were released precisely to substantiate the claim that Giannettini’s work for SID was of little importance. However that may be, several later heads of SID and Ufficio D, including Admiral Henke, Colonel Viola, Colonel Gasca Queirazza, failed to terminate his employment. If they really believed that his work was shoddy and insignificant, why was this the case?

313. Requisitoria VI 76 contro Giannettini, p. 39.

314. For a summary of the contents of this important SIFAR study, which was only recently declassified in connection with the "Gladio" investigation, see Cipriani and Cipriani, Sovranità limitata, pp. 68-73.


316. Quoted by De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, p. 168.

317. Flamini, Partito del golpe, pp. 78-9, quoting the testimony of AN member Paolo Pecoriello, who also noted that AN’s leaders were in close contact with elements of the Interior Ministry, SIFAR, and Luigi Gedda’s Comitati Civici, a vast organization of lay Catholics sponsored by right-wing factions within the Vatican.

318. Sentenza 31 VII 76 contro Giannettini, p. 258. However, the verdicts in this case were appealed over and over until all of the defendants were acquitted—twenty years after the events for which they had originally been brought to trial!--on the basis of the "insufficient evidence" formula.

319. The backgrounds of these directors of the institute are worth noting. De Boccard was a right-wing Catholic who sought to reconcile Christian doctrine with the traditionalist but essentially "pagan" views of Evola. He had been a GNR militiaman during the Salò period, had then drifted into various postwar neo-fascist groups, and reportedly became one of the intermediaries between the Vatican and U.S. ambassador Clare Booth Luce during the height of the Cold War. See Giovanni Tassani, La cultura politica della destra cattolica (Rome: Coines, 1976), pp. 115-16, note 33; and Barbieri, Agenda nera, p. 96, note 44. Beltrametti was a journalist who regularly contributed to right-wing publications like the illustrated weekly Il Borghese and the daily Il Tempo, and was also the author, among other works, of an interesting book on military strategy, Contestazione e megatoni (Rome: Volpe, 1971). Together with Rauti and Finaldi, he was implicated in the anti-constitutional Nuclei per la Difesa dello Stato affair. For his part, Finaldi wrote for Lo Specchio. All three were among the 81 journalists listed as having been financed by SID (and its predecessor). See De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 177 and 189-90, note 99.
320. Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, p. 84.


322. Finaldi, "Inaugurazione del Convegno", in *Guerra rivoluzionaria*, p. 16.


324. This was not only apparent from the subtitle of the proceedings--"the Third World War has already begun"--but was also repeatedly emphasized by the speakers. See, for example, Finaldi, "Inaugurazione del Convegno", *Guerra rivoluzionaria*, pp. 12-13; Giannettini, "Varietà delle tecniche", p. 169 (citing Suzanne Labin!); Pio Filippiani Ronconi, "Ipotesi per una controrivoluzione", p. 243; Eggardo Beltrametti, "Squardo riassuntivo", p. 259; and "Documento conclusivo", pp. 262-3.


326. Compare Beltrametti, "Guerra rivoluzionaria", pp. 69-82; Giorgio Pisanò, "Guerra rivoluzionaria in Italia, 1943-1945", p. 127; Alfredo Cattabiani, "Un'esperienza controrivoluzionaria dei cattolici francesi", pp. 143-7 (using the propaganda campaigns and cellular organization of the French integralists associated with Cité Catholique as a model); Gianfranceschi, "Arma della cultura", p. 201; and "Documento conclusivo", p. 264. And Giannettini, Rauti, and Clemente Graziani rightly pointed out that democratic juridical and constitutional systems themselves allowed the communists to legally penetrate, undermine, and subvert the state's administrative apparatus. See Giannettini, "Varietà delle tecniche", p. 164; Rauti, "La tattica della penetrazione comunista in Italia", pp. 93-4; and Graziani, "Appunti per una risposta alla guerra sovversiva", (which was written for the Istituto Pollio conference but appeared instead in) *Ordine Nuovo* 11:3-4 (May-June 1965), pp. 18-19. The obvious but unspoken corrolary was that the establishment of a more authoritarian regime would be necessary to resist and ultimately defeat communism.
327. See especially De Boccard, "Lineamenti ed interpretazione storica", pp. 44-7. In addition to the numerous references to the OAS and the French Army’s campaigns in Indo-China and Algeria, there were specific references to French guerre révolutionnaire theorists in many of the presentations. See, for example, ibid, pp. 39, 45 (Trinquier); and Beltrametti, "Guerra rivoluzionaria", pp. 58, 72-3 (Argoud, Trinquier, Bonnet, and Lacheroy). Rauti alluded to the works of the Belgian unconventional warfare specialist Roger Cosyns-Verhaegen in his presentation, and his close comrade Graziani explicitly did so. Compare Rauti, "Tattica della penetrazione comunista", p. 93; and Graziani, "Appunti per una risposta", pp. 9, 11, 21. The latter author also referred to Serge Chakotin, whose modified Pavlovian views were looked upon with favor by French psychological warfare experts. See ibid, p. 15.


329. Ibid, pp. 244-5.

330. For Beltrametti’s "self-defense" groups, see "Guerra rivoluzionaria", pp. 75, 84-5.

331. See "Appunti per una risposta", p. 20.

332. For Graziani’s views on appropriate countermeasures, see ibid, especially pp. 10-11, 19-29.

333. See Ergastolo per la libertà, pp. 4-6. From this point of view, Vinciguerra’s bitterly sarcastic remarks, for example, that the eagle insignia on ON’s membership card bore a remarkable similarity to the American eagle, make perfect sense. See ibid, p. 2.


335. This document is quoted, almost in full, by Laurent, Orchestre noir, pp. 169-71.
CHAPTER THREE: THE 1970 BORGHESE COUP

On the night of 7-8 December 1970, the second in a series of right-wing "coup" aimed at transforming or subverting Italy's parliamentary system was mounted in Rome by a World War II naval hero, Prince Junio Valerio Borghese. This series had been initiated in 1964 by General Giovanni De Lorenzo, then head of the Carabinieri, who had secretly developed an anti-leftist counterinsurgency contingency plan codenamed "Solo", and came to an end with the exposure of a rash of interlinked "presidentialist" coup plots in 1973 and 1974. Although these other operations were either called off before being activated or unmasked following the launching of preliminary psychological and terrorist actions but prior to their actual initiation, the so-called Borghese coup was already underway when it was suddenly and unexpectedly terminated. In a strategic sense it may not have been the most dangerous of these coup schemes, but it was the only one that actually managed to achieve some of its tangible operational objectives.

Not surprisingly, the action launched by Borghese became the subject of considerable speculation in journalistic and political circles following its belated public exposure in the Spring of 1971. Given the high degree of political polarization characteristic of Italian society in general and the media in particular, it is only natural that the political and journalistic analyses which later appeared reflected the partisan political interests of the groups or parties which sponsored them. The political establishment and the right immediately sought to downplay the seriousness of the plot, either by claiming that no coup had really been launched or by dismissing it as a farcical,
chimerical operation promoted by pathetic nostalgics and carried out by incompetent buffoons. In contrast, the left initially viewed it as a serious effort to destroy Italian democracy which was modelled on the Greek military coup of 1967. However, a close examination of what actually transpired reveals that neither of these interpretations is entirely accurate. To grasp the historical significance and political complexity of the operation, it is necessary to trace the career of Borghese and the development of his Fronte Nazionale, the organizational structure around which the plotters gravitated.

The Background

Junio Valerio Borghese was the restless scion of an aristocratic family whose Roman branch had attained great prestige, influence, wealth, and power through association, first with the Papacy and then with Bonaparte’s family during the Napoleonic Wars. Thirsting for adventure and inflamed by patriotism, he had joined the Italian Navy in the years before World War II and was then assigned to an elite naval sabotage unit which eventually became known as the Decima Flottiglia MAS. This innovative force was specifically created to develop secret weapons and new tactics, and was later entrusted with carrying out "special operations" at sea. To facilitate these tasks, it was provided with a compartmentalized cell structure to guarantee maximum secrecy, and was divided into a surface section consisting of motorized torpedo boats and an underwater section comprising midget submarines and "human torpedoes". During the first three years of the war it carried out a series of unusually daring exploits, including the sinking of British capital warships in the protected harbors of Gibraltar and Alexandria. Indeed, the Decima MAS was one of the few Italian military units which operated at a high level
of efficiency and consistently displayed real élan, so much so that Admiral Karl Dönitz and other top Kriegsmarine officials personally arranged for its commander Borghese to visit German naval facilities and help train Nazi "special operations" personnel in the various techniques his unit had pioneered. This phase of Borghese's military career was abruptly brought to a close when Mussolini was ousted from power in July 1943.¹

When the Wehrmacht occupied northern Italy and disarmed Italian forces in a lightning operation on 9 September 1943, the Decima MAS base at La Spezia was the only Italian military installation that was not seized by German troops. Borghese at once offered to continue fighting alongside the Germans, provided that his unit remained directly under his own command and was allowed to retain its Italian uniforms and insignia. Five days later—and thirteen days before the establishment of the Repubblica Sociale Italiano (RSI)—the Germans agreed to these terms, and the Decima MAS was placed under the overall operational command of SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, who granted it increasing autonomy as his respect and friendship for Borghese grew. The Decima MAS at once embarked on an aggressive and highly successful recruitment campaign, and it eventually consisted of a hodgepodge of units, including several well-trained infantry battalions, a small naval sabotage unit, a police company with its own intelligence and interrogation section, and various other ad hoc formations. It was employed primarily as an anti-partisan force in the "hottest" zones, and performed these difficult and unrewarding counterguerrilla tasks with a singular efficiency and that paradoxical mixture of utter ruthlessness and genuine chivalry which only elite units seem capable of displaying. But Borghese and his men were anxious to test their mettle against
Allied troops, and in February 1944 the "Barbarigo" battalion acquitted itself well after being sent to the Anzio front and deployed against American Rangers and Canadian troops. Later, at Borghese's request, Wolff authorized the transfer of the bulk of the Decima MAS to Venezia Giulia to fight Yugoslav and communist partisans, where the combat was especially nasty and brutish. In effect, then, the Decima MAS operated as an SS Sonderverband rather than as a unit under the control of the RSI's military command, a fact which caused Mussolini great consternation.²

Indeed, there were several unique aspects of the Decima MAS that deserve to be highlighted. As noted above, it maintained an almost total autonomy with respect to both the Duce and the entire Salò regime. Decima MAS recruits did not swear oaths to the RSI, and its personnel received much better pay and training than those of any other Italian force. When the RSI Undersecretary of the Navy later tried to transfer over 2000 men from Borghese's unit to help form a naval infantry brigade under Mussolini's direct orders, the two officers he sent were arrested on the spot by Decima MAS troops. In January 1944 Borghese was himself arrested and accused of plotting a "reactionary coup" against Mussolini, but a Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana (GNR) investigation cleared him and he was released after Dönitz personally intervened on his behalf. Approximately one year later, the Decima MAS began publishing a newspaper that was critical of certain aspects of fascism, which set off a new round of conflict between Borghese and the RSI government. The insubordinate naval officer and his men again emerged relatively unscathed due to high-level German protection.³ Second, the Decima MAS used rather unorthodox, if not criminal, means to requisition equipment and supplies.
According to both RSI and German intelligence reports, Borghese's troops employed all sorts of illegal methods to obtain provisions or enrich themselves, including outright thievery, unauthorized confiscations, intimidation, blackmail, trafficking in contraband, and trickery, and even went so far as to steal weapons from German supply depots. Its commander supplemented this activity by "pressuring" Milan businesses to offer his unit funding.4

Third, Borghese set up various Decima MAS intelligence structures, including an espionage headquarters in Switzerland, a police intelligence unit, and an intelligence-gathering network that had been established throughout RSI territory. He also sought to infiltrate spies and saboteurs into Allied-controlled Italy, and in general directed his agents to engage in espionage and intelligence activities in conjunction with elements of German counterintelligence. One of the important tasks assigned to the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was to neutralize the Decima MAS's stay/behind networks, a task undertaken, among others, by James Jesus Angleton of the OSS's counterespionage branch, X-2.5

Fourth, on several occasions Borghese sought to open up negotiations with "enemy" forces, ostensibly in an effort to form an alliance with all patriotic elements against anti-national or foreign communist guerrillas. He and his officers first attempted to negotiate such an arrangement with a communist partisan codenamed "Taras" against the Anglo-Americans, then with the Catholic partisans of the "Osoppo" brigade in order to forge an alliance against Yugoslav-backed guerrillas, and finally with representatives of British intelligence, to whom he offered to abandon the Germans and join an alliance against Tito. All of these proposals were eventually rebuffed, and some observers have
accused Borghese of seeking to deceive and betray his interlocutors or, in the latter case, save his own skin prior to the imminent Axis defeat. Although a considerable degree of opportunism was undoubtedly involved, these efforts were also consistent with Borghese's self-portrayal as a committed patriot and a military commander who was deeply concerned about the fate of his men. Finally, in exchange for helping to prevent the retreating Germans from sabotaging ports and industrial plants, Borghese was rescued from certain partisan retribution by Angleton, who dressed him up as an American soldier and drove him southwards in a jeep to Rome. After extensive debriefing at the Combined Services Interrogation Centre, during which he provided information on the "backgrounds of various members of the Italian military and diplomatic elite", the Black Prince was turned over to the Italian authorities for trial.

The war crimes trial which resulted proved to be somewhat anti-climactic. It was initiated in Milan, but on 17 May 1947 the Court of Cassation transferred the trial to a special court in Rome, since the atmosphere in the Lombard capital was considered to be too prejudicial for Borghese to obtain a fair trial. At the trial, which began on 15 October 1947, the Black Prince and sixteen others were accused of aiding and abetting the RSI and its Nazi overlords by sending his men to fight against Allied troops and carrying out brutal anti-partisan operations, which resulted in the torture and execution of captured partisans, the razing of villages, the deportation of prisoners to German camps, and the expropriation of goods for private gain. In his defense, Borghese claimed that he was compelled to act under German orders, that he was not personally responsible for the atrocities committed by some of his men, that his troops were apolitical patriots
who helped defend Italian interests in Venezia Giulia, that he had aided wounded
veterans and bombing victims, and that he helped to save Italian industries from being
destroyed by the retreating Germans during the closing weeks of the war. In the end, on
17 February 1949, he received a 12-year sentence instead of the life sentence requested
by the prosecution, since there was no material evidence that he had ordered or directly
participated in atrocities. This sentence was further reduced to eight years in accordance
with the terms of the general pardons of 1946 and 1948, and the time he had already
spent in prison was then subtracted from the remainder. The government upheld the
court’s decision, despite the protests of left-wing deputies in parliament and widespread
public outrage.⁸

In mid-1949 the Supreme Court of Appeals, after further limiting the already
reduced February sentence handed down by the Rome court, ordered that he be released
from Procida prison. At that time the political passions that had been fueled by civil
strife in northern Italy during the last two years of the war still ran very high. The
victory of Alcide De Gasperi and the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) party in the April 1948
elections had quashed lingering leftist hopes that a fundamental restructuring of the Italian
social and political system would grow out of the influence of the Resistance movement,
and also made any serious future efforts to root out fascist elements within the various
state agencies impossible. Indeed, the abject failure of the Resistance-inspired "wind from
the north" to sweep away the detritus of fascism was nowhere better symbolized than by
the exceptional judicial leniency granted to Borghese and other RSI leaders accused of
committing war crimes against Italian citizens.⁹ Hence Borghese’s premature release
only added to the already elevated levels of political frustration and tension that existed
throughout the peninsula. On the very day the Black Prince left prison, Roberto Mieville
led a demonstration by the MSI's Raggruppamento Giovanile Studenti e Lavoratori
through the streets of the capital, exalting Borghese and villifying partisan leader
Ferruccio Parri.10 These events created considerable outrage and consternation in anti-
fascist and leftist circles, which responded by initiating intense protests in parliament, a
virulent press campaign, and political demonstrations. In order to escape official
crackdowns or unofficial vendettas in this overheated atmosphere, Borghese maintained
a low profile and eschewed overt political activities for a time, though he could not resist
filing successive legal claims for compensation for his years in prison, the resumption
of his career in the Italian Navy, and the dismissal of the charge of murder.11 This
period of relative inactivity was not destined to last, however, since Borghese was a
restless individual who chafed at the bit for action and a former military hero whose
prestige other political forces sought to utilize for their own ends.

Between the time of his release from prison and his formal adhesion to the MSI
two years later, Borghese was kept "under observation" by the government.12 While this
unwelcome official attention prevented him from engaging in any visible political
activities of an anti-democratic nature, there are indications that during this period the
Black Prince was approached by representatives of different groups who sought to coax
him out of his seclusion and recruit his support for various political initiatives. The most
important of such attempts were apparently connected to efforts by hardline anti-
communists within the right wing of the DC, the American Embassy, the Vatican, and
the employers' association Confindustria to create a rightist, pro-Atlantic "national front" coalition, parallel to and independent of both the DC constellation and the MSI, which were perceived as insufficiently reliable guardians of the political and economic interests of the West. These elements considered the left-leaning "social" wing of the DC to be too hostile to private capitalist economic agendas and too willing to compromise or make common cause with the right wing of the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI). At the same time, they viewed the MSI as a nostalgic party with embarrassing attachments to an unpopular fascist past, and saw its left wing as a hotbed of anti-American and anti-Atlantic sentiment which had the potential to hinder efforts to integrate Italy into a pro-Western alliance system unless the party's moderates were able to obtain control and enforce internal discipline. Several parallel operations were thus initiated, both to strengthen conservative forces within the two "suspect" parties and to create rival anti-communist organizational alternatives. If the two existing parties continued to be heavily influenced by their "unreliable" leftist factions, the plan was to detach their "trustworthy" conservative factions and gather them into newly-established formations and coalitions.13

To this end U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief Allen Dulles is said to have entrusted two of his top operatives in Italy, Carmel Offie, a wartime intelligence officer who had been appointed to supervise the postwar activities of the Italian secret services, and James Jesus Angleton, by then head of CIA "special operations" in Italy, with the delicate mission of transforming restless nationalist youths and ex-military leaders of the RSI into the guardians of Atlanticism. American intelligence operatives purportedly began by approaching the leaders of various veterans associations that had
been created in 1949 by former fascist fighters, including the Federazione Nazionale Combattenti Repubblicani (FNCR), the Associazione Paracadutisti Italiani (API), the Associazione Nazionale Arditi d'Italia, and the Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani di Spagna (ANCIS), in an effort to enlist their aid. They then attempted to garner the support of certain ventennio-era fascist hierarchs, who had been excluded from the MSI due to the bitter hostility of its leftist and Evolan wings toward the so-called "traitors" of 25 July 1943. Some of the plans that grew out of these behind-the-scenes efforts to forge political alliances envisioned a role for Borghese. One was linked to the attempts after 1950 to create a "pact of unity" between the MSI and the Partito Nationale Monarchico (PNM), a project backed by factions within the two parties themselves, monarchist agents, some former Servizio Informazioni Militare (SIM) officials, elements within the American Embassy, and emissaries from the Vatican. Borghese seems to have been at least tangentially involved in this sensitive initiative, the aim of which was to draw the MSI into a conservative alliance that would strengthen its moderate factions and thereby ensure its fidelity to Atlanticism, inasmuch as his name was mentioned as a possible future King of Italy! But this quixotic and ridiculous suggestion, whose proponents naively hoped would appeal to both monarchists and ex-Salò fighters, was vociferously opposed by loyalists of the House of Savoy and was therefore almost immediately abandoned.

A more serious effort was then apparently made to draw Borghese into the CIA-backed "national front" project, one of whose main operational instruments was Luigi Gedda's Comitati Civici network. The goal of this elaborate anti-communist maneuver
was the creation of a broad "patriotic" coalition which would act to regenerate Italian national sentiments in such a way that they would not conflict with key American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) geopolitical interests. Exploiting the theme of military glory was one of the techniques employed to try and ween national-minded Italians away from insular, parochial forms of patriotism and xenophobic integral nationalism, both of which at times threatened to undermine attempts to create a multinational Western bulwark against the Soviet Bloc. The main targets of these efforts were members of the new veterans associations and the combative elements that constituted the base of the MSI, and it was believed that a prominent medal of valor winner like Borghese could function as a symbol of military heroism around whom such elements might rally. If this plan was successful, these militants would be withdrawn from the orbit of an unsavory, "unreliable" neo-fascist party and brought under the aegis and control of conservative Atlanticist forces. With these objectives in mind, CIA operatives supposedly visited Borghese at his small castle in Artena in an effort to persuade him to head this "national front" coalition. When Borghese's old friend and savior Angleton went to Artena himself to make a personal appeal for his help, the Black Prince became enthusiastic about the project.17 According to Pier Giuseppe Murgia, Borghese's establishment of his own Fronte Nazionale organization more than fifteen years later, again allegedly in the ambit of a "special operation directed by the CIA", essentially represented a revival of this earlier intelligence-backed project to unite all "patriotic" Italians.18

When the news of these efforts to recruit Borghese into a separate rightist
movement reached the MSI, it generated great consternation. The leaders of the party immediately recognized that such efforts were in part aimed at weakening the MSI, and at once took action to counter this new threat. A number of young RSI veterans affiliated with the party were sent to visit Borghese at Artena. They warned him that reactionary forces behind the "national front" were seeking to make instrumental use of his prestige, and that MSI-linked nationalist youths would not recognize his leadership or join such a front since it was inimical to the interests of an independent neo-fascist party. This threat of abandonment by ex-soldiers and youths who had always lionized Borghese was followed up by intensive efforts to recruit the Black Prince into the MSI. After holding a series of meetings with his associates and getting their approval, MSI Secretary Augusto De Marsanich personally offered to make Borghese Honorary President of the party if he would consent to join. In this way the MSI leaders hoped to lure him away from the rival "national front" project and exploit his fame for their own political ends. For reasons which are still not entirely clear, Borghese ended up accepting this proposal. He may have simply been won over psychologically by all the attention he received from various MSI representatives, as well as by the party's evocation of certain RSI traditions with which he identified. It is also conceivable--though there is no actual evidence of this--that he was encouraged to accept this invitation by Angleton, who may have modified his original plan to make use of the Black Prince because he felt that a loyal ally within the leadership circles of the MSI could help assure the party's pro-Atlantic orientation. Whatever the precise reasons, Borghese joined the MSI in November of 1951, and with great fanfare was made Honorary President on 2 December. This proved
to be an enormous propaganda coup for the party. Borghese was one of the MSI's most important new recruits, and his well-publicized entry into the party was followed not only by that of many youths who were inspired by his wartime military exploits, but also by additional financial subsidies from certain industrial and agrarian circles.20

On 4 December 1951 Borghese made his first postwar public appeal, in which he urged the MSI's members and supporters to form a compact, disciplined bloc in order to "reestablish the country's spiritual and material order". He also appealed to veterans and fighting men to join the party and make sacrifices so that "honor, independence, and freedom" could be restored to Italy.21 The Black Prince's entry into the MSI had been anxiously anticipated by the party's leftist and Evolan wings, which expected that he could be enlisted in their struggle against the "soft" bourgeois leaders who were compromising the movement's principles, pursuing a strategy of insertion into the corrupt democratic party system, and adopting a subservient attitude toward the materialistic Western powers which had defeated and humiliated Italy during and after the war. Although his combative personality and decision to write an introduction to Evola's *Gli uomini e le rovine* temporarily fueled such hopes,22 the expectations of the radicals were soon dashed. As Piero Ignazi points out, the former fascist war hero soon distinguished himself by his "unconditional adherence" to a pro-Western and philo-American foreign policy.23 It is therefore uncertain just how much Borghese's shift to the MSI really put him at loggerheads with his alleged conservative and CIA backers. He was labelled a "clown" by some proponents of the "national front" immediately after his defection from the project,24 and his actions initially strengthened the MSI at a time
when various pro-American forces were actively trying to create more "respectable" anti-communist alternatives. Yet he lent support to the Atlanticist faction within the party during a crucial phase in the struggle to define its basic geopolitical orientation.

By the time Borghese joined the party, the pro-Atlantic current within the MSI was already asserting its predominance. On 28 November De Marsanich held a press conference, timed to correspond with a meeting of the Atlantic Council in Rome, in which he acknowledged the need for American help in Europe's rearmament process and struggle against communism, without however renouncing national independence and the need to maintain separate national armies. The party's shift toward a pro-Atlantic stance thence proceeded apace, in part in order to ward off any future attempt to make use of the Scelba Law to ban the MSI, and was signalled by the ideological or tactical conversion of former Atlantic Alliance opponents and the placing of Atlanticists in key positions within the various party organizations and publications. Indeed, in December of 1951 both Michelini and Almirante, previously an ostensible critic of Atlanticism, appear to have visited the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Paris on a diplomatic mission. Others who publicly came out in support of NATO included Filippo Anfuso, Ernesto Botto, Prince Valerio Pignatelli, who was linked by personal friendship to many top British and American officials, and Borghese himself.

The Black Prince soon became involved in the project to create a new party-linked newspaper, which seems to have been initially designed to speed up the Atlanticization, if not the deradicalization, of the MSI. According to Murgia, this conservative initiative was backed by secret service elements, presumably the same ones that had earlier sought
to recruit Borghese as head of the "national front". In any event, the decision to create such a newspaper was taken without the knowledge of much of the MSI’s leadership, and it was first announced to the National Directorate in a letter sent by Borghese, who asked the members to recommend it to the various party organs. On 16 May 1952, the first edition of *Il Secolo d'Italia* appeared, with the lead editorial written by Borghese himself. Others who initially participated in the production of *Secolo* were the editor Bruno Spampanato, an ex-sailor who had been entrusted by Borghese with preparing Decima MAS propaganda in January 1945, and Franz Turchi, the last Prefect of La Spezia to be appointed by Mussolini. The immediate reactions of party leaders to these developments were far from enthusiastic. Members of the MSI Directorate held a meeting and secretly expressed their concerns about *Secolo*’s sudden, unannounced appearance and its unknown sources of financing, and Mieville, then head of the party’s Centro Stampa e Propaganda, made the rounds of party-linked publications and warned them that Borghese’s paper was not affiliated with the MSI and had "obscure origins and even more obscure objectives." After 18 August 1952, *Secolo* passed into the hands of Almirante and Anfuso (though Turchi remained to handle financing), and Mieville himself began to write regularly for the paper, which then began to move to the left. Certain external publishing ventures aimed at weakening the MSI and building a "national front" separate from the party were also undertaken by conservative forces.

Meanwhile, Borghese’s support for De Marsanich’s moderate and Atlanticist positions was publicly reaffirmed in his introductory speech at the Third MSI Congress at L’Aquila in late July 1952. He appeared on the podium next to retired General
Rodolfo Graziani, another prestigious new MSI recruit, and, after angrily denying that the party was totalitarian, stated that the tasks of the missini were to interpret the "common aspirations" of their countrymen and then resolve their basic economic problems. In an interview he claimed that the party's current opposition to the DC was not immutable, and confirmed its loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance by insisting that party members would certainly not become conscientious objectors in the event of an East-West war. Although this conservative stance disappointed the MSI's leftist and Evolan currents, Borghese remained extraordinarily popular. He took an active part in the party's campaigning before the administrative elections of 1953 and, like Graziani, drew huge crowds whenever he made public appearances. The triumphal mass rallies they held were of such concern to the authorities that frequent attempts were made to ban them. Interior Minister Mario Scelba banned a projected Borghese rally at the Colosseum on 24 May 1953, and similar bans were imposed by officials in Rovigo, Bolzano, Udine, and Pescara. Sometimes these actions provoked confrontations, and the Black Prince was actually detained by police at Rovigo and Padua. Nevertheless, despite their continued public support for the moderate line pursued by party leaders, by the end of 1953 both Borghese and Graziani had already begun to manifest their impatience with the MSI's petty infighting. Moreover, Borghese's imperious behavior had made him increasingly unpopular in MSI leadership circles, and as a soldier he remained contemptuous of politicians who he regarded as corrupt and unprincipled. For these very reasons, he remained a pole of attraction for the militants at the MSI's base. When the crisis over the unresolved status of Trieste escalated again in late 1953, the rallying cry of
nationalist student groups mobilizing to protect the city was "to Trieste with Valerio Borghese". They apparently sought to re-enact, under Borghese's leadership, D'Annunzio's 1919 feat at Fiume, and according to some accounts the aristocratic warrior assembled 1000 of his ex-sailors near Treviso, who were armed and ready to march in the event that Italian national interests in Zone A were further violated by the Allied Military Government or threatened by Yugoslav forces.

In January 1954 the two RSI military leaders jointly opened the Fourth Congress at Viareggio with a ritual appeal, in the name of the fighting men of Salò, to "the forces ready to defend order in the country." This generic appeal failed to paper over the party's profound internal differences, which immediately made themselves felt. Although the centrist faction represented by De Marsanich and Arturo Michelini emerged with the largest number of votes, the left and right opposition both made strong showings, Almirante shifted back to a more radical position, and the resulting programmatic statement represented a compromise that failed to satisfy anyone and only postponed a future showdown. In the aftermath the Evolans, then nominally led by Pino Romualdi, rallied around Borghese, who was removed from the National Directorate but not deprived of his status as Honorary President. Michelini's assumption of control over the party in October 1954, in the wake of De Marsanich's illness, only exacerbated the already pronounced internal strife. The new Secretary made extensive efforts to reduce the influence of the internal opposition in party organs and publications, efforts which proved quite successful. These manipulative, autocratic actions, coupled with a renewal of the tentative alliance with the PNM, finally brought matters to a head at the Fifth
Congress, held at the end of November 1956 in Milan, the stronghold of the MSI left. Tension was so high that brawls broke out between the opposing factions and the very identity of the party was called into question. Only Michelini's formal acceptance of almost all the "social" emendments proposed by Almirante, who had resigned from the Political Secretariat during the summer and resumed the leadership of the left, permitted programmatic agreement. Borghese himself supported the leftist-led opposition forces at the Congress. However, in the ensuing Central Committee elections, the left's list of candidates was defeated 314 to 307 by that of Michelini, assuring the latter's de facto control over the party. This led to a schism of some extremist elements positioned on the MSI left and right, including Ernesto Massi, who formed the short-lived Partito Nazionale del Lavoro in 1957, and Evola's disciple Rauti, who restructured the Centro Studi Ordine Nuovo as an independent organization.

On the day after the Congress ended, the leaders of the MSI left held a meeting in Rome. After a bitter debate, during which Borghese and others made harsh attacks on the direction taken by Michelini and his cronies, most of those present decided to remain in the party and continue their battle from within rather than breaking away and establishing an entirely new movement. Nevertheless, the process of mutual estrangement between the Black Prince and the MSI's accommodationalist leaders had become irreversible, and shortly afterwards he formally resigned from the party. At first glance his decision to resign, and indeed the entire course of his career in the MSI, may seem perplexing and difficult to explain. After allegedly displaying an interest in the anti-communist "national front" project backed by conservative and American circles, which
was in large part designed to weaken and circumvent the unreliable MSI, Borghese suddenly joined the latter movement. Within the MSI he publicly supported the moderate, accomodationist line of De Marsanich and Michelini, at least until 1954, and never abandoned his support for the Atlantic Alliance. Yet he lauded Evola’s critiques of modern bourgeois society in his introduction to the latter’s 1953 book, and during the Congress of Viareggio the MSI right rallied behind him in opposition to aspects of the program presented by party moderates. Two years later, he joined with Almirante and the MSI left to try and defeat Michelini’s slate at the Milan Congress, and was then invited to participate in the left’s separate post-Congress meeting.

It seems clear that these seemingly contradictory flip-flops were not dictated primarily by ideological considerations, since Borghese was a man of action rather than an ideologue in the strict sense. Nor is it likely that he was merely carrying out the orders of other "reactionary" forces which were seeking to manipulate the internal affairs of the MSI, as Murgia sometimes seems to imply. The real explanation for his behavior--though it is always hazardous to resort to such simplistic and unverifiable explanations--is probably to be sought in the psychological sphere. Despite his frequent glorification of the principles of order and authority, the Black Prince was himself a restless, independent, and ambitious man who found it difficult to follow orders and accept advice, especially from those whom he held in contempt.42 This rebellious streak had prompted him to ignore or defy some of the directives issued by fascist hierarchs and bureaucrats, up to and including Mussolini and certain high-ranking German officers, and operate in a more or less autonomous fashion at various times between 1943 and 1945.
After the war, feeling embittered and frustrated, he at once developed a hatred for the new parliamentary democratic regime. For one thing, it had placed him on trial as a war criminal. For another, he considered it a repository of venality and corruption which was unwilling to defend national values and unable to protect Italy from the threat posed by the Soviets and their domestic communist allies. Therefore, once it became clear to Borghese that the MSI leadership was jockeying to become a part of the degenerate bourgeois parliamentary system rather than seeking to create a genuine alternative to it, he began collaborating with the seditious elements on the party’s right and left wings.43

Although Borghese’s career in the MSI cannot be described in full detail given the current shortage of available documentation, it is even harder to trace his multifaceted activities during the period between his resignation from the party and his creation of the Fronte Nazionale in 1968. At the time he broke with the MSI his only remaining visible connection to an official rightist organization was to the FNCR veterans group, which he had assumed the leadership of following Graziani’s death in 1955. In 1959 the FNCR split into two rival organizations, the MSI-controlled Unione Nazionale Combattenti della Repubblic Sociale Italiano (UNCRSI) and the far more radical Federazione Nazionale Combattenti della Repubblica Sociale Italiano (FNCRSI), linked to Ordine Nuovo, which was openly critical of the MSI. Borghese’s role in this schism, if any, is not at all clear, and not long afterwards he apparently divorced himself from both groups.44 Yet this separation from the official organs of the legalist extreme right did not temper his restlessness or moderate his political alienation, and as time wore on he developed an increasing interest in insurrectionary projects aimed at replacing the existing
parliamentary system with a strong state.\textsuperscript{45} There are numerous indications that the Black Prince did not eschew political intriguing in the decade prior to founding the Fronte. Despite his disgust with the compromised policies pursued by the official neo-fascist party, he remained in contact with its more combative leaders like Almirante, Giulio Caradonna, and Luigi Turchi.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, before leaving the MSI he had already established links to radical elements within the party, some of which had then broken away and formed autonomous extraparliamentary groups. His close subsequent collaboration with leading members of those groups, which will be described shortly, suggests that he maintained at least sporadic contact with them all along. Finally, he was never long out of favor with certain circles of industrialists and the Roman aristocracy, of which he himself was a prestigious member, and it would appear that he also had contacts with key U.S. intelligence personnel and, within the hermetic and rarefied environment of the elite Roman salons, various Italian political and military figures.\textsuperscript{47}

This is perhaps best demonstrated by his involvement in various international financial schemes. In the early 1960s Borghese, who evidently had need of money, obtained the cushy job of president of the Banca di Credito Commerciale e Industriale, which had been given up, and perhaps transferred to him, by Sicilian financier Michele Sindona. The bank then became involved in an extremely complicated financial operation involving a "vast sector" of conservative economic interests, including Rafael ("Ramfis") Trujillo, son of the dictatorial Jefe of the Dominican Republic, José María Gil Robles and Opus Dei in Spain, Vatican and DC circles, renovated economic elites dating back to the fascist period, and a series of companies, many of which were established by a
lawyer named Ovidio Lefebvre d’Ovidio. This venture ended with a clamorous collapse, and Borghese and his partners were then charged with committing embezzlement and other illegal financial manipulations.\textsuperscript{48} Borghese’s penalty ended up being rather light, but his very involvement with some of these other groups is certainly significant. As will soon become clearer, Sindona was a key figure in a long succession of financial and political scandals involving, among others, Sicilian mafia families, powerful conservative groups in the United States, elements of various secret services, the Vatican bank, international financial interests, and Licio Gelli’s Propaganda Due (P2) masonic lodge.\textsuperscript{49} Gil Robles had long been an important fixture on the Spanish political scene, beginning his career as a member of the Catholic, authoritarian corporatist, and legalist but nonetheless anti-democratic Confederacion Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), and ending up as a moderate reformist within the Franco regime who helped to ease the transition to democracy and thereby sought to ensure himself a role in the post-Franco system.\textsuperscript{50} Opus Dei is a conservative and very secretive lay religious organization which was officially established on 2 October 1928 by José María Escrivá de Balaguer. For decades its upper ranks have been filled with members of the technocratic economic and political elites in Spain and other countries, and it too has been involved in a number of serious financial scandals, the most notorious of which was the Matesa affair of the 1970s.\textsuperscript{51} It is therefore very clear that by the early 1960s, if not sooner, Borghese had made a number of powerful, high-level contacts, both in Italy and other countries. Several of these same people were themselves implicated in various behind-the-scene attempts to influence the course of political events.
The first indications of the Black Prince's possible involvement in subversive plots surfaced in relation to the De Lorenzo "coup" of 1964. The most explicit information was provided by his later right-hand man in the Fronte Nazionale, Remo Orlandini. At a 19 June 1973 meeting with Captain Antonio Labruna of the Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID), whom he was trying to enlist as a co-conspirator in later plots, Orlandini claimed that in 1964 De Lorenzo had come to an agreement with Borghese regarding a coup d'etat, but that the general had lost his nerve at the last moment, when Giuseppe Saragat was about to replace the infirm Antonio Segni as President. According to Orlandini, he and Borghese personally alerted the various Carabinieri "legions" that the projected operation was to be launched the night before Saragat took office. De Lorenzo was then supposed to contact the plotters and give them the go-ahead signal, but failed to do so. When Carabinieri commanders began calling Borghese and demanding to know what was happening, he and Orlandini sought to find out by visiting De Lorenzo at Carabinieri headquarters. Once they arrived, they found that the general was waiting there in his dress uniform. After a chagrined Borghese insisted that De Lorenzo should be in his fighting gear instead of a dress uniform, the latter replied that everything had been halted and that he could do no more. This extraordinary testimony, provided by an insider with variable credibility, has not been confirmed. However, it receives some circumstantial support from a variety of other sources.

For example, some of the testimony presented to the parliamentary commission investigating the De Lorenzo affair suggested that Colonel Renzo Rocca of the Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate's (SIFAR) Ufficio Ricerche Economiche e Industriali (REI)
had secretly recruited armed civilian support groups to work in conjunction with the active duty Carabinieri units earmarked to carry out the "coup". Among those whom Rocca allegedly sought to recruit into these clandestine "civilian militias" were former RSI soldiers, sailors, paratroopers, and Decima MAS members. The key accounts of these efforts to enroll civilians—those of Carabinieri Colonels Ezio Taddei and Guglielmo Cerica, as told to Senator Raffaele Jannuzzi in the course of conversations later recounted by the latter—indicated that veterans of Borghese's old unit constituted a privileged source of recruits for Rocca. Even if true, this does not prove that Borghese himself played any tangible role in the project. Yet there is no doubt that his participation would have helped to attract and rally members of the groups targeted for recruitment by Rocca, and it seems likely that the Black Prince would have learned of whatever recruitment efforts were made, if not directly from Rocca, from one of his old comrades-in-arms or other contacts he had established in various political and economic circles. Therefore, whether or not Roberto Faenza is correct in linking Rocca's recruitment efforts to CIA station chief William Harvey's plan to employ "action squads" to mount attacks that could then be attributed to the left, the De Lorenzo "coup" may have been the first postwar operation in which Borghese and some of his close associates were enlisted to carry out actual paramilitary actions. In this connection, it should be recalled that some recently declassified testimony by other Carabinieri officers highlighted the important role played in the 1964 "coup" plan by former anti-Fascist exile Randolfo Pacciardi and his "presidentialist" Unione Popolare e Democratica per una Nuova Repubblica.

This is of some interest here, since the next highly visible political action taken
by Borghese was alongside Pacciardi two years later, in the midst of the crisis between Austria and Italy over the settlement of ethnic disputes in the Alto Adige/Süd Tirol region. Terrorist violence ostensibly committed by German-speaking extremists against Italian officials and citizens prompted the far right in Italy to form, in January 1966, a Comitato Tricolore per la Italianità dell’Alto Adige, which organized a series of public demonstrations to rally support for the defense of Italian interests in the area. Among the leaders of the Comitato, in addition to the Black Prince and Pacciardi, were various MSI leaders and the heads of several irredentist and veterans associations. They set up a central office in Rome, and branch addresses in a number of other cities. A rally held by the Comitato at the Cinema Cristallo in Rome was presided over by Borghese himself. From the podium in front of the assembled crowd, which included his trusted comrade Remo Orlandini and UNCRSI president Aurelio Languasco, the Black Prince proclaimed that the time had come to act in defense of the nation and urged all fighting men (combattenti) to be disciplined, remain on the alert, and "be ready". There is no evidence that this call to action had any concrete follow-up under the aegis of the Comitato Tricolore, later renamed the Comitato Nazionale per la Difesa dei Confini d’Italia, but it provides further evidence of Borghese’s activist sentiments. It would not be long before he would seek to transform those sentiments into concrete action of a subversive nature.

The National Front

Although the available information is sketchy, Borghese seems to have begun to flirt with the idea of establishing his own Fronte Nazionale sometime in 1967. The
organization was officially registered in Rome on 13 September 1968, but before that date a certain amount of preliminary planning had already been undertaken. It was probably in the course of his frenetic activities on behalf of the Comitato Tricolore, which dramatically displayed his ability to evoke the enthusiastic support of veterans, active duty military personnel, and rightist youths, that the idea first came to Borghese of rallying masses of patriotic, anti-communist forces and gathering them into a broader political movement under his own leadership. According to one of his closest associates, Benito Guadagni, the Comitato Tricolore was itself later transformed into the Fronte Nazionale. Although this is undoubtedly an oversimplification, it is probably true that elements from the Comitato were among the earliest recruits into the FN. However, its original cadres seem to have been drawn from among the members of a pre-existing Circolo dei Selvatici, a "cultural" association headquartered at Via dell’Anima 55 in Rome. In any case, it is clear that the FN grew out of an intensive effort to attract and mobilize ex-RSI fighting men and youths, and that the Black Prince also made efforts to appeal to former non-communist ("white") partisans who were disposed to join with their wartime opponents in the face of the threat posed to postwar Italy by communism. This attempt to obtain a broad base of support in order to rescue the nation from the clutches of the partitocrazia accounts for many of the emphases in the organization’s political pronouncements.

From an ideological standpoint, Borghese’s FN was neither original nor sophisticated. It relied upon the sort of generic appeals to patriotism and anti-communism that formed the common currency of the conservative, pro-Atlantic right in Italy. Aside
from some nostalgic and ritualistic references to more radical fascist themes, which were aimed at securing the allegiance of left-leaning RSI veterans and youthful neo-fascist revolutionaries, there was very little that differentiated the FN's rhetoric from that of dozens of other reactionary and authoritarian groups. In a preliminary proclamation dated 7 June 1968, only three months prior to the official registration of the FN, Borghese made a special appeal to attract alienated youths who were disgusted with the existing system. Therein he claimed to be "carrying the banner of honor into the most advanced social trenches" in order to rally all the Italians, including the fighting men, the laborers, the producers, the men of culture, and "the youths, all the youths". After attacking the parliamentary regime for its scandals and corruption, which only facilitated the threatening advance of Bolshevism, he appealed to those who desired an independent Italy "freed from the opprobrium of the diktat" imposed on the country after World War II by the Allies. He then promoted a unified Europe liberated from Eastern and Western domination, and a restoral of the unity of the Italians, who had been "artificially divided by an insipid partitocrazia which places its own interests apart from those of the nation." He promised to realize the aspirations of youths who were raising the cry of protest from the universities, factories, and shipyards by establishing an honest State "beyond the center, right, and left."59 But the proclamation ended on an ominous note: "There is no more time for words, it is necessary to pass to action." The "Commander" then revealed that several concrete steps had been taken to provide an organization for those who wished to rally behind him. First, a committee had been established in Rome to develop and coordinate plans. Second, "action groups" were being formed in every
region, province, and city, headed by highly qualified "delegates". Third, these groups were to enter into contact with the committee in Rome which, acting in Borghese’s name, would issue orders that had to be faithfully executed. Fourth, a meeting of all the delegates would be convoked as soon as possible in Rome. The committee’s address was listed as Via Giovanni Lanza 130, which corresponded to that of the office of Mario Rosa, one of Borghese’s closest associates.

A lengthier and more typical FN ideological statement was the organization’s January 1969 Orientamenti Programmatici. In it the FN was defined as a "free association" of Italians, as opposed to a political party, which sought to achieve a "new political order". An appeal was then issued to all the Italians who shared its notions about European civilization, the nation, society, the party system, and the state. According to the FN, "materialism and massification were two principles contrary to Italian and European civilization", and "dedication to the fatherland was the highest and most concrete form of altruism". The existing political parties were described as "seeds of disintegration, hotbeds of public and private corruption, and cabals (congreghe) operating in favor of particular interests, often foreign, in contrast to national interests." Hence in a "rational" State designed to satisfy the general interests of the nation, they could not be active protagonists of political life. Given this view, it is not surprising to discover that primacy of place among the FN’s plans was the creation of a strong and "authoritative" State which would be capable, not only of defending national honor and territorial integrity, but also of creating social and political institutions corresponding to the best traditions of the Italian people rather than the exigencies of modern civilization.
Political parties were to be excluded from participating in government activities or the union system. The old class subdivisions and antagonisms were to be replaced by a "realistic and healthy" collaboration between various employment categories, organized corporately and headed by freely-elected leaders of proven professional competence. A National Legislative Assembly was to be established, made up of both representatives from the employment categories and specially appointed citizens of merit. The nation's political economy was to be based on the recognition of private initiative and ownership, as long as these did not conflict with the national interest, and the "responsible participation" of employees in the management of businesses. Domestic policy was to be geared toward ensuring national cohesion, the rigorous observance of the law, the defense of public order and morality, and the material and moral support of the citizens. "Qualified" criticism would be tolerated insofar as it was expressed in order to further national interests. Foreign policy would be centered on maintaining the integrity, independence, and dignity of the nation, a task that was to be entrusted to the armed forces.\footnote{61}

In this program Borghese combined the standard themes of the conservative right—appeals to nationalism, order, anti-communism, traditional morality, the sanctity of private property—with some fascist-inspired ideas regarding corporatism, worker participation in company management, and the need for a strong, interventionist state. This somewhat contradictory ideological brew was a regular feature of FN proclamations. Two other characteristics of these pronouncements need to be further highlighted. As noted above, Borghese not infrequently made appeals to forces which on the surface
appeared to be his sworn enemies. He strengthened his contacts with former anti-fascists like Pacciardi, and cooperated tangibly with them in various joint political ventures. This was of course nothing new for the Black Prince, who in late 1944 had sought to form an alliance between his Decima MAS units and groups of "white" partisans in the Veneto against Yugoslav partisans and their Italian communist allies. Likewise, he sought to elicit the support of alienated youths and workers, including those who were not associated with the right. In 1970 the "Commander" indicated that the FN understood "the objectives that motivated the struggles of youth and labor" and recognized the spiritual components which underpinned them. In an interview he gave to journalist Giampaolo Pansa four days before the 1970 coup, he went so far as to claim that the FN was "progressive" rather than conservative, and that its ideas could even be categorized as leftist given its promotion of RSI-style "socialization" and worker participation. He added that the FN would apply whatever scheme was best for the Italians, regardless of whether it was pseudo-communist, socialist, or liberal in orientation. These kinds of rhetorical appeals have been viewed by some on the left as evidence that he was trying to initiate a sinister operation of infiltration and manipulation, a possibility reinforced by some of the purported activities of the FN. However, it seems clear that Borghese genuinely empathized with the frustration and alienation felt by youths, in part because he himself felt so psychologically estranged from the existing political system. Then too, there were practical reasons for adopting this approach. In the 1970 interview, he specifically indicated that Italian youths would be seduced by Mao Zedong's Little Red Book if they weren't provided with patriotic alternatives which could satisfy their
legitimate aspirations and grievances. 

Secondly, the FN sought to present itself as a legalistic, and even a democratic, organization in its public proclamations, despite its clear expressions of hostility toward parliamentary democracy. During a December 1969 phone conversation, Borghese told Pansa that it would be "pure folly" for anyone to try and reconstruct the fascist party, with its specific symbols and salutes. In this he was probably sincere, especially given the unlikelihood that such a chimerical venture could meet with success. In his interview a year later he also claimed to respect freedom and personal dignity. Furthermore, in the FN's program it was emphasized that a just state would rigorously respect the tripartite separation of power between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, and that the people themselves had the right to modify the structure of the state as long as such a modification was historically necessary and carried out in accordance with legally sanctioned methods. Yet this half-hearted promotion of democratic formulas, which was intended to make the FN seem less threatening--or perhaps to justify Borghese's own future plans to modify the existing political system--rather than to serve as a real safeguard for democracy in the "new" political order he sought to establish, was certainly not reflected in his other stated goals. For example, the projected limitation of party activities and the severe restrictions to be placed on expressions of dissent were incompatible with genuine democracy. It is also apparent that Borghese's "presidentialist" plan would have altered the existing balance of the three branches of government in such a way as to strengthen the executive, discipline the judicial, and subordinate the legislative.
The lip service Borghese sometimes paid to democratic themes was also contradicted by his increasingly apocalyptic rhetoric and frequent allusions to the need to take dramatic action. In a 1970 introduction to the FN’s Orientamenti Programmatici, the Black Prince claimed that it was "no longer possible to remain passive spectators of the ideological, social, and political 'stoning' (lapidazione) of the Italian fatherland." It was necessary for the Italians to resist the "oligarchy of interests and the conditioning, domestic and foreign", to which they were being subjected, since the ruling class’s total lack of principles was one of the primary causes of the "rampant chaos" afflicting the country. Still later, in the December 1970 interview, he said that the incapacity of that class and the absence of any principle of national unity had resulted in a delegitimation and degeneration of the state apparatus, which had already "surrendered totally" to the communists. Since the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) functioned as the "long arm" of Russia rather than as a democratic party, loyal communists would have no qualms about dressing up as priests if they received the order to do so. At some point the assistance invoked by party members could hence provide a pretext for the Soviet invasion of Italy, as it had earlier done in Czechoslovakia.66

This perceived situation of acute crisis led the Black Prince to suggest that a "little coup" (colpetto) might be necessary to bring down the existing state, though that state was currently so rotten that it might collapse on its own at any time. In either case the Italian people would then be forced to choose between communism and the nation. That was where the FN came into the picture. According to Borghese, his organization was already in the process of establishing a "shadow state" which would be capable of
replacing the existing regime when the latter collapsed. He tried to make it seem as though this imminent substitution of the government by the FN's structure would occur naturally, without resort to clandestine subversion or violence. Thus he claimed that when the FN was sufficiently consolidated in organizational terms, it would constitute a natural "center of attraction" that could simply fill the resulting political vacuum. Borghese and Guadagni both compared the situation in 1970 to that of 1922, when a degenerate old political class ceded power to a group that was more vital—the fascist movement which had just marched on Rome—almost without a struggle. This type of surrender was even more likely now, in their opinion, since allegedly there were already many FN supporters in mainstream political parties, and even a few FN "shadow" deputies and senators in Parliament who promoted the Fronte's agenda even though they were officially members of other parties. Borghese had not actively sought to recruit them, however, since the FN did not aspire to be a mass electoral party. Instead, influential political figures had approached the Black Prince to make known their concerns about the course the country was following and express their sympathy for his patriotic goals. Rather than asking them to quit the parties to which they belonged and join the FN, Borghese told them to remain at their government posts and as members of their parties, at least for the time being. All that he demanded was that they be willing to renounce their current affiliations and openly join the FN if he asked them to do so in the future. It was via this "fifth column" of secret supporters that the FN was managing to insert itself into the system without having to rely on drastic measures. The communists were using the same techniques to insert themselves into governmental
organs, from the communal level on up, so Borghese felt there was no reason why his supporters should do less.\textsuperscript{67}

Despite all these references to replacing the current government, the former Decima MAS leader insisted that he had not thought much about a traditional coup d'etat. He felt that such an extreme action would not be necessary and that, in any case, it would be "very difficult" to launch a Greek-style military coup in a country like Italy. Yet he applauded the Colonel's coup for having saved Greece from communism, the "worst of evils" that could befall a people, and said the FN might view a coup in Italy favorably if the groups launching it shared the movement's own basic goals. For example, if the military launched a coup and set up a government of technicians, the FN could justify it as long as it was a short term arrangement aimed at reestablishing order or preventing the communists from entering the government. He was quick to add, however, that the result of such an action would be the establishment of a conservative, "anti-social" government which would be divided from the people. In the long term, this would not be desirable from the FN's point of view.\textsuperscript{68} Yet these reassuring remarks were soon belied by the course of events, since three days later Borghese launched his own "little coup", making use of the very subversive and violent means he claimed to eschew. Investigating magistrate Filippo Fiore was therefore right to conclude that, beneath a facade of legality, the FN promoted a subversive, anti-democratic project that depended upon the use of force for its realization.\textsuperscript{69}

Although Borghese was clearly preparing for a coup throughout 1969 and 1970, this does not necessarily mean that he originally created the FN with this specific goal
in mind. Yet that is precisely what the Italian military intelligence service concluded. According to an SID report compiled by the staff of Ufficio D (Counterespionage), the FN was created in 1968 in order to "subvert the institutions of the state by means of a coup." Perhaps this is so, but that same report indicated that the Fronte was to be a mass anti-communist organization. These two contentions do not entirely mesh, however, since the type of clandestine cell structure that is best suited for carrying out a coup is in many ways unsuitable for promoting the growth of a mass political organization. There are three likely explanations for this apparent discrepancy. First, the Black Prince and his associates might have initially planned to build both a broad-based patriotic movement and a "shadow state", which together would hopefully be able, not only to compel the existing regime to cede power but also to take its place. The enthusiastic public response to his appearances at Comitato Tricolore rallies may have led Borghese to believe that he could mobilize nationalist sentiments like Charles De Gaulle had done in France. Both Borghese and Guadagni referred explicitly to this cisalpine model during the 1970 interview. The former Decima MAS commander noted that over one million citizens had rallied and marched through the streets of Paris in response to De Gaulle's appeal concerning the dangers posed to France by the May 1968 revolt, then suggested that something similar was needed in Italy. Guadagni added that only Borghese himself was capable of rallying the Italian people in this manner. The latter then claimed that the FN was trying to create an organization which could take advantage of such a massive popular response. By that time, obviously, the two FN leaders were attempting to provide a cover for their imminent coup, but it may be that these remarks honestly
reflected their earlier conceptions. When it became clear that the FN was unable to attract sufficient popular support, however, they may have felt compelled to modify their strategy and place all their hopes for political success on subversive projects.

Second, SID may have been right to conclude that Borghese intended all along to make use of the FN to launch a coup. This interpretation was certainly shared by sectors of the Italian left, which considered the Black Prince to be a "silent, spectral" figure who operated "discreetly behind the scenes" and held the "strands of the complex spiderweb" linking the various forces and actions of the right in his own hands. There is no doubt that the Commander viewed the Fronte as an activist vanguard under his command rather than a mass movement, a fact which he himself acknowledged in his 1970 talk with Pansa. Moreover, one must grant due weight to Borghese's psychological makeup and background as a military adventurer. There are also a number of circumstantial factors which tend to support the view that his pseudo-legalistic portrayal of the FN's goals had always been aimed at disguising its real nature. If, for example, Borghese had been a collaborator of De Lorenzo's in 1964, this would suggest that he had long nourished and been involved in subversive schemes aimed at transforming Italy's parliamentary democracy. It has also been claimed that the Black Prince was among those who were provided with a copy of the published proceedings of the 1965 Istituto Pollio guerre révolutionnaire conference by its editor, Eggardo Beltrametti. In that event, Borghese would certainly have become acquainted with the theme of that conference—the need to wage an all-out war against the communists, employing the same covert methods that they favored. The presentations in that particular book, by
supplementing the firsthand knowledge he had earlier gained in the course of conducting anti-partisan operations and providing a quasi-official justification for using the most sordid methods, perhaps gave him more of an incentive to have recourse to such methods himself. Finally, as will be detailed below, he was in close contact with the leading figures of several national and international right-wing extraparliamentary groups, groups which were themselves well versed in subversive techniques and covert operations. Such interactions could scarcely have encouraged him to employ legal, democratic means to achieve his political goals.

There is also a third possibility. From mid-1969 on, if not sooner, Borghese may have been knowingly employing a two-track strategy combining legal mass agitation and clandestine subversion. In fact, the developmental history of the FN suggests just that. Three months before the FN was formally established, he claimed to have already initiated preliminary organizational work, which involved the establishment of a planning committee in Rome and "action groups" in various regions and cities. It may well be that the basic organizational structure of the FN was conceived and fashioned in some rudimentary way around that time, but it is unlikely that much progress had actually been made in developing and elaborating that structure by June 1968. In creating the organization, Borghese relied upon the assistance of several close collaborators, including the building contractor Benito Guadagni, a former Decima MAS sailor whose father was killed by partisans, who initially provided most of the financing; the shipbuilder Remo Orlandini, the only Italian army officer entrusted by a suspicious Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) with the command of a German company during the Salò period,
who handled various operational matters and became the FN’s chief liaison with representatives of the state apparatus; and Mario Rosa, a former Major in the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN) and commander of the 3rd battalion of the RSI’s Appenine light infantry regiment, who was appointed Secretary. Following the Fronte’s formal founding in September, this leadership group transformed the planning committee into an executive body, set up official branches in several regions, and accelerated its efforts to rally supporters and recruit members.

The resulting FN structure consisted of a central headquarters in Rome and a series of provincial “delegations” throughout Italy. The FN leaders (“delegates”) in each province, who were selected by Borghese and his key associates from among prestigious and influential local supporters who had displayed enthusiasm and initiative, were charged with disseminating the FN’s ideas, recruiting personnel, obtaining financing, “networking”, and devising plans to counteract communist activities in their areas. When political conditions became propitious, they were intended to assume administrative functions analogous to those of the incumbent government Prefects. These delegates were each to be assisted by a committee, in theory composed of qualified representatives from various local economic sectors, whose members were in turn supposed to act as intermediaries with the people in their respective spheres. Although having a certain amount of autonomy in the local sphere, the delegates were required to execute orders emanating from headquarters without question. Such an organizational arrangement was more or less compatible with Borghese’s contention that the FN was intended to constitute a “shadow state” which would be capable of assuming governmental functions
upon the collapse of the existing system. However, this visible and ostensibly legalistic structure was subsequently transformed. Toward the end of 1969, a clandestine, parallel structure was created alongside—or rather beneath—the overt, formal structure. Groups belonging to the latter were thenceforth referred to by those in the know as "A groups", whereas the covert groups were denominates "B groups". Although the existence of these "B groups" was known only to the Fronte’s national leaders and those who actually provided their personnel, presumably the most trusted and action-oriented members of the local "A groups", every "A group" seems to have had an affiliated "B group", for which it provided an effective legal cover. The "B groups" therefore constituted clandestine armed cells within the bosom of the FN’s official organizational structure, cells which were entrusted with the key operational tasks and clearly designed to carry out sub rosa acts. The existence of this two-tiered structure explains why Judge Fiore emphasized that not every Fronte member should be viewed as a conspirator, since many of them had been attracted to the movement primarily on the basis of its patriotic appeals and were not cognizant of its behind-the-scenes drift toward violence and subversion.

Regardless of what the Commander’s previous intentions may have been, the year 1969 clearly marked a crucial watershed in the elaboration of the FN’s organizational network and operational plans. In the Spring of that year, Borghese and his associates organized a series of meetings with leading FN supporters in several regions of Italy. According to SID intelligence reports, the Black Prince outlined various plans with a clearly subversive thrust at high-level gatherings held at the engineer Tommaso Adami Rook’s villa in Pisa, at Pietro Paoletti’s villa in Nugola Nuova, and at different locations...
in and around Rome. At a 19 March 1969 meeting in the Hotel Royal at Viareggio, Borghese asserted that the armed forces would not lack FN support in the struggle against communism. At another in Genoa, he told supporters that he intended to form "groups of public safety" to oppose, if necessary by force, the accession of the PCI to power. Luigi Federlini, the Genoese "delegation" leader, then revealed that a countercoup was to be launched if the communists took power, even through legal means. The military was to occupy key cities and public offices, and their civilian supporters in the Fronte were to help enlist the public's support for the operation. Federlini concluded by saying that the FN's goal was to establish a "national regime of the Gaullist type", and claimed that the rightist weekly *Il Borghese* was slated to become the movement's official organ. Attempts were also made in this period to enlist the aid of other interests presumed to be sympathetic to Borghese's goals. Thus, during a meeting with various heads of the Società Metallurgica Italiana toward the middle of the year, an FN representative, in an unsuccessful appeal to obtain weaponry produced in the company's factories, indicated that the Fronte intended to launch a coup between June and September of 1969. Yet these grandiose schemes revealed themselves to be premature given the still limited manpower and resources at the FN's disposal.

After establishing the Fronte in 1968, Borghese had travelled throughout Italy, especially to various crisis points, in an effort to proselytize and recruit new members. He exploited both his prestige as a soldier and his extensive network of contacts in this effort, and was thus able to attract constituents from a variety of different social groups. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the FN's adherents consisted of RSI veterans who had never
reconciled themselves to the postwar order and younger right-wing ultras searching for adventure and something to believe in. These were joined by retired and active duty military officers, ex-paratroopers, members of athletic and sports associations, some former "white" partisans, and people from all walks of life who were concerned above all with the preservation of social order and the prevention of a communist takeover. Among these latter were a number of professionals and wealthy businessmen, especially in Liguria, who provided the organization with much of its financing. Nevertheless, the total number of FN adherents apparently never exceeded a few thousand. Although Guadagni gave exaggerated estimates of the number of FN supporters to Pansa, presumably in order to give the impression that the organization was far more powerful than it really was, Judge Fiore concluded that the Black Prince's success in recruiting active new members was surprisingly limited. Indeed, according to the Interior Ministry, several of the Fronte's branches only existed on paper. It is probable that the divergent assessments of FN strength derive in large part from a confusion between the number of its official members and the number of its covert supporters, which must have been considerably larger, especially if Borghese's claims regarding the existence of an extensive FN "fifth column" are true.

Even so, it seems clear that an inability to attract enough recruits directly into his own movement was one of the factors which prompted Borghese to strengthen links with other rightist political organizations. As he himself admitted at the time of his 1970 interview, the FN had contacts with every extraparliamentary rightist group in Italy, contacts which were mainly organizational rather than federative. Although Borghese
seemed reluctant to specifically name any of these organizations, Guadagni said that he personally maintained excellent and frequent contacts with the Secretary General of the Costituente Nazionale Rivoluzionaria (CNR), Giacomo De Sario. The FN was also affiliated with the Lega Italia Unità, an ephemeral umbrella organization which sought to group fifteen separate right-wing movements into a broad anti-communist front with expressly "presidentialist" designs. Among the participants at the Lega's founding meeting at Giuseppe Gattai's home in Viareggio on 7 November 1969 were representatives from the Fronte, Pacciardi's Nuova Repubblica, and several other key organizations, including Gaetano Orlando and Carlo Fumagalli, the leaders of the Movimento d'Azione Rivoluzionaria (MAR), and the intransigent monarchist Adamo Degli Occhi, future President of the Maggioranza Silenziosa. Despite its relatively short life span, this Lega may have played a role of some significance in the history of rightist anti-democratic plots by bringing together a number of more or less subversive groups and providing a legal cover for some of their organizational activities. In addition, the Fronte remained in contact with Pacciardi and, via Adriano Monti, with Edgardo Sogno, another uncompromisingly anti-communist ex-partisan. Other groups known to be linked to the FN were Europa Civiltà and Fronte Delta, both of which were actually mobilized on the night of the coup.

However, the most important contacts with the radical right that the FN cultivated in the second half of 1969 were with the two most active neo-fascist paramilitary groups in Italy, Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale. According to an SID report dating from this period, "there exists a precise agreement for political collaboration between
Commander Borghese and Pino Rauti, Secretary General of ON."\(^{85}\) The close collaboration between the two organizations was later confirmed by Borghese himself, who admitted that ON leaders Rauti, Rutilio Sermonti, and Giulio Maceratini had, due to their considerable organizing experience, made a valuable contribution to the FN’s own organizational work prior to Rauti’s decision to bring ON back within the MSI’s protective fold. Yet this unexpected November 1969 rapprochement between the majority in ON and a revitalized MSI, though perhaps disrupting the previous accords between Rauti and Borghese, by no means put an end to FN-ON cooperation. According to Guadagni, individual members of ON continued to lend the FN a hand even after Rauti had rejoined the MSI.\(^{86}\) Moreover, Rauti’s decision had provoked a bitter schism within ON itself, and various members of the more radical breakaway faction—the Movimento Politico Ordine Nuovo (MPON) led by Clemente Graziani—established, maintained, or increased their contacts with the FN. For example, the ex-paratrooper Sandro Saccucci, who was appointed head of the MPON’s "parallel organizations" at a 21 December 1969 MPON meeting in Rome, later assumed important operational responsibilities in connection with the FN’s coup attempt.\(^{87}\) Nor was he alone. Other extremists affiliated with ON and the MPON also participated in that action, as well as in subsequent FN plots. The intermediary between the Fronte and ON was Sandro Pisano.\(^{88}\)

Yet it was with Avanguardia Nazionale that Borghese forged the closest links. The personal connections between Borghese and Stefano Delle Chiaie, AN’s charismatic leader, date back to at least the mid-1960s. Both had participated at various gatherings of the European radical right, and the "black bombardiers" and his men were allegedly
regular visitors to the seat of the Circolo dei Selvatici. According to SID, relations between the FN and AN became even closer in the Fall of 1969, and at the end of that year Delle Chiaie and two of his chief lieutenants, Flavio Campo and Cesare Perri, were recruited into the Fronte's National Directorate. Serious discussions about a possible coup, initially projected for June 1970, were then undertaken. The notorious Delle Chiaie, who SID justly described as a "technician of mass agitation and conspiracy", was personally given the job of creating political and revolutionary cadres throughout Italy and coordinating their interaction with FN headquarters. Given AN's previous experience in planning and carrying out covert operations, it seems very probable that Delle Chiaie's organizational activity was in some way related to the creation of the FN's clandestine "B groups", a task that Rauti and his ON associates may have already laid the groundwork for prior to reentering the MSI. In any event, the Black Prince and Delle Chiaie soon developed so much respect for one another that Borghese gave special consideration to the latter's advice and ended up appointing him as the FN's "national military leader". This decision provoked the disapproval of some FN leaders, who feared that Delle Chiaie was untrustworthy and resented his usurpation of certain operational responsibilities which they themselves had wished to assume. But the stubborn old war hero, recognizing that the determination, discipline, and unscrupulousness of AN's ultras made them ideally suited to act as "point men" in any subversive operation, ignored their protests. In fact, he relied more and more upon Delle Chiaie and his men as time went on, and authorized Orlandini to distribute conspicuous sums of money to Campo and Perri.
Of no less importance, Borghese and others associated with the FN had established contacts with various international networks of right-wing extremists. Among the most active of these was the Nouvel Ordre Européen/Europäische Neu-Ordnung (NOE/ENO), headed by Swiss neo-Nazi Gaston-Armand Amaudruz. Since its creation on 28 September 1951, the NOE/ENO has held a series of international congresses at which representatives from a wide variety of neo-fascist groups—including, from the late 1950s till the mid-1970s, Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale—have gathered to extend each other solidarity and map out joint political programs. Like the gatherings of other such umbrella organizations, however, it is probable that these "official" congresses were used as a cover behind which certain subversive groups secretly sought to develop more tangible operational linkages and devise more specific strategies for action. For example, at the 9th NOE/ENO congress held in Milan on 25 March 1967, participant Robert Leroy of Aginter Presse revealed that a "seizure of power" in Italy and other countries had been discussed. According to Leroy, allegedly a close acquaintance of Borghese, Delle Chiaie, Clemente Graziani, and Europa Civiltà's Stefano Serpieri, it was felt that a military putsch could rescue Italy from its disastrous social and economic conditions, and that there were many good officers there who were in a position to seize power.\textsuperscript{92} If the Black Prince in fact knew Leroy well, this must have brought him, at least tangentially, into the orbit of Aginter Presse, the notorious network of right-wing subversives and terrorists headquartered in Lisbon. Nor, perhaps, was this Borghese's only contact with external forces later implicated in the "strategy of tension". The Extraparliamentary Left Research Group claimed, without providing any documentary means.

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evidence, that Borghese was one of the Greek Colonels’ most trusted men in Italy. In this capacity he supposedly developed links with both the Greek Foreign Minister at the Rome embassy and Kostas Plevris, a leader of the neo-fascist Kinema tes 4 Augoustou (K4A: 4th of August Movement).\textsuperscript{93}

Moreover, Borghese’s efforts to enlist external aid were apparently not confined exclusively to far right circles. According to the subsequent testimony of various persons linked to organized crime, the Black Prince also sought to recruit elements of the Mafia as participants in his projected coup. Thus Antonino Calderone, sibling of Mafia boss Giuseppe "Pippo" Calderone, revealed that Borghese personally made such a proposal to his brother during a secret meeting in Rome during the Spring of 1970. In return for the Mafia’s armed support, Borghese promised to "reconsider" the sentences of imprisoned mafiosi. Pippo must have been won over or at least intrigued, since shortly thereafter he approached Tomasso Buscetta, a key Sicilian capo, and outlined the scheme to him. Buscetta further claimed that it was the freemasons who had first alerted the Cosa Nostra to Borghese’s coup preparations. The Black Prince’s idea was at first enthusiastically supported by some of the bosses, especially Luciano Liggio and the three Rimi brothers, but objections later surfaced to his insistence that a full list of participating mafiosi be provided and that they wear, along with the rest of the conspirators, identifying armbands. Borghese subsequently agreed to forego this list and, in the wake of a successful coup, bring a halt to the trials of Liggio and Vincenzo and Filippo Rimi. Although in the end the bosses decided that it was too risky to accept Borghese’s offer, Natale Rimi and some other mafiosi apparently participated in certain
actions related to the coup.94

Nevertheless, in spite of the extensive links that Borghese developed with other extreme right and criminal groups, toward the end of 1969 it had become clear to him that the forces at the FN's disposal were "absolutely insufficient" to carry out his objectives. He therefore intensified his efforts to expand the number of FN supporters within the ranks of the official forces of order, in particular the armed forces.95 His own attitude toward the military, like that of many fascists and fascist sympathizers, had been characterized by a certain amount of ambiguity ever since World War II. As a onetime supporter of the wartime alliance with Germany, he clearly retained a bitter hostility toward those military leaders who had failed to do their duty and "betrayed" Italy by offering their allegiance to the servile Badoglio government after July 1943. On the other hand, as a career military man who only asked that his epitaph read "this is a soldier who has served his country well", the Black Prince had always felt a sense of solidarity with those officers and common soldiers who had supposedly placed the needs of the nation above their own personal interests and partisan political allegiances.96 For this reason, he had long maintained personal contacts with some of the more immoderate, hardline elements inside the officer corps, especially those in his old service, the Navy. His links to members of the armed forces, both tangible and emotional, were further reinforced during his public appearances at various MSI, FNCRSI, and Comitato Tricolore rallies, where both veterans and active duty military personnel repeatedly demonstrated that they reciprocated the former Decima MAS commander's esteem and affection. Finally, he was convinced that many soldiers would feel an affinity for the FN
simply because it promoted patriotism, traditional values, and the rigorous defense of disputed Italian border territories.  

These sentiments and perceptions made it natural for Borghese to view the armed forces as a rich potential source of recruits and "fifth column" supporters in his hour of need. Although he denied that the FN made active attempts to recruit soldiers, this disclaimer is contradicted by a variety of evidence. In 1973, for example, his right-hand man Orlandini confided to Captain Labruna of SID that the Fronte had spent years conducting penetration operations into the ranks of the military. Two years later, Investigating Magistrate Fiore concluded that the FN’s efforts to enroll adherents within the armed forces were further accelerated in the last quarter of 1969. This development may be reflected in one of the SID intelligence reports, which indicates that Borghese met with selected military leaders in Fiesole in October 1969, and again in Florence at the Circolo Forze Armate. Yet even though both the Black Prince and Orlandini appear to have expended a lot of time and energy working on these penetration and recruitment activities, gaps in the available sources and contradictory claims make it difficult to determine just how successful they ultimately were. There are two separate issues involved here. First, how extensive was the FN’s network of supporters and sympathizers within the armed services and other forces of order in Italy? Second, what role did these alleged supporters and sympathizers actually play in the 1970 coup and the Fronte’s subsequent subversive activities? The first matter needs to be tackled at once, but the second must be deferred until the coup has been described in detail.

There were undoubtedly a significant number of more or less tacit FN supporters

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within the military, especially among officers and in elite units, but the vast majority of them seem to have been unwilling to seriously entertain or actively commit themselves to subversive schemes. Despite this, many observers believed that the FN's infiltration into military ranks had reached worrisome levels. Various leftist investigators claimed that officers and NCOs who were secretly members of the FN had for years monitored their colleagues in order to assess their ideological reliability and, presumably, to sound out what their reaction might be if direct action was taken to transform the government and prevent a communist takeover. Those deemed to be sufficiently trustworthy were then carefully approached for recruitment.101 In this way, clandestine networks of FN sympathizers were supposedly set up within the various armed services. Some confirmation of this general scenario, as well as an indication of just how extensive such networks might have been, was subsequently provided by Orlandini himself. In the course of his many meetings with Labruna, Orlandini claimed that the plotters had established contacts above all with "high military circles", and that among the FN's active supporters in the armed forces were Air Force Chief of Staff Duilio Fanali; a group of admirals, including the Navy's Chief of Staff, Admiral Giuseppe Roselli Lorenzini; the commander of the Air Force in the Rome region, along with most of his men and all of the Air Force squadrons (stormi); various unit commanders; and General Giuseppe Barbasetti, commander of the parachute brigade. He also asserted that several top functionaries of the Ministry of the Interior, various police commissioners from the traditionally "black" neighborhoods of Rome (such as Parioli, EUR, and Trionfale), entire units of the national civilian police, and all of the Carabinieri (other than some
high-ranking generals) had secretly backed the Fronte, if not the actual coup.\textsuperscript{102} Perhaps even more ominously, Orlandini revealed that 3000 military officers in Italy were members of masonic lodges. He indicated that FN representatives had approached various masonic leaders in order to solicit their aid, and that several meetings were then held in Rome to discuss the proposal. In the end, important groups of freemasons supposedly voted, presumably in secret lodge assemblies, to support Borghese’s planned action.\textsuperscript{103}

However, these extravagant and eye-opening claims cannot all be accepted at face value. For example, although there were clearly subversive elements within the ranks of the Carabinieri, it is impossible to believe that all the members of such a conservative, legalistic corps would have sympathized with or supported the type of violent, unconstitutional schemes that Borghese was promoting.\textsuperscript{104} Likewise it is improbable that entire police units backed the coup, unless those units were small squads from notoriously nostalgic or pro-fascist locales.\textsuperscript{105} Orlandini thus exaggerated, at least in part, the extent to which FN plotters were receiving behind-the-scenes support from high-ranking military and police officials and their subordinates. He was clearly trying to impress Labruna by bragging about the Fronte’s powerful contacts, since he sought to recruit the SID man into the far-flung subversive network which was actively engaged, throughout 1973 and much of 1974, in planning new coups. Moreover, the transcripts of these Orlandini-Labruna talks themselves reveal that many ostensibly sympathetic superior officers were hesitant and prone to drag their feet when pressed by Orlandini to initiate concrete actions against the government.\textsuperscript{106} In the end, given the absence of
enough hard evidence and the omnipresence of political pressure being exerted to limit the damage to the reputation of state institutions, Judge Fiore was induced to minimize the amount of covert assistance provided to Borghese before, during, and after the coup by elements within the forces of order. This tendency was carried to even more absurd lengths by various appellate judges in the course of subsequent trials.

But the baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater. For one thing, several ranking members of the armed forces and the police can be shown to have been active co-conspirators, though their ultimate aims were in some cases quite different than those of Borghese and his radical neo-fascist followers. For another, it is clear that long before the coup Borghese and other FN plotters had secretly established contact with key operatives of various secret services, both Italian and foreign. The most important of these within Italy were the military intelligence service and the Interior Ministry’s Ufficio Affari Riservati (UAR). In 1973, Orlandini told Labruna that he had first made contact with General Vito Miceli when the latter was head of the Servizio Informazioni Operative e Situazione (SIOS)-Esercito—that is, before Miceli was appointed head of SID in October 1970—and that Miceli, who had met with Borghese in Orlandini’s Montesacro home on more than one occasion, was in agreement with the plotters and did nothing to harm them. Miceli later confirmed that he met with Orlandini personally in the Spring and Summer of 1969, and that he sent a trusted underling—Colonel Cosimo Pace—to meet with the shipbuilder four more times, all ostensibly in order to gather information. At these get-togethers, Orlandini repeatedly emphasized his respect for the armed forces, and discussed aspects of the FN’s activities and requirements.\textsuperscript{107} Yet Miceli’s efforts
to portray these meetings as falling within the ambit of legitimate intelligence gathering activities are not credible, since both during and after the coup he personally went out of his way to prevent the exposure of the operation and, in the process, protect the conspirators. These top level cover-up efforts, which helped bring an ongoing but largely hidden power struggle between rival factions within the government and SID to a head in 1974, will be discussed at some length below.

Orlandini further claimed that Dr. Salvatore Drago, a police medical examiner and one of the key FN plotters, had close links to the UAR. Drago served as an important intermediary between that powerful clandestine apparatus and Borghese’s men prior to and after the coup, and provided crucial logistical assistance beforehand to the AN commando group charged with penetrating the Viminale on the night of 7-8 December 1970. A 26 June 1974 SID report later identified the doctor as a very close friend of Federico Umberto D’Amato, de facto second-in-command within the UAR from 1969 till 1972, when he became its chief. Nor was Drago the only FN putschist with reputed connections to D’Amato. It will be recalled that many sources, both leftist and neo-fascist, have accused Delle Chiaie himself of secretly working with or for D’Amato. If these claims have any basis in fact, which seems very likely, it would suggest that influential elements within the Interior Ministry were not only kept abreast of the FN’s plans, but also played a "supportive" background role in the projected coup, at least to the extent that they could exploit or instrumentalize it for their own purposes. Yet the complicity of the Italian secret services in the Fronte’s pre-coup activities apparently did not end there. In 1976, an anonymous informant told a journalist from
L'Europeo that militants from the FN, AN, and ON had received training in unconventional warfare and disinformation techniques at a top secret base at Alghero in Sardinia. At the time this testimony was naturally viewed with some skepticism, since practically nothing was known about the installation itself. However, recent investigations have conclusively demonstrated that from the mid-1960s on it functioned as the principal training base for personnel recruited into the Italian "stay/behind" networks, as well as for those of other state security organizations and, perhaps, certain "unofficial" terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{110}

If it is true that select cadres from the FN and affiliated neo-fascist groups received training in unconventional warfare at the Sardinia base, it must have been done with the knowledge, if not the explicit sanctioning, of some high-ranking elements within the American security forces. It is now known that the Sardinia base played an important role in U.S. and NATO plans for the defense of the Mediterranean basin, that it was in part staffed and managed by American military and secret service personnel, and that it was specifically slated to be defended by American military forces in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between the superpowers.\textsuperscript{111} Given these circumstances and the extreme sensitivity of the activities being conducted at the isolated facility, it is inconceivable that the security-conscious Americans would have permitted Italian civilians to be trained there who were not earmarked to play a role that furthered, however indirectly, certain perceived U.S. interests. Nor is it believable that U.S. intelligence personnel did not know precisely who was being trained at the base. Unless it is assumed that those entrusted with running the base were extraordinarily incompetent,
which is hardly warranted given the effectiveness with which the operations at Alghero were concealed for a decade, there is no reason to doubt that they would have made careful checks into the backgrounds of all the individuals selected for such specialized and potentially dangerous training. It is certainly unlikely that they were misled about the trainees by Italian intelligence, since the SID men assigned to oversee activities at the base had themselves been carefully chosen by Italian secret service officials considered "friendly" by their American counterparts. Finally, there is no reason to think that the U.S. intelligence personnel in charge of the base would have had any qualms about training or making use of radical rightists. Since 1945 hardline factions within the U.S. military and intelligence establishments have repeatedly recruited right-wing extremists, including both former fascists and younger neo-fascists, into anti-communist intelligence and paramilitary organizations throughout Europe and other parts of the world. They would have had even less reluctance to make use of elements linked to Borghese, who American intelligence operatives had earlier rescued from a partisan vendetta and perhaps sought to recruit as titular leader of a postwar anti-communist "national front" coalition. Nevertheless, although there is nothing improbable about the informant's claim that FN members were among those trained at the Sardinia base, no documentary evidence has yet been uncovered to corroborate it.

There are, however, other indications that Borghese and some of his key associates were in contact with American intelligence officials in the months leading up to the coup. Orlandini himself testified that he was in direct contact with Hugh Fenwich, an American engineer who worked for a highly specialized electronics firm in Italy,
Selenia, many of whose products had military applications and were classified "top secret". The building constructor had been introduced to Fenwich by AN member Adriano Monti, an SID operative who had earlier been sent to Cairo on some sort of mission by the CIA. According to Orlandini, Fenwich worked covertly overseas to promote the interests of both President Richard Nixon and the Republican Party, but was not a regular member of the CIA. Fenwich appears to have had a private communications channel to Nixon, since he personally phoned the President on at least one occasion in Orlandini’s presence. At meetings with Captain Labruna in 1973 and 1974, Orlandini specifically identified the well-connected American as the intermediary between Nixon’s entourage, NATO military personnel, and Borghese’s plotters prior to and during the coup. In an effort to verify some of these claims, Labruna then conducted an investigation of Fenwich. His Ufficio D investigative team soon concluded that the engineer was considered an éminence grise of the CIA in Italy. Fenwich was apparently a CIA "resident"—an intelligence operative who conducted normal business activities abroad but secretly carried out delicate intelligence tasks—rather than an actual case officer; hence his name did not appear on the official list of U.S. secret service personnel. He had arrived in Italy after a long sojourn in two other intelligence "hot spots", Korea and Vietnam, and resided with his family at a villa in Grottaferrata. The sensitivity and importance of Fenwich’s work were apparently so great that one of SID’s regular informants inside the CIA refused, when asked, to provide any information about the engineer.

To this direct but unconfirmed testimony must be added a good deal of
circumstantial evidence indirectly linking the FN to various Western secret services. As noted above, Borghese and other FN leaders had personal contacts with key representatives of Aginter Presse and, perhaps, the Greek K4A. It has already been shown that Aginter personnel were closely connected to hardline factions of Portuguese, French, Spanish, West German, and probably U.S. intelligence, and that they carried out various dirty, "plausibly deniable" jobs at the behest of those factions in return for the provision of material aid and "cover". If it is true that Borghese was in contact with K4A leader Plevris, this would have linked him at least indirectly to elements of the Greek security services, since Plevris was an operative for both the Kratiki Ypiresia Pliroforion (KYP: State Intelligence Service) and the Greek Military Police (ESA). Yet there is still more. The apparent connections between leading FN plotters and intelligence personnel seemed to receive further confirmation when the lists of P2 masonic lodge members were discovered by the Polizia Giudiziaria in Licio Gelli’s villa at Castiglion Fibocchi in 1981. The names of many important people who were earlier implicated in the Borghese coup appeared on those lists. Among them were Fronte adherents like Orlandini, Drago, Sandro Saccucci, and Giacomo Micalizio; alleged military plotters like Fanali, General Giuseppe Casero, and General Ugo Ricci; and high ranking secret service officials like Miceli and D’Amato. Even the two SID officials who investigated and belatedly exposed the putschists, Captain Labruna and his boss, Ufficio D head Gianadelio Maletti, were on the lists. The presence of all these names in fact reveals something significant about the nature of P2 which has been glossed over by some commentators—the presence of members from rival secret service factions within its
secretive ranks—but in this context what needs to be emphasized is that Gelli and his P2 lodge were clearly linked to powerful political circles in the United States and other Western nations, including influential groupings inside their secret services. The significance of this for the outcome of the Borghese coup will soon be considered.

In any event, the end of 1969 saw Borghese and his chief henchmen strengthening alliances with right-wing paramilitary groups and sympathetic elements within the military and security services, both domestic and foreign. According to SID, this was merely the prelude to further organizational and operational developments. As the months passed in 1970, the Fronte accelerated its efforts to consolidate its forces, elaborate a structure capable of carrying out clandestine actions, and lay the groundwork for an operation designed to precipitate a military coup. At various meetings held at Adami Rook’s villa near the end of April, at which Pisa FN leader Ugo Mazzari and Pistoia FN chief Esperio Cappellini participated, the armed occupation of an objective in Rome was originally planned for 24 May 1970. This plan was abandoned soon after, presumably because the Fronte lacked sufficient strength or external support to carry it out at that point. On 1 June, at a meeting in Rosa’s office, Delle Chiaie was appointed as leader of the Fronte’s "B groups". By that time, the AN chief had already fled to Spain in order to avoid being indicted for giving false testimony in the Piazza Fontana case, but despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest he was able to travel to and from Italy without difficulty. Then, on 4 July, the Fronte’s national council was granted "unlimited deliberative and executive powers" in the course of a top-level meeting at the organization’s headquarters in Rome, which Judge Fiore believed was related to the
approach of an operational "D-Day", since normal administrative needs would not have required such an action.\textsuperscript{118} This interpretation was buttressed by SID, whose investigators indicated that Borghese's preparations for a coup were finalized sometime in July. According to their reconstruction, Adami Rook was to furnish "B group" personnel for the occupation of the Interior Ministry. In preparation for this, about twenty FN men from La Spezia and Genoa, including MSI \textit{federale} Gaetano Lunetta, came to Rome to reconnoiter the Viminale. Drago divided these men into cells of three or four men and personally conducted the operation. In early August another such survey was carried out for the head of the Genoese "B group", ex-paratrooper Stelio Frattini, and his adjutant Angelo Cagnoni, nicknamed "the beast". Frattini himself testified that Drago, acting on Orlandini's orders, accompanied Cagnoni on a reconaissance of the area inside the Viminale which was slated to be occupied, devised a plan for the various phases of the projected occupation, and then consigned that plan to Frattini.\textsuperscript{119} The surreptitious entry of FN personnel into the interior of the Viminale in late summer was undoubtedly facilitated by conspirators within the Interior Ministry, as it later was on the night of the coup. With the approach of the scheduled December "zero hour", a number of FN meetings were held to put the finishing touches on Borghese's operational plans.

Meanwhile, selected cadres from the FN, AN, and ON had participated in a series of paramilitary training exercises throughout the Spring and Summer of 1970. According to Paolo Guzzanti, Borghese entrusted the training of the FN's commando groups to Saccucci. Saccucci and other former paratroopers conducted this training during camping outings at Lago Turano (organized by Europa Civiltà). in Cascia, in the mountains that
surround Palermo, and at the Ponticelli cemetery near Naples. At least 300 people were allegedly trained in techniques of guerrilla warfare at the latter locale, without being disturbed at all by the forces of order. Indeed, the rightist weekly Lo Specchio later published excerpts from two official military documents which revealed that Saccucci had received authorization and logistical support from the Army General Staff before providing this training. Members of Ordine Nuovo were no less active in this sphere. Between 1 and 31 August, ON militants participated in four training camps held in the mountains of central Italy. Among the themes of the lessons were "Revolutionary War", "The Third World War has already begun", "The Organization of an Operational Revolutionary Group", and "Techniques for Finding the Financial Means necessary for a Revolutionary Group's Political Action", instruction which was supplemented by intensive practical training in karate and other gymnastic exercises. Other ON training camps were held in northern Italy. One was established by Salvatore Francia in the Piedmontese Alps, where participants were trained to use portable radios and fight with knives. Still another was in operation during August 1970 at Fort Foin, near Bardonecchia, at which forty ON "group leaders" conducted joint maneuvers and practiced shooting machine guns, automatic rifles, and pistols. Around the same time, AN organized one of its own paramilitary training camps near Leonessa. Finally, as noted above, selected members of all of these organizations may have secretly received training at the "Gladio" base in Sardinia. It seems that a certain number of weapons were also stockpiled by the FN throughout this period, since arms were found stashed at the organization's headquarters after the attempted coup was exposed in March.
Nor, alas, did FN personnel restrict their activities to devising plans, organizing, and training for unconventional warfare before launching the December 1970 operation. Less than one year after the Fronte was created in the Fall of 1968, various ultras associated with it began to be implicated in acts of political violence and provocation. The first of these incidents seems to have occurred in the last quarter of 1969, a period characterized by exceptional student and labor unrest. It was precisely during this "hot autumn" that the Fronte intensified its efforts to strengthen its links with action-oriented elements of other radical rightist organizations, the most important of which had been engaged in carrying out a terrorist "strategy of tension" since the Spring of 1968, if not earlier. A series of high-level planning sessions between representatives of the FN, ON, AN, and Europa Civiltà were therefore held in the weeks preceding the Piazza Fontana bombing. In the course of these meetings, the merits of employing certain operational techniques and the coordination of projected future actions were undoubtedly among the subjects discussed. One such gathering, called to discuss what the response should be to the 19 November "general strike" organized by the trade unions, was held in Rome at an apartment near Piazza Tuscolo on 15 November 1969. At the meeting, a violent disagreement erupted between those who favored a more moderate "containment" strategy and the "heavies" who promoted the use of terrorist attacks and public bombings in order to provoke a leftist overreaction, which would in turn precipitate an intervention of the forces of order. Following a brief exchange of fisticuffs, an outraged FN "moderate" and former Decima MAS trooper named Armando Calzolari stormed out of
the meeting. Far from bringing a halt to the drastic measures proposed by the ultras, the resulting breakaway of some other moderates seems to have removed all the remaining obstacles to the activation of those measures. Thus on 6 December, the ultras apparently decided to follow through with their plans during a secret meeting held in Rome at the Viale delle Milizie headquarters of the Associazione Nazionale Paracadutisti. There was almost certainly some relationship between the bombings in Milan and Rome on 12 December and the decisions taken by influential right-wing extremists in the course of these and other meetings, although later efforts to determine the precise criminal responsibility of actual FN activists—as opposed to that of members of the other groups with whom the FN was collaborating—have not proven successful.

Be that as it may, the mysterious year-end death of the disgruntled Calzolari appears to have been directly linked to his decision to break ranks with other camerati over the issue of employing certain types of violence. The exact role that Calzolari played in the FN’s activities prior to his disappearance was a matter of dispute, at least at the outset. According to leftist sources, Calzolari, ostensibly a public relations man for a bridge- and road-building firm, was in fact one of the Fronte’s two chief money-handlers, along with Luciano Luberti. In this capacity, he helped to procure and administer the organization’s funds, a task for which he was allegedly well-suited given his knowledge of several foreign languages and his establishment of numerous contacts abroad, especially in the United States. Calzolari’s wife, Maria Piera Romano, added that her husband had participated in regular get-togethers with top politicians, industrialists, and clerics, usually at elaborately organized dinners at Rome’s "Ville Radieuse"
restaurant on Via Aurelia. These assertions were vehemently denied by Borghese and Guadagni on the eve of the 1970 coup. They insisted that Calzolari was too young and lacked the "intellectual breadth" to have been enrolled in the Decima MAS, that he was a good lad who worked temporarily as a telephone operator and usher for the FN, that Borghese did not know him and only saw him once at FN headquarters, that it was hard to imagine him being the victim of a political crime, and that claims of his importance within the Fronte and closeness to Borghese were the products of a PSI-sponsored propaganda campaign. However, Calzolari’s presence at various high-level meetings of the extraparliamentary right during the Winter of 1969, which was later attested to by some of the other participants, itself demonstrates that his role in the FN was anything but insignificant. His subsequent fate only strengthens this interpretation, since otherwise it would not have been necessary to eliminate him in order to prevent the secret projects of the conspirators from being exposed.

At 8 AM on Christmas morning, 1969, Calzolari went out to walk his English setter Paulette. Although he indicated that he would be back shortly, he was never again seen alive by his family and friends. Despite intensive police efforts to locate him, it was not until 28 January 1970 that the corpse of the 43-year old "nationalist" was found, along with that of his dog, in a small pond of water in the Bravetta area, just southwest of Rome’s Villa Doria Pamphili park and about two miles from his house. Most of the police investigators assigned to the case seemed very anxious to classify the death as accidental, and Calzolari’s wife was initially quick to agree. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of evidence, both technical and circumstantial, suggested that foul play was
involved. Friends of the victim later testified that on 15 December, three days after the Piazza Fontana massacre, Calzolari told them he was worried because he had been threatened. Then, a couple of days before his disappearance, he confessed to his mother, Maria Pia Calzolari, that he had had a violent quarrel after listening to a 19 December speech by Almirante concerning the bombings in Milan and Rome. She also indicated that her son was a "bundle of nerves" when she first arrived for a stay at his house over the Christmas holiday. Finally, one dubious source claimed that Calzolari became so angry at a post-strage meeting—perhaps the one at which Almirante spoke—that he had threatened to reveal everything he knew about the background of the bomb plot. This disconcerting testimony suggests that some of his former political associates at once began applying psychological pressure in order to ensure his continued silence. Perhaps ominously, the ultras apparently held another secret meeting on 20 December, the day after Calzolari had had a second dispute with them about the bombings.126

Moreover, the intervention of right-wing extremists in this affair by no means ended with Calzolari's death. Various "friends" of his from "the party" immediately began to try and influence the behavior of his stunned wife. On the very day her husband disappeared, she received a call from someone who suggested that he was safe in Corsica. The next day the same person phoned and admitted that this was not in fact the case, after which she received a visit from three of the aforementioned "friends", who advised her that in order to protect Calzolari it would be better if she did not talk to anyone about what had happened. At that point she began telling the press that her husband may have been picked up by some friends and brought to Israel, where he was...
scheduled to participate in a course on counterguerrilla warfare, a story very similar to one which had apparently been disseminated by a particular FN leader to some of his associates. This was clearly a smokescreen designed to throw investigators off the track, since Calzolari’s wife thence warned her mother-in-law to keep her mouth shut so as not to jeopardize her husband’s life.\textsuperscript{127} In spite of Maria Romano’s seeming willingness to cooperate, those who sought to guarantee her continued silence soon added a "carrot" to their barely veiled threats. Two years later, she told Judge De Lillo that she would be hurt economically if the case was not closed. Since Calzolari was not insured, this suggests that someone else had promised to help his wife financially if the investigation into his death was discontinued. According to the Extraparliamentary Left Research Group, she had already received money from G. Bertone, a financial backer of the MSI.\textsuperscript{128}

The initial verdict of accidental death can also be criticized on logical and technical grounds. Although anything is possible, it seems unlikely that a robust person in the peak of health, an expert skindiver, and a former sailor in the merchant marine could have accidentally drowned in a small pond of water whose greatest depth was less than his own height. Nor is there any evidence that Calzolari intended to commit suicide, a possibility vehemently rejected by all of his family members and close friends. Instead, there are indications that he actually lost his life several days after his disappearance. Thus the autopsy report placed his death fifteen to thirty days prior to the date his body was discovered, the latter was found in an area which had previously been searched by police dogs, and his car was inexplicably missing from its parking space between 25 and
28 December. None of these facts jibe with the official theory of an accidental death, an explanation that even failed to satisfy certain neo-fascist journalists. On 2 January, an article in *Il Tempo* concluded that Calzolari’s work for the FN had made him knowledgeable about certain events whose particulars could interest "organized groups of political adversaries." Twelve days later Sergio Tè, a former member of AN and close associate of Delle Chiaie, wrote an article for *Il Secolo d’Italia* in which he claimed that Calzolari’s disappearance was a "political crime" and accused the radical left of responsibility. Tè further suggested that the lack of results in the investigation might be attributable, if not to foot-dragging, to an "overly efficient organization interested in 'disappearing' certain persons after making use of them to obtain important information."

The first of these revelations agitated Calzolari’s wife, but before she was able to take any action to help her husband she received a visit from Carabinieri Captain Castino, who temporarily persuaded her to abandon the idea that a crime had been committed.130

In view of these growing discrepancies, both Judge Aldo Vitozzi and Calzolari’s mother became more and more suspicious. Vitozzi decided to pursue the case against the will of the prosecutor, and eventually concluded that the FN man’s death was a homicide designed to cover up another crime—the 12 December bombings. Using the pretext that confidential information had somehow leaked out, the case was then taken away from the judge, who was subjected to disciplinary action. In March 1972 this particular case of "accidental death" was formally closed by the assistant prosecutor, Salvatore Pallara. Eighteen months later it was reopened, in large part due to pressure exerted by Calzolari’s mother, and in 1976 it was finally reclassified as a premeditated murder.131
Although the actual perpetrators were never definitively identified, the pall of suspicion fell directly upon Calzolari’s erstwhile comrades within the orbit of the FN. His mother was convinced that the Di Luia brothers or the sadistic Luberti had killed her son, but later Marco Pirina, the leader of Fronte Delta, testified that Mario Rosa told him that he and other FN members had eliminated a colleague who "talked too much", which prosecutor Claudio Vitalone assumed was a reference to Calzolari. If either of these people was in fact the culprit, the death of Calzolari may have been among the first examples of the FN’s employment of homicidal violence.

Another possible indication of the Fronte’s transition from clandestine planning to the actual commission of acts of provocation and terrorism emerged from the testimony of Evelino Loi, an unemployed Sardinian in his twenties. In the middle of January 1970, Loi appeared at the Rome offices of L’Epresso, where he testified at length about various alleged incidents involving himself and certain right-wing militants. According to Loi, a few days before the planned "general strike" on 19 November 1969, he was approached by Commander Guido Bianchini and Deputy Commander Santino Viaggio, two former Decima MAS men who had collaborated with Borghese in the organization of the FN. They alluded to the possibility of carrying out simultaneous terrorist actions in Rome and Milan, and asked Loi if he was willing to take part in such actions in return for payment. Recognizing the dangers involved, the young Sardinian refused, but right after the metalworkers’ demonstration at the end of November he was again contacted by Bianchini and Viaggio, who offered him even more money to participate in these "very important terrorist acts". Loi again refused. A couple of days
later, he went to the Questura and recounted his story to a top official of the Ufficio Politico, Dr. Umberto Improta, who continued to display skepticism until the day after the 12 December bombings in Milan and Rome. At that point, he contacted Loi and asked him to come down to the Questura and use the secondary entrance on Via Genova so that he would not be seen coming and going. When he arrived, Improta listened to his story again and advised him not to speak of these matters to anyone, saying "[i]t’s better for you. Don’t get yourself into trouble."³³³

Loi’s testimony regarding this supposed FN-sponsored provocation was generally disregarded, not least because Loi himself was an unscrupulous, dishonest, and apparently unbalanced person with a checkered past. After associating himself with the leftist student movement in order to obtain a free place to sleep and subsequently stealing donations which had been collected to provide bail for imprisoned students, he was kicked out by its leaders.³³⁴ Then, in exchange for 100,000 lire, he accused his erstwhile comrades of "hooliganism" and not caring about workers in an interview published by the rightist daily, La Luna. This brought him into the orbit of various radical right groups, according to both his own testimony and that of others. He claimed, for example, that he was approached at Stazione Termini by a policeman named "King", apparently a Celere officer named Murino, shortly after the interview appeared. "King" complimented him on recognizing the true nature of the communists, suggested that he join Giovane Italia, brought him to the Via Firenze headquarters of the organization that same evening, and introduced him to its president, Franco De Marco. There he was treated very well, so much so that he stayed on, took part in operational planning, and
was later entrusted with the task of recruiting jobless youth for violent actions, in exchange for which he was allegedly provided with considerable sums of money.

During this period Loi is said to have appeared in the front ranks at a number of neo-fascist demonstrations, and claims to have met Caradonna, Massimo Anderson, and—at a meeting of former combattants held at the Cinema Teatro—Santino Viaggio. Afterwards Viaggio brought him to FN headquarters and had him recount his political experiences to those present. On another occasion, Viaggio and Bianchini spoke of carrying out an attack on Parliament with sleeping gas, but later indicated that the plan was opposed by various MSI leaders. Still later, Viaggio supposedly paid Loi 50,000 lire to recruit people to cause trouble on the day of the "general strike", and subsequently confided to him that he had quarrelled violently with Almirante that same evening at MSI headquarters. Finally, Loi claimed to have observed Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese visitors at the seat of the MSI on several occasions, and to have encountered various police and Carabinieri officials at either MSI or FN headquarters.\(^\text{135}\)

It appears, however, that the general skepticism about Loi’s startling assertions was largely justified. Even if one overlooks his unbalanced personality and bizarre antics, some of Loi’s claims were explicitly challenged in the course of a later judicial inquiry into the Piazza Fontana massacre. Thus Improta and his superior both testified that when Loi first visited the Ufficio Politico he said nothing at all about the FN, but rather offered to uncover deposits of arms and explosives hidden by the Unione dei Comunisti Italiani Marxisti-Leninisti; it was only after 12 December that he fingered the two FN leaders. Although Loi reaffirmed the veracity of his previous revelations about the
proposals of Bianchini and Viaggio, he admitted that at police headquarters he had originally attributed actions which were then being prepared by the right to "left-wing extremists". Be that as it may, Loi also participated in another effort to implicate the FN, a scheme which further contributed to Judge Vittorio Occorsio's belief that his testimony was unreliable. At the end of August 1970, Loi brought two friends—Giulio Cossu and Pierino Rotilio—with him to the Trotskyist Savelli publishing house, one of the publishers of La strage di stato. There, prompted by Loi, Cossu and Rotilio told the journalist Marco Ligini that they had been hired as "mercenaries" by the FN and driven to Piazza Venezia on 12 December 1969, after which they disembarked and supposedly placed bombs at the Altare della Patria. No evidence was ever unearthed to substantiate their involvement in these bombings, and the falsity and manifestly ridiculous nature of some of their testimony to Ligini buttresses Occorsio's conclusion that the whole incident was a "stunt orchestrated by Evelino Loi..."136

This seems very probable, but the incident nonetheless raises the question of what Loi's motives were for trying to implicate the FN. The Extraparliamentary Left Research Group suggested three possible explanations for Loi's peculiar behavior. First, he may have been a compulsive liar or an irresponsible lunatic, in which case none of his claims should be taken seriously. Second, he may have been a police informant who was being used instrumentally to make certain declarations that cast suspicion on people who were innocent. Third, he may have been a provocateur paid by someone to make false revelations that would thence be exploited to discredit the media sources which printed them.137 To these hypotheses I would add a fourth—that Loi, in the hopes of obtaining
financial recompense, sought to concoct "revelations" that he believed partisan political publications would be interested in printing. All of these hypothesized motives are believable, though the second makes little sense here unless elements within Italian intelligence were trying to divert attention from the real perpetrators or "burn" unsavory fascist extremists. The most intriguing possibility is perhaps the third. It is standard procedure for secret services and other clandestine groups to utilize persons, wittingly or not, to act as conduits for various types of disinformation. In this instance it has been suggested that Loi had been hired to prompt certain leftist publications to print false and slanderous information, for which they could later be sued and perhaps discredited in the eyes of the public. Although there is no actual evidence of this, on another proximate occasion startling "revelations" were made by an ex-legionnaire about the supposed training of fascist squads in Corsica by the French Légion Étrangère, and shortly thereafter L'Espresso, the publication that printed them, was sued (though later acquitted of wrongdoing in court). In lieu of any corroborating evidence, it is best to treat Loi's claims with great skepticism.

Nevertheless, even if the FN was innocent of any involvement in the death of Calzolari or the recruitment of Loi for terrorist actions, members of the organization clearly participated in a series of violent incidents in Reggio Calabria. It has been well-documented that right-wing extremists played a key role in exploiting, if not actually fomenting, the series of popular local protests against the government's decision to shift the capital of Calabria from Reggio to Catanzaro. Neo-fascist publications boast about the actions of their comrades in guiding the uprising, and freely acknowledge that
militants linked to AN and the Fronte formed the nucleus of the Comitato d’Azione per Reggio Capoluogo. The most important of these Reggian activists were undoubtedly Felice Genoese Zerbi and Francesco ("Ciccio") Franco, both of whom had broken with the MSI’s initial official line, which they viewed as too compromised and supportive of the partitocrazia, and gravitated toward the hardline anti-government positions adopted by Delle Chiaie and Borghese. Sometime in 1969 local AN leader Genoese Zerbi seems to have become the FN’s delegate in Reggio, and three years later he and Franco purged the moderates on the Comitato d’Azione in the hopes of turning it into a revolutionary instrument.139

But the specific role played by Borghese and the directorate of the FN in the uprising is not so easy to determine. The Black Prince did make two trips to Reggio, once on 25 October 1969, prior to the outbreak of the revolt, and once on 8 August 1970, after it had already broken out. On both occasions the government refused to let him hold a rally, which precipitated violent confrontations between his supporters, led by Genoese Zerbi, and the forces of order.140 The issue is whether Borghese intended beforehand to precipitate an insurrectionary action, or whether his presence simply exacerbated an already tense situation. Some right-wing sources dismiss the idea that he and other neo-fascists had developed a precise insurrectional strategy for Reggio, and Borghese himself sought to legitimize his organization’s activities there by claiming that the FN sought to prevent violence and transform the revolt from one focussed exclusively on local issues into one representing a protest against the ruling political system. Although this latter point was in fact reflected in FN propaganda leaflets distributed in
Reggio, his assertions about trying to prevent violence cannot be taken at face value.\textsuperscript{141}

Indeed, they are belied by various acts of violence and terrorism carried out in Reggio during this period by ultras affiliated with the Fronte. At 11 PM on 7 December 1969—one year to the day prior to Borghese’s abortive 1970 coup—one someone tossed a powerful bomb at a window of the Reggio Questura from a speeding automobile, causing a great deal of damage and seriously wounding a police corporal.\textsuperscript{142} Although the police at first oriented their investigation mainly toward the Mafia and elements of the extraparliamentary left, within a few days police commissioner Emilio Santillo’s investigation laid bare the outlines of a rightist attack. On 17 December four neo-fascists were arrested: Aldo Pardo and Giuseppe Schirinzi for being the material perpetrators, Giovandomenico Zoccoli and Demetrio Modafferi for aiding and abetting the crime. Pardo and Schirinzi were notorious for their right-wing extremism and criminal behavior. Both had taken part in the April 1968 "tour" to Greece organized by the Ethnikos Syndesmos Ellinon Spudaston Italias (EESI: League of Nationalist Greek Students in Italy), the far right Greek student organization in Italy which was used as a front by the KYP, and both were active at various times in the MSI’s youth organizations, Ordine Nuovo, and Avanguardia Nazionale before joining Borghese’s FN.

During the investigation that followed, several witnesses provided significant details about the background of the crime. First, Ugo Serrano indicated that Pardo had been seen in the company of Genoese Zerbi in Piazza Italia on the night of the Questura bombing, and said certain people had told him that a series of bomb attacks initiated during a 30 November rally organized by Almirante had also been carried out by the
usual gang"—Schirinzi, Genoese Zerbi, Benito Sembianza, and Carmelo Dominici. Next, Paolo Marcianò claimed that Pardo confided to him that these actions were designed to create chaos and make the public think that left-wing extremists had carried them out. Schirinzi himself then revealed that in every Italian city, including Reggio, there existed a right-wing political organization headed by Borghese that was plotting the seizure of power by revolutionary means, and that in Reggio this organization was led by Genoese Zerbi and counted Sembianza, Dominici, Pardo, Francesco Ligato, Giuseppe Barletta, and a certain Paratore among its members. In spite of all this damaging testimony, Genoese Zerbi denied knowing about any of the bombings, and claimed that the FN intended to take power without relying upon dynamite attacks and terrorist methods. In their report the police concluded that there was insufficient evidence to indict Genoese Zerbi and most of the others for planning and carrying out the attacks, though they felt certain that they were behind them. Only Pardo and Schirinzi were brought to trial, two years later at Lecce. Although they were originally sentenced to four years in prison, in January 1975 this sentence was overturned and suspended by the Reggio appeals court.

Despite this judicial leniency, which was typical of the sort regularly meted out to right-wing ultras, extremists associated with the FN were involved in several acts of squadrist violence against the left. On 28 January 1970, for example, a group of Borghese "sympathizers" from AN and Fronte Delta, led respectively by Adriano Tilgher and Marco Pirina, launched an attack against leftist students at the University of Rome. Such sorties were standard features of neo-fascist political action, and thus require no further comment. However, other actions committed by various FN members
suggest that Borghese and the Fronte were also active participants in the terrorist "strategy of tension" then being waged in Italy by elements of the radical right. It has already been noted that several bomb attacks were carried out by FN members in Reggio, some of whom had earlier gone to Greece for instruction in how to conduct provocations, and that these actions were explicitly designed, according to the testimony of Marcianò, to make it appear that the left was responsible. It also seems likely that a number of unsolved terror bombings dating from this period, like the one that derailed the "Freccia del Sud" express train at Gioia Tauro on 22 July 1970, killing six people and wounding fifty-six others, were committed by neo-fascists who were linked in some way to the FN. As has been documented over and over above, this type of terrorist action, for which no person or group ever claimed responsibility, lay at the very root of the "strategy of tension". Indeed, in his November 1975 sentence Judge Fiore concluded that Borghese's overall strategy was to kindle hotbeds of disorder and provoke clamorous episodes of violence in order to reveal the impotence of the existing political system and precipitate an intervention of those forces still able to save the country from further degeneration and communist subversion, above all the military. The failure of the forces of order to intervene directly in response to this wave of terrorist provocations ultimately convinced Borghese that only a coup sparked by his own organization would compel them to get off the fence and take action. After a series of postponements, continued displays of supposed government pusillanimity in the face of leftist agitation prompted him to select a new "zero hour" on the anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Hence the codename "Tora Tora".
The "Tora Tora" Operation

According to Investigating Magistrate Fiore, the Fronte's operational plan was arranged in the most minute particulars, and the actions of the various participating groups were meticulously timed. The initial objective of the conspirators was to gain control of the Interior and Defense Ministries, with the inside help of FN supporters in the police and military. The seizure of these primary security headquarters would then make it possible for Borghese's supporters to issue orders via official channels to military and police units throughout the country. The Foreign Ministry may also have been targeted in this way, though it seems to have been a less immediate objective. At around the same time, various communications centers and the main broadcasting station of RAI-TV were to be seized, which would enable Borghese to read the following proclamation to the Italian people:

"Italians! The hoped-for political shift, the long-awaited coup d'etat has taken place. The political formula that has reigned for twenty-five years, and has carried Italy to the brink of economic and moral collapse, has ceased to exist. In the next few hours, in successive bulletins, the most immediate and opportune steps to deal with the current disequilibrium of the nation will be indicated. The armed forces, the forces of order, the men most able and representative of the nation are with us; on the other hand, we can assure you that the most dangerous adversaries, those...who want to subjugate the country to a foreigner [i.e., the communists], have been rendered powerless. Italians! The state that we will create together will be an Italy without distinctions (aggettivi) or political coloration. It will have only one flag, our glorious tricolor. Soldiers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, forces of order, to you we will entrust the defence of the homeland and the reestablishment of internal order. We will not promulgate special laws or institute special tribunals. We ask only that the existing laws be respected. From this moment on, no one will be able to laugh at you, offend you, wound your body or spirit, or kill you with impunity. In placing the glorious tricolor in your hands again, we invite you to raise your voices in our overwhelming (prorompente) chorus of love: Italy! Italy! Viva Italy!"
After these attempts to seize crucial strategic points had made some headway, diversionary acts of violence were to be carried out elsewhere in Rome with the aim of provoking a spontaneous, large-scale intervention of the still uncommitted forces of order. In addition to these primary tasks, other groups of plotters were assigned to impede the progress of military units loyal to the existing government by blowing up roads, get rid of Police Chief Angelo Vicari, kidnap or otherwise neutralize President Giuseppe Saragat, and carry out a number of important minor actions.146

Once these main objectives were secured, the civilian plotters planned to turn authority and control over to sympathetic hardliners within the armed forces and assume an auxiliary role by helping the Carabinieri and Celere police units quell resistance and arrest left-wing union and political leaders. The names of those to be arrested, as in the case of the counterinsurrectionary "Plan Solo" formulated by General De Lorenzo in 1964, had been drawn up well in advance by the conspirators, which must have required a good deal of prior intelligence gathering. The projected arrestees—who apparently numbered in the hundreds—would initially be transported to Civitavecchia in vehicles provided by police agencies and Pier Francesco Talenti's bus company. They would then be transferred to islands off the coast of Italy by ships placed at the FN's disposal by some of Orlandini's shipowner friends.147

The missions outlined above were allocated as follows. According to a report prepared for SID man Labruna by a rightist journalist close to some of the leading conspirators, members of AN had originally been assigned two tasks. Some were to blow up certain roads to prevent armored forces loyal to the current government from moving
on Rome from the Nettuno-Anzio area. The bulk were to occupy the Foreign Ministry and, with the help of Carabinieri plotters and technical specialists, take control of the radio transmitters inside. However, this plan engendered disapproval and suspicion among Delle Chiaie’s men, since it excluded them from the main Interior and Defense Ministry operations and exposed them to a possible trap. With Drago’s support, Delle Chiaie then appealed to the FN’s leaders to allow his followers to undertake a more important role in the operation and to provide some guarantees for their future security. In response, Borghese put him in charge of seizing control of the armory within the Interior Ministry, a task whose success depended upon the active participation of certain police officials assigned to guard the Viminale. Another AN commando group was entrusted with the kidnapping of Chief Vicari, which provides further evidence of just how much faith the Black Prince put in Delle Chiaie’s group. In the end, the job of taking control of the main RAI-TV transmission center near the Foreign Ministry (and perhaps, somewhat later, the Foreign Ministry itself) was assigned to the Inspector General of the Guardie Forestali training center in Cittaducale, Major Luciano Berti, unbeknownst to the men under his command. It is not entirely clear just how the plotters intended to take control of the Defense Ministry, but Air Force General Giuseppe Casero and Air Force Colonel Giuseppe Lo Vecchio apparently assured Orlandini that Air Force Chief of Staff Fanali would play a key role in this particular operation. Meanwhile, a sizable group of conspirators under the direction of ex-paratrooper Saccucci were to gather at the ANPDI gym on Via Eleniana, where they were to await the arrival of instructions and perhaps also a truckload of weapons. Along with the members of
extreme right youth groups like Europa Civiltà and Fronte Delta, Saccucci's men were apparently supposed to create disorders and provocations in various parts of Rome in an effort to distract and precipitate an intervention of the forces of order. It was then up to the military conspirators to do their part, for without the full support of FN sympathizers within the armed forces and police the operation had no chance of ultimately succeeding.

After making their way to Rome from all over Italy, several hundred conspirators converged at various prearranged locations in the hours leading up to the scheduled launching time. By the afternoon of 7 December, FN headquarters had become the site of frenetic organizational activity. A group of leading Fronte members had gathered there to discuss last-minute arrangements, including how to maintain contact between the different groups taking part in the action. Among the discussants were Giovanni De Rosa, Gino Arista, and Francesco Lombardi, as well as three MSI members who had sought to confirm rumors of an impending FN action and been incautiously admitted to the meeting on the strength of their party affiliation. These three--Central Committee member Gaetano La Morte, Alberto Pompei, and Adalberto Monti--later testified that they heard some disturbing things there as the night wore on, including talk that the FN's hour had arrived, that power was about to fall into their hands, and that the only thing they were still awaiting was the issuance of orders. On the evening of the same day, a "political headquarters" ("command post A") was established at Mario Rosa's Via Sant'Angela Merici office, from which the strategic planners of the operation, including Rosa himself, the Black Prince, General Casero, Colonel Lo Vecchio, and Carabinieri Major Salvatore Pecorella, kept in contact with the various action groups. Finally, an
"operational command" ("command post B") was set up at Orlandini's shipyard in Montesacro, where several of the most diehard conspirators had assembled to direct the successive phases of the operation. The most important of these were Orlandini, the ON-linked nuclear engineer Eliodoro Pomar, Dante Ciabatti, and Drago. An AN contingent from Rieti consisting of Adriano Monti, Gennaro Ciolfi, and Angelo Cagnoni stopped by for a time on its way to the Viminale. Still later in the evening, Orlandini and his henchmen were joined by other forces. Among the most important was the group from Genoa, which included Frattini, Frattini's right-hand man Pietro Benvenuto, and SID informant Torquato Nicoli, who was dressed in a Carabinieri Major's uniform and headed a troop of men who were likewise dressed as Carabinieri. Various materials crucial to the success of the coup had also been concentrated at the shipyard, including "Fronte Nazionale" armbands and auto decals, carbines and rifles obtained a few days earlier in Milan by a group of Ligurian youths at the behest of Frattini, and tour buses from Talenti's fleet of vehicles which were to transport the assembled men into the city at the opportune moment.150

These command centers were not the only concentration points for the plotters. Between fifty and one hundred local members of AN converged on the organization's Via dell’Arco della Ciambella headquarters at 6 PM on 7 December, ostensibly in order to ward off an expected communist attack. When they arrived, they were told the real reasons why they had been summoned and ordered to prepare for action. Another fifty non-Roman avanguardisti gathered at various apartments in different parts of the capital to await further instructions, and still others remained outside Rome but ready to
intervene if necessary. Later that same night, a handful of youths affiliated with the extreme right university group Fronte Delta were mobilized by their leader Marco Pirina, who was also the president of FUAN. Earlier that day Pirina had received a phone call from Mario Rosa, with whom he had been in contact since the Spring of 1970, asking him to come to his Via Sant’Angelo Merici office. There he met Rosa’s son Dalmazio, and together they went to meet Mario at a bar in Montesacro, where Pirina was told that disorders would soon break out in the city and that it would be necessary for rightist organizations to defend their headquarters. So it was that Pirina, Vincenzo D’Ambrosio, Giuseppe Garibaldi, and Guido Fiorani assembled in the evening outside the apartment of Antonio Reitano and Francesco Calcaterra near University City, awaiting further news. Considerably more activity occurred at the Largo Brindisi headquarters of Europa Civiltà, where a number of that organization’s supporters anxiously gathered to await developments, including Alberto Ribacchi, Alessandro Rossi, SID informant Stefano Serpieri (who had previously given information to the authorities in connection with the Piazza Fontana bombing), and Civiltà Cristiana leader Franco Antico, yet another SID informant. Once these various operational components were in place, a green light was given to the plan.

Of all the initial actions planned by Borghese and his associates, perhaps none was more important than taking control of the armory inside the Viminale. For one thing, doing so would provide the conspirators with considerable quantities of arms and ammunition. For another, it was a necessary first step in seizing control of the Interior Ministry’s communications center, which would in turn help them convince many
policemen to follow their orders and hinder the ability of loyalist elements to put up resistance. With the supposed authorization of General Domenico Barbieri, former head of the Pubblica Sicurezza training school at Castro Pretorio, Celere Captain Enzo Capanna, then Chief Adjutant of the head of the Ministry’s Reparto Autonomo Guardie, discreetly admitted at least two separate AN commando groups into the Viminale during the afternoon and evening of 7 December. Among the extremists Capanna let inside were Delle Chiaie himself, Adriano Monti, Alberto Mariantoni, Giulio Crescenzi, the so-called Quadraro group (Salvatore Ghiacci, Carmine Palladino, and Roberto Pallotto), and Flavio Campo. Once inside the armory, the plotters set about readying the nearly two hundred machine guns they found there, including six Beretta machine pistols, for transport. An important FN insider (and MSI provincial leader), Gaetano Lunetta, subsequently claimed that this group managed to secure complete control of the Viminale, including its extensive communications equipment, for two hours. Be that as it may, the bulk of the automatic weapons in the armory were loaded onto a truck, which was driven out of the Interior Ministry building just after midnight so that its lethal cargo could be delivered, among other places, to Orlandini’s shipyard.154

The complicity of Capanna and other members of the security forces was later highlighted by several sources privy to inside information. According to the summary prepared by Guido Paglia, a former AN leader and a journalist with close links to Aginter Presse and SID, the avanguardisti were actively assisted by Capanna and three other policemen. These latter indicated that they supported the operation even though they were not fascists, but insisted that the AN members follow their orders without
hesitation. The nature of their assistance was later described in greater detail by Orlandini during his 17 June 1974 meeting with Labruna and Romagnoli in Lugano: Capanna’s job was not only to admit and arm members of AN, but also to arrange for the subsequent defense of the Interior Ministry. To facilitate these tasks, he had earlier used a microbus to transport members of the police unit assigned to guard the Viminale over to the barracks on Via Panisperna, where they remained throughout the duration of the operation. Orlandini also claimed that the plotters had a police battalion at their disposal in Rome, which was ready to intervene at any moment, and that at some point Capanna was to occupy, presumably with the help of this battalion, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate buildings.155

The original revelations about AN’s occupation of the Viminale were met with widespread skepticism and blanket denials by the authorities, and a ridiculously inadequate in-house Interior Ministry "investigation" concluded that there was no evidence to substantiate them.156 But such reassuring responses proved to be premature. A Beretta machine pistol had in fact been stolen by one of the AN members who had penetrated the armory, probably Ghiacci or Pallotto, a potentially incriminating deed which later compelled Drago and Orlandini to arrange to have a replacement put in the missing weapon’s place. Subsequent investigations revealed that one of these six weapons (serial #Q/2041) was not the original, but rather a composite made up of parts from different machine pistols. This discovery not only confirmed that a group of conspirators had entered the Viminale on 7 December, but also that they had relied upon inside help, both to penetrate the building on that occasion and, later, to replace the weapon stolen...
from the armory. There can thus be no doubt that certain members of the Italian security forces were active participants in facilitating and then covering up a key aspect of Borghese’s coup.

Another AN commando group, led by Mario Bottari and comprising Sergio Cardellini, Remo Sturlese, and Pietro Carmassi, was given the delicate task of kidnapping Police Chief Vicari. According to Orlandini, Vicari was the “only man who could disturb” the plotters, and it was felt that putting him out of action might help prevent the forces of order from intervening against them at the first sign of a coup. But this mission met with total failure, both because Bottari and his men were unexpectedly trapped for hours between floors in a defective elevator in Vicari’s building and because Vicari happened to be visiting Palermo on the night of the coup. The latter circumstance subsequently prompted Giacomo Micalizio to lament that, had the plotters known, it would have been easy to arrange to have the Mafia eliminate Vicari. Other FN leaders seem to have toyed with this idea beforehand, since various Mafia pentiti later testified that Borghese’s men had tried to recruit them for this and other purposes.

Another key objective was the main RAI-TV transmitter, located in the state-owned company’s headquarters building on Via Teulada, not far from Piazzale Clodio. In the late evening of 7 December, Major Berti led a motorized contingent of 197 Guardie Forestali south from their school at Cittaducale, ostensibly on a training exercise to the Alban Hills. But there were several anomalous aspects of this exercise, anomalies which were not lost on the perplexed participants. First of all, another exercise in the Alban Hills had been conducted only three days earlier. Secondly, Berti’s men were very
heavily equipped with arms and ammunition—including pistols, rifles, fifty-three M.A.B. machine guns, a flame-thrower, and 7700 rounds of ammunition—a conspicuous array of armaments far beyond what could conceivably be of use on a normal Guardie training exercise. Finally, a fully-equipped ambulance accompanied the thirteen-vehicle column, which was hardly warranted given the type of injuries one might expect to incur on such an exercise. The confusion of Berti’s men was only increased when they reached Raccordo Annulare, where the vehicles, battered by heavy rain, veered toward Rome along Via Olimpia rather than toward the Alban Hills. When the column reached the Ponte Milvio bridge over the Tiber, Berti brought it to a halt while he stopped to talk to two men in a car parked along the side of the roadway. The march was then resumed until the large plaza adjacent to the Foreign Ministry was reached. After remaining there a few minutes and without offering any explanation, Berti wheeled the column around and led his forces back to Cittaducale, which they reached a little after 3 AM. Before dismissing his men for the evening, he complimented them on their efficiency and claimed that it had been noted by two functionaries of the Forestry and Agriculture Ministry, thus implying that the two men he had spoken to had been sent by the Ministry to assess their skills.159

Berti’s later explanations of the purposes of this exercise were not at all credible. The Forestry and Agriculture Ministry denied that any such evaluation or encounter had taken place, and added that his "exercise" had been carried out without official authorization. The Ministry also disputed his claim that he was authorized to view classified documents. Moreover, in the Fall of 1970 Berti had placed an order for a very
large number of handcuffs, likewise without the authorization of his regular administrative superiors. Since there was no logical reason to order such items for the Guardie, it seems clear that they were to be used to secure the leftist political and union officials scheduled to be arrested after the FN and its allies had seized control of Rome, a view that is strengthened by Saccucci’s parallel efforts to obtain handcuffs. Follow-up investigations seemed to indicate that Berti had taken all these actions on his own initiative, and had only made efforts to obtain authorization for them after the coup was aborted. Although Judge Fiore acknowledged that there was no material proof that Berti’s movements on the night of 7-8 December were linked to Borghese’s coup, several bits of circumstantial evidence suggested just that. Among other things, the supposed Alban Hills exercise was carried out in absolute secrecy and inexplicably ended up in the center of Rome, the route taken led directly from Salaria to Via Teulada, the participating Guardie were heavily armed without any justification, the column stopped several hundred meters away from the RAI-TV center, and Berti changed his original story, claiming that the two men he had spoken to were nothing more than indiscreet gay lovers. Furthermore, it emerged that Berti was a good friend of ANPDI vice president Umberto Poltronieri (who was in turn very close to Saccucci), and that he maintained links with some of the leading FN conspirators, including Borghese, Ciolfi, and Adriano Monti. Finally, Orlandini told several associates that over 200 Guardie Forestali had been ready to intervene near RAI-TV on the night of the coup.  

Saccucci was one of the most dedicated FN conspirators, and as such assumed a good deal of responsibility for certain phases of the operation. On 10 March 1971,
following the issuance of a search warrant by the judicial authorities, the Polizia Giudiziaria found an appointment book in Saccucci's home. This book contained numerous annotations, many of which shed light on his role as an organizer of the gathering at the ANPDI gym on the night of 7 December 1970. For example, the entry for 28 June refers to the delivery of a radio and 300,000 lire worth of handcuffs, the entry for 30 June indicates the concentration points and objectives of various groups of men under his direction, presumably for the projected coup, and the 7 March entry alludes to the Guardie Forestali for no appreciable reason. Most damning of all were his notations in the entry for 6-7 December, which listed the names of trusted associates who were to attend the meeting scheduled for the following evening at the ANPDI gym, including those he designated as "group leaders", along with the number of "certain" and "probable" persons each was to bring and the times and locations where they were supposed to meet before heading to the gym. Although the meeting there was billed as a "cultural event", at which the film "Berlin, Drama of a People" was to be shown, the mention of the number of "arms" and "autos" that different participants were to bring suggested that he planned to assemble them for purposes other than simple entertainment.  

Indeed, the ANPDI gym on Via Eleniana was the site of intense activity on the evening of 7 December. The movie was scheduled to be shown at 8 PM, and was supposed to be followed by a discussion. A large crowd eventually gathered, but according to a number of witnesses many of the attendees were neither members of ANPDI nor regular visitors to the gym. Among those present were its sponsor Saccucci
and several of his chosen "group leaders", including Corrado Biazzo, Massimo Bozzini, Alessandro De Angelis, and Vito Pace, as well as members of other extremist groups like Bruno Stefano (Movimento Integralista) and Fabio Di Martino (AN). A phalanx of young ultras was stationed at the doorway to monitor the admittance of guests, and once inside these latter were prevented from leaving. Testimony differs about whether the announced film was actually shown, but as time wore on the topic of conversation increasingly turned to the projected action. Various attendees overheard remarks like "the operation is in progress" and "the moment has arrived", and Saccucci and others spoke openly of a "demonstration action" or a coup. This is hardly surprising, since the chief function assigned to the group leaders and their men was probably to foment disorders at various points, though perhaps some were earmarked for other operational tasks. Inside the gym the general levels of anticipation and agitation steadily rose, reaching a crescendo as midnight approached. At that point Saccucci and Stefano departed for Orlandini’s shipyard, saying that they would return soon with precise operational orders. By then, the expected truckload of weapons should have arrived. But neither the truck nor Saccucci appeared at the gym at the allotted time, and as the minutes ticked by the crowd became more and more exasperated as its members argued about what to do.162

By midnight, then, the situation was as follows. A truck had just been driven out of the garage at the Viminale by members of AN, bearing automatic weapons for other groups of plotters. Aside from Orlandini’s shipyard it is not clear exactly where all these weapons were to be delivered, but it is fair to assume that some of them were destined for the ANPDI gym or various locations where Delle Chiaie’s followers were
concentrated, including AN headquarters. Other avanguardisti, together with their police accomplices, remained inside the Interior Ministry and perhaps took control of its communications center. Still another AN commando group was by then trapped inside the elevator in Vicari's building. The Guardie Forestali column led by Berti was closing in on the center of Rome, on its way to RAI-TV headquarters. A sizable contingent of armed men at Orlandini's shipyard waited to move into action, while several right-wing ultras awaited further instructions in Largo Brindisi and University City. Groups of ex-paratroopers and their youthful supporters anxiously anticipated the arrival of more weapons and orders at the gym on Via Eleniana. Some of these civilian plotters, perhaps from the gym or the shipyard, probably intended to rendezvous with military conspirators near the Defense Ministry, since—as will be explained later—certain Army, Carabinieri, and police units seem to have been mobilized and/or deployed in Rome and various other cities. In short, after months of careful planning and preparation, not to mention delays, the operation was now about to enter its decisive phase.

It was precisely at this critical juncture that everything was abruptly and unexpectedly called off. Not long after midnight, Borghese apparently received a phone call at "command post A". After a brief exchange, he turned to his assembled confidants and announced that external support would not be forthcoming. Someone then telephoned Orlandini at "command post B", urging him to come to Rosa's office at once. Orlandini and Ciabatti immediately rushed to the scene, where they encountered General Casero leaving at the front gate. Casero invited them in but, to their consternation, refused to provide them with any information. Once inside, Borghese told the newcomers that
everyone had to be recalled, news which Orlandini later said was so psychologically
devastating that it would have prompted him to commit suicide had he brought along a
gun. The Black Prince indicated that it was necessary to withdraw because a group of
officers inside the Defense Ministry who were to open the doors for one of the key
military plotters—General Duilio Fanali—was not in place, information that was later said
to be false. According to Orlandini, Casero had been entrusted with the task of bringing
Fanali to Palazzo Baracchini, from where the latter had volunteered to issue orders to the
entire military apparatus. The conspiratorial shipbuilder further claimed that he had
stationed Dalmazio Rosa and Colonel Lo Vecchio at "command post A" precisely in
order to prevent any attempt to call off the operation, but that these two were unable to
decide what to do since Borghese and the others present insisted that the action would
only be postponed for a few days, not cancelled entirely. In any event, the issuance of
the counterorder compelled Orlandini and others to make frantic efforts to recall the
groups of plotters who had already deployed for action, including Berti's men, the AN
contingent inside the Viminale, and perhaps various Carabinieri units, as well as notify
those elements who were still awaiting orders of the need to withdraw. This proved to
be a rather difficult task, both logistically and psychologically.\

Although it is not at all clear how the military and police units that allegedly
participated in the operation were recalled, since their supposed involvement was
systematically minimized in the successive judicial investigations, more is known about
the recall of the FN-linked action groups. It appears that Francesco Lombardi and
Saccucci were dispatched to halt Berti's column, and that they were the two mystery men
with whom Berti talked shortly before returning with his men to Cittaducale. Before embarking on this mission, Saccucci apparently instructed Bruno Stefano to return to the ANPDI gym, tell the people who had gathered there that the operation had been cancelled, and send them home. Shortly after 2 AM, Stefano arrived and informed the assembled crowd about the counterorder issued by Borghese, which produced enormous consternation and precipitated verbal protests, exchanges of insults, and bitter recriminations. The situation became so chaotic that Stefano told his friend Tizzoni that they should get out of there before everyone was arrested, something which might well have happened had not Captain Pecorella arrived and, after removing his pistol from its holster and brandishing it in a threatening manner, ordered everyone inside to go home. From a logistical standpoint, the most difficult task was intercepting the truck which had left the Viminale laden with arms. Somehow this was accomplished, after which Capanna and the avanguardisti spent some time unloading the weapons and replacing them in the Interior Ministry’s armory. Everyone who had concentrated at Orlandini’s shipyard, AN headquarters, and the seat of Europa Civiltà was ordered to go home; the members of Fronte Delta got tired of waiting for something to happen, and dispersed on their own initiative. By the time dawn arrived, everything had apparently returned to normal. The operation had ended as quickly as it had been launched, and the only material evidence that it had taken place was a missing Beretta that would not be discovered for several years.

However, the frustrations and mutual recriminations of the conspirators did not end with the termination of the operation. In its aftermath a great deal of bitter reflection
and angry discussion took place, on all levels, and many of the key participants blamed each other for the halting of the coup. Orlandini held Borghese personally responsible, Saccucci harshly criticized the Black Prince, Orlandini, and Rosa, and elements of AN accused several participants of purposely sabotaging the operation. Borghese remained reticent about this particular matter, and when asked he limited himself to saying that he had "obeyed superior orders". This explanation raised more questions than it answered, and certainly did not satisfy the curiosity or lessen the disappointment of the ultras. When the FN organized a secret high-level meeting at its headquarters in Rome on 17 January 1971 in order to assess the situation, a number of serious disagreements arose. Some of the less extreme "A group" members who had not been informed of the action beforehand protested, either because they had been left out of the deliberations or because they opposed paramilitary adventurism, whereas ultras such as Orlandini, Frattini, Pomar, Micalizio, Rosa, Lo Vecchio, and De Rosa expressed anger that the action had been aborted. The latter group openly and heavily criticized Borghese, and demanded to know what had gone wrong. His half-hearted efforts to justify issuing the counterorder failed to satisfy his interlocuters, and in the end he stormed out of the meeting, leaving everyone unhappy except his most loyal followers. Although Genoese lawyer Giancarlo De Marchi offered to procure large-scale financial support for serious future actions in which the intervention of high-ranking military personnel (or "eagles") could be counted on, the internal divisions that surfaced during this meeting threatened to destroy the cohesion of the entire organization.

A second FN meeting was then held in February at the Montesacro home of the
De Felice brothers, but again the December actions of the Black Prince, who was not present this time, came under heavy attack, and the existing factional disputes could not be resolved. This state of organizational turmoil persisted until the sudden arrest of Orlandini and other key plotters between 17 and 19 March, after which Borghese fled to Spain and in the process loosened his hold over the political movement he had created. Following a short-lived period of panic and confusion, the stage was set for a major restructuring of the Fronte, a resumption of its anti-democratic plotting, and an intensification of its collaboration with other subversive forces willing to employ violence to achieve their objectives. The extent of this activity would not fully emerge until a series of "presidentialist" coup plots involving FN ultras was uncovered by investigating magistrates in the course of 1973 and 1974.

Unfortunately, the very question that proved to be so divisive for disgruntled participants in the "Tora Tora" operation— who was really responsible for interrupting and terminating the action?— has yet to be satisfactorily answered. Nor can it be until the ultimate sponsors and real purposes of the operation have been identified with greater precision. Although these matters are no less difficult to assess, enough circumstantial evidence and first-hand testimony has been accumulated to enable the attentive researcher to hazard some educated guesses.

The Exposure and Investigation of the Coup

Despite the fact that the coup was successfully aborted at the last minute, rumors that some sort of rightist action had taken place on the night of 7-8 December immediately began to circulate. Most of these were undoubtedly generated by careless
tongue-waggers among the conspirators and within neo-fascist circles, but more than a few may have been disseminated by factions within the security services seeking to embarrass rival factions that were deeply compromised in the operation. These rumors and leaks, which quickly took on a life of their own, prompted the police to initiate an investigation of Borghese's organization. On 15 February 1971, the Ufficio Politico of the Rome Questura obtained permission from the Public Prosecutor's office to tap the phones of Orlandini, Rosa, Saccucci, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, inasmuch as they were FN members suspected of committing terrorist acts. It soon became evident that key members of the Fronte were planning new illegal activities, and that a number of them possessed weapons and explosives. On 8 March, the police were issued warrants authorizing them to search the homes and offices of Borghese, Rosa, Orlandini, Saccucci, Massimo Bozzini, and Flavio Campo. In the course of these searches, material evidence was discovered which provided significant details about the "Tora Tora" operation, including Saccucci's address book and copies of both a foreign policy position paper and the proclamation that the Black Prince intended to read over the radio after the main FN objectives had been seized. These revealed, according to Judge Fiore, that the plotters had developed a subversive plan "to attack the democratic institutions of the state." On 18 March the Ufficio Politico prepared a report outlining the structure and goals of the FN, with particular reference to "movements" that had apparently taken place in Rome on the night of 7-8 December 1970. Arrest warrants were then issued for Borghese, Orlandini, Rosa, Saccucci, De Rosa, and Lo Vecchio, but the Black Prince took refuge in Spain before he could be taken into custody.169
The arrest of several key figures in the FN and the initial revelations about the subversive actions they carried out on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor fell like a bombshell on the contentious Italian political scene. Every political group at once sought to exploit this information for its own partisan purposes. Groups on the left, which had grown increasingly concerned about the possibility of a right-wing military coup, portrayed Borghese’s actions as evidence that their fears had been justified. This interpretation was contemptuously dismissed by both government spokesmen and rightist journalists, who characterized the Black Prince and his men as incompetent buffoons who hastened to abandon their comic opera as soon as it began to rain. Although several plotters provided the police with details about the operation and documents were found that supported important aspects of their testimony, the interests of the political establishment were apparently best served by minimizing the significance of the whole affair. So it was that on 25 February 1972 the Court of Cassation overturned the Rome Court of Appeals’ decision not to free the defendants, who were duly released, ostensibly because there was not enough evidence to prove their guilt. This situation persisted until 15 September 1974, when Andreotti sent an SID report on the Borghese coup and later FN plots to the Rome public prosecutor, thereby opening the way for a new judicial investigation of the events of 7-8 December. The main results of that investigation, which were described in Vitalone’s Requisitoria and especially in Judge Fiore’s sentence, have already been summarized.

Yet this was by no means the end of the story. In his 1975 sentence, Fiore had indicted many of the conspirators for serious crimes and clearly revealed the seriousness
of various phases of the operation. Not surprisingly, this verdict was appealed, and at a
second trial in 1978 the "political conspiracy" and "armed insurrection" charges were
dropped. To accomplish this remarkable feat, the appellate judges were compelled to
resort to tortuous arguments which in some cases directly contradicted the evidence
collected during the instruction phase. For example, as a way of discounting the evidence
that FN plotters had penetrated the Viminale and stolen an automatic weapon, they
suggested that Orlandini might have learned from his contacts ahead of time that one of
the machine pistols in the Interior Ministry armory was a composite. Not only did this
bizarre reconstruction go against all the participant testimony, it also ignored the
revealing remarks made by Orlandini, in the course of a phone conversation tapped by
SID ten days after the coup, concerning the need to replace the stolen weapon.172
Likewise, testimony about the support offered to the plotters by elements within the
Italian security forces and Nixon's coterie was generally dismissed as baseless hearsay
or—when that proved impossible—attributed to acts of individual disloyalty and perfidy.
This made it possible for the judicial authorities to attest to the "absolute fidelity" of the
armed forces as an institution, as well as conclude that the movements on 7-8 December
constituted nothing more than a "muster of forces" (adunata) or "seditious
demonstration".173 If that conclusion were not ridiculous enough, on 27 November
1984 a second Rome Court of Appeals dropped the charges against all the remaining
defendants and concluded that no armed subversion or serious anti-constitutional actions
had taken place.174 The logic of this judicial finding, especially given the vast amount
of information that had surfaced about rightist plots during the intervening years,
confounded virtually every informed observer. In short, in all of these sentences the unwritten rule seems to have been to try and limit potential political embarrassment or damage by preventing the incrimination of the state apparatus, high-ranking political and military officials, and Italy’s American allies.

Nevertheless, certain aspects of the coup contributed to the comforting illusion that it did not represent a serious threat and that its participants were nothing more than nostalgic bunglers. There was, after all, something rather comical about the march of a band of heavily-armed but unwitting Guardie Forestali—the Italian equivalent of U.S. Forest Rangers—toward a key political and military objective. And the unexpected entrapment of Bottari’s AN contingent in an elevator in Police Chief Vicari’s building was worthy of a Three Stooges skit. Features such as these prompted the filming of a black comedy, "We Want the Colonels", which satirized the entire affair. However, it would be a major error to consider the Black Prince and his men apart from the far more powerful political forces which they claimed had promised to lend support to their action. Whatever else Borghese may have been, he was not an operational novice when it came to military affairs. No one with significant experience in military and paramilitary activities would have been foolish enough to believe that a total force consisting of a few thousand civilian activists would be able to carry out a successful coup d’etat in Rome without the support of elements from the regular security forces. Many of the plotters later testified that high-ranking military, Carabinieri, and police officers, as well as leading politicians and freemasons, had indicated their willingness to back the planned FN action. Even if one makes allowance for exaggeration and self-serving distortions,
these converging claims should have been taken seriously and thoroughly investigated by
the authorities.

The Involvement of the Security Forces

Given the absence of an in-depth official inquiry into these claims, the best an
outsider can do is examine the evidence that emerged during the trials about supposed
links between the civilian conspirators and representatives of the security forces. The best
place to begin is with the military intelligence service, whose task it was to monitor and
neutralize threats to the security of the postwar democratic state. It has already been
noted that General Miceli, head of SID from October 1970 to July 1974, had established
contacts with Borghese and Orlandini as early as the Spring of 1969, when he was still
chief of SIOS-Esercito. He claimed that these contacts were undertaken in relation to his
intelligence-gathering activities. However, this innocuous explanation directly conflicted
with Orlandini’s characterizations of those same meetings, and Miceli’s superior at the
time, General Francesco Mereu, later testified that such investigative methods were
abnormal and dubious.175 Perhaps more importantly, it is belied by Miceli’s subsequent
failure to take action against the plotters, even though he was regularly kept abreast of
their intentions and subversive activities by means of intelligence reports in the months
leading up to the coup.177

According to Judge Fiore, SID had begun to collect information on the FN, its
leaders, and its links to other extraparliamentary rightist groups as early as the Fall of
1968. As a result of this preliminary work, Borghese’s contacts with various disparate
political groups, including ON and AN, had come to light. During the first week of
December 1970, SID’s Raggruppamento Centri Controspionaggio (CS) had obtained authorization from the public prosecutor’s office to tap the telephones of Orlandini, Rosa, De Rosa, and Saccucci, a sign that leading FN conspirators were engendering more and more suspicion. But the situation came to a head even before these taps had the opportunity to yield their secrets.

On the evening of 7 December, Lieutenant Colonel Giorgio Genovesi at Centro CS I in Rome received an alarming message from SID informant Franco Antico, a member of both Civiltà Cristiana and Europa Civiltà, who told him that groups of youths belonging to the latter organization, the FN, and ON intended to launch a coup later that very night. Antico listed the Interior Ministry as one of their possible targets, and indicated that their goal was to spark some sort of response to the recent wave of leftist demonstrations. Genovesi immediately informed his superior, Colonel Antonio Cacciuttolo, head of the Raggruppamento Centri CS, who suggested that he pass by the Viminale to see if anything appeared out of the ordinary. From the plaza in front of the building everything seemed normal, so Genovesi made his way back to his office on Via Quintino Sella. Meanwhile, Cacciuttolo transmitted the explosive news to the head of Ufficio D, General Federico Gasca Queirazza, who in turn informed Miceli sometime between midnight and 1:10 AM. Miceli ordered his subordinate to stand by and see what developed. It was not until 2:10 AM that Genovesi was given the green light, presumably by Cacciuttolo, to pass Antico’s information along to the Carabinieri and the Ufficio Politico of the Rome Questura. After doing so, Genovesi returned to the Interior Ministry and remained on guard outside the building until 5 AM. Some three hours later he
personally visited Antico, who provided him with further details about the Via Eleniana gym meeting.\textsuperscript{179}

By the wee hours of 8 December, then, Miceli had already been made aware of the general outlines of the subversive actions initiated by Borghese, actions which the plotters were at that very moment desperately trying to abort and conceal. But instead of launching an immediate counteraction to prevent the various FN contingents from withdrawing, undertaking a thorough official investigation, and providing the authorities with all the details which SID had gathered up to that point, as duty demanded, he appears to have done everything he could to protect the conspirators.\textsuperscript{180} First, as noted above, he delayed taking any action until after 2 AM. Second, several hours later he limited himself to making a few vague allusions about the coup to General Enzo Marchesi, chief of the armed forces general staff, allusions which had little substance or probative value.\textsuperscript{181} Third, over the next two and a half months he allegedly failed to provide additional information which had been gathered by Centro CS I to his superiors and colleagues in the security apparatus, even though he met with them on several occasions during that period. In the first half of December 1974, both Interior Minister Franco Restivo and police chief Vicari testified that Miceli had consistently minimized the significance of the coup on these occasions and that their first indication of its seriousness was gleaned from the newspapers and police investigations. Restivo claimed that the head of SID had said his Ufficio D investigators had been unable to confirm Antico’s revelations and had said nothing at all about a possible FN occupation of the Viminale. Moreover, on more than one occasion Miceli had referred to the meeting at
the ANPDI gym as a "university student gathering". For his part, Vicari categorically denied that Miceli or anyone else at SID had provided the police with useful information about the coup.\textsuperscript{182}

This latter failure is especially noteworthy, since Miceli's subordinates in Ufficio D had in the meantime managed to accumulate a significant amount of information about the operation. The wiretaps that had recently been installed in the phones of various FN leaders had immediately borne fruit. As indicated above, Orlandini made a number of incriminating phone calls, including one to Miceli loyalist Cosimo Pace, in the wake of the aborted coup. Saccucci also recounted some details of the operation over the phone on 8 December, and the following morning Rosa made a call and lamented that the action would have been successful if it had not been recalled. Yet none of these recorded conversations were made available to investigating magistrates until January of 1975.\textsuperscript{183} Even more tellingly, Ufficio D prepared two initial reports on the plot, dated 15 and 23 December, both of which Miceli withheld from other investigative bodies until his hand was forced by the march of events.

This process began at the end of February 1971, after the Rome Questura had renewed its investigation of the FN and managed to obtain further information and compromising documents related to the coup. The police informed the judicial authorities of their findings, and as noted above the first arrest warrants were issued for some of the key conspirators in mid-March. Miceli was thence constrained to make Ufficio D's initial reports on the coup available to Judge Marcello De Lillo in order to avoid being accused of negligence or incompetence. Nevertheless, he rejected Ufficio D's suggestion that a
newly-prepared summary report of its findings be submitted to all the higher political authorities, in accordance with the normal bureaucratic practice. The SID chief instead recommended, presumably so as to delay the release of sensitive and compromising information without incriminating himself, that another report be prepared using somewhat different analytical criteria. Ufficio D then drew up a new report on the basis of these suggested criteria, but this too was filed away in SID’s archives at Fort Braschi, at Miceli’s orders, until the summer of 1974. Finally, Ufficio D proposed that SID prepare an "official" version of the events in response to a July 1971 request for information by the judicial authorities, but again Miceli blocked the initiative by insisting that all branches of SID await his orders before taking any further action. Needless to say, these orders never arrived.184

It was precisely during this highly sensitive phase of the investigation that Miceli allegedly took another significant action. According to Orlandini, in mid-1971 the general made a personal visit to Villa Margherita, the luxurious Roman clinic where he was being held under house arrest. They encountered each other briefly in the crowded hallway of the clinic, at which point Miceli supposedly put his finger alongside his nose, a gesture indicating that he was protecting the shipbuilder and that the latter should be patient and hold his tongue. Miceli later admitted that he had visited the clinic around that time, but denied seeing Orlandini or giving any such signal, an explanation the judges found unbelievable.185 Be that as it may, the military intelligence chief’s initial efforts to derail the judicial investigations continued up until 13 August 1971, when he responded in writing to the judges’ request for information. In his letter, he claimed that
SID was unable to confirm Antico’s information about the launching of a subversive right-wing action on the night of 7-8 December, and insisted that no evidence had been found of any "collusion, connivance, or participation" in such an action by active-duty military personnel or military circles. The progress of the investigation was thereby stalled, and toward the end of February 1972 those FN members who had been arrested for plotting subversion were released from prison.

It is likely that the case against Borghese and his supporters would have collapsed right then, had it not been for the personal initiative taken by Miceli’s rival, General Gianadelio Maletti, who had replaced Gasca Queirazza as head of Ufficio D in June 1971. Maletti discreetly reactivated Ufficio D’s investigation of Fronte Nazionale activities, a delicate task which he assigned to the Nucleo Operativo Diretto (NOD), a small operational group he established under his own direct authority, outside SID’s normal chain of command. Captain Labruna was put in charge of the NOD, and was assisted in his tasks by Colonel Romagnoli, head of Ufficio D’s military police section. After learning about Orlandini’s key role in the coup from one of the latter’s friends and business associates toward the end of 1972, Labruna made personal contact with the shipbuilder in early 1973 and, after a few meetings, managed to convince him that he was an FN sympathizer within the secret services. Once reassured, Orlandini began making a series of increasingly important revelations to Labruna about aspects of the “Tora Tora” operation, as well as about details of new FN plots against the government. Almost of all of these revelations, which culminated in the confessions made by Orlandini during the 17 June 1974 meeting at Lugano, were duly recorded by
Labruna. Along with the convergent testimony of other key witnesses and various material evidence, the details revealed by Orlandini soon made it possible to reopen the judicial investigation and bring Borghese's supporters to trial.

In mid-1973, Maletti informed Miceli that he had resumed his investigation of the FN and the rightist movements with which it was associated. Miceli replied that in the absence of concrete facts, no information should be provided to the judicial authorities "in order to avoid scandals detrimental to the institutions of the state." Once again, the head of SID succeeded in delaying the exposure of compromising information which his own subordinates had gathered. But this stonewalling could not be continued indefinitely, and the following summer the chickens finally came home to roost. After learning of the explosive revelations made by Orlandini at the Lugano meeting, Maletti ordered Labruna and Romagnoli to prepare a new report incorporating the shipbuilder's testimony. This report, dated 24 June 1974, was presented to Miceli on 3 July. The latter was visibly surprised and unable to hide his consternation, especially since he had recently been caught lying to the political and judicial authorities about Guido Giannettini's links to SID. Now he was being confronted with embarrassing information about "collusion between subversive forces and high-ranking military and civilian officials", information he had long gone out of his way to conceal, and was no longer in a position to prevent its release since he was soon to be replaced as head of SID by Admiral Mario Casardi.

Miceli's only remaining option was to try and prevent the dissemination of the report by means of a normal bureaucratic evaluation process rather than a unilateral
personal action, which would be certain to engender suspicion. In the hopes of diverting attention from his prior obstructionist role, he convoked a meeting at Palazzo Baracchini to discuss the contents of the report with his chief Ufficio D subordinates: Maletti, Marzollo, Genovesi, and Major Agostino D’Orsi. At the meeting he sought to discredit Orlandini’s testimony—which, it should be recalled, directly implicated Miceli himself—by repeatedly emphasizing that the FN plotter’s revelations had not been substantiated by any evidence. His goal was to persuade his colleagues that it would be preferable to either verify or revise the controversial claims in the report before actually releasing it, but the majority agreed that, whatever its possible deficiencies, it should nonetheless be transmitted to the judges entrusted with investigating various FN-linked plots. In desperation, Miceli then appealed to Admiral Eugenio Henke, who had by then become chief of the armed forces general staff, for help. The latter, not wishing to jeopardize his own position by colluding with or covering up for his departing intelligence chief, advised him to transmit the report to Andreotti without further delay. Thus deprived of further institutional support and protection, Miceli reluctantly did so on 7 July 1974. Shortly thereafter, Andreotti arranged a meeting between himself, Miceli, Casardi, Henke, General Enrico Mino of the Carabinieri, and General Vittorio Emmanuele Borsi di Parma of the Guardia di Finanza. Miceli again emphasized the absence of material evidence in support of Orlandini’s claims, which inadvertently buttressed the Defense Minister’s decision to investigate the alleged links between high-ranking military officers and Borghese’s civilian plotters.  

In the first week of August, Casardi transmitted an investigative report prepared
by Borsi di Parma to Andreotti. This report absolved General Roselli Lorenzini and five other military officers of the charges of colluding with the FN, a politically convenient conclusion which Andreotti blithely accepted. In response, he ordered Casardi to reorganize the Labruna-Romagnoli report and excise the unverified allegations about military plotters and U.S. involvement. The revised report was returned to Andreotti, who in turn transmitted it on 15 September to Chief Prosecutor Elio Siotto, along with a letter warning him that not all the information contained therein had been confirmed. Siotto seems to have tried to consign the report to a prosecutor other than Vitalone, but Andreotti hastily intervened and the report was then sent on to Vitalone and Fiore. At that point Miceli played his last card. On 26 September he sent an unsolicited letter directly to Fiore. In that letter he acknowledged that he had met with Borghese and Orlandini in 1969 and 1970 in connection with his legitimate intelligence-gathering duties, as noted above, and referred to the original Labruna intelligence reports which had not been sent to the judges by Andreotti. Apparently, his aim was to cast suspicion on the Defense Minister by suggesting that he was purposely withholding information from the judicial authorities. In response to an 18 October request for clarification from Fiore, Andreotti claimed that he had not sent the originals—with the full support of Miceli himself and certain other security chiefs—because they contained unverified information and might therefore cast suspicion on innocent people. But Andreotti's hand was now forced. On 24 October, he addressed the Defense Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and explained his reasons for withholding the original reports. Immediately afterwards, he ordered Casardi to send all of Labruna's reports to the judicial authorities.191
Any respite or sense of satisfaction which Miceli may have derived from the Defense Minister's discomfiture was shortlived, however. On 31 October Judge Tamburino, then in the midst of investigating the Rosa dei Venti organization, issued an arrest warrant for Miceli. The charge was "political conspiracy", since the SID chief had been identified by insiders as a key figure in "parallel SID", a top secret structure within the military intelligence service whose personnel overlapped with those of the subversive Rosa group, which in turn was actively conspiring with FN activists in Rome and Liguria. He was taken into custody in the waiting room of Achille Gallucci, head of the Ufficio Istruzione, by Carabinieri Colonel Ruggero Placidi, placed in a waiting automobile, and immediately whisked toward Padua. Miceli had no illusions about the trouble he was now in, and decided to make every effort to avoid being interrogated as a defendant by Tamburino. Just outside the Rome city limits the general claimed that he had fallen ill, so Placidi had no choice but to turn around and bring him to the Celio military hospital. The next day Tamburino dispatched a Paduan medical examiner to the capital with the task of determining whether or not Miceli was really too ill to be transported to Padua. Despite the latter's protestations, Dr. Paolo Cortivo authorized his transfer to the Paduan military hospital, which took place on the same day. Unfortunately, it was this very action that precipitated the jurisdictional struggle which resulted in the Court of Cassation's decision to combine both Tamburino's investigation and Judge Luciano Violante's Milan investigation of Edgardo Sogno's "white" coup with Fiore's Rome investigation of the FN. This occurred officially on 30 December, before Tamburino had had the opportunity to question Miceli.192
These transfers of jurisdictional competence prevented the more dogged magistrates from fully exposing the parallel, quasi-official networks that were making instrumental use of various right-wing coup plots and terrorist actions, but they did not let Miceli completely off the hook. On 4 January 1975, in the first of three appearances he was to make as a defendent before judges Fiore and Vitalone, Miceli angrily contested Andreotti's claims that prior to July 1974 he had ignored rightist violence and refused to acknowledge that a coup had taken place. He pointed out that he himself had later ordered Ufficio D to form an operational group to investigate subversive right-wing movements, and had only suggested that Maletti dissolve it and reassign Labruna after the latter's "cover" had been blown by the press in connection with the Giannettini affair. He further insisted that he had carried out his duties by informing other security agencies and his political superiors--Restivo, Defense Minister Tanassi, and President Giuseppe Saragat around the time of the coup--about the basic information gathered by his service concerning the "clamorous" FN action on the night of 7-8 December 1970. Indeed, he accused all three of the aforementioned government officials of knowingly withholding information which he had provided them from the judicial authorities.

Given the overall pattern of uncooperativeness displayed by Miceli, however, these claims failed to convince the investigating magistrates that his superiors were ultimately to blame or that he had properly performed his duties as head of the military intelligence service. As a result, public prosecutor Vitalone and Judge Fiore both ended up severely criticizing Miceli's half-hearted efforts to investigate the Borghese coup and subsequent FN plots. According to Vitalone, Miceli had "shamelessly lied, clearly
violating the fundamental duties of his office... either he had artfully disinformed his superiors or he lacked some of the essential qualities to undertake the highly delicate functions conferred upon him." 194 For his part, Fiore accused Miceli of intentionally and repeatedly trying to impede the investigation of the judicial authorities by withholding crucial information that his agency had accumulated on the plotters, and attributed this "unlawful conduct" not only to his general tendency to say "as little as possible", but also to his feelings of "reciprocal sympathy and consideration" for Borghese. 195 There is no doubt whatsoever that Miceli's duplicitous and obstructionist actions, by delaying and then sabotaging the prosecution of the leading FN conspirators, effectively made it possible for them to continue hatching seditious plots for another three and a half years. Even so, the judicial officials in Rome were clearly unwilling to charge the SID chief with anything other than aiding and abetting a crime, a far less serious offense than actively conspiring to commit one. Although Miceli was in this way absolved of serious wrongdoing and ultimately spared from serving a prison sentence, his professional career was destroyed by his bureaucratic rivals in order to protect higher ranking members within the Italian political establishment and, in all probability, their American allies.

Nonetheless a considerable body of diverse evidence, both circumstantial and material, demonstrates that Miceli was far from the only top security official who had actively sought to aid and abet Borghese's plotters. To believe that the general and his coterie of loyalists inside SID were acting solely on their own initiative, one would have to completely discount the links that they had forged with other powerful groups.
implicated in the coup. Among these were elements within the Carabinieri, the UAR and Pubblica Sicurezza corps, the armed forces, the NATO security apparatus, the U.S. national security establishment, freemasonry, and the Italian political class. Each of these must be discussed in turn, although the reader should keep in mind that they are all closely intertwined.

Any operational assistance or cover-up orchestrated by SID on behalf of Borghese's plotters would have inevitably involved the participation of Carabinieri officers, since much of the military intelligence service's personnel has long been regularly drawn from that very corps. In 1974 one specialist estimated that the bulk of the 2000 men employed by SID's Ufficio D were members of the Carabinieri, a proportion which was by no means abnormal. The traditionally close links between the service and the corps were further strengthened during the 1960s by General De Lorenzo, who had been appointed as commander of the Carabinieri after spending several years at the helm of SIFAR. During his controversial tenure at Viale Romania, De Lorenzo transferred several of his loyal subordinates from the military intelligence service and appointed them to fill important positions within the corps, a process which created considerable resentment among high-ranking Carabinieri officers who had not been previously seconded to SIFAR. At the same time he ensured that his own cadre of loyalists, headed first by General Egidio Viggiani and after 1965 by General Giovanni Allavena, maintained control over the latter organization. In this way, he solidified his power base within the Carabinieri and established much closer operational linkages, both formal and informal, between that corps and the military intelligence service, linkages
which undoubtedly persisted in an attenuated form even after his own forced retirement.

But these general institutional patterns are not the only factors that would lead one to suspect Carabinieri involvement in the coup. According to neo-fascist pentito Paolo Aleandri, the real purpose of Borghese's action was in fact to provide a pretext for the activation of emergency Carabinieri anti-insurrectional plans. Select elements within that corps were said to be fully aware of this plot in advance. Following the outbreak of disorders provoked by the Black Prince's men in the capital, these elements were to transmit a coded signal to the various Carabinieri commands, ordering them to carry out the actions delineated in certain top secret contingency plans which were stored in their secured areas. Among the tasks which these units had been assigned was the arrest of leftist politicians, union leaders, and "suspect" military officers, a plan about which many of the FN conspirators and their associates had already testified. Aleandri indicated that he had gleaned this information from several sources, the most important of which was Fabio De Felice, with whom he was in close contact throughout the mid-1970s. Along with his brother Alfredo, Fabio De Felice played a role in the FN similar but subordinate to that of Filippo De Jorio. More will be said about De Jorio's important political connections below, but Aleandri's unsettling testimony, though not yet definitively confirmed, has been buttressed by other evidence of Carabinieri involvement in the coup.

The direct operational participation of active-duty Carabinieri officials such as Pecorella has already been noted, as has the apparent wearing of Carabinieri uniforms by some of the civilian conspirators. But this was by no means the entire story. FN
leader Gaetano Lunetta later claimed that a number of high-ranking Carabinieri officers, including some who were seconded to SID, had participated in various 1969 and 1970 Fronte meetings at which there was open talk of a coup. One of these men, a lieutenant who had come to a Florence meeting with Adami Rook, enabled Lunetta to buy hundreds of military uniforms, including camouflage outfits, by displaying his official identification card at Unione Militare stores during a fifteen-day shopping spree in northern Italy. Lunetta added that among the guards who admitted the plotters into the Viminale there were members of the same corps, and that after the issuance of the counterorder the FN commandos inside supposedly had to wait for the return of a complicit Carabinieri guard troop before retiring from the Ministry. Lunetta further claimed that Carabinieri units were placed on alert on the night of 7-8 December, and that he personally saw the Black Prince for the last time at a Carabinieri barracks in Florence, after an arrest warrant had been issued for him and just before he took flight to Portugal on a naval vessel. This last assertion may not be at all far-fetched. Orlandini and Borghese were allegedly key players in the Carabinieri-centered De Lorenzo "coup" of 1964, and according to an April 1971 report sent in to Ufficio D from a regional SID office, the former Decima MAS leader had actually been a guest at the corps’ main headquarters on Viale Romania in Rome.

Perhaps most damningly, Brigadier Renato Olino later testified that at least one large contingent of Carabinieri was actually readied for action and deployed on the night of the coup. Olino claimed that General Dino Mingarelli, then commander of the corps’ N.C.O. training school in Florence, led a column of 45-50 Army trucks carrying 800
heavily-armed cadets south from the Tuscan capital to Cecchignola on the night of 8 December 1970. This force had ostensibly been mobilized to guarantee order during Tito’s visit scheduled for the next day, yet the men were ordered to sleep with their clothes on and be ready to move at a moment’s notice.\textsuperscript{201} Other sources indicated that Olino’s unit was not the only Carabinieri force to be deployed that night. For example, Giorgio Pisanò, an MSI senator with close ties to both neo-fascist and intelligence circles, later claimed that Rome had been encircled by a network of Carabinieri blockade posts on the afternoon of 7 December, but that these had been ordered not to impede any troop movements, no matter how suspicious these appeared, or confiscate any weapons they ran across.\textsuperscript{202} Hence Orlandini, despite possible embellishments, seems to have been telling the truth when he confided to Labruna that the plotters had the support of certain Carabinieri units, some of which were allegedly moving into action before being recalled when the counterorder was issued.

There is also scattered evidence that Carabinieri officers participated in efforts to protect the plotters, both prior to and after the coup. For example, a revealing report was compiled on 16 June 1969 by Lieutenant Colonel Gian Maria Giudici, at the time commander of the Genoese Carabinieri legion, concerning an April FN meeting held in that city. On 17 June it was sent to General Luigi Forlenza, then chief of the corps, who filed it away and then failed to acknowledge its existence even after Vitalone began his judicial investigation of the Borghese coup.\textsuperscript{203} Later, other personnel linked to the Carabinieri were accused of trying to interfere with that investigation. Thus Vitalone, defending himself from charges of being compromised by his political connections and
revealing secret information to the press, noted that there was no secrecy as far as the trial materials were concerned. He claimed that members of SID with "NOS" status had open access to the most secret trial documents, and added, in this connection, that assistant prosecutor Raffaele Vessichelli, an ex-Carabinieri officer, was a close associate of Marzollo, Miceli's former right-hand man at the military intelligence service. Vitalone argued that it was impossible to prevent leaks under such conditions, an opinion shared by chief prosecutor Siotto. Finally, Orlandini told Labruna a strange story in January 1973. He claimed that corrupt Carabinieri detachments had recently searched the homes of three or four FN plotters in La Spezia, ostensibly in search of arms and ammunition, even though they knew full well that these weapons had been stored elsewhere.

If Borghese's 1970 "coup" was in fact meant to spark a Carabinieri anti-insurrectional action, there are obvious parallels between that operation and the plans developed by De Lorenzo in 1964, which according to some insiders called for the utilization of civilian paramilitary groups to foment disorders and thereby set in motion a similar Carabinieri contingency plan. This in turn provides further indirect evidence that efforts to initiate and implement certain sorts of anti-leftist actions were not abandoned despite the exposure of earlier plots, and that there was a noticeable degree of continuity among the personnel involved in successive phases of this plotting.

The complicity of high-ranking officials of the Interior Ministry in the "Tora Tora" operation has also been attested to by a number of sources. The fact that Drago, whose close links with UAR official D'Amato worried many of the participating neo-fascists, prepared a floor plan of the Viminale and personally conducted groups of
plotters on a tour inside the building is in itself significant. It is difficult to believe that a police medical examiner, however trusted and well-regarded, could have provided tours of such sensitive, high-security areas to unknown civilians without obtaining authorization from someone much higher up the chain of command. In this case, all the circumstantial evidence points to D'Amato as the official who provided such authorization. Aleandri later testified that the De Felice brothers had explicitly identified D'Amato as one of the people who had pledged to support the projected coup, a claim that is surely strengthened by the actions taken by the Reparto Autonomo Guardie contingent entrusted with protecting the Interior Ministry on the night of 7-8 December. According to an April 1971 SID report, the AN conspirators were admitted into the Viminale that evening by Major Capanna, "on behalf of D'Amato's deputy [vice]". This did not occur until after Capanna had facilitated their entry by transferring the bulk of the guard troops under his command to the Via Panisperna barracks. To rationalize ordering his men to abandon their regular posts without engendering suspicion, Capanna must have had--or at least pretended to have--some sort of authorization from above.

This also raises the issue of Pubblica Sicurezza involvement in the coup, since that corps is under the authority of the Interior Ministry and the guards at the Viminale are specially selected from among its personnel. In 1989, FN leader Lunetta asserted that police officials had participated in various FN planning sessions along with Carabinieri and military officers, that several police agencies were instructed not to interfere with the movement of thirty cars filled with weapons and Ligurian plotters, and that mobile battalions were ready to occupy strategic points in Rome. As noted above, Orlandini
and other plotters indicated that various police units were slated to participate in the operation, and a high-ranking police official is said to have testified that some police barracks had been placed on alert on the afternoon of 7 December.\textsuperscript{210} The shipbuilder further claimed that Capanna had General Barbieri's authorization for his actions that day. Although Barbieri himself denied making any efforts to facilitate or cover up the coup, he admitted to the judges that during the winter of 1970-1971 Vicari had warned him to be ready for a coup plot initiated by Borghese, an alert confirmed by other Pubblica Sicurezza officials.\textsuperscript{211} Nevertheless, the precise nature of Barbieri's role remains uncertain, and no definitive evidence of the corps' direct participation in the operation—other than that of Capanna himself—has yet been uncovered.

Whatever the degree of actual Pubblica Sicurezza involvement, it would surely be naive to imagine that an intelligence official as able and well-connected as D'Amato was unaware of the fact that Borghese's men had penetrated the Interior Ministry and stolen one of the prized Beretta machine pistols.\textsuperscript{212} Here it is worth noting that these particular weapons had originally been consigned to the UAR in 1966, and had subsequently been transferred to the Reparto Autonomo armory.\textsuperscript{213} It would be of great interest to know just when this transfer took place, for had it occurred immediately prior to the coup the possibility of official complicity would surely be strengthened. Be that as it may, knowledge about key aspects of the plot at the highest levels of the UAR was perhaps reflected in the subsequent activities of Drago, who personally went out of his way to "acknowledge" SID's top-level cover-up efforts. At a meeting he arranged with an SID official in early 1971, Drago indicated that he and his associates appreciated and
would not forget that SID had not exposed them by revealing details of the coup. Whether the associates he was alluding to were members of the FN, officials of the UAR, or personnel from both entities is impossible to determine. At the very least, however, this thinly veiled "thank you" threat from a figure closely associated with D'Amato and the UAR seems to have reflected the traditional interservice rivalries—if not some degree of collusion or pattern of mutual blackmail—between the Interior Ministry's intelligence apparatus and the military intelligence service. These incidents, whatever their exact import, do nothing to undermine the testimony of Orlandini and other FN plotters about the UAR's supposed involvement in the operation.

Furthermore, the police and secret services were not the only state security forces implicated in the Borghese coup, and the Carabinieri were not the only military force that allegedly provided backup support for it. As several of the Black Prince's chief lieutenants readily acknowledged, the overall success of the operation depended above all on the active support and direct intervention of selected elements of the regular armed forces. To ensure the provision of such support when "X hour" finally arrived, Orlandini and other FN leaders had expended considerable effort over a period of years trying to set up clandestine cells within various military units. In the end, if the plotters had not been led to believe that some military backing would be forthcoming, it is very doubtful that they would have ever undertaken such a risky paramilitary venture. As noted above, Orlandini told Labruna on several occasions that various high-ranking military officers were among the conspirators, not only in connection with the "Tora Tora" operation, but also in connection with subsequent anti-constitutional coup plots. Lunetta later claimed
that representatives from all three armed services had attended various FN planning
sessions in 1969 and 1970. Both testified that certain military units had been placed on
alert in their barracks, mobilized, or actually deployed and then recalled on the night of
the coup.215 Throughout the evening, Borghese is said to have anxiously awaited
information about whether armored forces stationed outside Rome and Naples were
moving into action, and according to one source an armored column had actually headed
toward the capital.216

In the end, Judge Fiore considered the eyewitness testimony about the active
participation of General Casero and Colonel Lo Vecchio credible enough to recommend
that the two Air Force officers be placed on trial for political conspiracy.217 But neither
he nor Vitalone made any effort to ascertain whether or not the alleged alerts and troop
movements had actually taken place. Since at this point it is unlikely that an official
investigation of this matter will ever be conducted, one must consider various types of
indirect evidence in order to try and assess the degree of military participation on the
night of 7-8 December 1970. There are, as it happens, some suggestive bits of
information. First of all, lists of military officers, military departments (uffici), and arms
factories were discovered in the residence of Giovanni De Rosa, one of Borghese’s main
collaborators. As Nunziata points out, it is reasonable to suspect that these materials
contained the names of military personnel who were considered to be sympathetic to the
Fronte’s aims, if not those who had actually promised to support the coup.
Unfortunately, no attempt was made by the prosecutor to carry out a follow-up
investigation.218 Second, in his sentence Fiore noted that ex-paratrooper Saccucci,
another key FN operative, enjoyed the protection of "special military agencies (enti)", though the identity of those agencies was not further specified.²¹⁹ Third, it is possible that "Operation Triangle", an emergency intervention plan making use of select anti-communist cadres from regular military units, was activated on the night of 7-8 December 1970.²²⁰ Finally, it is worth taking a closer look at the two highest ranking military officers identified as key co-conspirators by Orlandini: Air Force General Duilio Fanali and Admiral Giuseppe Roselli Lorenzini. Although both of these men were absolved of guilt by Guardia di Finanza head Borsi di Parma following a two week investigation in late 1974, and they were never formally charged with complicity by the judges investigating the Borghese coup, there are a number of reasons to suspect them of having had some involvement in it.

The most important of the officers implicated by Orlandini was probably General Fanali, at the time Air Force Chief of Staff, who had allegedly agreed to accompany Casero and assist the plotters in taking control of the Defense Ministry and its communications network. Fanali has been aptly described by one researcher as a highly trained military man of "scarce democratic reliability".²²¹ Some time after 8 September 1943, the Badoglio government had entrusted the young colonel with the task of reorganizing the remnants of the Italian Air Force. Between 1947 and 1949, he was among that new generation of military theorists who contributed to various doctrinal debates concerning the nature and orientation of the postwar Italian armed forces. His sympathies were clearly aligned with the Italian right and the Atlantic Alliance, and for many years he was associated with Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano (PSDI) circles.
Later, he served as the director of the Scuola dell’Aeronautica and then became president of the prestigious Centro Alti Studi Militari (CASM), the school where selected officers of the Italian armed forces were sent to receive the most advanced and specialized military training. These assignments reflected not only his high professional qualifications, but also the amount of trust placed in him by top military and political authorities. In February 1968, following the establishment of a new cabinet headed by Aldo Moro, he was appointed as chief of the Air Force general staff. From that point on, perhaps provoked by the public disturbances associated with growing worker and student agitation, he appears to have become involved, at least tangentially, in various right-wing plots. Although the only "evidence" of his slated participation in the Borghese coup derives from the testimony of Orlandini and other plotters, his subsequent activities and associations are clearly indicative of authoritarian political proclivities.

After failing to become General Marchesi’s successor as chief of the armed forces general staff when his DC supporters were unable to get the retirement age raised from sixty to sixty-one, Fanali officially retired from military service on 31 October 1971. Yet he did not cease his involvement, now as a "private" citizen, in military and quasi-military affairs. According to FN leader Attilio Lercari’s detailed memorandum, following the flight of Borghese and the arrest of leading Fronte plotters in early 1971, "the initiative in the operations for the overthrow of the regime passed into the hands of Admiral Roselli Lorenzini...with the collaboration of Generals Fanali and [Vincenzo] Lucertini". Whatever the truth of this particular claim, there is no doubt that Fanali was in contact with various groups implicated in subsequent anti-parliamentary plots.
For example, Fanali maintained a close association with Filippo De Jorio—another intermediary, both before and after the coup, between Borghese's plotters and representatives of the political class—and other "respectable" proponents of authoritarian political solutions. This was exemplified by his participation in certain projects later sponsored by De Jorio, including the Istituto di Studi Strategici e per la Difesa (ISSED) and its triannual journal Politica e Strategia, the first issue of which appeared in December 1972. Fanali was named Honorary President of ISSED and became a regular contributor to that particular publication, which investigative journalist Flamini has characterized as a mouthpiece for pro-coup elements within leading Italian political and military circles. Even the most cursory examination of its editorial staff and contributors lends credence to this assessment. To name only a few, De Jorio himself acted as the editor-in-chief, guerre révolutionnaire promoter Eggardo Beltrametti originally served as associate editor, and the contributors included FN conspirator Alfredo De Felice; Gaetano Rasi, head of the intellectually respectable but philo-fascist Istituto di Studi Corporativi in Rome; General Corrado San Giorgio, head of the Carabinieri; French military officers like General Michel Garder and Colonel Marc Geneste; counterinsurgency theorist Brian Crozier; and two very important figures associated with the pro-Atlanticist European right, Ivan Matteo Lombardo and Leo Magnino.225

Yet Fanali also appears to have been in some sort of contact with intransigent "presidentialist" circles. For example, "white" coup proponent Edgardo Sogno boasted, at a private 29 March 1974 meeting in the home of Princess Elvina Pallavicini, that he had already contacted Fanali and other officers in connection with his plan to modify the
constitution and alter the command hierarchy of the armed forces. As if to illustrate that claim, Fanali was present in person at a February 1975 rally held by Pacciardi, Sogno, and Luigi Cavallo at the Cinema Adriano in Rome. Pacciardi initiated the proceedings by warning the assembled crowd that Italy was undergoing an institutional crisis, that Parliament was hopelessly ineffectual (inconcludente), that the judiciary was polluted by politics, and that even the police and armed forces had reached the point of disintegration. Sogno then took the stage and urged those present to respond to these debilitating crises by uniting under the direction of a temporary emergency government formed by men not compromised by association with the existing system. To the surprise of no one, he also indicated his willingness to assume a key role in such a government—as long as sufficient power was granted to the executive authority and there was an energetic liberalization of economic life. It can be assumed, on the basis of Fanali’s expressed views and activities in other contexts, that these sorts of extraconstitutional appeals were not at all alien to his thinking. Perhaps, then, it was no coincidence that the Lercari memorandum, an important source on post-1970 FN plots which explicitly implicated the former Air Force commander, was found in the home of Sogno’s longterm political associate Luigi Cavallo.

Moreover, Fanali made one of seven keynote presentations at a May 1975 conference on western European security sponsored by the Centro Italiano Documentazione Azione Studi (CIDAS), one of the innumerable pseudo-scholarly institutes and study centers established by right-wing and ultraconservative groups all over Europe between the 1950s and the 1970s. CIDAS was founded in Turin at the
beginning of 1973 by Alessandro Uboldi De Capei, head of IBM Italia, and was closely linked to the conservative MSI elements gravitating around former Marxist philosopher Armando Plebe. Its proclaimed goal was a very ambitious one—to mobilize intellectuals in a renewed effort to forge a respectable "culture of the right" and thereby oppose the dominance of the left in intellectual discourse. These efforts, which were initiated at CIDAS's first conference in January 1973, were lauded by the entire spectrum of conservative publications in Italy, even though Plebe himself acknowledged that the unfocussed conference represented only a preliminary step in a long-term process of consolidation. A second CIDAS-sponsored conference, which again attracted rightist intellectuals from Europe and Latin America, was held in the Fall of 1974 at Nice.228

In any event, at the 1975 CIDAS conference held in Florence, Fanali shared the speaker's platform with French General Garder of the Institut des Etudes Stratégiques (IES) in Paris, MSI journalist and Aginter Presse "correspondent" Piero Buscaroli, and PLI Senator Manlio Brosio, a former Secretary General of NATO, among others. The attendees included Colonel Geneste, also of the IES; Brigadier General Miguel Cuartero of the Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE) in Madrid; Richard Foster, director of the Stanford Research Institute in Washington, D.C.; Professor Werner Kaltefleiter, director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, a foundation closely linked to the West German Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU); several retired and active-duty Italian generals; a group of conservative intellectuals; and a number of other right-wing journalists, including Aginter "correspondent" and SID agent Giano Accame. Not surprisingly, a major theme of this particular conference was the threat posed to Europe
by the Soviet Union and its communist party allies, and it may have been intentionally
timed to exert political pressure on NATO leaders, who were scheduled to meet in
Brussels later that month.\textsuperscript{229}

Later still, Fanali adhered to the short-lived Partito Socialdemocratico Europeo
(PSDE), a new political party founded in the Fall of 1977 by anti-communist circles
linked to Sicilian prince and P2 member Alliata di Montereale, who became its president.
This party grew out of one of several parallel initiatives aimed at restructuring the Italian
right so that it could effectively contest the advance of the PCI, which at that point
seemed to be on the verge of superseding the DC as the dominant party in the Italian
parliament. Among the PSDE's other leading members were Bruno Zoratti and SID
operative Lando Dell'Amico, and it was apparently supported by George Meany, head
of the American AFL-CIO union, and Cardinal Giovanni Benelli, an influential
conservative with close links to Montini and his Vatican network, traditionalist German
prelates, and Franz Josef Strauss, head of the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union
(CSU).\textsuperscript{230}

As for Roselli Lorenzini, he had previously held a series of increasingly important
and highly sensitive appointments within the Navy's command hierarchy. On 22 October
1970, just six weeks before the "Tora Tora" operation was launched, he replaced
Admiral Virgilio Spigai as Chief of Staff of that branch of the service.\textsuperscript{231} In the course
of later meetings with Labruna, Orlandini gave the impression that Roselli Lorenzini had
backed Borghese's December 1970 coup, but all of his specific comments about the
admiral's actual role were made in relation to subsequent plots. The conspiratorial
shipbuilder independently confirmed Lercari’s claim that Roselli Lorenzini was slated to be the operational commander of the projected coup, and emphasized that the Fronte and its allies placed a great deal of faith in him, especially since they anticipated that he would eventually be appointed to replace Marchesi as Armed Forces Chief of Staff. In December 1971, the admiral apparently conferred in Rome with De Jorio and Genoese industrialist Andrea Piaggio, one of several Ligurian financial backers of the renewed FN-linked coup preparations. However, the plotters’ hopes were temporarily dashed following the February 1972 elections, when the new Prime Minister Andreotti selected Admiral Henke instead of Roselli Lorenzini for the highest-ranking military post. The latter was retired from the Navy that same month, at which point he assumed the presidency of the Società di Navigazione Italia, the Italian state’s commercial fleet.

According to Lercari, the admiral had wanted to "wipe out the political class by force" and, prior to his unanticipated dismissal, had ordered Fronte leaders to establish contact with the Colonels’ regime in Greece and attempt to enlist its support for their forthcoming operation. After a brief period of confusion and consternation following Roselli Lorenzini’s forced retirement, the task of obtaining and directing military support for the planned coup was entrusted to less well-placed hardliners like Generals Ugo Ricci and Francesco Nardella.

If Fanali and Roselli Lorenzini were in fact actively involved in the Borghese coup and/or subsequent FN conspiracies, military and security forces above and beyond the national armed forces might well be implicated, at least indirectly, in acts of anti-democratic subversion in Italy. It turns out that both of these high-ranking officers were
closely linked to circles within the NATO and American security establishments, as were Ricci and Nardella, who were indisputably protagonists in later plots. Prior to becoming Navy Chief of Staff, Roselli Lorenzini had commanded NATO’s naval forces in southern Europe, one of the more sensitive and important of the alliance’s naval assignments. For his part, Fanali was no less intimately associated with the NATO hierarchy. In 1966, having already served a two-year stint as Italy’s military representative at NATO headquarters in Paris, he was abruptly recalled at the insistence of the French government after publicly deriding De Gaulle’s decision to pull France out of the defense organization’s military structure. This undiplomatic gesture did no harm to his future career, however, since it only served to highlight his stubborn fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance and its American backers. Indeed, shortly thereafter he was appointed as director of the NATO Defense College, which had in the meantime been transferred from Paris to Rome.

Yet all along Fanali seems to have been operating in the interests of certain defense-related groups within the United States rather than—except where these may have overlapped—in the interests of the European alliance per se. The Italian judicial authorities later discovered, for example, that he was deeply involved in the Lockheed bribery scandal, along with ex-Prime Minister Mariano Rumor, former Interior Minister Luigi Gui, Defense Minister Mario Tanassi, and the omnipresent D’Ovidio brothers. He apparently acted as the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation’s chief agent within the Italian Air Force, and as such played an active role in manipulating that service’s procurement policy so as to arrange for the purchase of fourteen Lockheed C-130 "Hercules"
transports. Thus in February 1972, he wrote to General Wood, the U.S. Air Force’s attaché at the American embassy in Rome, to ask him to facilitate the visit that two Italian Air Force colonels would soon make to Washington in order to discuss purchase terms, and a few days later sent Colonels Ciarlini and Terzani to meet with Lockheed representatives at the Pentagon. In July of that year, he urged Gui to buy the C-130s and criticized its competitor, the FIAT-made C-222. He persisted in these intensive lobbying efforts despite the opposition of both his own service’s technical directorate, Costarmaereo, and that of his Army and Navy counterparts. After a sometimes acrimonious bureaucratic struggle, in October Fanali managed to persuade his opponents to vote for the "Hercules", a much larger and less appropriate long-range transport. As a result of these and other activities, he was subsequently found guilty of accepting bribes from European representatives of the Lockheed Corporation. It should also be noted that in early 1975 the Americans backed Fanali’s bid to succeed the recently deceased president of Panavia, General Gastone Valentini, but that this effort failed due to the Italian government’s veto.

Even if one attaches no importance at all to these links between supposed Italian military plotters and the Atlantic security organization, there are other possible indications of NATO involvement in the Borghese coup. For one thing, a complete file of top secret documents concerning Italian and NATO military dispositions was found in Orlandini’s possession. These documents were said to be so sensitive that they would have been the envy of military high commands and hostile foreign intelligence services. Moreover, both Lunetta and Orlandini testified that elements of NATO had
backed the coup. According to the former, NATO ground forces stationed at the Southern Europe Task Force (SETAF) base in Verona had, at the orders of a certain general, moved south and surrounded half of Rome on the night of 7-8 December. Orlandini provided still other details of NATO's supposed role in the operation. He explicitly claimed that NATO naval forces, acting at the behest of the highest ranking American political circles, were standing by to intervene. Although the judges decided not to pursue these politically sensitive matters, in part due to an absence of material evidence, the shipbuilder's testimony is so explosive that it deserves to be fully recounted here.

As noted above, Orlandini indicated that Fenwich served as the main liason between the plotters and Nixon's entourage at the time of the coup. Indeed, the go-ahead signal for the operation was supposed to be transmitted to the plotters, via a series of intermediaries, by Nixon himself. Once Borghese's men were in position and had attained their initial objectives, Fenwich was to make a call from Rome, using unofficial channels, to one of his trusted associates at Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) headquarters in Naples. From there it was to be transferred first to NATO’s Southeast Mediterranean naval base on Malta, and then directly on to Nixon, who was to give the order to proceed with the operation. According to Orlandini, the scheduled call was actually made from Rome to Naples on the evening of 7 December 1970, but was then apparently blocked (arenata) at Malta. Although the resulting failure to obtain anticipated American authorization and support seems to have been a key factor in the subsequent issuance of the counterorder by Borghese, Orlandini insisted on more than one occasion
that elements of the NATO fleet had been placed on alert and readied for any eventuality. Several naval vessels had already started their engines and been put in motion so as to be ready to sail, at a moment’s notice, in support of the plotters. "That is why I tell you", the shipbuilder confided to Labruna, "that you don’t have the slightest idea of the importance and seriousness of the thing."241

Nor was Orlandini the only leading FN conspirator who believed that Borghese’s "coup" would be actively supported by senior U.S. government officials. The Black Prince himself seems to have been convinced of this, something which does not seem at all unreasonable when viewed in the context, outlined above, of his apparent collusion with elements of U.S. intelligence in the earlier postwar period. He must also have been aware, given the close links which several Italian right-wing extremists had forged with the Greek military junta, that factions within the American national security establishment had covertly supported the Colonels’ 1967 coup, and that afterwards the U.S. government had formally recognized the new regime as soon as it became satisfied that this illegal seizure of power would not jeopardize American or NATO security interests. These perceptions may well have accounted, at least in part, for some of the positions outlined in the important foreign policy position paper that police later found in Borghese’s office.

In this document the former war hero emphasized, first and foremost, that his projected post-coup regime would maintain the Italian government’s current military and financial commitment to NATO. Indeed, it would develop a plan designed to increase Italian participation in the Atlantic Alliance. He also agreed to continue Italy’s
involvement, with certain important qualifications, in the European Economic Community and the United Nations. Finally, he planned to nominate a special envoy to establish direct contact with the U.S. President. The initial task of this envoy would be to arrange for the participation of Italian troops in Southeast Asia in exchange for an American loan. All of these measures were clearly intended to reassure the United States government that the new Italian regime would act in such a way as to reinforce, not weaken, the existing Western system of collective security.

Are the claims of Orlandini and other FN plotters concerning American support for their coup "manifestly incredible", as Andreotti ally Vitalone argued in his Requisitoria? To those unfamiliar with the details of the various clandestine operations sponsored by President Nixon and his closest political advisors, such claims may at first glance seem incredible. But when they are placed, as they should be, within the context of the American-backed overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende and the illegal domestic activities which precipitated the Watergate scandal, the possibility of American backing for a rightist coup in Italy cannot be so easily dismissed as fanciful. Taken together, the actions leading up to the 1973 Chilean coup and the creation of special investigative units under the President's direct control exhibit certain parallels with some of the contemporaneous activities, both confirmed and unconfirmed, which were said to have been undertaken by Nixon's appointees in Italy.

One of the key features of the Chilean operation was the utilization of right-wing paramilitary groups, the most important of which was Pablo Rodríguez's Patria y Libertad movement, to foment disorder and thereby provide a pretext for the direct
intervention of the armed forces. To provoke such an intervention, Patria y Libertad commando units began carrying out a series of terrorist attacks in the Fall of 1970—that is, in the weeks immediately preceding the Borghese coup—which they then falsely attributed to nonexistent leftist organizations like the Brigada Obrero Campesina. According to pro-communist Chilean sources, members of right-wing paramilitary formations also infiltrated genuine leftist groups, then used them as a cover to commit crimes. The parallels between this particular provocation campaign and the terrorist "strategy of tension" in Italy are self-evident. Nor was this the only disconcerting possible similarity between right-wing violence in the two countries. It was later discovered, for example, that leading members of Patria y Libertad had established close operational links with hardliners in the Chilean armed forces and the Carabineros corps, including officers within their respective intelligence services. Even more suggestively, they had also been the recipients of covert CIA funding. Finally, some sources claim that more than 10,000 members of Patria y Libertad and other civilian "independent units" had actively supported the military on the day of the coup, particularly in rounding up leftists who were slated for arrest. Note that this function was precisely that which Borghese and his men were supposed to carry out after they had succeeded in provoking the intervention of the Carabinieri and armed forces. Given these circumstances, it should come as no real surprise to learn that both the Black Prince and Delle Chiaie later established close links with the Chilean junta, from which they sought to obtain operational and logistical support.

Furthermore, Nixon’s paranoia and willingness to run dirty tricks operations
against putative domestic "enemies" should also be taken into consideration when the
credibility of claims about his alleged backing of the "Tora Tora" operation is being
evaluated. His decision to create a so-called Plumbers unit that would be answerable only
to himself grew out of his conviction that he could not fully depend upon the unswerving
personal loyalty of elements within the regular American national security establishment,
particularly the upper class Ivy League "liberals" who were overrepresented in the
highest levels of the CIA bureaucracy. Among other things, he apparently believed that
the "clowns...out at Langley" had acted to sabotage his 1960 election bid, a transgression
for which he had never forgiven them. As a result, he ordered two of his key
subordinates, Egil ("Bud") Krogh and Attorney General John Mitchell, to create
autonomous intelligence units under direct White House control. These were staffed with
presumed Nixon loyalists and entrusted with carrying out some of the President's most
sensitive domestic operations. The most notorious of such operations was the illegal 1972
break-in at the Watergate Hotel, whose repercussions eventually forced Nixon to resign
and thereby put an end to his efforts to establish an "imperial presidency". But the
creation of those units was by no means an isolated act. Nixon's tenure as President was
in fact marked by continuous attempts to strengthen the Executive Office under his
immediate control at the expense of other sections of the government bureaucracy. This
was exemplified by his rapid reorganization of the structure and functioning of the
committees affiliated with the National Security Council, which in practice concentrated
real power in the hands of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's staff rather than
those of Secretary of State William P. Rogers. The result was that Nixon and Kissinger
were "able to use the NSC system to establish their own supremacy, not only over foreign policy decisions, but also over their planning and preparation in general—and even to some extent over their execution." In Italy, the President adopted a similar strategy of relying primarily on hand-picked functionaries, rather than career State Department or CIA personnel, to carry out his policies.

On 26 September 1969 Nixon appointed one of his most trusted and "hawkish" diplomatic officials, Graham A. Martin, as ambassador to Italy. Martin was a former U.S. Army colonel and a forceful, manipulative diplomat who had recently finished a stint as ambassador to Thailand, where he had helped supervise the militarization of the country in connection with the Vietnam build-up. By the time he arrived in Rome at the end of October, right in the midst of the "hot autumn", American policy toward Italy appeared to be in a state of considerable confusion and disarray. In the May 1968 general elections, the moderate Partito Socialista Unificato, upon whose success U.S. support for the center-left experiment then chiefly depended, had won only 14.5% of the vote. In contrast, electoral support for the PCI had increased to 26.9%, which prompted some DC leaders to propose a nation-wide "constitutional pact" with the communists at their April 1969 convention. Perhaps most importantly, from early 1968 on waves of student protest and growing worker agitation had combined to generate both a widespread sense of "moral panic" among the citizenry and serious problems of public order. These tumultuous developments, which apparently threatened to destabilize the conservative status quo and made it increasingly difficult to justify or sustain a policy of cautious support for the formation of a center-left government, prompted the launching of some
seemingly contradictory American initiatives. On the one hand, personnel from both the embassy’s political section and the CIA made some preliminary behind-the-scenes attempts to approach influential elements within the PCI, ostensibly with a view toward forging closer links with members who had grown disillusioned with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{251} At first glance, these initiatives seem to have represented a new adaptation of the more flexible American policy, honed during World War II and resumed periodically thereafter by liberal elements within the State Department and CIA, which was predicated on supporting the relatively moderate and democratic factions of the left at the expense of pro-Soviet hardliners.

In marked contrast, Martin’s activities reflected a more rigid and less sophisticated American approach, that of intransigent opposition to any form of real or imagined socialism. On the surface, this appeared to be a sort of throwback to the era of ambassadors Clare Booth Luce and James David Zellerbach, who had vehemently opposed all initiatives aimed at covertly backing or publicly courting the democratic left. Martin was an aggressive and equally uncompromising anti-communist whose concerns about a worldwide Soviet conspiracy colored his evaluation of recent Italian political developments. Despite the objections raised by certain State Department and CIA officials with more experience in Italian affairs, he soon breathed fresh life into the policy of secretly enlisting the aid of the far right to contest, by whatever means necessary, the growing political influence of the communists and their sympathizers. He later admitted that he would not have ruled out the use of violence or the sponsorship of a military coup if all other methods had failed to prevent the PCI from coming to power,
even if the latter had done so through legal means.  

To carry out these covert anti-communist policies, Martin sought to bypass the normal bureaucratic channels, which included both the CIA station and State Department intelligence officials. Instead of reporting to or relying upon CIA station chief Howard ("Rocky") Stone, for example, the ambassador sought to use non-CIA personnel to establish autonomous intelligence-gathering and operational networks. He relied first and foremost upon the embassy’s military attaché, Colonel James D. Clavio, who acted as his liason man to the armed forces, the military intelligence service, and Miceli in person, and its legal attaché, Thomas Biamonte, in reality the leading Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) operative in Italy, who acted as his intermediary with the Pubblica Sicurezza corps, the Carabinieri, and the Interior Ministry’s UAR. In addition, he met regularly with certain "private" citizens who formed part of Nixon’s network of supporters in Italy. Among these were scandal-ridden figures such as Sicilian financier Michele Sindona, a member of the P2 lodge, and Archbishop Paul Marcinkus of Chicago, who collaborated with Sindona in various economic affairs after becoming head of the Vatican Bank in 1971. Martin’s unofficial helpers also included Pier Francesco Talenti and Hugh Fenwich, both of whom were later explicitly identified by Orlandini as the key intermediaries between the FN leadership and the Nixon administration.  

Talenti had made his fleet of buses available to the conspirators on the night of 7-8 December 1970, and that same evening Fenwich had allegedly made the call to Nixon on behalf of the plotters. In short, Martin was merely following the President’s own example in attempting to operate autonomously and outside the restrictive confines of the
official CIA and State Department bureaucracies.

Although there are no specific indications that the ambassador provided any tangible support for the Borghese coup, some of the plotters later testified that Fenwich, another "Nixon man" in Italy, had personally kept Martin abreast of the FN's activities. Orlandini added that Clavio had monitored the actions of the conspirators and tried to sound out the views of Italian officers about a possible military intervention. To these perfectly believable claims one must add another significant fact which was later revealed in the report of a congressional committee chaired by Representative Otis Pike. In February 1972, Martin ignored the protests of CIA station chief Stone and covertly funneled over 800,000 dollars to SID head Miceli, who was in regular contact with both the ambassador and Clavio. Although this sum represented only about 10% of the American funds that were supposedly earmarked for centrist parties during that period, and the money in question was ostensibly to be used to pay for propaganda activities on the eve of the general elections, Miceli was in fact given control over the distribution of a far greater percentage of the total funds being provided, and it is generally believed that he dispersed a good deal of it to various extreme right groups with which he had long been in contact. Most of these groups did not cease their anti-democratic plotting or their participation in violent actions until 1975—if they did so at all—and then only in the wake of a belated and half-hearted crackdown by the Italian government. Thus Martin not only took an active interest in the conspiratorial activities of the FN and its supporters, which is only to be expected given his position, but thence arranged for considerable sums of money to be distributed to an Italian secret service chief who was
himself later implicated, to say the least, in a cover-up of the "Tora Tora" operation. It can scarcely be doubted that the ambassador did so with the imprimatur of Nixon and Kissinger, both of whom were active proponents of coup plots against Allende during that same period.

However, although Nixon and his hand-picked emissaries are said to have encouraged rightist plots in Italy over the strenuous objections of the CIA station in Rome, one should not conclude that the agency was opposed in principle to such plots or that its personnel played no role at all in the Borghese coup. As we have seen, Fenwich was not just an influential businessman with close links to Nixon's entourage, but in all probability an important CIA operative. And several commentators have concluded that Clavio, who functioned as Martin's chief liaison to Miceli, was also a CIA man. This remains to be demonstrated, but there is no doubt that Clavio specialized in organizing various types of covert provocations or that he was using his position as military attaché at the American embassy as an intelligence cover. Furthermore, Lunetta testified that the CIA station chief in Rome, "a small but very energetic man", had attended a series of FN preparatory meetings at which the launching of a coup had been discussed. At first glance it seems highly improbable that Stone's predecessor, Seymour Russell, would have attended such potentially compromising meetings, and indeed the presence of any official CIA case officer would have violated the most elementary rules of tradecraft unless the meetings were held in total secrecy or arranged in such a way that the officers would have had a legitimate reason for attending. If Russell did personally participate at these meetings instead of employing a "cut-out", this
would have constituted an exceptional circumstance whose attendant risks could only have been justified by the importance of the ensuing discussions.\textsuperscript{258} Finally, yet another unconfirmed report indicates that CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton--Borghese’s angel of mercy in 1945--visited the Black Prince some weeks before the coup, and that shortly thereafter he returned to the United States.\textsuperscript{259}

Although it might be argued that very few things could be as important as plotting a coup, one must be skeptical of such claims in the absence of corroborating evidence, especially since the dangers and repercussions of exposure would be correspondingly greater. But regardless of whether or not these last two assertions have any basis in fact, which it is at present impossible to determine, there is little doubt that elements of the CIA were later involved, at least indirectly, in covertly promoting anti-communist violence in Italy. Thus Stone himself, who had earlier played an important role in the 1953 coup that brought the Shah to power in Iran, is said to have urged Italian intelligence chiefs to use Vietnam-style counterinsurgency techniques to halt the advance of the communists. According to General Gerardo Serravalle, chief of the official Italian "Gladio" organization from 1971 to 1974, both Stone and his deputy station chief, Michael Sednaoui, visited the Sardinian training camp at Alghero in late 1972. This visit was ostensibly made in order to review the training exercises for the "gladiators", but its real purpose was to discuss future American funding for the base. The CIA had already decided to reduce its previously high levels of support for the "stay/behind" program, since the possibility of a Soviet invasion and occupation of the Italian peninsula seemed increasingly remote. But the two CIA men took Serravalle aside and told him that
large-scale financing for the secret organization would only be restored provided that its role was expanded to encompass operations directed against "internal subversion". 260

On the surface this offer seems downright bizarre, since countering internal subversion had always been one of the chief functions of the "Gladio" network. This task was specifically listed in a June 1959 report clarifying the organization's sphere of action, and was reaffirmed even more forcefully at a 26 January 1966 meeting, during which the Americans proposed that select elements of the Italian services take a course in "counterinsurgency operations" at the U.S. Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg in North Carolina so that they would be better able to employ the "stay/behind" forces in these types of operations. 261 How, then, can one explain the peculiar offer made by Stone in December of 1972? One possibility is that it simply signified the abandonment of the network's earlier anti-invasion function and a full-scale shift toward its other chief task. However, both Serravalle and General Fausto Fortunato, then head of Ufficio R, the SID section under whose authority "Gladio" fell, supposedly turned down this offer. One can only wonder why, since by doing so they rejected increased American funding and repudiated one of the central functions of the organization they were entrusted with directing. Something is clearly fishy here, especially given the fact that a few months later Serravalle claimed to have discovered, to his chagrin, that many of the network's group leaders had a distorted and dangerous perception of it as an instrument for suppressing domestic leftists. 262 Be that as it may, Stone's offer itself demonstrates that his complaints about Martin's plan to fund Miceli, which supposedly caused Martin to threaten to have Marine guards throw him out of the embassy and put
him on a plane back to Washington, were motivated more by his opposition to the ambassador's tactless encroachment upon his bureaucratic turf than by a sincere opposition to employing rightists in covert anti-communist operations. It also suggests that contemporaneous CIA approaches to the PCI were designed primarily to obtain inside intelligence information which could later be used to discredit or fracture the party, not to open serious discussions or establish some sort of genuine modus vivendi with party representatives.  

Although there is certainly not enough hard evidence to demonstrate that NATO or American officials directly sponsored or participated in Fronte Nazionale plots, including the Borghese coup, the evidence that they were involved indirectly, via intermediaries, is considerably more compelling. The most important of these intermediaries were the "parallel" intelligence networks headed by Miceli at SID and D'Amato at the UAR, and Gelli's P2 masonic lodge. These organizations have already been introduced above, and it would require another book-length study altogether to describe everything that is now known about their history. But it is worth highlighting those features that might shed some light on the instrumental use and ultimate goals of the "Tora Tora" operation.

As has already been described, Judge Tamburino issued an arrest warrant for Miceli on 31 October 1974. The head of SID was accused of having promoted, formed, and organized, in conjunction with other persons, a secret association of military personnel and civilians in order to provoke an armed insurrection and, as a consequence of this, an illegal transformation of the constitution of the State and the form of government by means of the intervention of the armed forces, provoked by the actions of, and in part guided by, the very same association.
To achieve this objective, the association in turn made use of various armed groups with hierarchical structures, linked to each other at the base by "liaison officers" and linked to the summit by leaders spread out in various locales...[These groups were] financed to foment disorders, commit assaults, [and] carry out violent and threatening activities.264

In formally charging Miceli with these crimes, which primarily referred to his activities in the years after the Borghese coup, Tamburino sought to bring to light the links between neo-fascist paramilitary groups, an intermediate civilian-military coordinating body known as the Rosa dei Venti, and the top secret structure within the armed forces intelligence services which later came to be known, somewhat inaccurately, as "parallel SID".

As it happens, a number of people who were privy to inside information had already revealed important details about this particular structure and certain other parallel apparatuses linked to the secret services. In order to provide a justification for some of his unconstitutional activities in the mid-1960s, for example, General Giovanni De Lorenzo had been compelled to acknowledge the existence of one such apparatus. He claimed that the compiling of extensive personal files on leading Italian political figures was part and parcel of the vetting responsibilities of the Ufficio Sicurezza Patto Atlantico (USPA), which like SIFAR was attached to the Defense Ministry's general staff but was also linked, for intelligence gathering purposes, to the Carabinieri corps.265 It was later discovered that separate USPAs had been set up within the Defense and Interior Ministries, and that both were directly linked to a central headquarters located in Brussels. At the time of the Borghese coup, control of the Defense Ministry's USPA had been entrusted by Miceli to Colonel Antonio Alemanno of SID, whereas the Interior
Ministry's USPA was attached to the UAR and headed by D'Amato. But these secretive NATO security offices should not be confounded with other structures, including the more visible NATO secretariats in every Italian ministry, the clandestine "stay/behind" networks, "parallel SID" itself, or the latter's Rosa dei Venti offshoot.\footnote{266}

The entity known as "parallel SID" was an even more secret organization which had responsibilities that were primarily operational rather than intelligence-oriented. Several of its members, most of whom had themselves been arrested for anti-democratic subversion, began to break their code of silence during the mid-1970s. The first member to spill the beans was right-wing trade unionist Roberto Cavallaro, who testified in 1974 that the parallel organization, which he called Organizzazione X, included high-ranking elements from the Italian and American secret services, as well as from some leading multinational corporations, among its leaders. He traced its origins back the period right after De Lorenzo's "Plan Solo" was abandoned in 1964, and claimed that ever since it had manipulated, financed, and directed terrorist groups, via intermediaries, to undertake a strategy of destabilization. The goal, of course, was to provoke the security forces into activating emergency contingency plans designed to reestablish order. Cavallaro added that the organization aimed to alter the management of power in Italy, that NATO supported such an action, that the armed forces had been placed on alert, and that U.S. officials had taken part in operational meetings.\footnote{267} Finally, he indicated that Major Amos Spiazzi, an intelligence officer in an Army artillery unit stationed at Cremona and a key figure in later "coup" plots, was also associated with Organizzazione X.

Shortly thereafter, Judge Tamburino ordered Spiazzi's arrest. After remaining
silent for several months, the latter realized that none of his military superiors would be interceding on his behalf and thence admitted that he was in fact a member of this "security organization", whose ostensible purpose was to defend Italian institutions against the threat posed by communism. In May 1974 he testified that the organization was not identical to SID, though it largely coincided with SID, and acknowledged that it consisted of civilians, industrialists, and politicians as well as military personnel. The following year he told Judge Fiore that it constituted the "alter ego" of the official Ufficio I chain of command within the three armed services. He further claimed that he received a coded telephone message in April 1973 from Major Mauro Venturi, the secretary of Miceli's right-hand man, Colonel Marzollo, which instructed him to make contact with Attilio Lercari and Giacomo Tubino, two Genoese industrialists who were providing funds for renewed FN coup plots. Spiazzi soon put these Ligurian conspirators in contact with the representatives of right-wing paramilitary circles in the Veneto, including Eugenio Rizzato and General Nardella, and it was out of their collaborative efforts that the Rosa dei Venti organization congealed. Thus Spiazzi served as midwife in the birth and development of the Rosa network, within which he himself then assumed a very active role. But his real aim was to make instrumental use of this network in the interests of "parallel SID", that ultrasecret organization whose top leaders met with their Atlantic Alliance counterparts in Brussels at least once a year and were granted a NATO security clearance even higher than "cosmic". Among the members of this restricted elite, which amounted to a few dozen people at most, was the head of SID.

Miceli himself made no concerted effort to deny the existence of such an
organization. On the contrary, when he was being questioned by Judge Fiore about "parallel SID" shortly after his October 1974 arrest, he responded as follows:

"To be able to defend myself adequately and collaborate in the ascertainment of the truth, as I think it is my duty to do, I must refer to facts and circumstances, investigative methods, and intelligence results that involve the security of the state and that I believe to be covered by political-military secrecy agreements. I have already asked three times to be released from the bonds of secrecy, but up till now I have not received the authorization...[Therefore,] I find myself constrained to avail myself of the right to abstain from responding." 269

Newly-elected Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who had played an important role in covering up the clandestine activities of De Lorenzo ten years before, refused to grant Miceli’s request because, as he put it, he knew nothing about an organization within the secret services that had as its task the "subversion of the state".270 This elusive response was a model of political doublespeak. For one thing, Moro refused to address Fiore’s key question about why it was necessary to hold Miceli to secrecy agreements concerning things that supposedly did not even exist. For another, he referred exclusively to a parallel organization that aimed at undermining the state, which did not in fact exist within the services, and said nothing at all about the one that various witnesses claimed was designed to strengthen and protect the state from leftist subversion.

Miceli was therefore left to stew in his own juices, and he never forgave Andreotti and Moro for what he perceived to be their willingness to make him the "fall guy" and sacrifice his career. Three years later, after having been elected as an MSI deputy in 1976 and thereby obtaining parliamentary immunity, he finally had the opportunity to take a measure of revenge. In response to a precise question from Judge Antonio Abate, who was then presiding over the second Borghese coup trial, the former
SID chief seized the moment:

"In essence you want to know if a top secret organism exists within the framework (ambito) of SID. Up till now I have spoken of the twelve branches into which [the service] is divided. Each of these has, as an appendix, other organisms, other operational organizations, all of which have (sempre con) institutional aims. There is, and has always been, a particular top secret organization that the highest authorities of the state also know about. Seen from outside, by the profane, this organization could be interpreted as something alien to official policy. It is an organism inserted into the framework of SID, separated from the [regular] chain of officers belonging to Ufficio I, which undertakes fully institutional tasks, even if they concern activities that are far removed from intelligence gathering [!!!]. If you ask me about particular details, I tell you I cannot respond. Ask the highest authorities of the state about them so that you can obtain a definitive clarification."²⁷¹

In this way, Miceli issued a direct challenge to the political establishment and implicated high-ranking politicians in the actions undertaken by "parallel" SID. Unfortunately, Abate chose not to follow up on this suggestive firsthand testimony.

During the summer of 1984, further information about this organization was provided by yet another witness with firsthand knowledge of the neo-fascist milieu, convicted right-wing bomber Vincenzo Vinciguerra. Vinciguerra claimed that every terrorist massacre since 1969--other than the Peteano bombing for which he claimed personal responsibility--could be traced to a common organizational matrix. Indeed, the entire terrorist "strategy of tension", which was designed to reinforce the existing power structure and the Atlantic Alliance, was sponsored by a secret, parallel apparatus connected to the Interior Ministry's UAR and, via the Carabinieri, to SID. This strategy was not carried out by radical rightist organizations per se with the help of ideological sympathizers within those services, as Vinciguerra himself had originally believed, but rather by camouflaged elements of the security forces or their agents who operated inside
those rightist organizations. Once again, the existence of a secret structure resembling "parallel SID" was confirmed, this time by a political radical who had become convinced that the militants within his own milieu had been systematically manipulated by it.

Last but not least, this particular parallel organization has been explicitly linked to NATO "stay/behind" networks in the wake of recent revelations about the existence of the latter. The report on "Gladio" that Prime Minister Andreotti sent to Parliament in October 1990 was suggestively entitled *Operazione Gladio—La cosidette "SID Parallelo"*, and a few months later Spiazzi proudly referred to himself as a "gladiator" and likewise conflated the two organizations. Since then, many commentators have attempted to attribute all the massacres and coup plots that afflicted Italy between 1964 and 1984 to these recently uncovered "stay/behind" networks, which undoubtedly represents a gross oversimplification of the real situation.

What can be said with certainty, however, is that Miceli and D'Amato, both of whom were explicitly identified as "supporters" of the Borghese coup by key FN insiders, stood at the apex of secret, parallel apparatuses in Italy which were organically linked to the NATO and American security establishments. Given the context, this fact alone is of great potential significance. But there is additional testimony which suggests that these apparatuses, or at least certain elements of them, were activated and deployed on the night of 7-8 December 1970. In November 1983, Spiazzi told members of the parliamentary commission investigating P2 that his artillery unit had received orders to move on the evening of the coup. He claimed that he recalled that particular night very
well, both because he was acting as unit commander in the absence of Colonel Re and because the entire 67th infantry regiment, to which his unit was attached, was celebrating the anniversary of the battle of Montelungo. Spiazzi then described the precise sequence of events.

Sometime between 4:30 and 6 PM he received a phone call from his close friend, ON bigwig Elio Massagrande, who warned him that the FN would be carrying out a "demonstration" in Rome that very evening, at the behest of an important government leader (personaggio). Massagrande claimed that the Fronte was chosen because it was not a regular political party and because its members were notoriously right-wing, and further indicated that ON would not participate in the operation and had dissociated itself from it. Spiazzi had heard nothing about this beforehand and found it rather odd, but less than one hour later he received a second call from yet another friend, retired General Umberto Corniani, who also happened to be the FN's Veneto "delegate" and a key figure in the Gruppi Savoia, a militant monarchist organization with its own paramilitary squads. Corniani told Spiazzi that Borghese had phoned him and ordered him to make everything ready, since a major action would be launched in the capital that same night. Spiazzi remained perplexed and noncommittal, but around 9 PM he received a coded phone telegram—transmitted by Comiliter headquarters in Padua through his regiment’s Ufficio I operations channel in Cremona—ordering him to activate the "Triangle" emergency plan, which supposedly mandated that the entire "parallel SID" apparatus be immediately set in motion toward preselected objectives. Trustworthy elements within his own artillery unit were to march westward, meet up with the
"Lancieri di Milano" unit in Monza, and then move on to invest the Sesto San Giovanni neighborhood in Milan, a hotbed of left-wing radicalism. Due to a fortuitous transfer of munitions that was in the process of being carried out that very day, which meant that two armored personnel carriers full of artillery shells were already loaded and ready to go, Spiazzi’s unit was prepared to move almost immediately. By the time it reached the Agrate train station, however, a counterorder was issued via the same communications channels, and his forces thence returned to base.274

In addition to buttressing other allegations about the mobilization and deployment of military and Carabinieri units on the night of the Borghese coup, Spiazzi’s testimony explicitly linked such actions to a top secret operational plan to be carried out by the parallel networks headed by Miceli and D’Amato, among others. As one would expect, his superiors within the military hierarchy subsequently denied knowing anything about the "Triangle" plan. Among those who made this claim were Admiral Henke, Armed Forces chief of staff in December 1970, and General Siro Rosseti, at that time head of SIOS-Esercito in the Lazio region. Other officers testified that they had no recollections of that evening, including Captain Pirro, head of the Ufficio I communications center at Cremona.275 Once again, we are confronted with the problem of which witness or witnesses to believe, and in the absence of material evidence there is no way to be certain. Although it is obvious that Spiazzi, who was then seeking to defend himself against charges of subversion and political conspiracy, had very good reasons to attribute the responsibility for some of these illegal actions to his superiors, it is also true that the latter had equally strong motives for denying that these unconstitutional deployments took
place and for covering up "parallel SID"’s possible involvement in them. By doing so, after all, they would have been protecting their own careers and reputations. Spiazzi’s credibility in some other areas was attacked by the judges investigating the Borghese coup, perhaps with good reason, but much of the information he provided to Judge Tamburino and the P2 commission dovetailed very well with testimony and evidence that emerged in later years.

Even if some of the details can be said to be erroneous, it seems probable that there was considerably more than a kernel of truth in the revelations made by Spiazzi and others concerning the actions taken by certain parallel networks on the night of the "Tora Tora" operation. The existence of the "Triangle" plan and its activation that evening were both accepted without hesitation by MSI Senator and P2 commission member Giorgio Pisanò, who may well have received additional information about it from one of his contacts in the military intelligence service. In his account, however, no mention is made of the role allegedly played by "parallel SID". Pisanò characterizes "Triangle" as an emergency intervention plan which was based exclusively upon the mobilization and deployment of trustworthy anti-communist elements from each participating military unit. The actions justifying their seizure of key objectives and crackdown on "subversives" were to be carried out unwittingly by Borghese’s men, not consciously by elements of parallel civilian-military structures referred to as Organizzazione X or "parallel SID". Spiazzi, on the other hand, gives the distinct impression that both the FN and these parallel apparatuses had important, though different, roles to play that night. In any event, the extensive efforts made by Miceli to cover up Borghese’s "coup" and protect
the plotters should alone engender a certain amount of suspicion, since as SID chief he stood at the summit of one such network--perhaps the most important of them all--within the Defense Ministry.

Not coincidentally, "parallel SID" leader Miceli also happened to be a member of the P2 masonic lodge, which served as another important but indirect conduit between the Atlantic security establishment and the Black Prince's men. The parliamentary commission investigating P2 uncovered evidence that Gelli had close links to a number of Western secret services and was probably a top-level operative for one or more of them, that he was connected to leading Republican Party circles in the United States, and that many key figures who had a "significant involvement" in the Borghese coup were members of his secretive, restricted, and highly selective organization.277 This group not only included FN activists like Orlandini and Saccucci, secret service and parallel network personnel like Miceli and D'Amato, and military officers like Fanali and Ricci, but also one of Nixon's chief liaisons in Italy, Sicilian financier Sindona, through whose banking network the American government first laundered and then disseminated considerable sums of money which had been earmarked for anti-communist political groups.278 It should also be pointed out that Miceli began to strengthen his contacts with Borghese and Orlandini in mid-1969, during the very period when he was recruited into the P2 lodge, and that one year later Gelli worked behind the scenes to support Miceli's successful bid to become head of SID by lobbying Defense Minister Tanassi through the latter's secretary, Bruno Palmiotti, another P2 member.279 However, in discussing the interaction between P2 and the Borghese coup, it is not necessary to limit
oneself to highlighting this overlapping network of personal connections.

Miceli's active role in covering up the "Tora Tora" operation has already been discussed in detail. In carrying out this series of obstructive maneuvers, he seems to have worked in tandem with the Venerable Master of the P2 lodge. A good deal of information about Gelli's alleged efforts to protect the "Tora Tora" plotters was later recounted by neo-fascist militant Paolo Aleandri, whom Fabio and Alfredo De Felice had taken into their confidence. In 1974, the two De Felice brothers were warned by a sympathetic Guardia di Finanza official that an arrest warrant was about to be issued for various FN leaders suspected of having been involved in the Borghese coup. This ominous news prompted them to flee to London for safety, whereas Filippo De Jorio, one of their closest co-conspirators, opted to take refuge elsewhere, first in Paris and then in Montecarlo. After charges against the two siblings were dropped at the first trial, both De Felices returned to Italy, Fabio to Poggio Catino and Alfredo to Rome. At this point, having already developed a good deal of trust in Aleandri, his former high school pupil, Fabio De Felice asked him to collaborate on their journal, Politica e Strategia, and sought to involve him in other projects that they were sponsoring. It was in this context that the De Felice brothers began openly discussing a rightist seizure of power and revealing details about the role played by Gelli in the Borghese operation.

Aleandri subsequently claimed that Alfredo had been in regular contact with Gelli, and that the latter had personally introduced the two of them. Then, prior to departing for a job at Alfa Romeo in South Africa, Alfredo specifically requested that Aleandri serve as the intermediary between De Jorio, who had not been absolved in the first trial,
and the head of P2. Since both De Felice telephones were tapped, Alfredo told Aleandri that De Jorio would phone his house from Montecarlo, using the pseudonym "Marcelli", and asked the young radical to personally convey De Jorio’s messages to Gelli. Thereafter Aleandri received several anxious phone calls from De Jorio, who implored him to visit Gelli in his luxurious suite at the Hotel Excelsior, remind him of his plight, and get updates on the status of the defendants in the second "Tora Tora" trial. These contacts were undertaken during the 1977-1978 period. The Venerable Master was apparently already working behind the scenes to improve the plotters’ legal position, both by applying covert pressure on the relevant political and judicial authorities and by conditioning press coverage, and on one occasion he told Aleandri to reassure De Jorio that a general political solution was being arranged. Although it will probably never be possible to determine exactly how much influence Gelli’s multifaceted personal interventions exerted on this process, all the serious charges against the key Fronte Nazionale conspirators ended up being dropped.

Several years later, Fabio De Felice sent a letter to the president of the P2 commission, DC Deputy Tina Anselmi, in which he denied that he had ever met or seen Gelli, attacked the credibility of Aleandri, and criticized the tactics employed by the commission, especially its failure to solicit testimony from those it was accusing of involvement in illegal rightist subversion. Nevertheless, there are several specific pieces of evidence which indicate that Gelli and other leading P2 figures went out of their way to impede the progress of the judicial investigations and otherwise provide assistance to the plotters. For example, when he was questioned about the Borghese coup by
Colonel Antonio Viezzer of SID in the Fall of 1973 or the Spring of 1974, the Venerable Master himself sought to discredit Orlandini's damaging testimony by referring to the shipbuilder as an unreliable "teller of tall tales". Much earlier, in March 1971, when the judges sought to question Miceli in person about the information his service had accumulated concerning the recently-exposed FN coup, Attorney General Carmelo Spagnuolo—an important P2 member and a close associate of Gelli's—intervened personally and arranged it so that the general would not have to testify. Four years later another key P2 "brother", General Raffaele Giudice of the Guardia di Finanza, prevailed upon his friend Achille Gallucci, head of the Rome Ufficio Istruzione, to intervene with the investigating magistrates so that Miceli would be freed on bail, a goal which was duly accomplished.

Nor was the P2 lodge the only group within Italian freemasonry to be implicated in the coup, although all evidence of possible Masonic involvement was excised from the three judicial sentences. The FN's "delegate" for Milan was Gavino Matta, a former Italian fascist volunteer in Spain and a member of a "covered" Milanese lodge which was associated with the Grand Lodge (Piazza del Gesù) headed by Giovanni Ghinazzi. In the Fall of 1970 Matta had written a letter to Gelli, informing him that his own lodge did not intend to support the P2 chief's initiatives since it was opposed in principle to violent methods, and that herewith he had been authorized to annul "every previous agreement" between the two lodges. But shortly thereafter he sent another letter to Gelli, this time indicating that he was available for action. He was apparently as good as his word, for on the night of 7-8 December 1970 Matta had been in the midst of giving a lecture
on coup techniques to the conspirators who had gathered at Orlandini’s shipyard, but was interrupted just after midnight by the phone call instructing Orlandini to leave at once for Rosa’s office. Three months later, after receiving advanced warning that the plotters were about to be arrested, he fled to Spain together with the Black Prince. In this connection, it should be noted that Ghinazzi was himself implicated in later plots, and was therefore questioned by the judges investigating the Rosa dei Venti and the Sogno group.

To this incriminating information about the actions taken by influential freemasons must be added insider revelations about two planned neo-fascist thefts of compromising masonic documents. The first of these occurred in the Spring of 1971, when MPON bigwig Paolo Signorelli asked Sergio Calore to help steal sensitive masonic materials from a villa outside Rome that was owned by Edoardo Formisano, regional MSI counselor for Lazio and Arturo Michelini’s personal secretary. These materials, which supposedly contained information about the behind-the-scenes political backers of the Borghese coup, were successfully purloined and thence consigned to Rauti. Delle Chiaie was also apparently interested in this venture, since AN leader Adriano Tilgher kept Calore under surveillance until he was temporarily kidnapped and warned not to concern himself with the affair. Later on, right-wing killer Pierluigi Concutelli confided to Calore that the MPON had also planned to steal a cache of documents from Gelli’s Villa Wanda in Arezzo, but that this project was then nixed by the organization’s military leader, Giuseppe (“Beppino”) Pugliese, who made it clear that the Venerable Master was untouchable. The ultimate sponsors of these particular "black bag" jobs remain to
be identified, as do the precise reasons for planning or carrying them out. It may be that members of the two main neo-fascist groups wished to obtain documentary evidence against the powerful political circles that secretly made instrumental use of violence and subversion, evidence which could then, if necessary, be utilized either to protect themselves or blackmail their manipulators. Alternatively, they may have been put up to it by elements linked to one or more of those very circles, who wanted to be certain that such evidence would not fall into the wrong hands. In either case, it is clear that these initiatives were both byproducts of a complex pattern of internecine rivalries between shifting factions of Freemasons, neo-fascists, secret service personnel, and politicians.

Perhaps most importantly, certain witnesses have testified that Gelli himself played a key role in determining the outcome of the coup. This matter is best considered in connection with the source of the counterorder which led to the much disputed recall of the conspirators in the wee hours of 8 December 1970.

The Counterorder

To this day, the last-minute issuance of the counterorder by Borghese remains something of a mystery, largely because the Black Prince never provided a complete explanation of his reasons for issuing it. Yet few things could be more important in assessing the historical significance of the coup. Solving this mystery would not only help to clarify the aims pursued by leading FN plotters; it would also shed more light on the often divergent motives of the powerful political forces, both national and international, which tacitly sponsored the action and/or sought to exploit it for their own purposes.

Shortly after midnight on the evening of 8 December 1970, Borghese received a
phone call which prompted him to cancel the operation and interrupt the maneuvers which were already underway. He told his assembled lieutenants at "command post A" that the external support which the plotters had counted on had failed to materialize, but did not reveal the name of the caller or provide further specifics. When Orlandini and Ciabatti arrived a few minutes later from "command post B", he explained that the projected plan to seize control of the Defense Ministry had been rendered impossible because military accomplices inside the building had failed to carry out their assigned tasks. Later, in the face of open hostility and bitter recriminations from several of his closest associates, he justified his issuance of the counterorder by saying that he himself had "obeyed superior orders", an explanation that was far too vague and laconic to satisfy the disappointed ultras, many of whom believed that they had been personally betrayed by their former hero. No further details seem to have been proffered about this matter by the Black Prince prior to his August 1974 death in Spain, which has only served to fuel subsequent speculation about the ultimate source of those orders and the identity of the caller.

It is of course possible that Borghese was telling the truth when he claimed that he called the operation off because he had learned that Defense Ministry insiders were not positioned to fulfill their allotted tasks. If the plotters counted upon the support of sympathetic elements within the armed forces, as indeed they did, they would surely have recognized the importance of having a high-ranking military conspirator like General Fanali issue orders via normal communications channels located inside Palazzo Barracchini. Such orders would not only have served to "officially" authorize the
provision of this hoped-for operational support, but would also have helped to deter non-participating military units from trying to interfere with the "legitimate" movements being carried out by both civilian and military participants. This projected scenario seems all the more credible given the fact that some of Delle Chiaie's men, with insider help, had supposedly taken control of the Interior Ministry's communications networks for a few hours that very same night. It also jibes with Saccucci's bitter lament that certain "groups of buffoons", together with "other little clowns, more or less in uniform", had been responsible for the failure of the coup. If the Black Prince's explanation is accepted at face value, it can then be assumed that one of his loyal co-conspirators phoned to inform him about the unforeseen problems which had arisen in connection with the FN's plan to take control of the Defense Ministry. Yet this relatively straightforward scenario is problematic in other ways. It does not conform to other testimony concerning the alleged source(s) of the call(s) received by Borghese that evening, and it neither explains why the former war hero said he was obeying "superior orders", nor why he refused to provide further specifics when he was later subjected to aggressive questioning and harsh criticism by his key FN subordinates.

The first desideratum, then, is to try to identify which so-called "superior" may have transmitted the orders instructing the Black Prince to call off the operation. Several well-known candidates have been nominated for this dubious honor. Not surprisingly, one of them is General Miceli. As noted above, the information provided by Franco Antico to Lieutenant Colonel Genovesi had been transmitted up through the chain of command to the head of military intelligence service shortly after midnight. Some observers have
suggested that Miceli, being a friend of Borghese’s and a secret promoter of coup plots, then contacted the Black Prince by phone to warn him that the Fronte’s subversive actions that evening had already been disclosed to SID. Spiazzi offered a variation on this scenario. He identified Lieutenant Colonel Giuseppe Condò, one of Miceli’s loyalists within SIOS-Esercito, as the person who actually conveyed the counterorder to Borghese. But these particular claims were countered by other witnesses with indirect or direct insider knowledge. According to Paolo Aleandri, for example, Fabio De Felice was convinced that Gelli had personally played a role in contacting the Black Prince and persuading him to terminate the operation. For his part, Remo Orlandini insisted that the operation was called off because the call made by Fenwich to Nixon did not go through. He implied that Fenwich, or some other intermediary between the plotters and the American government, then transmitted this disappointing news to "command post A". Since anticipated American support for the coup was not forthcoming, Borghese was reluctantly compelled to abort the "Tora Tora" plan.

In short, many of the purported sub rosa backers of the operation have been accused of being ultimately responsible for calling it off by transmitting the infamous counterorder. These conflicting claims make it all the more difficult to identify the specific individual(s) who actually made phone call(s) to the Black Prince or one of his key henchmen that evening. Yet there is no necessary contradiction between the apparently divergent claims that Miceli, Condò, Gelli, or someone close to Fenwich had made calls which exerted some influence on Borghese’s actions. Miceli was linked at least indirectly to Fenwich through his primary liaisons at the American embassy, among...
whom were hardliners like ambassador Graham Martin, Clavio, and certain unidentified CIA officials, and in spite of a dearth of tangible evidence the same may also have been true of Gelli, his P2 "brother" and lodgemaster. For his part, Condò was one of the key operatives in the SID chief’s 1974 efforts to expose Edgardo Sogno’s potentially embarrassing connections to Andreotti’s wife’s aunt, the Marchesa Maria Antonietta Nicastro. Moreover, all four of the above-named individuals played important roles in clandestine, parallel networks that worked in tandem with NATO and U.S. security agencies. Indeed, given the partially overlapping goals of various national and international circles which sought to covertly condition Italian political developments, in the long run it may not really matter exactly who transmitted the counterorder to Borghese. The more important question is why such a message was conveyed, which can only be answered when the real goals of these backers have been further clarified.

The Aims of the Forces Involved

The "Tora Tora" operation has up till now been depicted in one of two fundamentally incompatible ways. The first portrays Borghese and his followers as pathetic nostalgics who were acting entirely on their own initiative, and characterizes the operation as an amateur affair which was called off for some sort of trivial reason. Gelli later claimed, for instance, that a torrential downpour was all it took to derail the action, and others have suggested that key FN leaders had second thoughts at the last minute and went home to bed. However reassuring such contemptuous dismissals of the seriousness of the affair may sound, they do not conform at all to Fiore’s detailed judicial reconstruction, and they completely ignore both the overall political context and the close
links that had been forged between the plotters and key elements within the security forces of the Italian state. For these and other reasons, this particular interpretation cannot be taken seriously. In marked contrast, the second depicts the "coup" in a far more significant and sinister light. It characterizes Borghese and his ultras as the point men for, or the unwitting dupes of, far more powerful forces which sought, respectively, either to promote or make instrumental use of their anti-democratic plotting. There is scarcely any doubt that this second basic characterization is closer to the truth, but more attention has to be focussed on what these forces operating behind the scenes were really up to.

Despite the attempts of certain mainstream and conservative commentators to dismiss "Tora Tora" as a farcical or chimerical affair, it is now generally accepted that the actions taken by Borghese's men on the night of 7-8 December were not meant to be carried out independently of other military and political operations. Neither the Black Prince nor any of his key subordinates, many of whom had had previous military experience, could honestly have believed that the limited paramilitary forces at their disposal would alone be sufficient to bring down the existing political system. Most of them later admitted that they had counted on the intervention of elements of the Italian security forces for ultimate success, and several added, without equivocation, that they had anticipated the provision of American or NATO logistical support. These perfectly believable claims cannot be dismissed as mere post-facto rationalizations for incompetence and failure, since they fit the known facts like a hand fits a glove. From the outset, the FN had both expressed its public solidarity with the armed forces and
undertaken extensive covert efforts to recruit high-ranking military personnel, especially those in sensitive operational posts. Moreover, these complementary activities seem to have borne considerable fruit. Borghese’s expressions of soldierly esteem were reciprocated by important circles within the military establishment, and certain active-duty officers both encouraged the Black Prince to take action and promised to support the plotters if and when such an action was initiated. Despite their systematic efforts to limit the political damage stemming from their investigation, Judge Fiore and his colleagues were forced to admit that these officers, who they claimed it was impossible to identify with greater precision, had reneged on their promises at the crucial moment. In any event, it is clear that the Black Prince did not authorize the "Tora Tora" action until he had satisfied himself that the promised military support would be forthcoming.

Once the idea that a completely autonomous or independent military action by the FN and its neo-fascist allies has been ruled out, there remain three more or less plausible scenarios. The first is that anti-democratic rightists within the ranks of the military and various security agencies had really been persuaded to join forces with the extraparliamentary bands led by Borghese. Like the Black Prince and his civilian followers, and perhaps in part prompted by the Fronte’s secret but extensive proselytization and recruitment efforts, certain of these officials may well have come to believe that a communist seizure of power was imminent, either through legal or illegal means; that the degenerate partitocrazia was offering no effective resistance to this threat; that dramatic, even violent solutions were called for before it was too late; and
that the former naval hero was the only figure with enough prestige to rally the public in support of an overtly authoritarian anti-communist regime. In this case the goal of all those involved, whether or not they were formally affiliated with the security apparatus of the state, would have been essentially the same—to launch a full-scale military coup similar, in its general outlines, to those that were successfully carried out by the Greek Colonels and countless Latin American praetorians.

It seems clear that the bulk of the FN’s operational leaders honestly believed that sympathetic elements of the armed forces would support an outright Borghese-led attempt to overthrow the existing political class. However naive such a notion may seem in retrospect, there is considerable evidence suggesting that this was precisely what they were counting on. The first is the proclamation that the Black Prince had personally prepared, in advance, to read over RAI-TV’s airwaves (and perhaps also transmit via certain restricted military channels). As noted above, this consisted of an emotional public appeal for support aimed at "patriotic" Italians and members of the armed forces, coupled with an effort to reassure the U.S. and its NATO allies that the new government his followers intended to set up would not only maintain, but increase, its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. It should also be recalled that Borghese’s close associate Guadagni unabashedly promoted the Black Prince as an Italian version of De Gaulle, who alone would be able to establish a cisalpine "public safety" regime on the French model. A similar belief that the coup would usher in a new government and that leading FN figures would then assume key positions in it was expressed by Orlandini, who told Fenwich that he himself would be appointed as chief of the armed forces
general staff in the wake of a successful coup.\textsuperscript{301} There is no doubt that equally grandiose ideas were shared by many other plotters, who mistakenly placed faith in the expressions of sympathy and promises of assistance proffered by various military and secret service personnel.

Although it is practically certain that Borghese and his men had some genuine admirers and active supporters within the ranks of the Italian security forces, the assistance of such avid loyalists was apparently provided on an individual rather than an official or institutional basis. Those who secretly represented formal or parallel institutional interests seem to have operated in accordance with very different agendas. Indeed, the majority of the observers who are familiar with the details of the "Tora Tora" affair, whether former participants or serious external investigators, have concluded that the FN plotters were duped and manipulated by elements of various military and intelligence organizations which they had mistakenly trusted and relied upon for the success of their venture. The proponents of this interpretation include knowledgeable individuals on all sides of the political spectrum, ranging from leading Fronte Nazionale protagonists and neo-fascist ultras to radical left-wing analysts and some relative "moderates". There are, however, serious differences of opinion about which personnel honestly supported the Black Prince’s goals and which ones sought to sabotage or otherwise subvert those goals. There is probably no way to provide a definitive answer to these questions given the current lacunae in the available documentation, but it should be possible to make some educated guesses and rule out some of the more implausible scenarios.
There are two contrasting variants of the theory that the rightist ultras who were participating in what they thought was a coup had been secretly manipulated and instrumentalized by powerful political, military, and intelligence factions with divergent aims. Both of these variants share one common postulate, that the actions carried out by Borghese's forces would provide the pretext and the catalyst for the launching of a top secret anti-insurrectional plan by elements of the security forces of the Italian state. The plotters would thus undertake only the initial "provocation" phases of a far more complex and extensive operation. In this sense, they would perform the same function that right-wing extremists have often performed elsewhere, both before and after 1970. The key question is whether the FN conspirators were ultimately to benefit from, or be victimized by, their pro-coup provocation efforts that evening. In other national contexts, one can find examples of both these possible outcomes. Many of the rightist paramilitary groups whose violence provided a pretext for the 1967 military coup in Greece were later disbanded when they had outlived their usefulness or threatened to become too autonomous, and after helping to precipitate the 1980 military coup in Turkey, leading figures of the neo-fascist Milliyetçilik Hareket Partisi (MHP: Nationalist Action [or Movement] Party) were first marginalized and then arrested and placed on trial for terrorist activities. In marked contrast, in Chile members of rightist paramilitary squads like Patria y Libertad were incorporated into DINA, the junta's secret police, and other security or propaganda agencies after the 1973 coup.

The first and more straightforward variant of the "state manipulation" theory is perhaps best referred to as the "anti-leftist" variant. This plan was apparently designed
to unfold in the following way. Borghese's forces were to seize various key objectives with inside help, including the Interior Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the central headquarters of RAI-TV, and possibly the Quirinale presidential palace and the palaces housing the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, contingents from AN, the ANPDI, and other rightist youth groups would foment disorders at strategic locations throughout Rome. Even if the PCI and extraparliamentary left were not provoked into some sort of overreaction, the goal was to create the impression that radical left-wing groups had taken to the streets in an insurrection attempt. In either case, the suppression of these violent disorders would have appeared to require the immediate intervention of the security forces. In short, carefully planned disturbances would produce a crisis of public order that would in turn precipitate the activation of emergency anti-insurrection plans by special cadres of the Carabinieri, selected units of the armed forces, and certain parallel apparatuses linked to the secret services. Once these official forces had moved into position and relieved the plotters who had seized control of the above-noted objectives, the paramilitary civilian forces would then, to the chagrin of their leading militants, be consigned to a purely auxiliary and marginal status. They would be allowed to assist regular units in their efforts to arrest "subversive" leftist politicians and union leaders, and perhaps be assigned to carry out other "dirty" jobs. But their overall operational role would be severely circumscribed and their political influence would be practically nil, thus dashing the overinflated expectations of the Black Prince and his chief lieutenants.

A number of informed observers have argued, however, that Borghese and his
plotters were themselves among the forces that were to be suppressed in the wake of the intervention by the security forces. Far from benefitting from their crucial provocateur role in the operation, they were intended to be its initial victims. This particular variant can be referred to as the "anti-extremism" variant. As in the other variant, the actions taken by the Fronte and its allies were again supposed to provide the spark that catalyzed the activation of various emergency anti-insurrectional plans. It is therefore likely that some of these plans governed the reactions of the Carabinieri, others the response of regular military units, and still others the actions to be taken by clandestine structures and paramilitary networks linked to NATO or the U.S. But in this case, along with radical leftists, "expendable" right-wingers like the Black Prince's followers were also primary targets of the crackdown. The action would have been publicly justified by the need to carry out a major strike against the dangerous "opposing extremisms" that were then posing a threat to the existence of the Italian state. But the real purpose was to make instrumental use of "black" terrorism and subversion in order to strengthen the political positions of certain factions affiliated in one way or another with the political establishment, factions which had supporters and referents in a number of other Western countries. By cracking down on both right- and left-wing ultras, certain of these ambitious and opportunistic politicians, government officials, and well-connected "outsiders" were apparently hoping to pose as the "saviors" of Italian democracy. Who were these unscrupulous men, and how did they ultimately make use of the Borghese coup?

Two shifting factional groupings seem to have been behind the "state
manipulation" scenarios outlined above, since both were at odds with the proponents of an outright coup. The first of these was the so-called "presidentialist" group. It consisted of a number of highly influential political figures, both within and outside government, who believed that the postwar First Republic was too unstable, corrupt, and inefficient to resolve Italy's profound economic, political, and social crises or increase her international role and stature. The chief problem they identified was the weakness of the executive branch in relation to the power and privileges enjoyed by representatives of the disputatious parties, both inside the corridors of Parliament and throughout the administrative apparatus of the entire country. After all, in spite of the political dominance of DC-led coalitions and the general continuity of fundamental policies and decision-making processes in the period after 1948, Italy was a country where particular cabinets had fallen on an average of more than once per year. Indeed, the whole party system, rooted as it was in patronage, corruption, and influence-peddling, presented a target of opportunity for unscrupulous forces of all types, including the communists, who could easily exploit its many weaknesses with their own well-organized and highly-disciplined party apparatus. The presidentialists wanted to replace this "soft", inefficient, and easily conditioned system, which in their view was ripe for an eventual communist takeover, with a brand new Second Republic. To accomplish this goal, they advocated the formation of a temporary "emergency government" and the carrying out of constitutional reforms. These reforms would be designed, among other things, to greatly expand the powers of the President at the expense of Parliament, and to alter the nature of the latter by eliminating proportional representation and instituting a more stable two-
party arrangement which was loosely modelled on the American system.\textsuperscript{302}

The second of the two manipulative factional groupings consisted of influential elements within the existing political establishment which sought to make use of political violence and subversion in order to buttress their own personal and clientelistic power base and thereby gain advantages in the covert infighting that has always characterized Italian parliamentary and bureaucratic politics. These "establishment manipulators", who can perhaps be usefully subdivided into cynical opportunists and those who were firmly convinced that their own career advancement was in the higher interests of the country, were generally affiliated with leading factions of the DC. It should be pointed out that the DC exhibited certain unique characteristics which distinguished it from most other modern European parties. As a politically dominant interclass Catholic party, it encompassed an unusually broad variety of social groups and sectional lobbies whose specific interests could not always be easily reconciled. These included, among others, the reformist, left-leaning economic agenda of Catholic workers, the moderately conservative interests of the middle class forces which constituted the party's majority, the anti-reformist policies generally advocated by large landowners and certain groups of industrialists, and the far right "social" concerns of its integralist elements. This aggregation of conflicting intraparty interests was further complicated by the external pressure periodically applied by powerful but internally divided Vatican circles. As an outgrowth of these extraordinary countervailing forces, the party developed into a vast, sprawling apparatus that was composed of loosely connected clientelistic networks and, consequently, riven by intense factional disputes.\textsuperscript{303} Indeed, it could be argued that the
internal struggles between various DC factions were as important as the DC's rivalries with other parties in determining the constellation of forces at the apex of the Italian state. It would, however, be wrong to associate all these DC correnti with specific ideological and programmatic agendas, for many evolved into self-interested patronage networks that revolved around particular leaders whose own policies shifted over time.

Given the divergent political aims of the "presidentialists" and the "establishment manipulators", it would be natural to associate the former with the "anti-leftist" variant and the latter with the "anti-extremism" variant. On the surface, the presidentialists seemingly intended to marginalize the more sordid elements of the far right after using them to take control of the government, whereas the establishment manipulators aimed to utilize them in a dual way, first to provide the pretext for a military intervention and then to serve as the sacrificial rightist victims of subsequent official crackdowns on the "opposing extremisms". But such a simplified bifurcation between their respective plans for Borghese and his men may not fully correspond to reality. Note, for example, that the so-called "white coup" sponsored three years later by Sogno, a leading and indefatigable presidentialist conspirator, specifically provided for the "burning" of violent neo-fascist groups and the promotion of a "progressive" social agenda. It was hoped that these actions would help to garner public support for their attempts to form a temporary "emergency" regime. This suggests that the presidentialists may have earlier envisioned a similar action against the radical right, despite their ostensible attempts to forge "alliances" with some neo-fascist leaders, and it has even been argued that they intended to "burn" the ultras in order to clear the way for the carrying out of their own
plans. On the other hand, it may be that certain establishment manipulators did not really want to eradicate the entire paramilitary right, but only certain "disposable" factions of it. Since they presumably intended to base a considerable portion of their own popularity on their continued attempts to control the scourge of violence perpetrated by the "opposing extremisms", they may well have wished to exploit future acts of right-wing terrorism in order to periodically renew this source of public support. In that case, it would have been in their long-term interest to ensure the survival of certain neo-fascist networks, if not to covertly foster occasional acts of violence by their members. Exploiting fears of genuine or artificially-manufactured "threats" to the existing state has long been an effective technique employed by political leaders, whatever their ideologies, who sought to fortify their own positions of power.

The fundamental differences between the attitudes of the presidentialists and the establishment manipulators toward the existing political class can be boiled down to a single declaratory sentence. The former wanted to replace or radically reorganize that class, whereas the latter, being important members of it, sought to preserve it even as they worked to improve their own positions within it. But this divergence should not obscure some important underlying similarities between the two groups. Both were resolutely pro-Atlantic in their geopolitical orientation and uncompromisingly anti-communist on the home front, and in this sense their views did not differ greatly from those of Borghese and his chief lieutenants. These attitudes alone made such conspiratorial groups acceptable, at least as a last resort, to influential circles within the governments and secret services of the United States and other Western nations. Under
normal circumstances many of those circles clearly preferred to avoid undertaking risky political ventures which might backfire, but faced with the prospect of a possible communist assumption of power, even via legal means, they would not have hesitated to have had recourse to groups of this type. Only some of the more radical neo-fascists who collaborated on some level with the Black Prince were considered wholly beyond the pale, since they were genuinely hostile to Atlanticism and opposed to American imperialism.

With this background, the roles played by the various quasi-official forces which secretly encouraged Borghese to launch the provocative "Tora Tora" operation can perhaps be further clarified. The best place to begin is with the "political" figures associated with the leadership group of the Fronte Nazionale, specifically Filippo De Jorio and the two De Felice brothers, who were nicknamed the "brothers Karamasov" by their co-conspirators. De Jorio was a high-profile lawyer who had developed close links with "vast sectors of the parliamentary right", above all influential conservative factions of the DC. According to his own 1975 admission, he had served as one of Prime Minister Mariano Rumor’s political counselors in 1969, and had then been elected as a DC deputy for the Lazio region. By age 37 he had acquired so much prestige, "both within governmental circles and inside the party structure", that he was regularly invited to participate in top-level meetings with DC leaders such as Rumor, DC Secretary Flaminio Piccoli, and Giulio Orlando. During this period, moreover, he apparently became one of Giulio Andreotti’s right-hand men. He later revealed that he had played an active role in the planning and organizing work which took place prior to the May...
1972 elections, and that in connection with this and other duties he had occupied an office near Prime Minister Andreotti's on the third floor of Palazzo Chigi. The following year he acted as a political counselor for Andreotti, at whose request he advocated a rejection of the center-left formula at the June DC congress. In October of that same year, after Andreotti's government had fallen, the former Prime Minister and members of his faction held a meeting at Rome's Cinema Antares. At this gathering De Jorio was the only speaker seated on the stage next to Andreotti, along with the coterie of government officials and bureaucrats who backed the latter's political return.308

De Jorio was thus in regular and direct contact with some of the most powerful figures in the Italian political establishment throughout the entire period when he was actively involved in FN plots, since his involvement in such plotting by no means ceased after the abrupt termination of the "Tora Tora" operation. Among other things, he played an active role during the top-level FN meetings held in January and February of 1971, as well as at the December 1971 meeting in Genoa between industrialist Andrea Piaggio and Admiral Roselli Lorenzini. He also openly supported the FN leaders who were originally arrested for participating in the Borghese coup, first by serving as Orlandini's lawyer and then by speaking at a 13 February 1972 public rally held in support of the arrestees at the Cinema Adriano in Rome.309 But where did his real loyalties lie, to the right-wing golpistas commanded by the Black Prince, to the presidentialists operating behind the scenes, or to certain opportunistic politicians? In his sentence Judge Fiore highlighted De Jorio's importance by noting his close relations with Orlandini, his presence at crucial FN meetings before and after the coup, and his projected appointment
to an important post within the post-coup government, but implied that he was a Fronte loyalist who was using his connections with powerful political figures on behalf of the plotters.310

There are, however, reasons to doubt this politically convenient interpretation. It is true that De Jorio served as the main intermediary between the FN plotters and various influential politicians who claimed to be sympathetic to their cause, but it may well be that he was working at the behest of the latter, whose interests were in reality quite different than—if not antithetical to—those of Borghese. Among other things, De Jorio’s links to various secret or parallel structures need to be kept in mind. Around the time of the coup, for example, he was President of the Ufficio Alti Studi Strategici, located inside the Defense Ministry, and was therefore in close contact with the leaders of the Italian armed forces.311 His name also appeared prominently on the P2 membership list, and as noted above he later managed, using Aleandri as his liason, to solicit Gelli’s intervention in support of his legal defence. Beyond that, he was connected to a vast network of "private" intelligence-linked organizations and personnel, many of them indefatigable advocates of unconventional warfare and/or unconstitutional action. On 14 March 1971—only three days before the initial arrest of Orlandini and other leading plotters—De Jorio attended the premier meeting of the rightist Associazione Amici delle Forze Armate, along with the Black Prince himself and retired General Giovanni De Lorenzo, of "Plan Solo" notoriety. He was also amongst those present at the infamous 24 June 1971 conference on "Guerra Non Ortodossa e Difesa", which was sponsored by the Istituto di Studi Militari (ISM), an advocacy group headed by Paolo Possenti that had

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been created in the 1960s by a far right DC parliamentary association. Later still, De Jorio provided the seed money for the establishment of the Politica e Strategia journal, which consistently promoted various forms of military intervention—short of an outright coup d'état—in response to leftist subversion and violence. In October 1974, moreover, he publicly criticized the judges who had issued a search warrant for presidentialist proponent Sogno. Thus De Jorio operated right in the midst of that shadowy right-wing milieu where elements of the state, the parallel state, and ostensibly anti-state forces intermingled, plotted, and sought to exploit and manipulate each other.

Alfredo and Fabio De Felice were the FN figures who collaborated most intimately with De Jorio, albeit in a subordinate capacity, and they frequently appeared at the DC official's side during the most significant Fronte gatherings, including a November 1970 meeting with Orlandini and the first two post-coup meetings in 1971. Although both actively participated in the operational planning and coordination work that preceded the Borghese coup, as well as in subsequent plotting, the focus of their efforts lay in somewhat different areas. Alfredo concerned himself above all with "political" matters, and was in large part responsible for maintaining contacts between the plotters and various political and military circles, whereas Fabio concentrated on "organizational" matters, in particular on strengthening FN links with the entire spectrum of ultra-rightist groups. Less details have surfaced about Alfredo's role, since key right-wing pentiti were not as close to him as they were to Fabio. It seems certain, however, that Alfredo graduated from a university with a degree in chemistry, and according to Aleandri he subsequently obtained a job as an industrial counselor in De Jorio's office. And although
De Jorio initially financed and was nominally the editor of *Politica e Strategia*, it may be that Alfredo was really in charge of the publication.\textsuperscript{314}

As for Fabio, the elder of the two De Felice brothers, he had had a long history of activism in Italian and European neo-fascist circles. On 8 March 1953, in the course of an action organized by the MSI to protest Allied policy toward Trieste, he lost the lower part of his left leg when a bomb exploded outside the Fronte Sloveno’s Contrada del Corso headquarters in that city. He then became an MSI Deputy, but was expelled from the party in October 1955, presumably for expressing views critical of the leadership. After promoting a short-lived MSI dissident movement called the Movimento Antifascista Italiano [!], he joined an international anti-Marxist center created by the Fronte per la Rinascita Nazionale. In 1963, he and MSI ultra Giulio Caradonna formed the Centro di Europa Unità, with financial assistance from unspecified sponsors in Spain and France. Four years later, he became chief of propaganda for Pacciardi’s "presidentialist" Nuova Repubblica movement. Aleandri later confirmed that Fabio was closely linked to Caradonna, and added that he had similar relations with ON leaders Rauti and Clemente Graziani.\textsuperscript{315} And if Aleandri’s radical neo-fascist associate Sergio Calore is to be believed, Fabio was also one of the founders, along with Delle Chiaie (AN), Graziani (MPON), Paolo Signorelli (MPON), and Enzo Maria Dantini, of the "Nazi-Maoist" Organizzazione Lotta di Popolo (OLP) in early 1970.\textsuperscript{316} Fabio’s myriad associations with such extremists by no means ended after Borghese’s venture failed. SID informant Francesco Primicino aptly characterized the situation that obtained throughout the 1970s and right up into the early 1980s when he noted that Fabio was linked to the
As in the case of De Jorio, the problem here is to determine whose interests the De Felices were in fact serving. Several clues are provided by the testimony of Aleandri, Calore, and other neo-fascist pentiti, but certain ambiguities unfortunately remain. A good deal of evidence suggests that Fabio De Felice was a genuine proponent of radical rightist ideas and violent strategies for conditioning Italy's political environment. According to Aleandri, who was a student in his secondary school philosophy class and thence developed a close political relationship with his former teacher, Fabio was heavily influenced by the philosophical and political views of esoteric "traditionalists" like Julius Evola and René Guénon, two idols of the Italian far right. As such, he expressed a fundamental antagonism toward the materialistic cultural values and the levelling massification process associated with modern democratic states, and in their place promoted the ideal of an "organic", hierarchical society of the medieval type. Since it was no longer possible to reestablish such a society, the next best thing would be the creation of a "national-socialist" society purged of its plebeian and pseudo-democratic elements. He recognized, like Evola, that this was an uncompromisingly elitist and anti-democratic view which would never appeal to the mainstream bourgeois and leftist forces in Italy, and thus advocated the assumption of power by a dedicated minority, even if this required--but only as a last resort--an outright coup d'état. In the meantime, he felt that the one existing group which embodied "traditionalist" values and could attract sufficient support among alienated anti-leftist youths was Ordine Nuovo, so much so that he and his brother apparently wrote anonymous articles for various ON
publications. On the surface, all this would lead one to conclude that Fabio was a genuine Evolan militant, and that in the period leading up to and following the "Tora Tora" operation he and his brother were interacting with De Jorio and other political and military officials on behalf of Borghese and the FN. It may even be true.

Other information exists, however, which complicates and casts considerable doubt on this relatively straightforward scenario. First of all, both De Felice brothers had connections to a number of parastate or parallel intelligence structures which will by now be familiar to the reader. Alfredo was apparently a close friend of the UAR’s Federico Umberto D’Amato, and Fabio admitted monitoring developments alongside the latter from within the Interior Ministry during the heavy-handed police repression of the 5 July 1960 Porta San Paolo demonstration against Fernando Tambroni’s government. The pair were also closely associated with Gelli, if the testimony of a host of neo-fascist insiders is taken seriously. For example, Walter Sordi explicitly testified that right-wing terrorist Gilberto Cavallini had told him Fabio was a member of P2 who had personal contacts with Gelli. And, as noted above, the Venerable Master of the P2 lodge helped to facilitate the mid-1970s flight of the two De Felice brothers, and then sought to lessen their legal problems stemming from various FN plots. Moreover, in his efforts to establish and maintain regular contact with supposed pro-coup sympathizers within the Carabinieri, Alfredo had always relied upon Gelli as his exclusive intermediary. Thus it is not surprising to learn that Fabio later met with Carabinieri Colonel Michele Santoro on several occasions at the Castel San Pietro villa of right-wing criminologist Aldo Semerari. Santoro was one of the key subordinates of General Giovanbattista Palumbo,
commander of the Pastrengo Carabinieri division in Milan, who after 1972 lay at the apex of a powerful P2-linked cell within that division.\textsuperscript{321} Perhaps most importantly, Aleandri testified that at the time of the Borghese coup Fabio De Felice had some contacts with CIA operative Fenwich through a certain Maria Francini of Forano Sabino, who bragged openly of her links to influential Vatican circles and her special relations with the American and Israeli intelligence services. Although Fabio found her personally disagreeable, she later helped the brothers to escape and arranged for them to stay at some sort of "Jewish" establishment in Geneva before they found refuge in the London home of Fenwich's wife. Both De Felices were also said to have relied upon the behind-the-scenes support of conservative networks inside the Vatican, not to mention particular sections of the DC.\textsuperscript{322}

Secondly, Fabio De Felice's relationship to the radical right was a very complex and ambiguous one, both before and after the Borghese coup. His possible involvement with the OLP, a murky provocateur organization which propagated Franco Freda's ideas about combining the forces of the radical right and left in a joint attack on the bourgeois system, has already been alluded to. At around the same time, if not earlier, Fabio established close working relations with MPON leaders Signorelli and Massimiliano Fachini. These three, along with the OLP's Dantini, later organized themselves into a clandestine Directorate or leadership group that began to secretly control the activities of ON itself and the front groups with which it was integrally linked. According to Aleandri, Fabio De Felice was the key figure within that invisible collegial body.\textsuperscript{323} From the Fall of 1976 on, a series of meetings were held at the homes of Fabio himself,
Signorelli, and Aldo Semerari. The purpose of these gatherings, which were typically attended by this trio and a number of younger neo-fascist militants, was to formulate a new political plan designed to consolidate the remnants of various extremist groups that had been disrupted and fragmented by the exposure of a series of rightist "coup" plots and terrorist bombings in 1973 and 1974, the 1975 trial of the "Tora Tora" plotters, and an official crackdown on the paramilitary right in the wake of Pierluigi Concetelli's assassination of Judge Vittorio Occorsio. The flight of several key neo-fascist leaders (like Delle Chiaie and ON's Clemente Graziani) to safer havens abroad, coupled with the breakdown of the sometimes acrimonious attempts to unite ON and AN into a single organization, had only exacerbated this tendency toward disaggregation. In any event, it was at the aforementioned meetings that the adoption of a new decentralized and self-financing terrorist strategy, modelled in large part on the one employed by left-wing terrorist groups like the Brigate Rosse, was first proposed and then agreed upon. This particular strategy, which depended upon the compartmentalization of relatively autonomous and "spontaneous" terrorist cells that were to operate behind a variety of organizational facades, ultimately passed through four successive stages. These ranged from a trial phase in which minor attacks were made and claimed by non-existent groups, to a phase of "demonstrative" assaults geared toward providing specialized training to young terrorists, to a phase of more serious violence in which human casualties were intentionally generated, to the final phase in which outright bomb massacres were contemplated and then carried out. Fabio himself was later implicated in the sponsorship of a number of these terrorist actions, including the failed bombing outside the Consiglio
Superiore della Magistratura headquarters in Rome’s Piazza Independenza, the 23 June 1980 assassination of Judge Mario Amato, and the Bologna train station bombing a little over one month later. Although he was later acquitted of the charges brought against him in connection with the most serious of these acts of violence, it seems fair to conclude, as neo-fascist Walter Sordi in fact did, that he had no qualms about perpetrating public bombings to achieve his political goals.325

Fabio’s actions, as described up to this point, could still be viewed as consistent with genuine neo-fascist subversion. But the situation was more opaque than it may seem at first glance. To carry out their strategy, he and the other members of the secret ON directorate made extensive efforts to recruit and indoctrinate younger right-wing extremists. Not all of these lads fully shared the political ideas of their self-appointed mentors. The militants associated with ON, Terza Posizione, and Costruiamo l’Azione who participated in aspects of this strategy were in fact divided into three main factions, the most "traditional" of which was the one led by Fabio and Semerari. In contrast to the faction headed by Signorelli and Elio Massagrande, which ostensibly sought to establish a national socialist state after a violent seizure of power and claimed to be more open to the novel ideas associated with the newer generation of neo-fascist ultras, and the faction headed by Aleandri and Calore, which honestly adopted a left-leaning "social" strategy and proposed a link-up with certain elements of the extraparliamentary left, Fabio and Semerari preferred to eschew direct revolutionary action. Instead, they worked to establish a logistical base which could serve as a hub for linking various institutional and non-institutional forces. In order to facilitate an eventual assumption of power, Fabio...
further recommended the formation of a clandestine (non pubblica) structure which
would penetrate and make instrumental use of anti-communist organizations that operated
in public. Exploiting the cover provided by these organizations, he ultimately aimed to
infiltrate and covertly control key centers of official and quasi-official power, ostensibly
in the interests of a future revolutionary transformation of society.326

However, a number of developments led Calore and Aleandri to suspect that
Fabio and his brother were playing a complex double game. By the late 1970s the two
younger radicals had undergone a political transformation of their own, one which had
led them to borrow ideas associated with the New Left and conjoin them with the more
revolutionary aspects of the original fascist worldview. Their first clear indication that
the elder De Felice brother's role might be other than what it seemed occurred when they
decided to establish a journal of their own and diverge from the "reactionary" line
promoted by Fabio. At first the latter pretended to go along with the idea. But he
subsequently antagonized his former protégés when he sought to exert personal control
over their new project, an intrusive effort which provoked fisticuffs and ended up
precipitating a complete schism, both organizationally and ideologically. After the break,
Aleandri and Calore began to reflect on the role which Fabio may have played as a
"force of intoxication" in certain developments.327 They later concluded, for example,
that Fabio had not simply tried to reorganize the paramilitary right after 1975, but also
to assume personal control over the entire reorganization process. More specifically, he
sought to develop a hegemonic political "line" which would undergird the actions taken
by all the decentralized operational cells, and to control those cells covertly by infiltrating
his own loyalists into them.328

Were it not for other factors, it might be possible to write even this off as a simple reflection of rampant egotism, misdirected authoritarianism, or the development of some sort of Führer complex. But Fabio’s intention of making instrumental use of terrorism paralleled all too closely the uses to which the secret services and unscrupulous politicians regularly made of subversion and violence. Indeed, he repeatedly emphasized the role terrorism played in the context of a far more elaborate political scheme. On one occasion he told Aleandri that “a massacre makes no sense if no one exploits its political effects”, and on another occasion he admitted openly that armed bands were only one, and perhaps the least important, aspect of a much vaster political design.329 In his scheme the primary function of such armed bands, it would seem, was to commit acts of terrorism that would 1) prepare the public psychologically for an authoritarian crackdown, and 2) provide a tangible pretext for the intervention of the security forces of the state. According to convicted terrorist Vinciguerra, the sub rosa institutional backers of pseudo-revolutionary rightists—including those who, in his view, made up the secret ON directorate—would not only authorize the carrying out of terrorist actions by the paramilitary groups under their control, but would also attempt to "cover" and otherwise exploit autonomous terrorist actions carried out by genuine revolutionaries who were not under their control. Fabio’s insistence that planned public bombings should not be openly sponsored likewise placed him firmly within the older neo-fascist tradition of not claiming responsibility for perpetrating massacres, massacres in which personnel from the secret services were consistently implicated. Perhaps most significantly, he
admitted to Aleandri that the political design he was carrying out had been set in motion "on a level far superior to our own".330

Who, then, occupied this higher level? Some of Fabio's closest erstwhile comrades and protégés later became convinced that their would-be mentor was manipulating them in the interests of reactionary forces associated with the very political establishment they were seeking to overthrow. This cadre of serious revolutionaries in groups such as Costruiamo l’Azione and Terza Posizione had belatedly recognized that the long succession of would-be "coup"s and terrorist massacres had only served to stabilize the corrupt bourgeois system and strengthen the position of certain unscrupulous elements within the existing political class. After reflecting further upon their own firsthand experiences, they concluded that the strategy being carried out by the De Felices had been developed by those in charge of various parallel security apparatuses. As per usual, they identified the culprits as members of the political and military circles with which Fabio and Alfredo were in regular contact, in particular certain elements of the Carabinieri, along with secret service personnel from the UAR and the military intelligence service, all of which were in turn linked in some way to Gelli and the P2 lodge.331 These reasonable but unverifiable inferences naturally engendered a good deal of bitterness, so much so that at a certain point Calore and Aleandri seriously considered assassinating the P2 chief, who for them embodied in his person the poteri occulti which had systematically manipulated, exploited, and betrayed the aspirations of the revolutionary right.332

Based on the testimony of several of these neo-fascist insiders and on other
indications, the two PCI-affiliated judges who investigated the Bologna train station bombing concluded that Fabio De Felice and other members of the clandestine ON directorate had functioned as *de facto* agents of these secret and parallel services, as well as the intermediaries ("cutouts", in intelligence parlance) between those services and the paramilitary right. Although Fabio seems to have been the key operative within that group, he was not the only one among them who had connections to said services. Signorelli was not only linked personally to Gelli, but apparently also to officials in SID, the Carabinieri, and the Army. For his part, Fachini had been implicated in the Piazza Fontana massacre and also had links to the secret services. The same is true of Semerari, who in addition had developed a close association with key figures in the Camorra, by whom he was apparently later murdered in an unusually brutal fashion. Last but not least, Fabio apparently participated in several joint political projects with Dantini, whose name was later discovered on a list of individuals that were considered for recruitment into the top secret "stay/behind" paramilitary networks. In short, as the judges themselves emphasized, practically everyone involved in the Bologna bombing and related crimes can be suspected of having some sort of relationship to the Italian intelligence agencies, however obscure or ill-defined it may have been. This conclusion, though undoubtedly exaggerated for political effect, received some indirect confirmation from, of all sources, the military intelligence service itself, which had been "reorganized" and renamed the Servizio Informazioni per la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI) in 1978. Both SID and its successor SISMI repeatedly acted to obstruct efforts to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of right-wing violence. After initially feigning ignorance about
the criminal activities of ON front groups like Costruiamo l’Azione and the Movimento Rivoluzionario Populare (MRP), even though they were keeping track of them all along, they then went out of their way to derail the judicial investigation by systematically spreading disinformation, planting false clues, and suggesting unproductive leads.\textsuperscript{334} Although this was nothing new in cases involving "black" terrorism, such behavior is in and of itself a significant indication that something was going on behind the scenes.

There is little doubt, then, that at the time of the Borghese coup both De Felice brothers were actively colluding with elements within the security forces of the state, both official and parallel. It may be objected that the above account of Fabio’s apparently duplicitous behavior dealt in part with the era after 1976, which leaves open the possibility that something had changed between 1970 and the second half of the decade. Given the fact that during this interval arrest warrants were issued for him and his brother based on their purported involvement in the "Tora Tora" operation, it is possible that the initial failure of various quasi-official forces to prevent them from being brought to trial prompted Fabio to seek a measure of revenge by actively assisting subversive and anti-state elements within the neo-fascist milieu. But if he was in fact colluding with D’Amato as early as 1960, it is more likely that the thread which tied together all of his later political activities was a covert association with the UAR and/or other parallel apparatuses. His involvement with a new generation of ultras after 1975 should thus probably be seen as a continuation of his earlier manipulation of the radical right on behalf of those apparatuses.

There are two possible explanations for this behavior. One is that Fabio was
merely pretending to be an Evolan enthusiast in order to penetrate neo-fascist circles and thence make instrumental use of them. The second, which is perhaps even more disturbing, is that there was no real contradiction between holding radical Evolan views and assisting the security services of the state to buttress the position of conservative forces within the political establishment. Although Evola's visceral rejection of the modern bourgeois world appealed to alienated youths who found it satisfying to rebel against authority figures and social conventions, some of his specific viewpoints—for example, the idea that communism represented the more immediate threat even though the materialistic values associated with the United States would ultimately prove more damaging to the spiritual vitality of traditional European civilization—could be translated in practice into a naive and counterproductive collaboration with pro-Atlantic and anti-communist hardliners inside the government bureaucracy. And Evola's glorification of the ascetic "warrior elites" who offered a forlorn resistance, both existential and physical, amidst the ruins of the modern world could be seen as applicable to the "lost soldiers" who filled the ranks of the OAS. As was suggested above, such an identification probably helped to prepare the way for the adoption of guerre révolutionnaire concepts and techniques by an entire generation of neo-fascist extremists. In this sense it is possible that Fabio, like many other opportunistic Evolans (including Rauti of ON and Delle Chiaie of AN), foolishly hitched his wagon to bourgeois forces which happily exploited him to promote long-term interests which, beyond the common ground of anti-communism, were fundamentally antithetical to his own.

Regardless of what the exact motives of Fabio De Felice and his brother were,
along with De Jorio they were almost certainly working in conjunction with elements of the political establishment at the time of the Borghese coup. De Jorio was their immediate superior within the FN hierarchy, and as noted he was closely associated with DC leader Giulio Andreotti, who has been a key figure in that establishment since the late 1940s. Andreotti has long been recognized as one of the most sophisticated and machiavellian politicians in postwar Italy, if not all of Europe. He is a member of the second leadership generation within the DC, that which emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Between 1941 and 1944, he was president of the Federazione Universitaria Cattolici Italiani (FUCI). He thence began his postwar political career by serving as undersecretary of the Council of Ministers under Alcide De Gasperi, who had become Prime Minister in December 1945 after the collapse of the government headed by Resistance leader Ferruccio Parri. Since then, he has held innumerable cabinet posts himself, ranging from Defense Minister to Finance Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs, and served as Prime Minister seven times between 1972 and 1992. He remains an immensely powerful figure within both the dominant political party and the partitocrazia, that corrupt, immobile system of "rule by parties" which serious reformers and radicals of all stripes have incessantly but ineffectively denounced. And unlike most of his peers, he has managed—up until very recently, at least—to weather all the storms of controversy that have surrounded him during the last four decades. These facts are generally known. What is less well understood, however, is that since 1944 he has been affiliated with various clandestine networks, both domestic and foreign, which have covertly but actively sought to condition the Italian political environment. In
part, this is a natural process which everyone who holds high public office will be
enmeshed in to some degree. Yet not all politicians have courted and worked to exploit
such networks as avidly, assiduously, or effectively as Andreotti.

It would be impractical and enormously time-consuming to try and delineate all
of the secret "parapolitical" activities Andreotti has purportedly engaged in over the
years, especially given the current dearth of solid evidence. A few suggestive examples
will therefore have to suffice. To begin with, Andreotti's close association with De
Gasperi may have led to his direct or indirect involvement in covert influence operations.
De Gasperi himself was a distinguished political figure with a firm commitment to formal
democracy and a principled opposition to right- and left-wing authoritarianism, and his
role in the establishment of a postwar democratic structure uncontaminated by anti-
constitutional elements was in general a salutary one. Even so, like all great statesmen,
he was not entirely immune to the seductions of power and the forbidden, vicarious
pleasures associated with covert action. Towards the end of World War II, with the
secret assistance of powerful Vatican circles, he had actively promoted a scheme to set
up a bloc of East European states which would serve as a bulwark against Soviet
expansionism. Among the clerics who backed this chimerical project was Austrian bishop
Alois Hudal, a key figure in the initial establishment of exfiltration networks for wanted
Nazis and East European collaborators who were trying to escape punishment for war
crimes. In 1947, De Gasperi personally guaranteed the safety of Ferenc Vajta, a wanted
Hungarian fascist who worked for French and British intelligence. He also agreed to
assist, albeit unofficially, the Krizari (Crusaders) anti-Tito paramilitary group, which was
made up largely of former Ustaše. Shortly thereafter, De Gasperi actively collaborated in American efforts to influence the April 1948 elections, through both overt and covert means, and he became the chief beneficiary of these efforts when he was duly confirmed as Prime Minister. Finally, he was invited to meet on 25 September 1952 with a number of high-ranking political figures, including Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, CIA chief Walter Bedell Smith, French social democrat Guy Mollet, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland, and French Prime Minister Antoine Pinay, in order to lay the groundwork for the creation of the so-called "Bilderberg Group". This now notorious association, which was named after the Hotel de Bilderberg in Oosterbeek where the members held their first formal conference in May of 1954, was apparently the brainchild of a pro-Atlantic Polish refugee and former Special Operations Executive (SOE) agent named Joseph Retinger. Ever since its foundation, the Bilderberg Group has unfortunately attracted the obsessive attention of legions of conspiracy theorists, most of whom have been associated with the far right. Although there is nothing necessarily sinister about the holding of secret, heavily-guarded meetings between representatives of the Atlantic ruling elites, and the more extravagant claims about the alleged plotting of the "Bilderbergers" can easily be dismissed, it would nonetheless be unwise to presume that the private discussions regularly held at these exclusive gatherings attended by top-level American and European officials were wholly devoid of broader political significance. Be that as it may, the topics under discussion and the precise role played by De Gasperi cannot be further clarified until more information has been made available by insiders.
As for Andreotti, his assumption of a variety of influential posts in successive cabinets, particularly his stint as Defense Minister from 1959 to 1966, brought him into regular and sustained contact with a host of American and NATO military officers who were responsible for European defense matters. Among these officers was a self-described "friend", Army Colonel Vernon Walters, who served as military attaché in Rome from 1960 to 1962 and in that capacity often acted as an interpreter during meetings between high-ranking Italian and American officials. Walters, who was later appointed Lieutenant General and then Deputy Director of the CIA (1972-1976), was a well-known rightist who in 1961 was said to have promoted direct American military intervention to prevent the PSI from entering the government coalition in Italy.340

Andreotti also established close relations with Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, so much so that Kissinger wrote a glowing foreword to the English translation of the Italian politician's observations about the United States.341 Moreover, he was on friendly terms with General Alexander Haig, "an old acquaintance as NATO commander", who together with Kissinger was later accused of having authorized Gelli to recruit 400 top-ranking Italian and NATO military officers into P2 in the Fall of 1969.342 One concrete example of the close relations which Andreotti maintained with influential elements of the American political and security establishments had a considerable impact on his subsequent relations with Miceli. The latter had apparently provided some highly negative assessments of Andreotti in intelligence reports he dutifully passed on to his American counterparts. These assessments were later shown to the Italian politician by his friends within those agencies, a breach of secrecy and
propriety which fanned Andreotti's rancor toward Miceli and probably contributed to his
decision to make the SID chief the "fall guy" in connection with the "Tora Tora" affair.343

Beyond these official contacts with personnel entrusted with planning military,
paramilitary, and covert political operations, Andreotti was apparently linked to a number
of international networks which have been implicated in a variety of behind-the-scenes
activities. The first of these was an international anti-communist intelligence service
called Pro Deo. According to one PCI-linked source, in 1945 a young Andreotti served
as the private secretary for a right-wing Belgian priest named Felix Morlion, who with
the help of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had created Pro Deo during the war
and had then transferred its headquarters to Rome in 1944. However that may be, there
is no doubt whatsoever that Morlion's Pro Deo organization was linked to several
Western secret services, or that it has since been involved in a number of important
coverd operations.344

Andreotti may also have been associated with a bizarre pseudo-chivalric order
known as the Prieuré de Sion, centered in France, one of many such groups which claim
to have links to the medieval Templar order. A good deal of utter nonsense has been
written about the nature and purposes of this peculiar secret society, but it seems to have
included among its members a number of highly influential individuals who one
unidentified author characterized as the "éminences grises of high finance and of
international political or philosophical societies."345 However that may be, documentary
evidence exists which demonstrates that the recent Grand Master of the Prieuré, the
lawyer Pierre Plantard de Saint-Clair, was one of the key men called upon by De Gaulle to create the Comités de Salut Public in order to facilitate the ex-general's return to power in 1958. Other sources suggest that several intelligence agencies and various rival secret societies have sought to infiltrate the Prieuré in order to exploit its organizational secrecy and manipulate its influential members.\(^\text{346}\)

All of this may seem rather tenuous, if not entirely fanciful, but in 1948 the shrewd Roman politician undoubtedly became a "knight" in an indisputably authentic chivalric order, the Sovereign Military and Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Cyprus, Rhodes and Malta, better known today as the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM) or, simply, the Knights of Malta. There is no need to recount the long and illustrious history of the SMOM from the time of its foundation as a Christian philanthropic and military order in the eleventh and twelfth centuries to its reestablishment as a sovereign state with papal assistance in the late nineteenth century. What needs to be emphasized here is that it has since become an immensely powerful organization whose ranks are filled with the Catholic elite of Europe and the Americas, including a large number of major statesmen, international financiers, and top-ranking intelligence officials. Although it remains unclear whether the order has acted on its own initiative to promote anti-communist "crusades" and establish secret cells within various Western secret services, whether it has been infiltrated by personnel from these latter who have sought to manipulate and exploit it for such purposes, or whether--as seems most likely--some intricate combination of these two processes was at work, there is no doubt that the SMOM has been involved in innumerable covert political and financial
operations during the postwar period. In connection with this study, it is worth noting that Organizzazione X member Roberto Cavallaro testified that SID was compelled by statute to provide information, via the Carabinieri, to the SMOM, a claim that was later contested by Spiazzi.

Moreover, Andreotti later became a member of the so-called Cercle Pinay, as well as a "lifetime member" of one of the main associations linked to that group, the Brussels-based Académie Européenne de Sciences Politiques (AESP). Established in 1969, the Cercle Pinay was an informal and unofficial pan-European network of conservative pro-Atlantic political and business leaders whose titular head was the aforementioned "Bilderberger", Antoine Pinay, who was also an SMOM "knight". But the actual operational control of the Cercle was in the hands of Pinay's deputy, the lawyer Jean Violet, a prewar activist in the terrorist Cagoule organization who became a paid operative of both SDECE and the BND during the 1950s. Violet and other members of the Cercle were also linked, typically via intermediaries like Aginter Presse and affiliated groups such as the AESP, to an extensive array of other Western intelligence and security agencies, including the CIA, MI6, the Spanish Dirección General de Seguridad (DGS), the Portuguese PIDE, and the Swiss intelligence service. The AESP itself was headed by a kingpin of the postwar Belgian right, Florimond Damman, and counted among its leading members Pinay, Violet, the archduke Otto von Habsburg (head of the Paneuropa-Union [PEU]), Manuel Fraga (a leader of the right-wing Alianza Popular party in Spain), Father Yves-Marc Dubois (a Dominican priest who worked for SDECE and the Vatican intelligence service), Paul Vanden Boeynants.
(a hardline Belgian Defense Minister implicated in many scandals), Alfredo Sanchez-Bella (a top Opus Dei official and operative of the Spanish intelligence service under Franco), Jacques Soustelle (ex-OAS), Giancarlo Valori (a key figure in P2 before his falling-out with Gelli), and C.C. van den Heuvel (formerly an official of the Dutch Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst [BVD] and thence head of the "private" Internationaal Documentatie en Informatie Centrum [Interdoc] in the Hague), to name only a few.349 Although there is no evidence that Andreotti was personally involved in the various criminal and subversive activities in which Cercle Pinay- and AESP-linked groups were periodically implicated, such as the alleged fostering of coup plots in Belgium in the 1970s and early 1980s, his close association with powerful Atlanticist political, financial, and secret service circles may have some bearing on the behind-the-scenes role he is said to have played in the Borghese affair.

Of more direct relevance, however, was the close relationship between Andreotti and the P2 lodge. The former Prime Minister’s name was almost entirely absent from the majority report of the parliamentary commission investigating the P2 affair. This diplomatic omission may lead the ill-informed reader to conclude that he played no role in the activities of the lodge and had no connections with Gelli, but such an assumption is by no means warranted. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Andreotti went out of his way to aid Gelli and certain other key members of P2 from the early 1960s on. In the first half of that decade, while serving as Defense Minister, he awarded a contract for producing 40,000 mattresses for NATO’s armed forces to the Frosinone factory of Giovanni Pofferi’s Permaflex firm, where Gelli was employed as head of the Sales
Department. This turned out to be the beginning of the latter's rise to economic prominence. Although Andreotti later claimed that he first met Gelli in 1977, at a ceremony celebrating Juan Perón’s second return to power in Argentina, a 19 March 1973 Guardia di Finanza report prepared by Major Di Salvo suggested that the relationship between the two men may have dated back to the 1962 period. Andreotti also pretended that he took no interest in P2 until the scandal exploded onto the front pages, an assertion that is scarcely believable given the nature of his relationship to P2 "brother" Sindona, both before and after the September 1974 collapse of the latter’s vast but unstable financial empire.

Michele Sindona’s meteoric rise and scandalous career would have been inconceivable if de facto alliances between Allied intelligence agencies, organized crime, influential Vatican circles, and a wide variety of ultraconservative political groups had not been formed during World War II and then extended into the postwar era. There is no need to describe Sindona’s extraordinary life history in detail, since entire books have been devoted to that subject, but in the current context his close working relationship with elements of Western intelligence deserves further emphasis. These connections seem to have dated back to the period of the Allied invasion of Sicily, at which time he admitted befriending a number of American soldiers. The latter provided him with additional provisions at a time when he was engaging in black market foodstuff exchanges authorized by Sicilian-American Mafia leader Vito Genovese, who along with "Lucky" Luciano had been recruited by the American government to help pave the way for the invasion and occupation of the island. It may be that Max Corvo, a member of
Earl Brennan’s OSS team who landed in Sicily just after the Allied landing, was among those Americans. This probability is strengthened by the fact that Sindona later turned to Corvo for assistance after he got into serious trouble with the American authorities following the failure of New York’s Franklin National Bank, which he had purchased a controlling interest of in 1972.352

Sindona’s associations with Western intelligence networks took a qualitative leap in the early 1950s, after he moved to Milan and established a brilliant career as a tax lawyer and financial advisor. Following the bishop of Messina’s recommendation, he met with Monsignor Amleto Tondini, an official of the Curia whose sister was married to one of Sindona’s cousins. After their meeting, Tondini wrote a letter of introduction for him to Prince Massimo Spada, who was both an SMOM "knight" and an important financial advisor to the Vatican. Spada immediately took the young lawyer under his wing, and thence introduced him to several important people, including Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI.353 Montini was a key figure in the Vatican’s intelligence apparatus who had worked closely with the OSS during World War II and had subsequently maintained his connections with leading U.S. intelligence personnel, especially James Jesus Angleton, who had in the meantime been placed in charge of the CIA’s Vatican Desk.354 This association with Montini, who as Pope would later appoint Sindona as the Vatican’s financial advisor, drew the unscrupulous Sicilian directly into a complex web of covert anti-communist operations being carried out by the Vatican and its Western intelligence allies.

The first documented example of Sindona’s personal involvement in such
operations occurred in early 1955. At that time Montini, who had recently been appointed archbishop of Milan, was seeking to counteract growing communist labor influence by making personal visits to several factories and celebrating masses on the premises. This plan was vehemently opposed by powerful PCI union officials, so Montini turned to Sindona for help. The young financier pressured his clients who owned factories to help overcome this communist opposition, and then personally accompanied Montini on his factory visits, during which the latter warned workers about the dangers of leftist policies and appealed to them to support the Church. After months of such proselytization, many workers ended up voting to replace communist union leaders. Four years later, Sindona raised over two million dollars in a single day after Montini appealed to him for assistance in funding the construction of a home for the elderly, the Casa della Madonnina. It was later suggested that much of this money may have been provided to Sindona by the CIA or the Mafia. Whether or not this particular suggestion is warranted, the use of Sindona’s banks and financial companies to funnel secret U.S. or Vatican funds to anti-communist political groups was not an uncommon occurrence, and the practice later assumed a far more sinister dimension.

In April 1967, for example, the Continental Bank of Illinois transferred 4 million dollars to Sindona’s Banca Privata Finanziaria. After receiving these funds, Sindona immediately wired the money—ostensibly a "loan" which was guaranteed by the Central Bank of Greece—to Colonel George Papadopoulos through a bank account of the Helleniki Tecniki construction company, which was in fact controlled by the Greek Army. Shortly afterwards, Papadopoulos and other right-wing military officers launched
the coup that overthrew parliamentary democracy and ushered in a seven-year period of military dictatorship. In 1970, Sindona bought a 2 million dollar bond issue from the National Bank of Yugoslavia, supposedly at the request of the CIA, which then placed the bonds in "friendly" Yugoslav hands. A couple of years later, Sindona’s banks were used as a conduit for some of the millions of dollars allocated by Nixon for the funding of right-wing groups in Italy. The bulk of this money, as noted above, was then passed on by ambassador Martin to Miceli for distribution. At around the same time Sindona purchased the Rome Daily American, a financially-strapped English-language newspaper published in the Eternal City which had earlier received secret subsidies from the CIA. He later claimed that he did so at the specific request of Martin, who wanted to ensure that the paper remained in trustworthy, pro-Atlantic hands.356

Nor were these the only connections between Sindona and personnel associated with the security and intelligence establishments of the Western Alliance. In early 1976 Gelli enlisted the aid of Edgardo Sogno and Luigi Cavallo, Sogno’s right-hand man, in his efforts to protect Sindona from the American and Italian judicial authorities. In exchange for a payment of 100,000 dollars by Sindona, Sogno and Cavallo orchestrated a campaign—with the unwitting assistance of genuine leftist groups—to make it appear as though the Italian left despised and wished to assassinate the notorious financier. What makes this operation noteworthy is the fact that these two veteran anti-communists had worked for elements of NATO intelligence since the mid-1950s, if not earlier.357 Furthermore, the shareholders in Sindona’s various banks not only included the Vatican, but also Britain’s Hambros Bank, Ltd., one of the world’s leading merchant banks. The
postwar representative of the Hambros Bank in Italy was none other than John McCaffery, who had been head of SOE’s station in Berne during the latter phases of World War II and had worked very closely with both Allen Dulles of the OSS and with Sogno’s "Franchi" partisan organization. McCaffery was a hardline anti-communist who sympathized with Sindona’s increasingly right-wing views, so much so that the Sicilian felt safe in approaching him in 1972 with his plan to sponsor a political coup. Sindona claimed that his goal was to "secure the backing of the armed forces for orthodox democratic politicians who wanted a proper Parliamentary government and not a branch office of the Kremlin". After being falsely reassured that neo-fascists were to be excluded from participation in the coup, McCaffery presented the financier with "a detailed plan for the take-over of the government and for the new administration’s first year in office". The Scotsman added that he was "sure to a moral certainty that Sindona spoke about the proposed coup with important figures in the American Central Intelligence Agency and with top level officials in the American Embassy in Rome", including ambassador Martin, and that "there exist numerous documents in America which reflect the benevolence on the part of the United States towards the coup organized by Sindona". These latter claims certainly seem plausible, but in any case it is clear that McCaffery, whether acting on his own initiative or as a representative of certain factions of British intelligence, actively supported Sindona’s plans to alter the constellation of political forces in Italy by initiating a military action.

The behind-the-scenes role played by another major shareholder in Sindona’s acquisitions, the Continental Bank of Illinois, is perhaps even more suggestive. It has
already been noted that the bank was used to transfer 4 million dollars to the Greek Colonels just prior to the launching of the 21 April 1967 coup. This action, which occurred prior to Nixon’s assumption of the presidency, suggests that the bank already served as a respectable financial “front” which was used to disguise the real sources of U.S. government subsidies to “friendly” political groups abroad. The chairman of the Continental Bank during this period was David M. Kennedy, a devout Mormon and Republican Party stalwart who helped raise money for Nixon’s 1968 election campaign. By way of thanks, Nixon appointed Kennedy as Treasury Secretary between 1969 and 1971, after which the latter served as U.S. ambassador to NATO. There is no doubt, then, that Sindona’s financial dealings with American business circles, many of whose members were in turn linked to the Mafia, brought him into direct contact with key members of Nixon’s entourage. It should therefore come as no surprise to learn that when Sindona got into hot water with Security and Exchange Commission regulators and the U.S. Justice Department in the wake of the tumultuous 1974 collapse of his Franklin National Bank, the law firm which defended him was Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander, where Nixon had previously been a partner and where his ex-Attorney General John Mitchell found employment after his period of government service.359

All of this constituted an important backdrop to the mutually supportive relationship that seems to have existed between Andreotti and the Sicilian banker for nearly thirty years. Sometime around 1960, then Defense Minister Andreotti was introduced to Sindona, perhaps by Monsignor Montini himself. According to the politician’s own admission, he subsequently developed a great deal of respect for
Sindona’s undeniable abilities as a financial manipulator. In part, this was undoubtedly due to the fact that Sindona had funnelled millions of dollars into the coffers of the DC’s center-right factions. Although it is probable that Sindona began dispensing funds to the DC in the 1960s, some of which may have originally been passed on to him by the Vatican, the Mafia, or U.S. intelligence, financial documents reveal that he provided the party with a total of 11-12 billion lire in the period between 1972 and the May 1974 divorce referendum. This was accomplished not only through direct subsidies disguised as "short-term loans", but also through monthly stipends and the establishment of "no-risk" DC-affiliated accounts at Sindona’s banks. Be that as it may, in December 1973 Andreotti publicly hailed the businessman as the "savior of the lira" at an Italian-American dinner held at the Hotel Saint Regis in New York City. At that time, he must have already known about Sindona’s role in laundering the proceeds from the Mafia’s heroin trafficking, his attempts to drive down the value of the lira and profit from the resulting exchange rates, and his increasingly elaborate fiscal con games, something which became obvious to everyone when the latter’s financial house of cards collapsed the following year.

Even more suggestively, Andreotti was later accused of working behind the scenes after the crack to help Sindona, at least to avoid being extradited to Italy, if not to save his failing banks and companies. This is an enormously complex story, and most of the evidence concerning Andreotti’s role stems from the testimony of various protagonists in the affair. On the basis of the contrasting analyses presented by partisan members of the commission investigating the Sindona case, it would appear that Andreotti
expressed sympathy for the financier and acted as if he intended to help him, but that in the end he decided not to jeopardize his own political influence by providing too much tangible aid to Sindona. Such behavior would be entirely in character for Andreotti, who was perfectly willing to let others pay the penalty for illicit activities in which he himself was deeply involved. He was, after all, the quintessential "establishment manipulator". Since he was utterly convinced that his own accretion of power would benefit his party, his Church, and his country, he felt that the use of any and all means was justified to bring about this end. There is no doubt, however, that between 1975 and 1979 Andreotti was in regular contact with Sindona and his lawyers (typically via intermediaries like Banco di Roma manager Fortunato Federici), that Sindona looked to him for help and expected that he would provide it, that he may well have applied some sub rosa pressure to ameliorate the position of "St. Peter’s banker", and that he might have done a good deal more if the Sicilian’s judicial and financial situation had not become so hopeless and potentially compromising. Whatever the extent of Andreotti’s intervention, many people directly involved in aspects of these secret negotiations explicitly identified him as Sindona’s key referent or ally within the Italian political establishment, a claim that seems impossible to dispute.\textsuperscript{363}

At the same time that Sindona was allegedly being helped by Andreotti, he was undoubtedly receiving substantial behind-the-scenes assistance from Gelli and other members of P2. Among these latter were international businessman Umberto Ortolani, banker Roberto Calvi, Supreme Court president Carmelo Spagnuolo, Italian-American financier Robert Memmo (a close associate of Texas oilman and Nixon ally John
Connally), Public Works Minister Gaetano Stammati, Società Condotte dell’Acqua president Loris Corbi, MSI Senator Mario Tedeschi, OP editor Mino Pecorelli, DC leader Massimo De Carolis, Federici, Sogno, Cavallo, and Guarino. Together these influential masonic "brethren" played a key role, directly or indirectly, in every aspect of the multifaceted operations designed to "salvage" the Sicilian’s financial affairs and prevent his extradition from the United States to Italy. Among other things, these efforts involved applying pressure on the Banca d’Italia to prevent the liquidation of the Banca Privata Finanziaria’s holdings, influencing the actions of the Italian Supreme Court, mediating the conflict between Sindona and Calvi, slandering Sindona’s enemies in the press, terminating the investigations of officials who were uncovering Sindona’s illegal financial dealings, delaying the extradition process, and indirectly assisting the staged 1979 "kidnapping" of the Sicilian by the Gruppo Proletario Eversivo, a nonexistent far left organization. In short, from 1974 on Gelli utilized portions of his vast network of national and international connections—a network which included Andreotti—in order to mount a sustained covert lobbying campaign on behalf of Sindona.

Several informed observers have thus emphasized that the Venerable Master’s systematic efforts to save the financier moved in tandem with those allegedly undertaken by Andreotti, even though the latter was in a more exposed public position and was apparently unwilling to risk or sacrifice his political career in the process. This general convergence of activities on behalf of Sindona, together with the initiatives taken by Andreotti over the years in support of Gelli—and vice versa—suggests that the machiavellian pair had overlapping and interrelated political agendas. It is almost
certainly an oversimplification and an exaggeration to claim, as Roberto Calvi’s widow Clara and the banker Carlo Bordoni both later did, that Andreotti was the real leader of P2. After all, there is no documentary evidence indicating that he was even a formal member of the lodge. But Partito Radicale deputy Massimo Teodori was entirely justified in concluding that P2, far from being a subversive group in opposition to the existing system, was an organic (albeit clandestine) element of the very partitocrazia which Andreotti had so ably exploited to acquire and maintain his political influence. Nevertheless, Teodori errs in focussing so much attention on Italian domestic politics, since it causes him to minimize the significance of the pro-Atlantic international stance adopted by both the P2 lodge and the DC political establishment with which Andreotti was associated. Indeed, it was precisely their covert support of the interests of NATO and their active opposition to the advances made by the European left which tied Gelli and Andreotti, not only to each other, but also to various Western intelligence and security networks. Although they also began to build bridges to the PCI in anticipation of the probable formation of a "national unity" government in 1976, both were manipulative opportunists who had shrewdly capitalized on postwar geopolitical realities by hitching their wagons securely to the Atlantic Alliance.

With this background, it may at last be possible to elucidate Andreotti’s role in the Borghese coup. There is some circumstantial evidence which suggests that he was the primary "promoter" of the operation within the political establishment. In the early evening of 7 December 1970, ON leader Massagrande had warned Spiazzi that the FN would be carrying out a "demonstration" later that night at the behest of an important
government official. When members of the P2 parliamentary commission later asked Spiazzi to speculate about who that official might be, the artillery officer indicated that the answer could most likely be found in an October 1974 article that Filippo De Jorio had written for the philo-fascist weekly *Il Borghese*, "Il Giuda è tra noi". In this article, which was then reprinted in the 16 October 1974 issue of *Secolo d'Italia*, De Jorio criticized Andreotti for having cynically abandoned his earlier support for the center-right coalition formula, and for betraying De Jorio and other opponents of the center-left by transmitting SID's reports to the judges investigating the "Tora Tora" plot. De Jorio was undoubtedly motivated to make this charge due to the fact that Andreotti’s actions had led to his own arrest in connection with that plot, and he was clearly hinting that this very same "Judas" had himself encouraged Borghese to carry out his projected coup on the eve of Tito’s scheduled visit to Rome. Although Spiazzi did not mention Andreotti by name, he acknowledged that a former Defense Minister was probably the secret political sponsor of Borghese’s action. In doing so, he implied that the same person had given the order to activate the "Triangle" operation, an action which he claimed was directly connected to the "coup". These claims seem quite plausible, though there is, understandably, no hard evidence to substantiate them. If it is assumed, for argument’s sake, that they are true, it then becomes possible to speculate about Andreotti’s probable motives. In such a case, it is self-evident that his aim would neither have been to sponsor a military coup nor to establish a "presidentialist" regime, but rather to exploit the resulting disorder politically in order to buttress certain factions of the DC and extend his own influence within the party. De Jorio’s later defense of his
own actions—why would he have sought to overthrow the political system which he himself was an integral part of?—is even more applicable to Andreotti, a far more powerful figure. By a process of elimination, then, it can be concluded that if the latter gave some sort of "green light" to Borghese and his men, his goal was to use the Black Prince’s action to justify a crackdown on the so-called "opposing extremisms", including the FN and its neo-fascist allies.

Regardless of whether Andreotti or someone else was behind it, this apparent attempt to make instrumental use of and eliminate "disposable" elements of the far right was sabotaged at the last minute when someone warned Borghese, either that the promised official support would not be forthcoming or that he and his men were themselves going to be the likely victims of their own provocation. Those who have been variously identified as having issued that warning were Miceli, Condò (Miceli’s subordinate at SIOS-Esercito), Gelli (who was closely linked to both Miceli and Andreotti), and Fenwich (who was associated with supposed pro-coup circles within the Nixon administration). But the motives of these particular individuals, or of the groups secretly backing them, may have been rather different.

Although both Miceli and Gelli were self-professed admirers and friends of Borghese who had no qualms about promoting right-wing violence in order to prevent the left from gaining strength or coming to power, this does not necessarily mean that they were in total agreement about short- or longterm political goals. It seems certain that Miceli acted to prevent the FN plotters from being entrapped and "burned", as well as to protect them from judicial reprisals in the years after the coup, but the reasons for this
are not as clear as one might suppose. The SID chief has generally been portrayed as a far right sympathizer, in which case he must in part have shared Borghese's antipathy toward the political class, as well as his desire to supplant or at least overhaul it. This alone could have provided the general with sufficient personal motivation to come to the Black Prince's assistance. Other secret service officials have claimed, however improbably, that Miceli had been a firm supporter of the DC's more centrist Doroteo faction until he was ousted from SID in disgrace, and that it was only afterwards that he embraced the hard right and joined the MSI. If so, in warning Borghese he may have been acting in accordance with the designs of factions within the political class which sought to stymie their rivals bent on launching an "anti-extremist" action. Finally, he may have been following directives issued by international and national security personnel who oversaw the official and parallel apparatuses he headed. These personnel may have originally decided to promote Borghese's operation for one reason or another, and then had second thoughts about the wisdom of carrying it out. The same range of possibilities could also apply to Miceli's P2 lodgemaster. Gelli and his secret society were almost certainly the instruments of other centers of power, both national and international, but it remains unclear whether he was operating in the interests of those who sought to condition but preserve the status quo, the "presidentialists" (as his "Piano di Rinascita Democratica" would lead one to believe), or the hardliners who promoted far more drastic solutions. He may have mediated between all three factions, or played each off against the others for his own gain, an interpretation that is strengthened by the contemporaneous presence of members of each rival faction within his lodge.
The same problems beset the outside observer who is seeking to clarify the role played by various military and security forces in Borghese’s operation. There is no doubt whatsoever that individuals associated with all of these forces—the three branches of the armed services, the Carabinieri, the Pubblica Sicurezza corps, the UAR, SID, and the parallel networks affiliated with these groups—had actively encouraged Borghese to launch a coup and had promised to provide him with tangible support if he did so. Some of these officers may have honestly favored and actually backed this course of action, but those on the highest levels were either unwilling to risk their careers when the time came or had purposely misled the Black Prince about their real operational and political objectives. Most of the personnel who filled the ranks of the military and police units which were mobilized and deployed on the night of the “coup” undoubtedly believed that they were engaging in maneuvers. The bulk of those with some insider knowledge about Borghese’s plans probably expected that they would be employed in a crackdown on the far left. Only a very few could have been informed that armed elements of the extraparliamentary right were also going to be arrested or otherwise suppressed—if indeed that was the goal of certain factions within the state apparatus and the political class.

Of all the security forces implicated in the affair, the UAR was the organization that was most directly compromised. It is impossible to believe that Delle Chiaie and his men could have taken control of the armory within the Interior Ministry in the absence of high-level collusion. Major Capanna alone could not have effectuated such a complex and risky operation without the knowledge and consent of D’Amato or some other top official. If UAR personnel were willing to place themselves in such an exposed position,
however, it is doubtful that they were participating in an "anti-extremist" operation targeting the right along with the left. After all, there would have been too many neo-fascist eyewitnesses who could have provided details about the assistance they received inside the Viminale. MSI senator Giorgio Pisano has suggested that AN and its official backers were operating autonomously, if not in accordance with a different agenda than the other FN plotters, even though they were ostensibly following Borghese’s orders. This is certainly possible, given Delle Chiaie’s unscrupulousness and willingness to sacrifice associates and abstract principles for his own personal advantage. But it is hard to believe that AN’s paramilitary squads were going to be deployed in an operation directed against the forces of Borghese and Orlandini. What seems more probable is that the UAR was acting in support of an "anti-leftist" provocation or, much less likely, an outright American-backed coup, and that D’Amato and his associates were unaware of the fact that elements from other parallel networks were secretly working at cross-purposes to sponsor the "anti-extremist" variant. Whatever D’Amato’s game was, the theft of the Beretta machine pistol by members of AN served to prevent the immediate exposure of the operation and the later betrayal of the plotters under Delle Chiaie’s command.

The role played by various international forces, in particular the Nixon administration and U.S. and NATO security agencies, is equally difficult to elucidate. Once again, there is little doubt that certain individuals who acted as intermediaries between the plotters and the Americans, whether those in Nixon’s entourage or those affiliated with the embassy in Rome, had persuaded Borghese that the U.S. government
secretly backed his projected coup. But it is impossible to determine whether these liaison men were acting in good faith, knowingly manipulating Orlandini, or being misled themselves by their American contacts. The actions taken by Fenwich and Talenti offer no real clue to this mystery. Given the current state of the evidence, it is also unclear whether Nixon and Kissinger ever seriously considered sponsoring a rightist coup in Italy, although their unconstitutional policies elsewhere make it unwise to categorically reject such a scenario. It is in any case apparent that there were deep divisions within the American policy-making establishment about what course of action to follow in Italy. Nixon had many enemies within the diplomatic and intelligence communities who sought to delay the implementation or sabotage some of his national security initiatives. This subterranean struggle between the President and his opponents within various U.S. government bureaucracies led directly to the Watergate affair and ultimately destroyed Nixon's political career.

What can be said with apodictic certainty, however, is that there were intense factional rivalries within the ranks of all the forces implicated in the Borghese coup. It is not yet possible to identify the exact composition of the competing factions, which in any case shifted over time, but the course and outcome of that coup reflected the intense and largely covert factional struggles between national and international proponents of a military coup, a "presidentialist" solution, and a strengthening of the existing political system. There are some noteworthy ironies in all this. Although the individuals suspected of giving the counterorder were severely criticized later by the plotters, whoever actually did so seems to have saved some of the more unsavory elements of the
extraparliamentary right from being massacred or arrested *en masse*. These latter survived to be exploited anew by rival secret service factions, which continued to utilize them to condition the Italian political environment by encouraging them to commit terrorist acts and foment anti-democratic coups. Moreover, all of the official and quasi-official groups involved initially sought to cover up the "Tora Tora" affair and protect the FN conspirators, in part because they were themselves implicated in it. But beneath the surface of this mutually-beneficial phase of cooperation, each of the factions was maneuvering to exploit the situation for its own political advantage. This process came to a head in the middle of 1974, when Andreotti acted to weaken his political rivals by publicly exposing various FN-linked plots.

One last point deserves to be emphasized before this account can be brought to a close. The chief danger presented by the Borghese coup did not lie in the actions carried out by neo-fascist paramilitary squads, but rather in the political exploitation of those actions by elements of the state apparatus and their international referents.\(^{371}\) It would be a serious mistake, then, to regard the operation as an abject failure simply because the Black Prince called off the paramilitary phases of the action at the last minute. Indeed, on a political level the "coup" proved to be a great success. As FN leader Lunetta later put it, the "political result[s] that those who organized the attack sought to attain w[ere] achieved: the deep-freezing (*congelamento*) of the [center-left] policies of Aldo Moro, the removal of the PCI from the government arena, [and] the assurance of [Italy's] total pro-Atlantic and pro-American loyalty". He then summed up the situation as follows: "[t]he truth is that there was a coup and that it succeeded."\(^{372}\)
Note that these general results were considered desirable and actively pursued by each of the factions identified above, and from that point of view they all benefitted from the "Tora Tora" operation even though they may not have attained their more specific operational objectives. In this sense, the Borghese coup was merely a microcosm of the entire history of right-wing terrorism and subversion in Italy, for in practically every case the most serious and threatening aspect of such criminal activities had to do with the way they were politically exploited by the powers-that-be. These violent destabilization tactics were generally put to authoritarian uses, and they invariably resulted in a stabilization of the existing political structure, much to the chagrin of the radical neo-fascists who genuinely sought to overthrow the hated bourgeois state.
1. For this "naval" phase of the Decima MAS's operations, see Borghese's own account in *Sea Devils* (Chicago: Regnery, 1954), a translation of *Decima Flottiglia MAS*. For the advice and assistance he provided to his German counterparts in Berlin, in exchange for some technical information and plastic explosives, and his friendly relations with Dönitz at the German submarine headquarters in Paris, see *ibid*, pp. 191-8. Note also that Borghese had commanded a submarine during the Spanish Civil War and had served briefly in Franco's Navy. See *ibid*, p. 201.


7. *Ibid*, pp. 236-45; Naftali, "ARTIFICE", p. 226 (quote); and the interview with Angleton in "Valerio Borghese ci serviva", *Epoca* 27:1323 (11 February 1976), pp. 26-7. One person who seems to have collaborated with Angleton on this sensitive mission was Commander Carlo Resio, codenamed SALTY, one of the X-2 chief's agents within the Servizio Informazioni Segreta (SIS), the Italian Navy's wartime intelligence service.

8. For further details about the trial, see Algardy, *Processi ai fascisti*, pp. 201-41. The great leniency shown to Borghese was in part the result of the sympathetic attitude of the judicial authorities in Rome, a stronghold of pro-fascist sentiment, as well as his status as one of the few *bona fide* war heroes in the Italian armed forces during World War
II. He had been awarded a number of prestigious medals, including the Cross of Savoy and the German Iron Cross.

9. For a general description of the course of some of the more famous trials, see ibid, passim.


12. Interestingly enough, even before Borghese was released from prison, an intelligence report compiled by James Jesus Angleton in 1947 indicated that members of his old military unit, the Decima MAS, had commenced activities again. Its most active member at this time was the fascist journalist Ezio Maria Gray, who later became a moderate MSI leader, and it received financing from Marchese Patrizzi, Commendatore Luce, and the architectural engineers Tudini and Valenti. See Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, *Gli Americani in Italia* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), pp. 263-4.

13. These early postwar covert projects initiated by the right to condition the Italian political system have yet to be thoroughly examined by historians, largely because many of the key official records have not yet been placed at the disposal of researchers. Preliminary attempts to describe these activities have been made by various left-wing Italian journalists, in part on the basis of previously classified documentary materials. See, for example, Murgia, *Ritorneremo!*, especially pp. 177-317; Faenza and Fini, *Americani in Italia*, passim. For a somewhat later period, see Roberto Faenza, *Il malaffare: Dall'America di Kennedy all'Italia, a Cuba, al Vietnam* (Milan: Mondadori, 1978), pp. 264-376. In addition, there are a few specialized works which deal with certain aspects of these projects.

14. For details on the involvement of U.S. intelligence personnel in these efforts to draw Italian rightists into the Atlanticist camp, see Murgia, *Ritorneremo!*, p. 213. The two works of Murgia contain an extraordinary wealth of detail about little-known aspects of rightist anti-communist operations in Italy up through 1953. Unfortunately, it is often impossible to identify or evaluate the specific sources he used in his reconstruction, especially regarding the more sensitive covert operations. Although some of the details he provides have been confirmed by other sources, others cannot be verified given the current state of the documentation. Since much of the following account of Borghese's activities up to and including his adhesion to the MSI is based on that of Murgia, the reader should keep in mind that many of his claims remain difficult to substantiate.

16. For more on the role played by the Comitati Civici in this "national front" project, see ibid, pp. 236-43. In general, see Carlo Falconi, Gedda e l'Azione cattolica (Florence: Parenti, 1958), pp. 125-40, etc.; Gianni Baget Bozzo, Il partito cristiano al potere: La DC di De Gasperi e di Dossetti, 1945-1954 (Florence: Vallecchi, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 220-6, and volume 2, pp. 389-95. Information that later surfaced in the course of the Congressional investigations headed by Senator Frank Church (Democrat—Idaho) and Representative Otis Pike (Democrat—New York) into U.S. intelligence activities, as well as official material subsequently released in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, confirms that the CIA provided financing and organizational assistance to Gedda and the Comitati Civici, and that Angleton was personally involved in the anti-communist propaganda projects that resulted. See, for example, Faenza and Fini, Americans in Italy, pp. 276-8, 318-24.

17. Murgia, Ritorneremo!, pp. 214, 238. Note that Angleton himself denied ever seeing or contacting Borghese again after helping him to escape from the clutches of vengeful partisans in 1945. See the interview with the former CIA counterintelligence chief published as "Valerio Borghese ci serviva", p. 27. Although such a self-serving denial should not be accepted at face value, actual evidence of subsequent Angleton encounters with Borghese has yet to be produced. A meeting of this type would have certainly fallen within the purview of Angleton’s responsibilities in Italy, however, and his involvement in various postwar anti-communist projects in that country is now a matter of public record.

18. Ritorneremo!, p. 214. This conclusion is overly simplistic if not downright misleading, and in any case the CIA’s involvement in the 1968 creation of Borghese’s Fronte Nazionale remains to be demonstrated. If there was any late 1960s counterpart of this earlier "national front" coalition project, it was probably the Lega Italiana Unità, not Borghese’s Fronte Nazionale. Nevertheless, it appears that the U.S.-backed project of the early 1950s was also formally known as the Fronte Nazionale. Murgia always uses lower case letters when using the phrase, but in a 26 June 1951 letter to Umberto II of Savoy (Vittorio Emanuele III’s son and unlucky would-be successor), Prince Gianfranco Alliata di Monteralle, an influential monarchist leader in Sicily and future Propaganda Due (P2) masonic lodge member, used initial capitals whenever he referred to this earlier national front. See the portions quoted in the detailed historical study of Domenico De Napoli, Il movimento monarchico in Italia dal 1946 al 1954 (Naples: Loffredo, 1980), pp. 131-2, who himself adopts Alliata’s orthography.


22. For Borghese's introduction, see Julius Evola, *Gli uomini e le rovine* (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1990), pp. 9-11. The original version of this work, which included that introduction, was published in 1953.


26. Murgia, *Ritorneremo!*, p. 217. One of the sources he cites for this mission is the 1-31 December 1951 issue of the independent left fascist publication *Il Pensiero Nazionale*, which was edited by national syndicalist Stanis Ruinas.

27. Borghese's public show of support for the conservative, pro-American line of De Marsanich and Michelini engendered a great deal of resentment within the MSI left, which felt spurned and betrayed. Thus Ferruccio Ferrini, former RSI Undersecretary of the Navy, published some harsh articles in *Pensiero Nazionale*. In them he accused Borghese of plotting against Mussolini, trying to seize power for himself, and escaping Mussolini's retribution only due to the intervention of some German generals who had already begun negotiating with the Anglo-Americans, then suggested that the Black Prince himself may have already made contact and secret agreements with the latter. See his "Pagine inedite della RSI", *Pensiero Nazionale* 5:23-29 (1-31 December 1951); compare *ibid*, 6:3 (16-29 February 1952). Cited in Murgia, *Ritorneremo!*, p. 231, note 92. As has been shown above, these assumptions were largely justified.


30. It is interesting that Murgia attributes the origin of Secolo to a conservative, U.S.-backed maneuver to promote an Atlanticist line within MSI circles. On the surface, this does not jibe with certain other accounts, particularly some in the ambit of the party, which identify Secolo as an expression of the internal MSI left from 1952 to 1956. See, e.g., Gianni S. Rossi, *Alternativa e doppiopetto: Il MSI dalla contestazione alla destra nazionale, 1968-1973* (Rome: Istituto di Studi Corporativi, 1992), p. 25, note 23. This apparent discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the ideological orientation of
Secolo shifted several times in the course of its checkered history, and that there was not always complete agreement or uniformity between the paper’s domestic and foreign policy positions. At the outset Secolo seems to have been designed to promote a pro-Atlantic geopolitical stance, but it then moved leftwards in the "social" sphere after Almirante assumed more control over its direction. In 1958, Michelini established another official party organ, Il Popolo Italiano, to contest the influence of Secolo and promote the leadership’s moderate line. Although this latter venture was not a success, the moderates subsequently assumed control over Secolo, which thence began to adopt more conservative positions. To untangle these complexities and fully trace the newspaper’s various ideological fluctuations, one would have to do a detailed content analysis and relate its positions to MSI factional struggles in different periods.


34. Ignazi, Polo escluso, p. 89, note 50.

35. Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, p. 41.

36. Murgia, Ritorneremo!, p. 112. On 3 November of the previous year, Borghese had been among the speakers at a Lega Nazionale rally held at the Cinema Rossetti in Trieste, during which a group of neo-fascists attacked a young DC supporter. The rally was followed by a march toward San Giusto. The procession was led by some MSI militants carrying a tricolor wreath shaped like an X, to which were attached two blue ribbons with the slogan "To Valerio Borghese--Trieste Italiana". See Claudio Tonel, ed., Dossier sul neofascismo a Trieste, 1945-1983 (Trieste: Dedolibri, 1991), p. 86.


39. Rosenbaum, Nuovo fascismo, p. 202. It should be emphasized that Romualdi was far from being a radical Evolan. Like other moderates among the party’s rightist
opposition, including Gray, Ernesto De Marzio, and Nicola Foschini, he lent his support to Michelini at the crucial 1956 Milan Congress. For the rapprochement between this "soft" right and the moderate center on the eve of that Congress, see Almirante and Palamenghi-Crispi, *Movimento sociale italiano*, p. 73.


42. As Borghese himself admitted in a 1970 interview. See Pansa, *Borghese mi ha detto*, p. 124: "I am, by nature, rather intolerant of any form of party discipline".

43. For Borghese’s deep-seated resentment toward the postwar regime and consequent receptivity to coup plots, see Egardo Beltrametti, *Il colpo di stato militare in Italia* (Rome: Volpe, 1975), pp. 98-9. It should be recalled that Beltrametti was a key organizer of the 1965 *guerre révolutionnaire* conference at the Parco dei Principi Hotel, funded by SIFAR, and a leading proponent of military-backed actions in a total war against communist subversion in Italy. According to investigative journalist Gianni Flamini, Beltrametti provided a copy of the published conference proceedings—*La guerra rivoluzionaria*—to Borghese. See Flamini, *Il partito del golpe: Le strategie della tensione e del terrore dal primo centrosinistra organico al sequestro Moro* (Ferrara: Bovolenta, 1981), volume 1, p. 94.

44. The accounts in the various secondary sources about Borghese’s role in the FNCR split are contradictory. According to the Extraparliamentary Left Research Group, Borghese helped precipitate the schism and then aligned himself with the UNCRSI, which backed the official MSI line and was organically linked to the party. See *Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo*, p. 254. In contrast, Rosenbaum claims that the split was engineered by Michelini loyalists after FNCR head Borghese had broken with the MSI’s moderate line. See *Nuovo fascismo*, p. 71. Rossi also links Borghese to the more radical FNCRSI, which vociferously criticized the MSI for being "bourgeois and reactionary". See *Alternativa e doppiopetto*, p. 62. The latter interpretation seems far more credible, since after 1956 the Black Prince became a fierce opponent of the MSI’s leadership group, at least publicly.


46. Paolo Guzzanti, *Il neofascismo e le sue organizzazioni paramilitari* (Rome: Partito Socialista Italiana, 1972), p. 23. Borghese’s contacts with Luigi Turchi were also noted by the Extraparliamentary Left Research Group, which added that his father Franz, the editor of *Piazza d’Italia*, was later an active promoter of Nixon’s election among groups of Italian immigrants in America. See *Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo*, p. 257. According to the latter source, Borghese, Luigi Turchi, and Caradonna were all among the right-hand men (*uomini di fiducia*) of Kostas Plevris, the Greek secret service.
operative entrusted by the Colonels with organizing their covert activities in Italy.

47. The suggestion that Borghese may have had contacts with Italian political leaders in exclusive Roman salons is that of Rosario Minna, "Il terrorismo di destra", Terrorismi in Italia, ed. Donatella della Porta (Bologna: Mulino/Istituto Cattaneo, 1984), p. 47. Minna, then a Judge at the Turin Tribunal, has had considerable experience investigating cases of right-wing subversion.

48. The most detailed account I have been able to find about Borghese’s financial shenanigans is that of Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, p. 168. Compare also Guzzanti, Neofascismo e le sue organizzazioni paramilitari, p. 24; Minna, "Terrorismo di destra", p. 47; Norberto Valentini, La notte della Madonna: L’Italia tragi-comica del golpe nei documenti inediti dei servizi segreti... (Rome: Le Monde, 1978), pp. 27-8. The ambiguity about whether Sindona simply resigned or intentionally transferred his position as president of the bank to Borghese derives from the ambiguity of the phrasing in Flamini’s account ("ceduta da Sindona"). According to Renzo Vanni, in 1962 Borghese received 10 billion lire from Trujillo through the Finanziaria Italiana company. See Trent’anni di regime bianco (Pisa: Giardini, 1976), p. 141. It is also worth noting that Ovidio Lefebvre D’Ovidio and his younger brother Antonio, the more powerful and brilliant of the two, were among the key Italians later implicated in the Lockheed Corporation’s bribery scandal, for which see Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, pp. 19-20; Giuseppe D’Avanzo, Dossier Lockheed: Contributo alla ricerca di una verità (Rome: B&C, 1976); Giorgio Galli, L’Italia sotterranea: Storia, politica e scandali (Bari: Laterza, 1983), pp. 177-80; David Boulton, The Lockheed Papers (London: J. Cape, 1978), pp. 135-58; Maurizio De Luca et al, Tutti gli uomini dell’Antilope (Milan: Mondadori, 1977), esp. pp. 39-45; and a number of press reports dating from 1976, for example, Paolo Ojetti, "Le duecento società dell’avvocato [Antonio] Lefebvre" L’Europeo 32:21 (21 May 1976), pp. 118-19. Perhaps it is no coincidence that both Ovidio and Borghese were among those linked to the earlier bank collapse, since during that period the enterprises of the Lefebvre brothers seem to have been utilized by the secret services to "cover" certain highly secretive political operations. Thus in 1961, Ettore De Martino, a stockholder in many of Antonio’s (dummy) firms, liquidated the front company—Torre Marina—which had previously been used by the Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate (SIFAR) to purchase the land at Alghero in Sardinia, land that henceforth functioned as a training base for special warfare personnel, including recruits for the clandestine "Gladio" network. See Paolo Ojetti, "Il SIFAR compraviva terreni in Sardegna", L’Europeo 32:22 (28 May 1976), p. 40. Compare Parlamento, Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi [hereafter CPI/Stragi], [22 Aprile 1992] Relazione sull’inchiesta condotta sulle vicende connesse all’Operazione Gladio (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1992), p. 41, note 2. Among Torre Marina’s shareholders (soci) were originally General Ettore Musco (at the time head of SIFAR), Colonel Felice Santini (then head of Servizio Informazioni Operative e Situazione [SIOS]-Aeronautica and later Air Force attaché in Washington), and Colonel Antonio Lanfalone (a top
official in SIFAR's administrative section); on 5 January 1956 these three sold their shares to General De Lorenzo, Colonel Luigi Tagliamonte (chief of SIFAR's administrative section), and Colonel Giulio Fettarappa Sandri (head of Ufficio R). The only civilian among the stockholders was the engineer Aurelio Rossi.


50. General information on Gil Robles and CEDA can be found in any serious book which deals with the political history of twentieth century Spain. A good introduction to the Spanish right, with much information about CEDA, can be found in Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). For CEDA itself, see the two volume work of José R. Montero, La CEDA: El catolicismo social y político en la II República (Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1988). For specific accounts of Gil Robles' political career, see José María García Escudero, Vista a la derecha: Canovas, Maura, Cambo, Gil Robles, Lopez Rodo, Fraga (Madrid: RIALP, 1988), pp. 179-226; and José Gutierrez-Rave Montero, Gil Robles, caudillo frustrado (Madrid: ERSA/Prensa Española, 1967). Many of Gil Robles' own writings have also been published, for example, No fue posible la paz (Barcelona: Ariel, 1968), and Marginalia política (Barcelona: Ariel, 1975).


53. For Rocca's recruitment of former Decima MAS members, see Parlamento, Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sugli eventi del giugno-luglio 1964 [hereafter CPI/De Lorenzo], Relazione di maggioranza (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1971), p. 554; idem, Relazioni di minoranza: Terracini et al (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1971), pp. 162-3. Although the testimony of Senator Jannuzzi was then contested by the
Carabinieri officers who he claimed had told him about this illegal recruitment, and was thus rejected as unconfirmable hearsay by conservative members who formed the majority of the parliamentary commission, this claim has now been confirmed by the publication of Cerica’s testimony to the Lombardi Commission investigating the 1964 “coup”. See CPI/Stragi, Relazione sulla documentazione concernente gli "omissis" dell’inchiesta SIFAR (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1991), volume 4, pp. 260-1, 298-9. Most of the journalists and academics who have examined the matter had already accepted that Rocca did indeed make efforts to recruit former RSI soldiers, especially from the Decima MAS. See, for example, Giuseppe De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia (Rome: Riuniti, 1984), p. 72.

54. Malatiare, p. 369.

55. See especially the testimony of Colonel Cerica—not coincidentally one of the same officers who denied Jannuzzi’s version of their discussion about the illegal recruitment activities of Rocca—before the Lombardi Commission investigating De Lorenzo’s "deviations". See CPI/Stragi, Relazione...concernante gli "omissis" dell’inchiesta SIFAR, volume 4, pp. 262-97. Compare the converging testimony provided by Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Podestà to a journalist from the newsweekly ABC in November of 1967, cited in Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, pp. 191-2.

56. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, pp. 121-2. Compare the brief descriptions of the Comitato Tricolore in Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, p. 163; Guzzanti, Neofascismo e le sue organizzazioni paramilitari, p. 27.

57. Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, p. 69. But Guadagni also claimed that the Black Prince did not suddenly decide to form the FN one day after having thought about it for a long time. Instead, influential people from all over Italy had been approaching Borghese and asking him why he was taking was doing nothing to impede the spreading degeneracy and chaos. It was these entreaties from sympathetic patriots that supposedly prompted him to respond and take concrete action. See ibid, pp. 117-18.

58. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 3. According to the Extraparliamentary Left Research Group, the Circolo dei Selvatici originally served as a cultural "front" for an earlier RSI veterans association headed by Borghese, the Fronte Grigioverde. It was then later used to "cover" the early gatherings of the FN. See Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, pp. 191, 254-5.

59. This promotion of a united Europe freed from Western as well as Eastern domination, and for a State that transcended traditional political categories has been taken by some to mean that Borghese himself supported some radical fascist ideological positions characteristic of the RSI. Although he may have found some of this rhetoric congenial, it seems clear that he employed it primarily for tactical reasons—to appeal to the RSI veterans and youthful neo-fascist activists who had always idolized him and whom he was then seeking to recruit into the FN. He resented the "humiliating"
provisions of the postwar peace treaty and often claimed to be opposed on a philosophical level to the materialistic cultural values associated with the United States, but prior to 1971 his de facto support for an Atlanticist military alliance against communism never wavered. In this context, it should be pointed out that in 1973 Edgardo Sogno—who no one could possibly accuse of supporting radical neo-fascist positions—also planned to combine an authoritarian rightist political stance with an ostensibly progressive social agenda so as to defuse opposition to his "white coup", a subtler sort of anti-communist strategy characteristic of the more enlightened sectors of the American government with whom he had often collaborated. It is even possible that the Black Prince’s appeals to transcend ideological boundaries reflected the new strategy of manipulation then being initiated by the radical right to compromise leftist forces. Finally, on a number of occasions Borghese insisted that attempts to revitalize classical fascism or recreate the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) would be foolish and counterproductive.

60. Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, pp. 134-5.


62. As noted above. See Lazzeri, Decima MAS, pp. 141-52.

63. Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, pp. 93, 102-4, 139.

64. Ibid, pp. 67-8.

65. Ibid, pp. 47-8, 92-3, 137.


67. Ibid, pp. 80-1, 89-95, 100-2, 104-10, 117-19, 121-2. Note that colpetto can mean either "little blow" or "little coup", and it is possible that Borghese was being purposely ambiguous with his language in this instance.

68. Ibid, pp. 93, 101-3.


70. Cited by Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 5.


73. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 1, p. 94.
74. Ibid, volume 2, pp. 5-6. For Orlandini’s background, see Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 26-7. For Guadagni’s, see Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, p. 43. Orlandini later told SID man Labruna that he personally set up the first FN cell, after which others were slowly developed throughout the peninsula. See Valentini, Notte della Madonna, p. 39.

75. For details concerning the FN’s organizational structure and its purposes, see Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, pp. 43, 88-9; Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 71-2; Guzzanti, Neofascismo e le sue organizzazioni paramilitari, p. 23.

76. For the general nature of the "A" and "B" groups, see Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 71-2. Compare Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 5; Ferraresi, "Destra eversiva", p. 60. Tomasso Adami Rook, a Pisan engineer and assistant manager of the Galileo firm in Florence, was the national leader of the FN’s "B groups". Although he later denied that there was any division of labor between the "B" and "A" groups, this claim was disproved by numerous other sources of information. See Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, p. 227.

77. For brief accounts of the FN’s activities in the first half of 1969, see Sentenza 5 XI 76 contro Borghese, pp. 71-2, 76; Flamini, Partito del Golpe, volume 2, pp. 8-9, 29-31, 58-9. These accounts are based primarily on the information collected in various SID reports concerning the Borghese coup, which were later published in Parlamento, Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sulla loggia massonica P2 [hereafter CPI/P2], Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione raccolti dalla commissione, volume 7, tome 16, pp. 147-329.

78. Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, p. 43; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 8; Rosenbaum, Nuovo fascismo, p. 84.

79. For characterizations of the FN’s adherents, see Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, pp. 42-3; Ferraresi, "Destra eversiva", pp. 60-1; Minna, "Terrorismo di Destra", p. 47; Adalberto Baldoni, Noi rivoluzionari. La destra e il "caso italiano": Appunti per una storia, 1960-1986 (Rome: Settimo Segillo, 1986), p.188. Guzzanti specifically notes the presence of some rightist ex-partisans disposed to follow Borghese’s obscure "aristocratic" line. See his Neofascismo e le sue organizzazioni paramilitari, p. 23.

80. For FN financing, see Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 69, 72; Minna, "Terrorismo di destra", p. 47. Specifics about the industrialists and other wealthy supporters of the FN can be found throughout Fiore’s sentence and volume 2 of Flamini’s Partito del golpe. As will become clear below, support from financial circles in northern Italy, especially Liguria, did not cease following the FN’s aborted December 1970 coup.
81. Estimates of the number of FN supporters are widely divergent. For example, Guadagni claimed that there were "hundreds of thousands" of such supporters. Borghese, more prudently and realistically, numbered them at "several thousand", including "a fairly large number of youths". See Pansa, *Borghese mi ha detto*, pp. 79-80. Various secondary sources estimate the total number at between 1000 and 3000 members. Compare *Ibid*, p. 43, citing the Interior Ministry report; Guzzanti, *Neofascismo e le sue organizzazioni paramilitari*, p. 24; Rosenbaum, *Nuovo fascismo*, p. 84. These latter estimates jibe with Judge Fiore's conclusions that the results of Borghese's recruiting efforts were "unexpectedly meagre". See *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, p. 72.

82. Pansa, *Borghese mi ha detto*, pp. 99-100. The CNR was founded in November 1967, and within two years it claimed to have established 48 provincial committees and to number 9000-10,000 militants. In August 1969 it began publishing a monthly journal, *Forza, Uomo*. According to De Sario, formerly National Secretary of the Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano's (PSDI) national youth federation, the members of the CNR were "fascist protesters" inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini, Niccolò Bombacci, Vilfredo Pareto, Filippo Corridoni, the futurists, and the Mussolini of 1919, among others. Although the CNR publicly repudiated violence and sought to appeal, like Pierre Poujade in France, to the small shopkeepers, in its journal its members were characterized as "men ready for an arduous revolutionary struggle" against a "democracy that [was] suffocating freedom". The CNR's activities were mainly concentrated in Milan and Varese during 1970. See *ibid*, pp. 164-5.

83. Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, pp. 95-7. For more on the Lega itself, which was officially established in Milan on 8 March 1970, see Pansa, *Borghese mi ha detto*, pp. 173-4.

84. For Monti as the FN's intermediary to Sogno, see Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, p. 196.

85. Cited by *ibid*, volume 2, p. 8. Unfortunately, he fails to note the date of this report.

86. Pansa, *Borghese mi ha detto*, pp. 98-9. Borghese referred to ON militants as "very fine youths". Interestingly, Rauti, Sermonti, and Maceratini were all appointed to the MSI's Central Committee after rejoining the party, and the latter was put in charge of the party's "civil emergencies" section. See Rossi, *Alternativa e doppiopetto*, p. 108.

87. For the appointment of Saccucci, see Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, p. 141. Saccucci brought a number of other ON and AN members into the FN at the time he joined. See *ibid*, p. 8.


90. Cited by Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, p. 102. For discussions about a future coup, see Valentini, *Notte della Madonna*, p. 14, citing an account written after the coup by a journalist closely linked to rightist circles, who then provided it to SID man Labruna. The same source notes that Campo, Delle Chiaie’s number two man in AN, was responsible for organizing and executing clandestine plans, and that Perri was put in charge of maintaining relations between AN and the FN. Compare also *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, p. 454, for confirmation of Perri’s role. Both Campo and Perri were apparently members of the AN’s own national directorate. See the later trial against AN (for reconstituting the fascist party): Tribunale di Roma, Presidente Pasquale Lapichino, *Sentenza n. 6961 del 5 giugno 1976 nel procedimento penale contro Agnellini, Roberto + 63* [hereafter *Sentenza 5 VI 76 contro Agnellini*], pp. 1-2.


92. See "Che cosa hanno detto i neofascisti all'Europeo", *L'Europeo* 30:33 (15 August 1974), p. 26. Leroy insisted, however, that during that NOE/ENO Congress there was no talk of placing bombs, and that his close associate Yves Guérin-Sérac [Guillou] could neither "be linked to bombs" nor "have inspired homicidal ideas". As the account of Aginter Presse above has indicated, the latter claim is clearly not true. For the close association between Leroy, Borghese, and the other Italians mentioned, see Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, pp. 143-4.

93. *Strage di stato: Vent'anni dopo*, pp. 251-2, 257. Borghese himself denied having any meetings with Greek plotters prior to the December 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing, and insisted that these and other bogus claims were part and parcel of a Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting him. See Pansa, *Borghese mi ha detto*, pp. 121-3.

94. Various details of Borghese’s efforts to recruit Mafia aid for his projected coup can be found, to provide only a few examples, in Pietro Calderoni, "Golpe di mafia", *L'Espresso* 34:11 (20 March 1988), pp. 7-8, citing Antonino Calderone’s testimony. Compare the remarks by FN leader Gaetano Lunetta in Mario Scialoja, "Fu vero golpe", *L'Espresso* 35:4 (29 January 1989), p. 39, who claimed that it was a contingent of mafiosi from Sicily (rather than AN members) who carried out the failed mission to capture Vicari. See also Philip Willan, *Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy* (London: Constable, 1991), pp. 96-8, citing the testimony of Buscetta and Liggio.

95. *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, p. 74.
96. Pansa, _Borghese mi ha detto_, pp. 54-7, 96-8, 130. In Borghese’s view, a sense of higher patriotic duty and a spirit of self-sacrifice were required of a military man. If someone in the service believed that the concept of the fatherland had become outdated, he should take off his uniform at once, go home, and get another job, because he would not be able to discharge his duties properly.


98. _Ibid_, p. 98.


100. Flamini, _Partito del golpe_, volume 2, p. 103.


102. Cited by Valentini, _Notte della Madonna_, pp. 39-40, 45. Compare _ibid_, p. 14, citing the report on the coup prepared for Labruna by right-wing journalist Guido Paglia, which was itself based on information provided by both Orlandini and Adriano Monti. Many other people were named as FN supporters in the period after the 1970 coup. Although it is sometimes difficult to be certain just what time frame Orlandini is referring to, the alleged FN supporters listed here apparently backed the Fronte prior to the launching of that coup.

103. _Ibid_, pp. 64-5, for some of Orlandini’s allusions to the important role played by freemasonry in the 1970 coup. Further details were later provided by Andrea Barberi and Nazareno Pagani, "Un’ombra da Piazza Fontana a Pecorelli", in _L’Italia della P2_ (Milan: Mondadori, 1981), pp. 63-4. Note that there is some discrepancy between the Orlandini quotes cited in the latter source, which refer simply to _ufficiali iscritti_ in the context of a discussion of the FN’s military supporters, and the summary of his testimony by Valentini, who refers to 3000 official masonic adepts rather than military officers _per se_. In the text I have interpreted these "3000" as military officers who were affiliated with masonry, though this may not have been what Orlandini meant. In any event, it is interesting that the normally tenacious Labruna did not investigate this masonic connection further, and that his superiors failed to mention these particular Orlandini revelations in the reports they sent to the judicial authorities. More detailed information about the involvement of P2 in the Borghese coup did not surface until the activities of the lodge were accidentally uncovered in the early 1980s, at which point it was discovered that Miceli and other high-ranking SID officials were themselves members of the organization. See further below.
104. For the Carabinieri's general conservative legalist orientation, see Richard Collin, The De Lorenzo Gambit: The Italian Coup Manqué of 1964 (Beverley Hills and London: Sage, 1976), pp. 21, 27-8. However, as with almost all state security forces, the Carabinieri corps was riven with factionalism, and within it there were influential elements with extremist, anti-democratic sentiments. It was surely no accident, for example, that General De Lorenzo placed his reliance almost exclusively on the Carabinieri, specifically the powerful legions in Milan and Rome, in designing his "anti-subversive" Plan Solo. For details concerning the politicization of the corps and the infighting among various Carabinieri factions, see Giorgio Boatti, L'Arma: I Carabinieri da De Lorenzo a Mino, 1962-1977 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1978), passim.

105. For general accounts of the Italian police since the end of World War II, most of which focus on their politicization and abuses, see Romano Canosa, La polizia in Italia dal 1945 ad oggi (Bologna: Mulino, 1976); Angelo D'Orsi, La polizia: Le forze dell'ordine italiano (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1972).

106. Indeed, Orlandini became increasingly upset because these officials kept making excuses to avoid taking action, so much so that at a certain point he felt that this inaction would doom the plans of the conspirators. See Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 41, 77-8, 85.

107. For their testimony, see Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 85-6, 141-3, 164; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, pp. 31-2, 102-3. Among the revelations Orlandini made to SID men Labruna and Romagnoli in Lugano were that prior to their 1969 meetings, the shipbuilder had made contact with Miceli in 1968 through a civilian intermediary, then had met with him several times at a hotel in the Roman neighborhood of Prati, near Piazza Cola Di Rienzo. Orlandini also confirmed Romagnoli's query about whether their initial contact grew out of earlier contacts between Borghese and Miceli in 1954 and 1955, in connection with a plan to launch an anti-communist crusade in Sicily. If true, this links the events of 1970 explicitly to those of the earlier rightist plots, and demonstrates a continuity, hitherto only suspected, between some of the personnel involved.


109. Cited by Cipriani and Cipriani, Sovranità limitata, p. 157, note 21. Compare Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 92, who notes that the close links between these two men later caused many neo-fascist participants to suspect that Drago was a double agent who had acted to sabotage the coup.

110. For the training of FN, AN, and ON members at the base, see Corrado Incerti and Sandro Ottolenghi, "Il campo di Alghero", L'Europeo 32:21 (21 May 1976), p. 39. According to their unnamed informant, the Alghero base was ostensibly administered by the Defense Ministry, but was in fact run by the secret services, specifically Ufficio D
of SID. The commander of the base was Colonel Fernando Pastore Stocchi, who had previously been Miceli’s personal secretary at SIOS-Esercito. This informant also claimed that select groups of left-wing terrorists and Arab guerrillas were trained there. For the key role of the Sardinia base in training "Gladio" personnel, see CPI/Stragi, Prerelazione sull...Operazione Gladio, pp. 27-9.

111. CPI/Stragi, Prerelazione sull...Operazione Gladio, pp. 27-9.

112. Cited in Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 55, 136-8. More information on Selenia can be found, in the context of the Lockheed scandal, in De Luca et al, Tutti gli uomini dell’Antilope, pp. 69-70. Therein Selenia is described as a "veritable den of generals", eleven of whom, drawn from the Italian Army, Navy, and Air Force, served as its expert advisors. Many other ex-officers and relatives of military notables were among the firm’s employees. Indeed, Selenia did not even hesitate to hire a retiring Air Force general who had earlier been officially responsible for monitoring the activities of the company! It was in fact very common for high-ranking military officials to work for defense contractors after they retired.


115. The complete lists can be found in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione raccolti dalla commissione, vol. I: Le carte sequestrate a Castiglion Fibocchi, tomes 1-4. Evaluations of their reliability can be found in ibid, vol. II: Riscontri sull’attendibilità delle liste, tomes 1-9. Somewhat more accessible for those not working in Italy is the main list at the end of Martín Berger, Historia de la logia masonica P-2 (Buenos Aires: El Cid/Fundación para la Democracia en Argentina, 1983), Appendix 2, pp. 125-51. There are a number of errors and omissions in the latter, especially concerning the Italian "brethren", but it provides more useful information regarding the Argentine members of P2. Some of the P2 members implicated in the Borghese coup are listed by De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, p. 182.

116. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, pp. 159-60.

117. Ibid, pp. 177-8, citing an SID report.
118. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, p. 77.

119. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, pp. 176-7, 180. Compare Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, p. 348, for Frattini’s testimony about the role played by Drago.

120. Neofascismo e le sue organizzazioni paramilitari, pp. 23-4. Compare Vanni, Trent’anni di regime bianco, p. 355. For the information about the Army’s provision of trainers and material for these exercises, see Ferruccio Albanese, "Parasoccorso per l’Italia", Lo Specchio (13 September 1970), cited by De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 132 and 144, note 80.

121. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, pp. 178-9, citing SID reports. Note that the first two training courses listed, when combined together, were identical to the title of the published proceedings of the 1965 (SIFAR-funded) Istituto Pollio conference on guerra rivoluzionaria. This was hardly coincidental, since the ideas expressed at that conference profoundly influenced the subsequent strategies and tactics employed by the Italian extraparliamentary right. Convicted right-wing terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra later claimed that ON leaders made little effort to disguise their organization of such paramilitary camps because they were doing so with the connivance of the police, Carabinieri, and military. See his Ergastolo per la libertà: Verso la verità sulla strategia della tensione (Florence: Arnaud, 1989), p. 7.

122. Vanni, Trent’anni di regime bianco, p. 355.

123. For descriptions of the meetings, see Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, p. 134; and Sassano, Politica della strage, p. 107. Among the participants at the 15 November meeting—according to the former source—were Calzolari; paratroop General Michele Caforio; "Commander" Guido Bianchini, a former Decima MAS man and later Borghese loyalist in the FN; a group of paratroopers, including some from the RSI’s "Nembo" unit; and a number of extraparliamentary rightists, including members of AN and Europa Civiltà. Note that Caforio and Stelio Frattini later sued the publishers of Strage di Stato. Caforio claimed that he was in Reggio Calabria on that date, after having arrived there on a military aircraft. See Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, pp. 118-19. The plaintiffs were apparently unable to prove their cases, however, since the same information appears in later editions of the book. The same source indicates that Borghese himself may have attended the 6 December meeting.

124. Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, p. 120; Sassano, Politica della strage, p. 106. Among those who attended these dinners, according to Calzolari’s wife, was Cardinal Eugène Tisserant. Prior to taking his sacerdotal vows, Tisserant was an Army colonel who had been sent on an important mission to the Middle East by the French secret service. Later, he became a member of the Roman Curia and aligned himself with its integralist faction. Along with Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, Tisserant was allegedly one of the chief Vatican protectors of Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS) leaders who took refuge in Italy following the failed Algerian putsch in 1961, including guerre...
révolutionnaire theorist Colonel Charles Lacheroy. See Strage di stato: Vent'anni dopo, pp. 123-4 (including note). Tisserant was also in contact with Aginter Presse. In November 1966 his former secretary, Monsignor Georges Roche, wrote as follows to Aginter chief Yves Guillou: "You know that I share your sentiments as well as those of your group. It is with all my heart that I wish for the success of your efforts and pray that your works will be blessed." See Frédéric Laurent, L'Orchestre noir (Paris: Stock, 1978), p. 132.

125. Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, pp. 122-3. It is simply untrue that Calzolari was too young to have been in the Decima MAS. Although he was too young to have participated in Borghese's earlier naval exploits, he would have been seventeen in 1943 and hence could have been among the many youths who joined the ranks of Borghese's infantry units during the RSI period.

126. All of these details can be found in the account of Sassano, Politica della strage, pp. 106-7. The untrustworthy source of the revelations about the post-strage meeting was Evelino Loi, about whom see immediately below.


128. Strage di stato: Vent'anni dopo, p. 117 (and note).

129. Ibid, pp. 121-3; Sassano, Politica della strage, pp. 109-10, 111-12.


132. For Pirina's testimony, see Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 144, quoting directly from Vitalone's Requisitoria. Luberti was a likely murder suspect, since he was a genuine psychopath. During the Nazi retreat in the Salò period, Luberti and his paramilitary band were singlehandedly responsible for the murder of over 200 people, the brutal torture of many others, and the rape of dozens of women, crimes for which he was nicknamed the "hangman of Albenga". In a book entitled I camerati, Luberti later claimed that he was "fiercer than the SS" and that "murder will always be the most stimulating of human activities." Although he was condemned to death by firing squad at a 1946 trial in Savona, the sentence was repeatedly reduced until he was released from prison in 1953. After his release, he soon reestablished contact with Borghese, and involved himself in various right-wing political activities prior to becoming an FN money-handler. On 18 January 1970, at around the same time that Calzolari died, Luberti shot his German girlfriend Carla Grüber in the head with a 7.65 caliber pistol. Her decomposing body was discovered in their apartment on 3 April, but it was not until 10 July 1972 that the police captured him in Portici after a firefight. For Luberti's
background, see Sassano, Politica della strage, pp. 113-16.

133. Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, pp. 135-8. Here it is worth recalling that Improta was one of the police officials who unceasingly promoted the "anarchist trail" in the Piazza Fontana investigation, an attempt to cover the footsteps of the real perpetrators for which he was later sanctioned. See, for example, Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, p. 522.

134. Loi was born into a Sardinian family with communist sympathies. Shortly after moving to Rome in the mid-1960s, he had climbed to the top of the Colosseum and threatened to jump off if he was not provided with employment, a bizarre act which netted him a housecleaning job at a Monsignor’s residence. Within a few days he quit and began frequenting Stazione Termini, the main train station in Rome, in the company of a group of unemployed southern Italians and Sardinians who eked out a precarious living from day to day. When elements of the leftist student movement occupied Rome University’s Faculty of Law in Piazza Esedra during the winter of 1968, Loi managed to persuade the occupying students to let him participate in their struggle, thereby obtaining a place to stay at night. In that locale, he organized a contingent of his southern Italian friends and helped repel a series of neo-fascist attacks. The Law School was cleared out by the police in early February 1969, at which point the students occupied the main campus. Three thousand police and Carabinieri then made a dawn attack on the campus, arresting seven people in the process. Since one of Loi’s friends was among those arrested, Loi himself was provided with 400,000 lire gathered via a student collection on behalf of the arrestees, but was immediately kicked out of the movement after student leaders discovered that he had pocketed these donations. He then began associating with radical rightists. These actions help to illuminate his character, or lack thereof.

135. Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, pp. 138-42. According to Loi, Carabinieri Captain Servolino was a regular visitor to MSI headquarters, whereas Servolino’s colleague Captain Nobili (commander of the Piazza Venezia Carabinieri company), Lieutenant Colonels Giordano (from the Army) and Lilli, and General Dalla Chiesa supposedly frequented FN headquarters. If the latter reference is to Carabinieri General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, this claim is scarcely believable.

136. All of these details are found in the preliminary sentence of Judge Occorsio, which was excerpted by neo-fascist journalist Mario Tedeschi in La strage contro lo stato (Milan: Borghese, 1973), pp. 126-30.

137. Strage di stato: Vent’anni dopo, p. 141.

138. Ibid.

139. For these details, see Reggio 1970: Una rivolta tra cronaca e storia (Reggio Calabria: n.p., n.d.), pp. 6-7, 31-6, and passim; the Ciccio Franco interview published.
in Gianni Rossi, ed., La rivolta. Reggio Calabria: Le ragioni di ieri e la realtà di oggi (Rome: Isituto di Studi Corporativi, 1991), pp. 217-29; and Rossi, Alternativa e doppiopetto, pp. 156-67. All of these are neo-fascist sources, the first radical, the last two moderate.

140. For Borghese’s visits to Reggio, see Reggio 1970, pp. 24-8; Rossi, Alternativa e doppiopetto, p. 157. The former source provides a number of interesting details. For example, after discovering that his rally had been banned, Borghese went with Genoese Zerbi to the Questura to talk to Police Commissioner Emilio Santillo. When the Black Prince entered the police station, all the policemen present snapped to attention. Santillo then indicated, as if to apologize, that he was ordered to interdict the rally by the political establishment. Despite this show of respect, a four-hour pitched battle later broke out between Borghese’s supporters and the police.

141. See Rossi, Alternativa e doppiopetto, pp. 157-8; Pansa, Borghese mi ha detto, pp. 81-6; and Reggio 1970, p. 77 (reprint of an FN leaflet).

142. The details provided in the next two paragraphs are based on the account of Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, pp. 111-15, who bases his on police reports and the trial testimony.

143. Ibid, p. 143.

144. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 74-5. Compare the assessment of public prosecutor Claudio Vitalic in his 1974 Requisitoria (p. 77), wherein Borghese’s strategy was identified as the carrying out of provocations, specifically public disturbances, in order to precipitate and justify the launching of repressive counterblows by the forces of order. Cited by Claudio Nunziata, “‘Golpe Borghese’ e ‘Rosa dei Venti’: Come si svuota un processo”, in Eversione di destra, terrorismo, stragi: I fatti e intervento giudiziario, ed. by Vittorio Borraccetti (Milan: Angeli, 1986), p. 80.


146. For Borghese’s operational plans, see ibid, pp. 78-82; Valentini, Notte della Madonna, Part I, passim.

147. Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 15-16, 25; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 225. Talenti was a key Nixon supporter in Italy who served as some sort of intermediary between Miceli and various FN leaders, including Orlandini.

148. Cited in Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 15-17. Labruna’s source for this information was almost certainly Guido Paglia, who was not only closely linked to Delle Chiaie and AN, but was also an Aginter Presse “correspondent” and one of the 81 journalists allegedly on SID’s payroll. See Vinciguerra, Ergastolo per la libertà, p. 24. For the latter information, see the 5 December 1976 edition of the rightist weekly Il

149. Vitalone's Requisitoria, p. 95, cited by Nunziata, "'Golpe Borghese' e 'Rosa dei Ventî'", p. 88. Additional information about Fanali's background will be provided below.

150. *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, pp. 85-8. Compare Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, pp. 222-4. For the designations "command post A" and "command post B", see Orlandini's testimony cited in Valentini, *Notte della Madonna*, p. 139. For the acquisition of the arms, see *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, pp. 246-7, 299-302, 343-5, 457-8, 473-5, 479-80. According to various witnesses, the money to purchase these weapons was provided by a so-called Comitato Ristretto Genovese consisting of Pietro Catanoso, Ernesto Grosso, and Leopoldo Zunino, though no proof was ever found to substantiate this. In any event, it is certain that on 2 December 1970 Benvenuto persuaded Gabriele Di Nardo, Paolo Pinacci, Federico Ratti, and Renato Ridella to accompany Frattini and him to the Armeria Galli on Via Moscova in Milan, from where a handful of Winchester carbines and Heckler & Koch repeater rifles were directly purchased. The latter three then "loaned" Frattini and Benvenuto their permits to carry arms.


153. Ibid, pp. 118-21. Serpieri had played a key role as an informant in connection with the Piazza Fontana bombing. Antico's provision of information to SID on the night of the coup will be discussed below.

154. For these events, see ibid, pp. 89-90; Valentini, *Notte della Madonna*, pp. 17, 51-2, 135; and Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, pp. 222-3. Lunetta's illuminating testimony can be found in Scialoja, "Fu vero golpe". Note also that Orlandini later told Labruna that some of the AN members who first entered the Viminale on the afternoon of 7 December were of particular utility because they already "had knowledge of certain things." See *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, p. 116. This cryptic remark may simply refer to the fact that Drago had provided a detailed hand-drawn map of the interior of the Viminale to AN leaders, but it may also have been some sort of allusion to inside information previously obtained by Delle Chiaie, perhaps owing to his alleged relationship with UAR official D'Amato.


156. For the gross incompetence of the investigators--no officials and none of those on guard duty that night at the Viminale were even questioned--see the account in Fiore's *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, pp. 94-5, where it is implied that this may have
been the result of something worse than negligence, that is, complicity in a cover-up.

157. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 90-5. In a later appellate sentence, it was argued that this composite weapon may have been in the armory long before the coup took place. However, this absurd explanation does not explain how Orlandini and other plotters knew of its existence. See Nunziata, "'Golpe Borghese' e 'Rosa dei Venti'," p. 75.

158. For the unsuccessful Vicari operation, see Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 127-9. The alleged FN-Mafia links have been noted above.

159. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 105-7. Berti’s background is worth noting. During World War II he had fought with the "Littorio" Division on the French front, and after the war had been condemned by the Rome Court of Appeals for promoting collaboration with the invading Germans. Yet this background did not prevent him—along with thousands of others who were compromised in similar ways—from resuming a career in "the most delicate ganglia of the bureaucratic structure..." See Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 225, citing trial documents.

160. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 107-13, 249-56.


163. For these dramatic details, many of which remain unconfirmed, see the verbatim testimony of Orlandini published in Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 139-40. Compare Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 130, 132-3.

164. See Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 363-4, for Lombardi’s probable role in this task.


166. Ibid, p. 93, citing Orlandini’s testimony.


168. Ibid, pp. 131-9; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:1, pp. 3-6.

169. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 41-3.


171. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 45-50.

173. See the summary of the 1978 sentence in Nunziata, "'Golpe Borghese' e 'Rosa dei Venti'", pp. 74-8. Compare Vitalone's Requisitoria, p. 126, cited ibid, p. 86, for the overly simplistic suggestion that only a few disloyal officers sympathized with or supported Borghese's action. By criticizing this reductionist approach, I do not mean to indict the Italian armed forces as a whole, but rather to suggest that certain influential but minoritarian factions within the military establishment promoted such an authoritarian involution.

174. See Corte d'Assise di Roma, Presidente Giuseppe Giuffrida e Giudice Estensore Antonio Germano Abate, Sentenza n. 29/78 del 14 luglio 1984 nel procedimento penale contro Orlandino, Remo + 77 [hereafter Sentenza 14 VII 84 contro Orlandini], pp. 649-50, where various charges against Orlandini, Delle Chiaie, Berti, and other leading conspirators (for armed insurrection against the state, the theft of arms from the Interior Ministry, the illegal transport of weapons, and the attempted kidnapping of Police Chief Vicari) were dropped "because the event[s] did not occur (non sussiste)". [!!!]

175. See Cecchi, Storia della P2, p. 141.


177. SID reports were prepared about various aspects of FN plotting on 25 November 1968, 11 May 1969, 22 May 1970, 6 August 1970, 28-29 August 1970, 19 September 1970 (two), and 7 December 1970. See Nunziata, "'Golpe Borghese' e 'Rosa dei Venti'", pp. 93-4. Most of these were later published in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 7, tome 16, pp. 147-329. Miceli should have familiarized himself with the general information contained in these reports after he became head of the service in October 1970, since such intelligence reports were regularly transmitted to the office of the chief of SID.


179. Ibid, pp. 157-60. Nunziata is particularly critical of this inadequate initial effort by SID to verify Antico's information. As he points out, an external examination of the Viminale palace from the plaza side made it impossible for Genovesi and his partner to observe the side entrances to the building, one of which members of Delle Chiaie's group had made use of to carry out their assigned tasks. See "'Golpe Borghese' e 'Rosa dei Venti'", p. 94.

180. For Miceli's inaction, see Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 160-1, 391-2. Compare Nunziata, "'Golpe Borghese' e 'Rosa dei Venti'", p. 94; De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, p. 101. Several secondary sources, basing their accounts on prosecutor Vitalone's Requisitoria, as well as other documentary materials, claim that
Miceli was informed of Antico’s tip shortly after midnight. But Gasca Queirazza subsequently testified that he provided preliminary details regarding the coup to Miceli at 1:10 AM on 8 December. See Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, p. 392.

181. However, a strange anomaly surfaced in connection with this conversation. Although Miceli did his best to muddy the waters, he accidentally told Marchesi about the meeting at the gym on Via Eleniana, even though Gasca Queirazza had not mentioned any such meeting when he had earlier spoken to Miceli. Although Marchesi later admitted that this talk with Miceli may have occurred the next day, by which time Miceli may have been officially informed about the ANPDI meeting, suspicions remained that the head of SID may have had another inside source of information about what transpired on the evening of 7-8 December. See Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 390, 392.

182. These testimonies are cited by Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 199-202.


185. Ibid, pp. 404-5.

186. Ibid, pp. 163-5. The key passages of this report, taken from Vitalone’s Requisitoria, are cited by Nunziata in "'Golpe Borghese’ e 'Rosa dei Venti’", pp. 92-3.

187. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 165-7. The details of Labruna’s investigation and Orlandini’s testimony form the basis of Valentini’s important book, Notte della Madonna. Much of the information provided by Orlandini has been used in the reconstruction above, and more will be referred to in the narrative below. For more on the NOD, see ibid, pp. 11-13; and De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 191-2.

188. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 167-8.

189. Ibid, pp. 179-80. Miceli’s testimony about his reaction to the Labruna report can be found in Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, p. 600.

190. For these details, see Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 151-3.


192. Ibid, pp. 198-9, 203.

194. For these quotes, see Cipriani and Cipriani, *Sovranità limitata*, p. 159; and De Lutis, *Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia*, pp. 106-7.


198. *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, pp. 316-18. Unfortunately, the crucial role of De Jorio was glossed over in the sentence. See *ibid*, pp. 323-8.

199. Scialoja, "Fu vero golpe", pp. 38-9. Note that there may be some problems with Lunetta's testimony. It is perhaps more reasonable to assume, for example, that the guards assigned to protect the Viminale were from the Pubblica Sicurezza corps instead of the Carabinieri. The former are under the administrative control of the Interior Ministry, whereas the latter, as a part of the army, are organizationally dependent upon the Defense Ministry. Capanna, the key "inside" man at the Viminale, was a member of the Celere, the anti-riot squad of the national police. Even so, it is possible that certain Carabinieri were seconded to guard the Interior Ministry that night.


201. Cipriani and Cipriani, *Sovranità limitata*, pp. 156-7. Compare Orlandini’s testimony to Labruna, cited in Valentini, *Notte della Madonna*, p. 140. Here it is worth noting that Mingarelli was earlier implicated in De Lorenzo’s 1964 "coup", and was later accused by judges of attempting to derail the investigation of the 1972 Peteano bombing.


205. *Ibid*, pp. 46-7. These detachments had allegedly been sent by Armed Forces chief of staff Henke, who had supposedly established a Mafia-like clique within the service which carried out illegal shakedowns and accepted payoffs. In this case, bribes had been paid to ensure that no weapons would be found.


210. See Sassano, SID e partito americano, p. 88, for the latter claim.

211. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 241-2.


214. Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 9-10. As Valentini rightly notes, this so-called "thanks" also served as a warning, specifically a reminder to SID that certain of its own officials were complicit in the coup.

215. See Valentini, Notte della Madonna, pp. 39-64, 69-87, and passim for Orlandini’s testimony; Scialoja, "Fu vero golpe", pp. 38-9, for Lunetta’s.

216. Compare Sassano, SID e partito americano, p. 86; Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 248.

217. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 297-8, 365-7. It was apparently Lo Vecchio, an especially active plotter, who recruited Casero into the FN and convinced him to support the operation.


219. Cited by De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, p. 104. Note that this could help to explain why Saccucci’s efforts to train FN members in guerrilla warfare may have been tangibly supported by the Army General Staff.

220. See CPI/P2, Relazione di Minoranza: Pisanò, pp. 135-40, for further details about this plan. Senator Pisanò’s basic source for this was Lieutenant Colonel Amos Spiazzi, who claimed that his artillery unit was activated, in accordance with the stipulations of the "Triangle" plan, on the night of the Borghese coup. The implications of this will be
discussed at greater length below, in connection with the alleged involvement of "parallel SID" in the "Tora Tora" operation.


222. For background information on Fanali’s career, see ibid, pp. 37, 97, 105; Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 1, p. 185; De Luca et al, *Tutti gli uomini dell’Antilope*, p. 35.

223. Ilari, *Forze Armate tra politica e potere*, p. 156.

224. See the passage cited verbatim by Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 3:1, p. 73. Lucertini had been appointed as Fanali’s successor as Air Force Chief of Staff.

225. On ISSED and *Politica e Strategia*, see ibid, volume 3:1, p. 212. Among the articles written by Fanali for the journal were "Come è possibile oggi la difesa dell’Europa" in 1 (December 1972), pp. 43-7, and "Il fianco meridionale della NATO", in 2 (March 1973), pp. 88-94.


228. On CIDAS and its first two conferences, see ibid, volume 3:1, pp. 266-7, 662. Among the more famous academic attendees were Raymond Aron, Thomas Molnar, and Paul Feyerabend. Of more relevance to this study is the fact that the participants included Gaetano Rasi, Armin Mohler, Alain de Benoist, and Hennig Eichberg, all leading thinkers associated with the postwar radical right. The latter two, in particular, helped lead that right out of the nostalgic, pro-fascist ideological ghetto and toward more unorthodox currents of thought (many of which borrowed elements from the left), and thence became leading figures in the "New Right" in France and Germany. In any event, the presentations at the first CIDAS conference were later published as *Intellettuali per la libertá* (Turin: CIDAS, 1973); those in the second as *Conoscenza per la libertà* (Turin: CIDAS, 1975). A list of well-wishers and participants at the latter can be found on pp. 345-52. Among the well-wishers were author Anthony Burgess, science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke, geneticist Hans Eysenck, social scientist Ernest Gellner, natural scientist Konrad Lorenz, philosopher Karl Popper, physicist Werner Heisenberg, and historian Arnold Toynbee, along with Front National leader Jean-François Chiappe, who identified himself as a "historian", and others with less distinguished pedigrees.
229. See Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 4:1, pp. 91-3, for details about this CIDAS conference.

230. Ibid, volume 4:2, pp. 469-70. For more on Dell’Amico, see De Lutiis, *Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia*, pp. 156-60.


232. Valentini, *Notte della Madonna*, pp. 39, 78. Note that Orlandini indicated that he himself had last met with Roselli Lorenzini before his arrest in March 1971, but that afterwards it had been too dangerous since both of their names had been linked to conspiratorial plotting. Moreover, in contrast to Lercari, Orlandini named Air Force General Giulio Cesare Graziani—rather than Fanali and Lucertini—as Roselli Lorenzini’s chief operational subordinate. At that time, Graziani was commander of the Second Air Region. Ibid, p. 78.


234. See Ibid, volumes 2, p. 204, and 3:1, pp. 282-3. Supposedly, Lercari and other FN members contacted the Greek junta with the help of a very close associate of Papadopoulos, and then asked the latter to provide the plotters with financial help and, once the operation was launched, to send two cruisers into the Adriatic in order to interdict arms trafficking networks that could supply anti-coup forces.


236. See ibid, pp. 114, 185, for the incident in Paris, etc. Fanali’s stint as headmaster of the NATO Defense College is revealed by De Luca et al, *Tutti gli uomini dell’Antilope*, p. 35.

237. See, for example, De Luca et al, *Tutti gli uomini dell’Antilope*, pp. 37-8, 106-10, 118-25. Apparently, Fanali bought a luxurious villa in Sassolini, about 60 miles outside Rome near the sea, and stock in a number of companies, including SIP and Montedison, with the bribes he obtained from Lockheed.

238. Ilari, *Forze Armate tra politica e potere*, p. 150.

239. See Vitalone’s Requisitoria, p. 94, cited by Calderoni, ed., *Servizi segreti*, pp. 49-50; and Willan, *Puppetmasters*, p. 96. It is not known how Orlandini obtained these documents.

240. Cited in Scialoja, "Fu vero golpe", p. 39. On the surface, this claim seems hard to believe. Verona is a considerable distance from Rome, and major troop movements of this type would surely have been difficult to disguise.
241. Cited in Valentini, Notte della Madonna, p. 135. For his entire testimony regarding American involvement, see ibid, pp. 55-6, 82, 135-9.

242. This document is fully cited in Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 81-2, note 7.


244. For Patria y Libertad’s use of "false flag" terrorist provocations, see Poul Jensen, The Garotte: The United States and Chile, 1970-1973 (Aarhus: Aarhus University, 1988), pp. 232-5, as well as Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, Labyrinth: The Sensational Story of International Intrigue in the Search for the Assassins of Orlando Letelier (New York: Penguin, 1983), p. 62. Propper was the U.S. prosecutor who investigated the 21 September 1976 murder of exiled Chilean leftist Orlando Letelier, which occurred in broad daylight on Washington, D.C.’s embassy row. Propper soon discovered that the "hit" had been ordered by General Juan Manuel Contreras, the head of the post-coup Chilean secret police, the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), and that it had been carried out by Cuban and American contract agents affiliated with that agency’s 5th (External Operations) Department. For the organization of DINA, see the diagram in Ascanio Cavallo Castro et al, Chile, 1973-1988: La historia oculta del régimen militar (Santiago de Chile: Antártica, 1988), p. 50.

245. See, for example, Luis Vega, Anatomia de un golpe de estado: La caída de Allende (Jerusalem: La Semana, 1983), p. 168, citing the example of the Vanguardia Obrera Popular.

246. On the activities, connections, and funding of Patria y Libertad, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, Report, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 24, 31; Donald Freed, with Fred Landis, Death in Washington: The Murder of Orlando Letelier (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1980), pp. 51, 55-6, 66-7; Branch and Propper, Labyrinth, pp. 62-3, 349-50, 378-80, 494-500; and John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 41, 54, 56, 69, 103, 106-18, etc. Further information can be found in general histories of the coup and its precursors. Some of the more "noteworthy" aspects of Patria y Libertad deserve to be highlighted here. Among other things, it possessed both a legal organizational facade and a clandestine cell structure, which was subdivided into training squads, "death squads", and shock troops; its cadres were trained by former military officers, many of whom were graduates of the CIA’s International Police Academy or the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas in Panama; its leaders reportedly had frequent contacts with officials at the American embassy; it was regularly engaged in anti-democratic terrorist actions and psychological warfare operations, both before and after the 1973 coup; it was directly involved in the murder of pro-constitutionalist military officers, including Generals René Schneider and Carles Prats; it promoted anti-Semitism and professed to have a national syndicalist
ideology; it had links to ultra rightist groups and drug trafficking networks throughout Latin America, including those established by anti-Castro Cuban exiles who had worked for the CIA; and many of its members were incorporated into Chilean security agencies after the coup, including the newly-formed DINA. For a remarkably thorough and detailed analysis of American policy toward the Allende regime, with a particular consideration for the characteristics and limitations of the available sources concerning that policy, see Jensen, Garotte, passim.

247. See, for example, the account by Robinson Rojas Sandford, The Murder of Allende and the End of the Chilean Way to Socialism (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 7. This claim was disputed by Robert J. Alexander, The Tragedy of Chile (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978), p. 281, who noted that by that time many radical right terrorists had already been imprisoned or forced into exile by the Allende regime. In any event, among the many far right paramilitary groups which constituted these "independent units" were the Comando de Ex-Cadetes, PROTECO (Protección contra el Comunismo), Soberanía, Orden y Libertad, and the Comando Rolando Matus, which was linked to the rightist Partido Nacional. Rojas, a radical Chilean leftist who blamed Allende for being overly cautious and making too many compromises with the forces of reaction, also claimed that the Americans stationed two destroyers off the coast of Valparaiso and one destroyer and a submarine off the coast of Talcahuano on the day of the coup. This small task force had originally been assigned to participate in the annual "Operation Unitas" maneuvers alongside ships from the Chilean navy. See Murder of Allende, pp. 185, 188. If these naval forces were really meant to support the military golpistas in Chile, even as a last resort, Orlandini's claims about abortive American naval support for "Tora Tora" do not seem quite so far-fetched. No actual evidence has been produced to support this contention in connection with the Chilean coup, however.

248. For Nixon's special hostility toward the liberal CIA and State Department snobs from Ivy League schools, particularly the former, see Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 36. The "clowns" phrase can be found in R[j]ichard N[ixon], The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 447. It may not be wise to attach too much weight to this contemptuous outburst, which was prompted by Nixon's frustration over the CIA's failure to provide him with advance warning about Lon Nol's 1970 coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia. Nevertheless, British historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones aptly sums up Nixon's overall attitude as follows: "There can be little question concerning Nixon's continuing doubts about the competence and loyalty of CIA personnel." See The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1989), p. 177.

249. The literature on the Watergate scandal is enormous, and need not be cited here. However, it should be pointed out that Nixon's efforts were perhaps sabotaged from the outset by some of the "loyalists" recruited into his special investigative units. It may well be the case, for example, that "former" CIA men E. Howard Hunt and James W. McCord, two of the key Plumbers, had been infiltrated into the unit by the Agency itself, apparently with the aim of neutralizing Nixon's efforts to set up a special power base.


255. See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence, published unofficially as *CIA: The Pike Report* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1977), pp. 194-5. For evidence that Miceli controlled the distribution of a much greater percentage of the $10 million total, see Gatti, *Rimanga tra noi*, pp. 119-21. A good deal of this money went to the MSI and DC, but 3.4 million dollars was provided to an unspecified "political organization created and supported by the CIA".

256. For Clavio as a CIA officer operating under cover, see Cipriani and Cipriani, *Sovranità limitata*, p. 170. This was also strongly implied by Spanish secret service operative Luis González-Mata (in the reference cited immediately below). But I have seen no evidence to indicate that he was affiliated with the CIA station in Rome, something which appears even less likely given the hostility displayed by both Nixon and Martin toward agency personnel. Like many Americans, foreigners have a tendency to attribute all American clandestine intelligence activities to the CIA. As a result, the actions undertaken overseas by the three U.S. military intelligence services, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the FBI are often completely ignored, despite the fact that these organizations are stuffed to the gills with hardliners who have a very narrow conception of the national interest. By comparison, CIA personell are generally more moderate and cosmopolitan, especially in the analytical branches. There is, however, no doubt that Clavio was a covert operations specialist. Among other things, he was the organizer of a false coup plot against General Alfredo Stroessner, dictator of Paraguay. This was arranged so that it would implicate the notorious French drug trafficker Auguste Ricord, who had taken refuge in Paraguay after the 1955 overthrow of Perón, and thereby prompt Stroessner to extradite him to the United States so that he could be
brought to trial. The architect of the plan to have Ricord turned over to the Americans was Kissinger himself, and the instrument to be used by Clavio was the Vanguardia Latino-Américana (VAS), a phony pro-Castro revolutionary group which González-Mata had created many years before. American economic pressure ended up achieving the desired result before this provocation was actually launched, but it provides an excellent example of the kinds of operations Clavio specialized in. For further details, see Gonzalez-Mata, Cygne: Mémoires d'un agent secret (Paris: Grasset, 1976), pp. 311-23.

257. Scialoja, "Fu vero golpe", p. 38.

258. Former DCI William Colby specifically noted that in the 1950s the CIA station in Rome always tried to use "outside officers"—those who, like Fenwich, operated under a private cover and had no visible connections to official American agencies—as intermediaries when making unofficial contacts with Italian nationals. The only times that exceptions were made was when the missions were so important that "inside officers" could alone be trusted to handle them. See Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 120. Perhaps this was one such exception.

259. See Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 255, quoting an issue of L'Espresso without citing the date.

260. See Serravalle, Gladio, pp. 94-7. Compare CPI/Stragi, [22 Aprile 1992] Relazione sull'...Operazione Gladio, pp. 22-3; and Jonathan Kwitney, "The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe", The Nation 254:13 (6 April 1992), pp. 444-5. That this was not merely a case of selective memory is confirmed by the fact that Serravalle had prepared a report for his superiors, dated 22 December 1972, about what transpired at this meeting. For more information on the career backgrounds of Stone and Sednaoui, see Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, eds., Dirty Work [1]: The CIA in Western Europe (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978), pp. 670-2 (Stone), 645-6 (Sednaoui). Compare East German propagandist Julius Mader, Who's Who in the CIA: A Biographical Reference Work on 3000 Officers of the Civil and Military Branches of the Secret Services of the USA in 120 Countries ([East] Berlin: Mader, 1968), p. 501 (Stone). Stone was born in Ohio in 1925, served in the U.S. Army in World War II, obtained a B.A. degree from the University of Southern California, spent a year at the School of Advanced International Studies, and served at CIA stations in Iran, the Sudan, Syria (from which he was expelled in 1957 for trying to organize a military coup to overthrow the Ba’athist Party), Pakistan, Nepal, and Vietnam before arriving in Italy. Sednaoui was born in Egypt in 1925, attended the American University in Beirut and Columbia University, served overseas in the U.S. Army, and worked for the CIA in Morocco before being assigned to the Italian station. Note, however, that Gatti’s informants told him that Stone had become disillusioned about the employment of covert operations after his experiences in Syria.

262. Ibid, p. 23; Serravalle, Gladio, pp. 94-7. The General’s reaction to this proposal, if recounted accurately, was equally bizarre. He felt that he had only two options, since he was temporarily unable to consult his superior Fortunato. Either he should refer the matter to Miceli for consideration, in which case he feared that the proposal would be accepted and he would be compelled to engage in illegal policing activities [!!]. Or he could simply reply—naively or falsely—that such internal security operations were not part of the organization’s formal mandate. He chose the latter approach, adding that he no longer felt that the PCI represented a threat to the system, that he suspected that 70% of the communists would take up arms against the invaders if the Russians sought to occupy Italy, and that (jokingly) if such an event transpired he would have no hesitation about enrolling communist resistance fighters into the secret organization! Not surprisingly, this response annoyed the humorless Stone, and from that point on—if not earlier, as seems obvious from some of his own rather naive observations--Serravalle was kept out of the information loop concerning covert anti-PCI measures. More significantly, these and other incidents led the latter to suspect that the official "stay/behind" network in fact served as a cover for an even more secret and unconstitutional organization, perhaps identifiable with "parallel SID". See Serravalle, Gladio, pp. 98, 38-41, etc. This is probably much closer to the truth.

263. Compare Gatti, Rimanga tra noi, pp. 88-90. It is, of course, possible that the more liberal CIA and State Department personnel at the embassy genuinely opposed Martin’s plan to support "suspect" groups on the far right, whether for principled or purely tactical reasons. They may have wished to pursue the "opening to the left" policy in a more aggressive way, or simply been concerned about the likelihood that American support for the right, if exposed, would seriously damage efforts to promote pro-Atlantic centrists. Given the current state of the documentation, it is impossible to identify the precise factional divisions within the embassy staff.


265. De Lorenzo’s direct testimony is cited in CPI/De Lorenzo, Relazione di minoranza, p. 69.

266. See De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 127-8.


268. For summaries of this testimony, see De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, pp. 111-12. Note that Spiazzi’s testimony about the coded message from Venturi was disputed by the latter, who claimed that such codes were never used.

269. Quoted verbatim by De Lutiis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia, p. 142, note 46.


273. For Corniani’s links to the Gruppi Savoia, Edgardo Sogno, and the MNOP, see Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 3:1, pp. 87-9, citing Spiazzi’s testimony before Judge Tamburino.

274. For a transcript of Spiazzi’s testimony, see CPI/P2, *Allegati alla relazione, Serie I: Resoconti*, volume 13, pp. 272-5, 280.

275. Ibid, pp. 246 (Rosseti), 321-2 (Henke), 280 (Spiazzi concerning Pirro).


277. For the "significant involvement" of P2 figures in the Borghese coup, see CPI/P2, *Relazione di maggioranza* (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1984), p. 87.

278. The role played by Sindona in financing rightist groups in the early 1970s was first revealed by Roberto Cavallaro. See further below for some examples of this.

279. See CPI/P2, *Relazione di minoranza: Massimo Teodori [PR]* (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1984), p. 24. This was later admitted to Judge Pier Luigi Vigna by Gelli himself. See idem, *Relazione di maggioranza*, p. 80. Not coincidentally, Gelli also worked behind the scenes to secure the promotion of high-ranking P2 members to the apex of other key security apparatuses, for example, Generals Raffaele Giudice (1974-1978), Marcello Floriani (1978-1980), and Orazio Giannini (1980-1981) to head the GdF; General Enrico Mino (1973-1977) to head the Carabinieri; and—after the secret service "reform" of 1977—General Giulio Grassini to head SISDE, General Giuseppe Santovito to head SISMI, and Prefect Walter Pelosi to head CESIS. See ibid, pp. 80-1.

280. Compare Calderoni, ed., *Servizi segreti*, p. 64, who concludes that Gelli’s activities moved in "perfect harmony" with the "documented inertia" of Miceli.

281. For the details found in the next two paragraphs, see Aleandri’s testimony in CPI/P2, *Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione*, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, especially pp. 35-6, 43-8, 51-4, 56-9. Aleandri had first developed a friendship with Fabio De Felice while he was a student at the "Gregorio da Catino" scientific high school in Poggio Mirteto, where De Felice taught philosophy. The teenager sympathized with De Felice’s critiques of the economism and "positivist myths" of modern bourgeois
society, as well as with the ideas of "traditionalist" intellectuals like Evola and René Guenon, whose works his teacher had recommended. After graduating in 1973, Aleandri kept in regular contact with De Felice and Franco Celletti, a mutual friend, and in the course of a series of subsequent gatherings De Felice came to trust his former student so much that he began to make a series of important revelations to him about clandestine right-wing activities. Among other things, Fabio claimed that he and his brother now acted as the behind-the-scenes leaders of Ordine Nuovo, whose ostensible chiefs were Clemente Graziani and Paolo Signorelli.


283. Excerpts from De Felice’s letter were published in CPI/P2, *Relazione di Minoranza: Pisanò*, pp. 133-5. Note, however, that Aleandri never claimed that Fabio had met Gelli, only that Alfredo was in contact with him. See, for example, his 23 September 1982 testimony before Judge Rosario Minna, cited in idem, *Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione*, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, p. 48.


286. This information first appeared in the infamous M.FO.BIALI file (p. 169), wherein it was indicated that a phone tap revealed that Giudice told Miceli on 12 May 1975 that he had personally intervened with Gallucci to have the former SID chief released from prison. See Calderoni, ed., *Servizi segreti*, p. 67. Miceli initially denied this in his 29 June 1982 testimony to the P2 commission, but when confronted with the evidence was forced to admit that Giudice may have mentioned it to him. See CPI/P2, *Allegati alla relazione, Serie I: Resoconti*, volume 4, pp. 541-2. The M.FO.BIALI file concerns, among other things, a vast and illicit scheme to purchase petroleum by General Giudice, SID-linked journalist Mino Pecorelli, and Maurizio Foligni.

287. Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, pp. 193-4. The contrast between these two letters is perhaps to be explained by the fact that the first was written on behalf of Matta’s lodge, whereas the second may have referred to Matta’s personal decision. But Flamini implies, perhaps justifiably, that the second letter reflected a change in the lodge’s policy toward P2.


290. See Calderoni, ed., *Servizi segreti*, pp. 64-6. The sources for this information were Calore (13 December 1984 testimony to the public prosecutor in Bologna) and Pietro Casasanta (21 March 1985 testimony to same), a safecracker who refused to participate in the first theft because he was a friend of Formisano’s. Concatelli was the neo-fascist who, using a special American-made MAC-10 machine pistol which had originally been consigned to the Spanish intelligence service, assassinated Judge Vittorio Occorsio in the streets of Rome on 10 July 1976. For the details of this crime, to which elements of the “Black International” made important contributions, see Corte d’Assise di Firenze, Presidente Pietro Cassano, Giudice Estensore Francesco Carvisiglia, *Sentenza n. 1/85 del 21 marzo 1985 nel procedimento penale contro Graziani, Clemente + 18*, passim. After his arrest, Concatelli personally strangled two talkative neo-fascist pentiti inside Italian prisons.

291. See *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, pp. 131-3, for Borghese’s justifications for issuing the counterorder.

292. These remarks were made by Saccucci in the course of a tapped 20 January 1971 phone call to Costantino Massimo Bozzini, one of the “group leaders” mentioned in his address book and his liaison man with FN leader Rosa. See *Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese*, pp. 500, 268-70. The two also discussed the need to administer an “exemplary lesson” to the person responsible for the last-minute interruption of the operation, but Bozzini replied that the FN could not get ahold of/lay a hand on (dargli in mano) that particular individual. See *ibid*, p. 132. The person in question was not further identified, but it could have been a reference to Borghese himself, though some have suspected Gelli.

293. See, for example, Sassano, *SID e partito americano*, pp. 86-8. This particular left-wing journalist also argues that the operation was prematurely exposed because Antico accidentally informed Genovesi, who was not his regular SID handler and was not among the coup backers within the service. This then made it impossible for Genovesi’s complicit superiors to cover the action up, and they thus had no choice but to warn and delay taking action against the golpistas. Unfortunately, Sassano cites no real evidence in support of either of these claims, although they are certainly not implausible.

295. See his testimony in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie I: Resoconti, volume 14, p. 370; and idem, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, p. 47. Note, however, that in the latter Aleandri emphasized that De Felice did not present any concrete details in support of his conviction.

296. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, pp. 511-12, 519-20. Miceli’s primary goal was to try and implicate Nicastro in Sogno’s anti-democratic activities, thereby damaging Andreotti’s prestige and political image. Another target in this operation to gather intelligence about Sogno’s subversive plotting—in connection with which the former Resistance hero was seeking allies in both the “black” circles of the Roman nobility and the hierarchy of the armed forces—was Miceli’s main rival Maletti, an ally of these so-called “presidentialists”. Regarding this matter, compare also the note found on 11 November 1980 in the home of Maletti, reproduced in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 828-31.

297. See Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 95, for Gelli’s claim that the plotters all returned home because it started to rain! He made this patently ridiculous assertion during a 27 June 1989 interview with Willan.

298. Compare Sentenza 14 VII 84 contro Orlandini, p. 97.


300. The sources for these details have already been cited. It should be noted, however, that Delle Chiaie later claimed that Borghese had never seriously believed in the possibility of carrying out a coup, despite the crafty efforts of secret service personnel to fuel such hopes. See his testimony, following his arrest in Venezuela and extradition to Italy, summarized in Sandro Acciari and Pietro Calderoni, “Parola di golpista”, L’Espresso 33:16 (26 April 1987), p. 15. But Delle Chiaie also insisted that his own involvement in the coup was totally fabricated by Maletti and Labruna of SID, which is scarcely believable given the reluctant but damning testimony of other plotters. Everything the self-serving “black bombardier” says must be treated with great caution, despite the fact that he undoubtedly has a vast amount of firsthand knowledge concerning neo-fascist links to various intelligence and security services.

301. Cited in Gatti, Rimanga tra noi, p. 102. Unbeknownst to Orlandini, Fenwich taped this June 1970 conversation and then consigned the recording to ambassador Martin.

302. For more on the specific views of the “presidentialists”, see especially Edgardo Sogno, La Seconda Repubblica (Florence: Sansoni, 1974), passim.

303. For the historical development and main characteristics of the DC, see especially Baget-Bozzo, Partito cristiano al potere; idem, Il partito cristiano e l’apertura a sinistra: La DC di Fanfani e di Moro, 1954-1962 (Florence: Vallecchi, 1977); Francesco Malgeri, ed., Storia della Democrazia cristiana (Rome: Cinque Lune, 1987-
88), of which three volumes have so far appeared, covering the period from 1943 to 1962; Paolo Possenti, Storia della D.C., dalle origini al centro-sinistra (Rome: Ciarrapico, 1978); Giorgio Galli, Storia della Democrazia cristiana (Bari: Laterza, 1978); Manlio Di Lalla, Storia della Democrazia cristiana (Turin: Marietti, 1979-82), 3 volumes, which cover the period up till May 1968. For the importance and role of the DC factions, see Alan S. Zuckerman, The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy (New Haven: Yale University, 1979).

304. See Tribunale di Torino, Giudice Istruttore Luciano Violante, Sentenza n. 665/75 del 5 maggio 1976 nel procedimento penale contro Sogno, Edgardo + altri, pp. 31-2, 35.

305. See Cipriani and Cipriani, Sovranità limitata, p. 154.


307. See Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 68, citing De Jorio’s own claims in an article that appeared in the 29 August 1975 issue of Secolo d’Italia. Note that he prepared this account of his background in order to defend himself against charges of political conspiracy in connection with the Borghese coup.


309. Ibid, volume 3:1, pp. 3-5, 28, 93, 116-17. Among the other speakers at the public rally were MSI theorist Armando Plebe, right-wing journalist Gino Ragno, MSI Senator Mario Tedeschi, and ON bigwig Giulio Maceratini.

310. Sentenza 5 XI 75 contro Borghese, pp. 323-8.

311. CPI/P2, Relazione di minoranza: Pisano, p. 136.

312. For details, see Flamini, Partito del golpe, volumes 3:1, pp. 22-3, 60-2, 212, and 3:2, p. 641. The president of the Amici delle Forze Armate was former RSI official Elio Toschi; the Secretary General was Gino Ragno, who also headed the reactionary Associazione per l’Amicizia Italo-Tedesca. Among the other attendees at the organization’s first meeting were MSI ultras like Giulio Caradonna, Luigi Turchi, and Massimo Anderson; monarchist extremists like Alfredo Covelli; DC rightists such as Possenti; leading "presidentialists" like Randolfo Pacciardi; and guerre révolutionnaire proponents like retired General Giorgio Liuzzi, formerly armed forces Chief of Staff, and Marino Bon Valsassina, who had given a presentation at the 1965 Istituto Pollio conference. Immediately after the meeting, a march was organized in the direction of Piazza Venezia, toward the tomb of the unknown soldier. With De Lorenzo at their head, many of the overexcited participants yelled pro-coup slogans such as "We’ve had it with the bordellos, we want the Colonels" and "Ankara, Athens, now it’s Rome’s turn". See
ibid, 3:1, pp. 22-3. Note further that De Jorio, General Fanali, and Ivan Matteo Lombardo all promoted greater cooperation between the U.S. and Europe for the defense of the Mediterranean in the September 1974 issue of Politica e Strategia, and that De Jorio published a special issue of that journal concerning leftist infiltration into the armed forces, which contained articles by secret service-linked "political warfare" specialists like Brian Crozier, Michel Garder, and Carabinieri commander Corrado San Giorgio. See ibid, 3:2, pp. 598, 660-1. According to Aleandri, De Jorio financed the journal, which was sold in kiosks and distributed free to high-ranking members of the armed forces. See his testimony in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 44, 54.


314. See Aleandri’s testimony in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 35, 47-8.

315. For Fabio’s injuries during the Trieste action, see Caradonna, Diario di battaglie, pp. 104-5. For his subsequent associations, see the 26 June 1974 SID report reproduced in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, p. 238. I have been unable to obtain further information about the Fronte per la Rinascita Nazionale. The "Centro di Europa Unità" mentioned in the SID report should not be confused with the 1950s publication produced by the MSI’s Centro Studi Europei, Europa Unità, or the center itself. The 1963 date indicates that the reference was to another organization altogether. If so, it must have been too ephemeral to have left an imprint in the sources dealing with the Italian radical right.

316. See Giuseppe De Lutiis, ed., La strage: L’atto d’accusa dei giudici di Bologna (Rome: Riuniti, 1986), p. 192. (This book contains an edited version of the actual sentence concerning the 2 August 1980 bombing of the central train station in Bologna, the bloodiest terrorist massacre in the history of postwar Europe. Officially, the title should be listed as follows: Tribunale di Bologna, Giudici Istruttore Vito Zincani e Sergio Castaldo, Sentenza-Ordinanza nel procedimento penale del 14 giugno 1986 contro Adinolfi, Gabriele + 56. Herein the title of the book will be cited to avoid confusion, since the pagination is different.) For more on the OLP, see Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 156. The latter author cites a Rome Questura report which lists the organization’s founders as "Nazi-Maoists" like Dantini, Ugo Gaudenzi, and Ugo Cascella. No mention is made therein of Fabio De Felice or the other OLP "founders" named by Calore. Note that the initials OLP were the same as those used in the Italian acronym for the Palestine Liberation Organization, causing several leftists to suspect that they were purposely chosen in order to mislead outsiders about the right-wing origins of the group.
317. For the role played by Fabio De Felice in the new "anti-state" strategy adopted by the radical right after 1974, see Aleandri's testimony in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 38-41, 58-9, 61-8. Compare Sergio Calore's views in ibid, pp. 102-5. For Primicino's remarks, see ibid, p. 113. There is considerable controversy about whether this strategy represented a significant break with the previous pattern of collaboration and collusion between extremist neo-fascist groups and elements of the state apparatus, and a proper assessment of the activities of Fabio (and other ambiguous figures such as ON leader Paolo Signorelli and criminologist Aldo Semerari) could go a long way toward resolving this controversy. For a general discussion of this "new" rightist terrorism, and the view that it was a genuinely new development, see Vittorio Borraccetti, "Introduzione", in Eversione di destra, especially pp. 21-4; Giancarlo Capaldo et al, "L'eversione di destra a Roma dal 1977 al 1983: Spunti per una ricostruzione del fenomeno", in ibid, pp. 198-244.

318. Compare the critique of fascism, from the right, offered by Evola in Il Fascismo: Saggio di una analisi dal punto di vista della destra (Rome: Volpe, 1970). This interpretation has always struck me as odd, to say the least, since without these plebeian, pseudo-democratic, and populist features there can be no genuine fascism.

319. For these details, see Aleandri's testimony in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 43-4, 52-4, 65-6. Fabio's interaction with Aleandri took place during the period from 1974 to 1979, so it remains possible that these ideas germinated subsequent to the launching of the coup. This seems unlikely, however, given his association with various far right groups from the early 1950s on.

320. Ibid, pp. 55-6 (Aleandri). For further details of the police assault on the demonstrators at Porta San Paolo, which was led by mounted Carabinieri, see Canosa, Polizia in Italia, p. 218.

321. For Gelli as the link between Alfredo and the Carabinieri and his assistance in helping both De Felices to avoid arrest, see CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 35, 47-8, 56. Compare Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 4:1, p. 117. For Cavallini's revelations to Sordi regarding Fabio's association with P2 and Gelli, see De Lutiis, ed., La strage, p. 132. For the meetings between Fabio, Semerari, and Colonel Santoro, see Aleandri's testimony cited in Salvi, ed., Strategia delle stragi, pp. 113-14. Santoro claimed that he did not recall whether he ever met Fabio, but other witnesses confirmed many of Aleandri's claims. Palumbo's background and activities are themselves worth noting. After 8 September 1943, he had been a member of the so-called Fiamme Bianche, an RSI anti-partisan formation. Moreover, his anti-democratic sympathies apparently did not diminish in the postwar period. According to Nicolo Bozzi, another Carabinieri officer at the Pastrengo division, it was not unusual to encounter prominent right-wingers—for example, MSI Senators Gastone Nencioni and Giorgio Pisanò, and Adamo Degli Occhi of the Maggioranza Silenziosa movement—conferring with Palumbo at division headquarters. Note also that on several occasions Palumbo and his right-hand men in the corps were directly
implicated in misleading judicial authorities about the source of various terrorist actions. Among other things, they helped to lay the false "anarchist trail" after the December 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing and then sought to impede and derail the search for the Peteano bomber, Vincenzo Vinciguerra. Santoro played an important personal role in the latter effort. See ibid, p. 110 (Bozzi testimony) and passim (for evidence of Carabinieri interference with the Peteano investigation). For information on Palumbo's affiliation with P2 and the meetings between three high-ranking Pastrengo officials (including Palumbo) and Gelli at the latter's villa, see CPI/P2, Relazione di maggioranza, pp. 79, 81-2, 90-1; idem, Relazione di minoranza: Teodori, p. 31. Finally, it should be pointed out that the Pastrengo division had been assigned a key role in De Lorenzo's projected "Plan Solo" operation, and that thereafter it became a veritable den of delorenziani.

322. See CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 36, 55, 71-2; idem, Serie I: Resoconti, volume 14, p. 379.

323. For the formation of a "secret leadership group" within ON by Fabio De Felice, Signorelli, Fachini, and possibly Alfredo De Felice, see idem, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, p. 53; and De Lutiis, ed., La strage, pp. 193, 200. For Fabio as the key referent within that group, see the latter source, p. 195; for the early 1970 origins of Fabio's association with Fachini and Signorelli, see ibid, p. 130.

324. See CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, p. 58 (Aleandri), for these meetings and Fabio's goal of consolidating and reorganizing the paramilitary right. Aleandri said Calore confided to him that one of the chief reasons for the breakdown of AN-ON unification plans, which formed the backdrop for these gatherings, was that members of ON had discovered that members of AN were secretly collecting dossiers on them. See ibid, p. 40. If so, this was presumably being done for the UAR or some other intelligence agency.

325. For the outlines of this new "decentralized spontaneism" terrorist strategy, see ibid, pp. 61-3; De Lutiis, ed., La strage, pp. 190-1, 196-7. For Fabio's willingness to employ violence and his involvement in promoting various terrorist attacks, see the former source, pp. 63 and 65 (Aleandri), and 99 (Sordi), as well as the latter source, pp. 132, 205, 208, 274. Note also that Fabio often allowed wanted right-wing terrorists, such as Roberto Fiore of Terza Posizione, to stay at his villa. See Aleandri's testimony cited in the former source, p. 68. As for the dismissal of the most serious charges against him, it should be pointed out that the evidence against him was primarily circumstantial rather than material. For these and other reasons, many of which were far less justifiable and explicable, he ended up getting off scot free, like almost everyone else who was accused of secretly sponsoring right-wing terrorism in the period between 1968 and 1984.

327. See Aleandri's testimony in idem, Serie I: Resoconti, volume 14, p. 384.

328. For Fabio's efforts to exert practical control over the splintered remnants of the paramilitary right, see idem, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 38, 58-9, 61-4, 68.


330. Ibid, pp. 87, 96, 196 (quote), 207 (Vinciguerra). For Fabio's goal of provoking a military intervention, see Primicino's testimony in CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 112-13.

331. See, for example, De Lutiis, ed., La strage, pp. 190-1, 199-200, 203, and passim.

332. Compare ibid, pp. 382-4, 386-8, 395, 397-8 (Aleandri); and idem, Serie II: Documentazione, volume 3, tome 4, part 1, pp. 102-3, 109-10 (Calore). Calore specifically claimed that Fabio secretly sought to promote P2 goals in the pages of Costruiamo l'Azione. For a general history of the post-1976 neo-fascist groups which operated in accordance with the "armed spontaneism" strategy, see Ferraresi, "Destra eversiva", pp. 74-96.


334. Ibid, pp. 54-5, 227-83.


336. For a general outline of Andreotti's political career, see his own account in Governare con la crisi (Milan: Rizzoli, 1991), passim. Like all self-serving political autobiographies, this one is highly selective in its coverage, and needs to be supplemented by external sources.

337. For De Gasperi's involvement in efforts to foster anti-communist projects in Eastern Europe and, however peripherally, to protect wanted Nazis, see Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Unholy Trinity: How the Vatican's Nazi Networks betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), pp. 17-18, 65, 133-4, 237. Along with Hudal, De Gasperi's circle of influential supporters at the Vatican included Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini, who later became Pope Paul VI. More will soon be said about the latter's clandestine activities.

338. On the active role played by De Gasperi in the American-backed anti-communist campaign preceding the 1948 election, see James E. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948", Diplomatic History 7:1 (Winter 1983), pp. 35-55. His involvement in some of the more covert aspects, such as arranging for
the secret provision of 25,000 American firearms to his government, is described by Faenza and Fini, *Americani in Italia*, pp. 256-9.

339. For the establishment and nature of the Bilderberg Group, see [former Spanish intelligence operative] Luis González-Mata, *Les vraies maîtres du monde* (Paris: Grasset, 1979), pp. 19-92, which, despite the lurid title, contains some very useful information along with a number of suspect claims; Wim Klinkenberg, *Prins Bernhard: Een politieke biografie* (Amsterdam: Onze Tijd, 1979), pp. 305-22, who characterizes the group in the title of the relevant chapter as "an Atlantic general staff"; and Alden Hatch, *Bernhard: Prince of the Netherlands* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 235-51, an unabashed sympathizer who argues that the group's meetings have had a "great but indefinable impact on the history of our times" (p. 235). Note that Retinger played a key role in establishing and directing a plethora of early postwar organizations which worked actively to strengthen the political, economic, military, and cultural connections between the United States and the nations of Europe, including the Council of Europe. Some of these organizations, such as the European Movement, were later discovered to have been the recipients of covert funding from the CIA and other American intelligence agencies. See, for example, Steve Weissman et al, "The CIA Backs the Common Market", in *Dirty Work [1]*, ed. by Agee and Wolf, pp. 201-3; and González-Mata, *Vraies maîtres du monde*, p. 20. Compare Retinger's own account in *Joseph Retinger: Memoirs of an Eminence Grise*, ed. by John Pomian (London: Sussex University, 1972), pp. 203-60. He claims that in the end De Gasperi could not actually make it to the 1952 preparatory meeting of the Bilderberg Group, but that the Italian leader was an active supporter of the European Movement who frequently met with Retinger from 1948 on. See ibid, pp. 232, 251. For more on the activities of Bedell Smith as CIA director, see the internal CIA study by Ludwell Lee Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953* (University Park and London: Penn State University, 1992). Note, however, that the published version omits most of the more sensitive covert and paramilitary operations undertaken by the CIA during his tenure as DCI.

340. For Andreotti's connections to the American and NATO security establishments, see his own observations in *The U.S.A. Up Close: From the Atlantic Pact to Bush* (New York and London: New York University, 1992), pp. 32-46 and passim. For his relationship with his "friend" Walters, see ibid, pp. 32-3, 169, 181-2, 186-7, 196; compare Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 359-67, 567. For Walters' advocacy of an anti-PSI military intervention, see Platt and Leonardi, "American Foreign Policy and the Postwar Italian Left", p. 208. Some sources have sought to rebut this eyewitness testimony, including former CIA director Richard Helms, who claimed, rather ambiguously, that Walters would not have advocated a political project contrary to that of the White House because he was a "loyal man who always did what was asked of him". Quoted by Gatti in *Rimanga tra noi*, p. 57. But when Walters' frequent involvement—indirect or otherwise—in right-wing military coups in various Third World countries is taken into consideration, this testimony seems far less
improbable. See, for example, Ellen Ray and William Schaap, "Vernon Walters: Crypto-Diplomat and Terrorist", Covert Action Information Bulletin 26 (Summer 1986), especially pp. 4-6. For a specific instance in connection with the 1964 military coup in Brazil, see Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1977), pp. 43-9, 69-72, 220-1. For a brief listing of Walters' official appointments, which included a stint as a member of NATO's Standing Group in Washington from 1955 to 1960, see John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 757. Once again, however, there was nothing necessarily sinister about the fact that Andreotti entertained close relations with Walters, who was then serving as military attaché in Rome, as it was part and parcel of his duties as Defense Minister.

341. For the foreward, see Andreotti, U.S.A. Up Close, pp. vii-x.

342. See ibid, p. 79, for the Haig reference. For Gelli's links to Kissinger and Haig, to whom the P2 chief was supposedly introduced by CIA Clandestine Services chief Theodore ("Ted") Shackley, see the 1983 SISMI report quoted in Cipriani and Cipriani, Sovranità limitata, p. 156. This claim was later reiterated by self-described CIA contract agent Richard Brennecke, a generally unreliable source. See Frank Snepp, "Brennecke Exposed", Village Voice 36:37 (10 September 1991), pp. 27-31.

343. See CPI/Stragi, Relazione sulla documentazione rinvenuta il 9 ottobre 1990 in via Monte Nevoso, a Milano (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1991), pp. 160-1. This particular volume contains transcriptions of the handwritten notes written by Aldo Moro while he was a prisoner of the Brigate Rosse, notes which were mysteriously found in the same apartment where he was imprisoned twelve years after his 1978 murder. Thus the evidence concerning this aspect of the feud between Miceli and Andreotti was provided by Moro himself, who was Andreotti's chief rival within the DC during the early 1970s. Compare Cipriani and Cipriani, Sovranità limitata, p. 159. In this connection, it should be emphasized that the covert infighting between Miceli and Maletti reflected the subterranean political struggle between their respective political allies, Moro and Andreotti.


345. See Michael Baigent et al, Holy Blood, Holy Grail (New York: Dell, 1983), p. 214. The source they quote from is a 22 January 1981 article in the French press, but the authors cannot identify what publication the article appeared in because they received a xerox copy without any identifying marks. Note that the above book and its successor,
The Messianic Legacy (New York: Dell, 1986), mix some blatant historical falsehoods—for example, the absurd idea that Jesus of Nazareth’s bloodline was preserved in the Merovingian dynasty and thence passed on to certain aristocratic members of the Prieuré—with some very strange historical truths, which means that their specific claims always have to be evaluated with extreme care. For an insightful and highly entertaining summary of the various theories, nonsensical and otherwise, about the nature of the Prieuré, see Robert Anton Wilson, "The Priory of Sion: Jews, Freemasons, Extraterrestrials, the Gnomes of Zurich, Black Israelites and Noon Blue Apples", Gnosis Magazine [San Francisco] VI (Winter 1988), pp. 30-9.

346. For Andreotti's affiliation with the Prieuré, see Baigent et al, Messianic Legacy, p. 353. For more on the Prieuré's alleged political and economic activities and influence, see ibid, pp. 227-364; André van Bosbeke, Chevaliers du vingtième siècle: Enquête sur les sociétés occultes et les ordres de chevalerie contemporaine (Berchem: EPO, 1988), pp. 28-31. Compare also the book by Swiss journalist Mathieu Paoli, Les dessous d'une ambition politique: Nouvelles révélations sur les trésors du Razès et de Gisor (Nyons: Editeurs Associés, 1973), pp. 79-114. Paoli was later purportedly executed by the Israeli government for engaging in pro-Arab espionage activities.

347. For Andreotti as a "knight" of the order, see Alessandro De Feo, "Ortolani cavalleria, carica!", L'Espresso 27:25 (28 June 1981), p. 25. Compare André Van Bosbeke, Opus Dei en Belgique (Anvers: EPO, 1986), p. 148. For more on the lesser-known political activities of the SMOM, see Martin A. Lee, "Their Will Be Done", Mother Jones VIII:6 (July 1983), especially pp. 22-5; "Françoise Hervet" (pseudonym), "Knights of Darkness: The Sovereign Military Order of Malta", in Covert Action Information Bulletin 25 (Winter 1986), pp. 27-38; Kevin Coogan, "The Friends of Michele Sindona", Parapolitics U.S.A. 3 (August 1981), pp. 71-103; Van Bosbeke, Chevaliers du vingtième siècle, pp. 119-29, 195-227; and Penny Lernoux, People of God: The Struggle for World Catholicism (New York: Penguin, 1989), pp. 283-301. Compare the barely fictionalized book by Roger Peyrefitte, Knights of Malta (New York: Criterion, 1959), passim, for some juicy tidbits about Vatican and SMOM infighting. Amongst the many influential SMOM "knight" outside Italy in recent times were Otto von Habsburg (head of several pro-Atlantic pan-European organizations), General Reinhard Gehlen (the former Nazi intelligence official who later headed the BND), Alexandre De Marenches (ex-chief of SDECE), William J. Casey (ex-OSS, Reagan’s CIA Director until his death in early 1987), James Jesus Angleton (ex-OSS and former head of CIA counterintelligence), George Raymond Rocca (Angleton's chief counterintelligence assistant at CIA), John A. McCon (former CIA Director), Clare Booth Luce (U.S. ambassador to Italy), retired General Alexander Haig (ex-Secretary of State), J. Peter Grace (an American businessman closely linked to the intelligence community, who helped recruit wanted Nazi war criminals after World War II), William Simon (former U.S. Treasury Secretary), William F. Buckley (ex-CIA) and his brother James (who headed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty after the war), King Baudouin of Belgium, Robert Gayre (a British intelligence officer who later edited the pro-Nazi
Mankind Quarterly), King Juan Carlos of Spain, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (formerly Prime Minister of France), and Argentine dictator Juan Perón. Key Italians who were affiliated with the SMOM included Baron Luigi Parrilli (who acted as a liaison between SS Gruppenführer Karl Wolff and Allen Dulles of the OSS at the end of the war), Monsignor Fiorenzo Angelini (an intermediary between the Vatican and Gedda's Comitati Civici), General Giovanni De Lorenzo (former head of SIFAR), General Giovanni Allavena (De Lorenzo's assistant at SIFAR, who later joined P2 and secretly provided Gelli with copies of the confidential secret service files which were supposedly destroyed), Admiral Eugenio Henke (ex-head of SID), General Giuseppe Aloja (Armed Forces Chief of Staff and De Lorenzo's right-wing rival within the military), Admiral Giovanni Torrisi (a former commander of NATO's central Mediterranean sector, then Armed Forces chief of staff and P2 "brother"), General Giulio Grassini (head of SISDE and P2 member), General Giuseppe Santovito (head of SISMI and a member of P2), Umberto Ortolani (Gelli's second-in-command in the P2 lodge), and a host of influential Italian politicians other than Andreotti (including Giovanni Gronchi, Antonio Segni, Giovanni Leone, Amintore Fanfani, Arnaldo Forlani, Paolo Emilio Taviani, etc.). This list reads like a veritable "who's who" of the Italian political and security establishment.

348. See CPI/P2, Allegati alla relazione, Serie I: Resoconti, volume 13, p. 299. Elsewhere, however, Spiazzi acknowledged that Cavallaro was a member of a top-secret parallel apparatus who knew details about the "stay/behind" networks that no military officer had yet revealed to the public. He also described him as an able, intelligent person whose testimony was largely accurate, even though he sometimes mixed the truth with falsehoods. See ibid, p. 278.

349. Andreotti himself noted his affiliation with the Cercle Pinay, which he described as a "small and entirely informal" group of Europeans and Americans set up to discuss current world affairs. He added that the Cercle met once or twice a year, usually in Washington at the home of Nelson Rockefeller, but sometimes in Europe; one of these latter meetings was held in Bavaria, where the host was CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss. Pinay, Father Dubois, David Rockefeller, and Italian construction magnate Carlo Pesenti were regular attendees, and Henry Kissinger also sometimes participated. See Andreotti, U.S.A. Up Close, p. 61. For more information on the Cercle Pinay and its vast network of connections, both overt and clandestine, see the important study by "David Allan" (pseudonym), Le Cercle Pinay: Service de renseignement privé de la droite paneuropéenne (Brussels: unpublished manuscript, 1992). Compare also Pierre Péan, V: Enquête sur l'affaire des "avions renifleurs" et ses ramifications proches ou lointaines (Paris: Fayard, 1984), especially pp. 33-54 (for Violet's background) and 55-95 (for the Cercle Pinay). For Andreotti as a "lifetime member" of the AESP, which was founded in 1969, see the organization's 1978 membership list published by Hugo Gijssels, Netwerk Gladio (Louvain: Kritak, 1991), p. 152. His name does not appear on the AESP's 1975 list, however, which suggests that he only became a formal member later. For Pinay's SMOM affiliation, see Hervet, "Knights of Darkness", p. 38. For more on Pinay, see Christiane Rimbaud, Pinay (Paris: Perrin, 1990); and Sylvie Guillaume,

350. For the circumstances surrounding the awarding of this contract to Permaflex, see Antonio Caminati, Il materasso dalle molle d'oro: La Permaflex, l'Italbed e le altre imprese di Giovanni Pofferi (Rome: Ediesse, 1984), pp. 33-40. Compare also CPI/P2, Relazione di minoranza: Teodori, pp. 153-4.


352. For the Corvo link, see DiFonzo, St. Peter's Banker, p. 237; "Lombard", Soldi truccati, pp. 39-41; and De Luca, ed., Sindona: Gli atti d'accusa dei giudici di Milano, pp. XII-XIV. In his memoirs Corvo not only makes no mention of Sindona, but also falsely denies that his OSS team established close contacts with the Mafia. See The OSS in Italy: A Personal Memoir (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 22-3. For documentary evidence to the contrary, see Campbell, Luciano Project, pp. 180-2. For Sindona's Mafia-authorized foodstuff exchanges in Sicily, see DiFonzo, St. Peter's Banker, pp. 24-5; "Lombard", Soldi truccati, pp. 37-41; Panerai and De Luca, Il
Crack, pp. 17-18; and David A. Yallop, In God’s Name: An Investigation into the Murder of Pope John Paul I (New York: Bantam, 1984), p. 106. The latter work should be used with special caution. For further details about the collapse of the Franklin National Bank, see especially Joan Edelman Spero, The Failure of the Franklin National Bank (New York: Columbia University, 1980).

353. DiFonzo, Saint Peter’s Banker, pp. 13-32; Panerai and De Luca, Il Crack, pp. 77-85; "Lombard", Soldi truccati, pp. 43-6, though the latter focusses on Spada (and, in later years, American archbishop Paul Marcinkus) and completely ignores the role of Montini.

354. Montini was no ordinary official within the Vatican secretariat, since Pope Pius XII regularly assigned him “particularly delicate and difficult tasks” to perform. Among other things, the Pope placed Montini in charge of supervising the Vatican’s efforts to resettle displaced persons and refugees in western and central Europe, a task which fell under the bureaucratic authority of the Amministrazione del Patrimonio della Sede Apostolica (APSA). As head of APSA, Montini was responsible for overseeing the establishment of "ratlines"—exfiltration routes—and providing passports and other identification documents to tens of thousands of refugees. In this capacity, he facilitated the activities of fascist sympathizers like Bishop Alois Hudal and Father Krunoslav Draganovic, who focussed their efforts on protecting wanted Nazi war criminals and collaborators by helping them to escape and avoid punishment. See Aarons and Loftus, Unholy Trinity, pp. 18-19, 34-6, 58, 85, 116. Moreover, some evidence exists which suggests that Montini was one of X-2 chief Angleton’s main informants inside the Vatican during World War II. See ibid, pp. 235-7; Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War (New York: Morrow, 1987), p. 354.

355. See, for example, the interview with former CIA officer Victor Marchetti, who testified that a large number of bishops and monsignors—including Montini—were the recipients of secret CIA funding. He speculates that Montini may not have been aware of the ultimate source of those funds, but this scarcely seems believable given the latter's extensive experience in covert operations and his close relationship with Angleton and other U.S. intelligence officials. Compare DiFonzo, St. Peter’s Banker, pp. 34-5; and Yallop, In God’s Name, p. 108.

356. For Sindona’s participation in these CIA-linked affairs, see DiFonzo, St. Peter’s Banker, p. 93, 99-101, 102-4; Panerai and De Luca, Il Crack, pp. 151-2; Yallop, In God’s Name, p. 130-1. Note that Martin called Sindona a "liar" and denied that the Sicilian had purchased the Rome Daily American at his request. For confirmation of the CIA’s funding of the publication, see John M. Crewdson and Joseph B. Treaster, “Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by CIA”, New York Times (26 December 1977), p. 37. Compare "Lombard", Soldi truccati, pp. 44-5.
357. See DiFonzo, St. Peter's Banker, pp. 227-30, for more details about the involvement of Sogno and Cavallo in these particular covert operations. Among other affiliations, the latter two men were both key figures in the Italian branch of the international CIA-funded Paix et Liberté organization.

358. This information was contained in a 3 February 1981 affidavit that McCaffery prepared in support of Sindona, at a time when the financier was facing serious criminal charges in the U.S. and Italy, as well as extradition to the latter country. His goal was to portray Sindona as a patriotic anti-communist and friend of America who would be persecuted for political reasons if he were sent back to Italy. The affidavit is quoted in full in ibid, pp. 104-6. For more on Hambros Bank’s involvement in Sindona’s business affairs, see Panerai and De Luca, Il Crack, pp. 38-41.

359. For Sindona’s links to the American political establishment, in particular top Republican Party circles, see Panerai and De Luca, Il Crack, pp. 149-57; Penny Lernoux, In Banks We Trust: Money-Making, Lending, and Laundering from Boardrooms to Back Alleys (New York: Penguin, 1986), pp. 180-1; CPI/Sindona, Relazione di minoranza: Giuseppe D’Alema et al [PCI], especially pp. 498-501. Roberto Gaja, Italy’s ambassador in Washington, D.C., from July 1975 to March 1978, later testified that Sindona had originally felt “absolutely secure” in conducting his less than licit financial activities within the United States due to the support he felt he had from the Nixon administration, the State Department, and certain congressional circles. See the latter source, p. 498. Among the other Nixon men linked to Sindona were Harold Gleason, President of the Franklin National Bank, who handled the sales of Nixon’s Park Avenue apartment in 1969 and later introduced Sindona to Maurice Stans, the treasurer of Nixon’s Committee to Re-Elect the President (CRP) who was implicated in illegal payoffs in connection with the Watergate scandal. Gleason’s son, it should be added, worked at Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander. Other powerful figures involved with the Sicilian banker were Philip Guarino, chairman of the Italian-American division of the Republican National Committee and an honorary P2 member, and Paul Rao, Jr., an attorney for the Gambino “family”. Both were leaders of the ultraconservative, Sindona-funded Americans for a Democratic Italy organization, and both provided affidavits to the Justice Department in support of Sindona (along with McCaffery, Sogno, and Gelli, among others). Finally, it should be pointed out that David Kennedy had developed excellent personal relations with the future head of the Vatican Bank, Monsignor Paul Marcinkus of Cicero, the Mafia-saturated Chicago suburb where Continental Bank was headquartered. For more on Marcinkus’s role in Sindona’s schemes and the resulting loss of millions of dollars invested by the Vatican, see Leonardo Coen and Leo Sisti, Il Caso Marcinkus: Le vie del denaro sono infinite (Milan: Mondadori, 1991); and Rossend Domenech Matillo, Marcinkus: L’Avventura delle finanze vaticane (Naples: Tullio Pironti, 1988).

360. See CPI/Sindona, Relazione di maggioranza, p. 160; idem, Relazione di minoranza: D’Alema et al, p. 368. For Montini’s personal role in introducing the two men, see Lernoux, In Banks We Trust, p. 181, though not all of her information is
accurate, especially about European (as opposed to Latin American) matters.


362. For the role of Andreotti in the Sindona affair, including his alleged efforts to "save" the latter, compare CPI/Sindona, *Relazione di maggioranza*, pp. 117-20, 141-61; idem, *Relazione di minoranza: D'Alema et al*, pp. 367-73; idem, *Relazione di minoranza: Teodori*, pp. 524-6, 547-9, 566-73. Compare also CPI/P2, *Relazione di minoranza: Teodori*, pp. 37-40. The majority report, not surprisingly, tends to minimize Andreotti's role, whereas the above-cited minority reports reflect PCI and PR attempts to indict the entire *partitocrazia*, of which Andreotti has long been a key representative. The latter therefore tend to focus on important but lesser known issues which the political establishment would prefer to sweep under the carpet.


366. For Spiazzi's testimony, see CPI/P2, *Allegati alla relazione, Serie I: Resoconti*, volume 13, pp. 292, 294, 286. I have not been able to obtain a copy of De Jorio's article, for which see Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 3:2, p. 686.

367. De Jorio's argument can be found in another article which appeared in the 29 July 1975 edition of *Secolo d'Italia*: "Today it is asserted that I conspired and even organized an armed insurrection. A conspiracy and insurrection against whom? Against the [state] power in which I myself took part?" Quoted in Flamini, *Partito del golpe*, volume 2, p. 68.

368. Compare the testimony of Spiazzi, who concluded that Andreotti intended to eliminate Borghese and carry out a "center extremist" countercoup. See CPI/P2, *Allegati alla relazione, Serie I: Resoconti*, volume 13, p. 294.

369. See CPI/P2, *Relazione di minoranza: Teodori*, p. 27.
370. See CPI/P2, *Relazione di minoranza: Pisanò*, p. 137. It should be recalled, however, that Pisanò not only had a personal grudge against Delle Chiaie, but also that the MSI senator was himself working for factions of SID. All of his claims regarding Delle Chiaie therefore need to be carefully evaluated.


CHAPTER FOUR: THE 1973 ATTACK ON MILAN POLICE HEADQUARTERS

The period between December 1970, the month that witnessed the launching of the Borghese coup, and May 1973, when a grenade attack was carried out in front of the central police headquarters in Milan, was an era of spiralling social, economic, and political crises. Although student and worker protests had subsided considerably since 1969, continued agitation had compelled the government and big business to initiate some long overdue reforms. Traditional social mores were themselves under siege, as the bitter controversy over the legalization of divorce demonstrated, and many Italian citizens not surprisingly found such rapid cultural changes disconcerting. As if to compound these domestic difficulties, international market forces fueled a recession which threatened the livelihood of members of a broad range of social groups, and as usual the fractious Italian parliament failed to take decisive ameliorative action. These troubling developments precipitated a shift to the right in the 1972 elections, in which the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) doubled its previous percentage of the vote. On the extraparliamentary level, militant demonstrations and violent confrontations were regularly staged by both the right and the left. When Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) Secretary Enrico Berlinguer began promoting an "historic compromise" between his party and the other leading parties, Democrazia Cristiana and the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), intransigent anti-communists of all stripes began to feel that their worst nightmare, the entry of the "reds" into the corridors of national power, was becoming a reality. Their anti-constitutional plotting therefore reached a crescendo during this period, and
took concrete form in a series of seditious schemes in which neo-fascists, "presidentialists", and "establishment manipulators" comiled in an effort to translate their sometimes irreconcilable plans into reality. The primary organizations involved in these anti-constitutional activities were Carlo Fumagalli's Movimento di Azione Rivoluzionaria (MAR), Edgardo Sogno's "white" coup apparatus, the Rosa dei Venti group in the Veneto, the Propaganda Due (P2) masonic lodge headed by Licio Gelli, and a plethora of neo-fascist "front" groups such as Ordine Nero.

On 17 May 1973, right in the midst of this increasingly suffocating atmosphere of psychological tension, clandestine plotting, and politically-motivated violence, there was yet another traumatic act of terrorism, one which is perhaps emblematic of the entire "strategy of tension".1 Around 11:00 that morning, toward the end of a ceremony at the main Milan police station in memory of Luigi Calabresi, the former police commissioner in that city who had been assassinated one year before by terrorists,2 a man named Gianfranco Bertoli hurled an explosive device toward the building from the opposite side of Via Fatebenefratelli. Although falling well short of the entrance to the Questura, the detonation of the device nevertheless resulted in the death of four bystanders and the wounding of more than forty. In the midst of the chaos and confusion caused by this carnage, Bertoli tried to melt into the crowd, but he had been observed tossing the explosive and was quickly surrounded and immobilized by a group of outraged citizens. At that point he yelled "viva Pinelli, viva anarchism". It was soon discovered that he had an anarchist symbol, a circled A, tattooed on his arm, and in statements made to the police and magistrates after his arrest he claimed to be an individualist anarchist inspired
by Max Stirner who had acted alone to try and kill Interior Minister Mariano Rumor, in attendance at the ceremony, in order to avenge the suspicious 15 December 1969 death of the anarchist Giuseppe Pinelli during an interrogation by Calabresi’s men. This politically convenient testimony, however perplexing it might appear to anyone familiar with Stirner’s writings, was at once seized upon by the press to buttress favored theories about the source of terrorism. Thus right-wing newspapers immediately characterized Bertoli’s attack as yet another example of uncontrolled leftist violence and subversion, centrist papers presented it as further evidence of the dangers posed by "opposing extremisms" to Italian democracy, and the leftist press, mindful of past provocations, did not hesitate to label Bertoli a fascist provocateur. It is fair to say that the general public, influenced by the popular media, initially considered the perpetrator to be an unbalanced anarchist, and this interpretation can still be found in books by mainstream academics on terrorism in Italy.

However, the picture that emerged in the course of several judicial investigations is considerably more complex, if not altogether different. In order to clarify this, it is necessary to provide more detailed information about Bertoli’s background and movements prior to the attack. According to his own account, by the age of twenty Bertoli had become an ideological Bolshevik and had forged links to the PCI federation in Venice. His alleged conversion to individualistic anarchism occurred later, "first as a visceral reaction" and then on the basis of a more serious examination of various anarchist texts. But the evidence indicates that prior to this supposed adoption of leftist ideas he had already embarked upon a life of petty crime, in the course of which he was
arrested and imprisoned several times, became associated with local elements of organized crime, and established connections to a number of figures linked to the extreme right and secret services in the Veneto.⁶

Among these right wingers was Rodolfo Mersi, a refugee from Yugoslav-occupied Venezia Giulia who had immediately adhered to the MSI after settling in Venice. In 1953 or 1954 Mersi became a police informant in that city, supposedly on his own initiative. His primary assignment was to discover hidden arms caches, and it was in this capacity that he crossed paths with Bertoli, who was involved in local underworld-linked arms trafficking by 1955 and had tried to sell Mersi some weapons from a deposit in Asiago.⁷ Mersi informed the police, and shortly thereafter Bertoli himself was recruited as a police informant and became a collaborator of the Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate (SIFAR) and various unidentified "international secret services". This judicial conclusion was confirmed by Admiral Mario Casardi, a former Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID) chief who testified in 1975 that Bertoli had been a SIFAR informant from 1954 to 1960.⁸ Bertoli thence began to furnish machine guns and pistols to the Fronte Anticomunista Italiano, a right-wing group led by a former Repubblica Sociale Italiano (RSI) supporter which received support from Giuseppe Togni and the chemical industrialist Franco Marinotti, and along with his friend and fellow SIFAR collaborator Giorgio Sorteni—one of the key witnesses for much of this phase of Bertoli’s past—he made efforts to locate hidden communist arms deposits. Bertoli did not deny Sorteni’s assertions, but put another gloss on these actions by claiming that he had undertaken them to help the local PCI federation keep tabs on its enemies.⁹
This latter claim is scarcely believable, both because it would suggest that SIFAR was so inept that it would unknowingly recruit an amateur PCI double agent as a collaborator and because it does not jibe with the overall pattern of Bertoli’s associations and subsequent activities. According to right-wing "political soldier" and self-confessed Peteano bomber Vincenzo Vinciguerra, for example, Bertoli fell in with Ordine Nuovo circles in Mestre, an industrial town on the mainland across from Venice. Moreover, he allegedly displayed a membership card from the anti-communist organization Pace e Libertà while employed at the Montecatini chemical plant in Porto Marghera in 1964 and 1965, and at some point during the 1960s he shared a jail cell together with his friend from Dolo, Sandro Sedona, a future member of the Veneto group affiliated with the Rosa dei Venti organization. This is certainly a peculiar curriculum vitae for a self-proclaimed leftist sympathizer. Nevertheless, even with his connections to certain segments of the state security apparatus, Bertoli was often in trouble with local authorities. He drank heavily, and continued to engage in acts of petty theft, some of which involved gratuitous violence. He also may have participated in acts of neo-fascist squadrismo. Thus, according to information provided to MSI secretary Giorgio Almirante by one of that party’s Padua leaders a week after the 17 May attack, Bertoli had taken part in the notorious 16 April 1969 neo-fascist assault on the Paduan city hall, for which MSI provincial leader Lionello Luci and thirty-six others were charged by the district attorney’s office.

Despite this previous history of rightist militancy and secret service collaboration—or more likely because of it—toward the end of the 1960s Bertoli began to frequent
various anarchist groups, including the Circolo Nestor Machno in Venice.\textsuperscript{14} Although his drunkenness, links with organized crime, and occasional admissions of friendly relations with fascists made the members of that group suspect that he was a provocateur, Bertoli was able to obtain the assistance of various anarchists and leftists in 1970-1971, when he sought to leave Italy after being charged with armed robbery in Padua.\textsuperscript{15} He was helped in his efforts to expatriate by various members of the Circolo Anarchico Ponte della Ghisolfa in Milan, including Amedeo Bertolo and Umberto Del Grande, who furnished him with the passport of Massimo Magri, which they had obtained from Aldo Bonomi and to which they affixed Bertoli's picture. A post-strage investigation by members of the Partito Comunista d'Italia/Marxista-Leninista (PCdI/M-L), a Maoist group to which Magri belonged, revealed that Magri's passport had been stolen in 1969 and added to a stock of other stolen passports gathered by members of the leftist student movement in order to help Greeks who were being persecuted by the Colonel's regime to emigrate.\textsuperscript{16} Files discovered in an apartment linked to the Brigate Rosse (BR) in 1974, presumably deriving from an internal BR investigation prompted by Bonomi's membership in the organization, revealed that Bertoli had found refuge at a certain Bevilacqua's house at Saint Moritz in Switzerland after crossing the border in the Sondrio zone with Bonomi's help, a reconstruction which was subsequently confirmed by the court testimony of the individuals involved.\textsuperscript{17}

At this point Bertoli's travel itinerary becomes somewhat unclear. Although the roughly forged passport he was using did not match his age or height at all, such obvious discrepancies did not impede his ability to pass through ID checkpoints in several
European countries. He apparently went to Germany and Holland before heading to Avignon, France, where Bertolo had instructed him to meet with a Spanish political refugee named Martín Armand. Bertoli then went on to Marseilles, where he seems to have made a number of friends or contacts who have not yet been identified. While in Marseilles he obtained a visa from the Israeli consulate without any difficulty or delays, travelled to that country (where he arrived on 26 February 1971), and resided at the Karmiyah kibbutz for over two years. During this sojourn in Israel, a number of suggestive things transpired. First of all, he shared a room there for some time with Jacques Jemmi, and also often socialized with Jemmi's brother Jean-Michel, both of whom were associated with two neo-fascist organizations in France, the Mouvement Jeune Révolution (MJR) and Ordre Nouveau, and who were then in transit to the Colonels' Greece. Given the nature of those organizations, which will be discussed below, and the destination of the Jemmis, their intensive interaction with Bertoli could have considerable significance. Secondly, prior to his departure from Israel on 8 May 1973, he received several letters from Italy, and one which arrived between February and April that year visibly worried him. According to the testimony of various residents at the kibbutz, Bertoli indicated that this letter provided him with a departure date and travel itinerary, and that it was necessary that he arrive in Marseilles by 15 May in order to meet a friend. Thirdly, Bertoli claimed to have obtained the Israeli-made hand grenade he used in the attack from the armory of the kibbutz where he stayed, hidden it in his room, smuggled it onto the ship "Dan" through two checkpoints in Israel and then through others in Europe, and brought it all the way to Milan with him, but this
reconstruction of events conflicts with other testimony and is problematic for various reasons. The Israeli government denied that any bombs were stored in or stolen from the armory of the Karmiyah kibbutz, Jacques Jemmi denied having seen the grenade in the room he shared with Bertoli, and it is unlikely that prior to boarding the vessel the latter could have fooled the Israeli authorities by distracting their attention and shifting it from one hand to the other, as he claimed. For this reason, the investigating magistrates concluded that he probably acquired the explosive in Marseilles, or possibly in Milan itself.

Further mysteries surround Bertoli's stay in Marseilles, which according to the judges "is one of the most troubling pages of the story because it probably contains the key to explaining the real preparation of the strage." Bertoli claimed he went to Marseilles to avoid both passport checks at Genoa, where the "Dan" made a stop, and remaining in Italy any longer than necessary, since there was an arrest warrant out for him, but this account is hardly credible. While in Israel he had probably already learned that the arrest warrant had been rescinded, since he had received several letters from Italy, and after passing through ID checkpoints all over Europe without difficulty it is doubtful that he suddenly felt it necessary to go on to Marseilles because he became worried about a passport check at Genoa. Moreover, as noted above, he had already indicated to acquaintances in Israel that his initial destination was Marseilles. Upon his arrival in that port city, he took a room at the Hôtel du Rhône for three days, but actually slept there only the first night, if at all, and behaved in an ostentatious manner seemingly designed to ensure that he was remembered, according to the proprietress.
Unfortunately, Bertoli’s movements and activities during his stay in Marseilles remain obscure. According to the investigating magistrates, there are vague indications that he met with the person or persons who had summoned him to the city, but the French and Italian police were unable to obtain tangible evidence of such encounters.

At 6:00 on the morning of 16 May, Bertoli took a train to Milan, where he arrived at 4:00 in the afternoon. According to his own account, he left his baggage (with the grenade) and changed money at the train station, took the subway to the Piazza Duomo stop to "pass the time" by touring the city center, rented a room at the Pensione Italia on Via Vetrario, and phoned the home of his old friend Mersi,28 who had moved to Milan from Venice several years earlier, become a member of the MSI’s Confederazione Italiana Sindacato Nazionale Lavoratori (CISNAL), and gotten a job as a waiter at the Ristorante Alfio. That same afternoon, however, he also made an attempt to contact Amedeo Bertolo, the anarchist acquaintance who had previously helped him elude the police by facilitating his departure from Italy. Although he initially denied doing so, at around 4:30 PM Bertoli introduced himself to Seja Anneli at her newstand in Via Orefici and asked to speak to Augusta Farvo, Anneli’s aunt, whose home was known in political circles as the "anarchist salon" of Milan. Anneli told him she would relay the message, and when Bertoli returned to the newstand two hours later she accompanied him to Farvo’s house. After ringing the bell, Bertoli spoke to Farvo on the intercom, telling her that he was an anarchist from Venice who wanted to speak to Bertolo and asking for the latter’s address. When he failed to adequately explain why he needed that address, Farvo became suspicious and told him to look it up in the phone

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Bertoli then gave up, although he may have spoken to Bertolo later on the phone, and visited Mersi's house. Although Mersi himself was not yet there, Bertoli stayed and talked to his wife, Antonietta Di Lalla, until Mersi returned home at around midnight. He spent the time trying to impress Di Lalla and did not reveal the specific reasons for his visit to Milan even after Mersi arrived, but let it be known that he was forced to leave Israel, that he feared he was being followed and watched, and that he felt he was mixed up in things from which he could not escape, at one point even blurting out that he hoped he would be stopped. At around 1:30 AM, Bertoli returned to his boarding house for the night.

The next day, according to his own account, Bertoli got up at 7:30 AM, bought a copy of Corriere della Sera (supposedly to learn the location of the ceremony for Calabresi), took the subway to Piazza Duomo, went to a nearby bar for a cognac, arrived at Via Fatebenefratelli at 10:40, a little after the departure of Interior Minister Rumor and Police Chief Efisio Zanda Loy, and tossed the bomb. This reconstruction did not satisfy the judges at all, since several witnesses claimed to have seen him in the area of the Questura at an earlier hour. Two employees at the Bar Annunciata—a different bar than the one where he said he bought a cognac—testified that they served him at 9:30 and 9:45, and again at 10:30, whereas a certain Gemelli of the Polizia Scientifica said he observed Bertoli with two other people on the sidewalk across from the Questura at around 9:50. Bertoli himself was hard to miss, and one of his two companions had long blonde hair and a beard à la Jesus Christ. This not only indicated that he had accomplices present in Milan, which he repeatedly denied, but also suggested to the
investigating magistrates that Rumor or other representatives of the state may not have been the real targets, as Bertoli insisted. This latter suggestion received indirect support from other eyewitnesses at the scene, who claimed that Bertoli did not actually wind up and hurl the grenade toward the police station entrance, but simply aimed it at the sidewalk and tossed it, thus provoking a massacre of innocent citizens. It was not until he was cornered by members of the crowd afterwards that he yelled "viva Pinelli", thereby associating himself with and incriminating the anarchists.32

These then are the basic facts about the crime and the background of the perpetrator, but as usual there are enough gaps and contradictions in the judicial records to generate confusion and permit different interpretations of the events. There are two main possibilities. The first is that Bertoli really did act alone, that he was an unbalanced "lone nut" with anarchist sympathies. After all, Bertoli himself never abandoned his claim to have acted alone and in conformity with the historical tradition of anarchist "propaganda of the deed" gestures.33 When confronted by evidence that he had long had contacts with or received assistance from the security services and diverse political extremists, he attempted to justify this by saying that as an individualist anarchist he had no problems carrying out an act of revolt using means and opportunities provided to him by totally divergent political circles, including "forces of the right [and] the police".34 He cited as an example the 1893 attack on the French parliament by the anarchist Auguste Vaillant, who he asserted had been armed and assisted by the police, obviously for their own reasons.35 He also argued, apropos of his association with both radical rightists and some leftists, that "[a]t the root of every extreme position of the right or the
left there is always a feeling of revolt against the existing society", the implication being that this feeling provides them with a common psychological bond which transcends ideological differences, a view which has much to recommend it and is nowadays shared by many political analysts and psychological researchers. These explanations are superficially plausible, and perhaps receive some indirect support from the conclusions of the examining psychiatrists, who determined that Bertoli, though very bright and knowledgeable about political and philosophical texts, was a person with an "absolute incapacity" to find a place for himself in normal society, which caused him to revolt against it, commit crimes, and develop associations with criminal elements and diverse political extremists. This post-facto psychiatric analysis, however simplistic, is certainly not belied by his previous history of violence and criminality.

However, Bertoli's politically convenient account of his own motivations, which despite his assumption of full responsibility had the practical effect of implicating the left in general and anarchist circles in particular, was decisively rejected by the judges at both trials. They assumed, not without good cause, that Bertoli's probable reason for providing misleading and often vague testimony—about the provenance of the bomb, his activities in Marseilles, his efforts to contact Bertolo, his movements on the day of the attack, and so forth—was to protect his sponsors and accomplices, since if he had acted alone it would not have been necessary to engage in such obfuscation. Moreover, instead of viewing his failure to attack Rumor and Zanda Loy as the result of incompetence, they interpreted it to mean that he was not really attempting to harm the highest-ranking members of the government, which in turn proved his act did not reflect the "solitary
revolt of an anarchist", since anarchists invariably aimed to strike a blow against the symbols and representatives of state power. Furthermore, they rightly emphasized that a person with Bertoli’s unstable emotional makeup was ideally suited to be manipulated and used instrumentally, and believed there was a "strong probability" that this was indeed the case. That notion was indirectly buttressed by the testimony of a Venetian mobster with pro-Nazi ideas named Coser, who had previously worked together on illegal capers with Bertoli and viewed him as a "follower" who was incapable of following through on plans without the support of others. Thus on the basis of both logic and the considerable corpus of evidence at their disposal, the investigating magistrates concluded that there were unknown people behind Bertoli who "pulled the strings" and that the attack itself was "inspired by an organized group and linked to a vast and obscure criminal design." Unfortunately, they were unable or unwilling to shed further light on the identity of this group.

This conclusion clearly adds weight to the second main possibility, that there was a larger group of conspirators involved and that Bertoli was merely the individual selected by that group to make the attack. Considering the nature of Bertoli’s past associations, that group could in theory be identified as either a loose network of anarchists or groups on the extreme right linked to elements of various Western secret services. The former interpretation was promoted by the right-wing press in a histrionic anti-anarchist campaign similar to those it had previously employed with success. It was based upon the incontestable evidence that Bertoli had established contacts with anarchist groups in Venice and Milan, a feat he accomplished by claiming to be an ideological...
sympathizer and attending some of their meetings, and that certain members of those
groups, along with one BR adherent, later helped him avoid being arrested by facilitating
his expatriation. In addition, Bertoli’s ostentatious expression of negative opinions about
Calabresi, both at the kibbutz in Israel (where he also lauded Pinelli) and to Mersi’s
wife, on the surface conformed to his image as an anarchist. It is also possible that
Bertoli spoke on the phone to the anarchist Bertolo the day before the attack, as noted
above, and afterwards Bertolo definitely lied about not previously meeting Bertoli, who
he had earlier helped to acquire the falsified Magri passport. Finally, since the people
with whom he met in Marseilles and those with whom he was seen in Milan have not yet
been identified, it remains possible that he had obtained some logistical assistance from
a clandestine network of leftists, who certainly would have had a motive to try and
avenge Pinelli’s death, purportedly at the hands of Calabresi, by attacking state
representatives attending a dedication ceremony on the anniversary of the former police
commissioner’s murder.

However, this possibility was also firmly rejected by the investigating magistrates,
who found no evidence that any of the leftists who crossed Bertoli’s path—neither those
who had helped arrange his escape in 1970 nor those whom he tried to contact in Milan
in 1973—were in any way involved in the attack on the Questura. They argued instead
that, given his past associations with the extreme right and the secret services, his
proclaimed ideology was an “artificially adopted cover” which enabled him to pursue
other goals, that his attempt to contact Bertolo the day before the attack may have been
an act of provocation, and that his movements and leftist associations were probably
arranged by others in order to "confound the matrix of the criminal design". This hypothesized effort to create a leftist "legend" for Bertoli not only corresponds to the specific reconstruction of events in this case, but also perfectly conforms to the long established pattern of far right and secret service attempts to infiltrate, manipulate, and implicate the left in terrorist actions. For this reason, it is this latter possibility that must be further explored, though as usual the judges stopped well short of trying to retrace such a politically explosive trail back to its ultimate sponsors.

Many witnesses testified that Bertoli began to serve as a police informant and SIFAR collaborator in the mid-1950s, and the reasons are scarcely difficult to imagine. He was then in a very vulnerable legal position, having already established a long arrest record for petty crimes and having just been accused of arms trafficking by SIFAR informant Mersi. Like the majority of common criminals who end up collaborating with the forces of order, he was scarcely able to refuse to accede to their demands for cooperation, since the alternative was going to jail. It can also be assumed that a social outcast with an uncertain income would find it difficult to resist an offer to collaborate with powerful elements of the state apparatus in return for even a modest stipend. And, like most other people associated with organized crime, it is likely that Bertoli had rightist sympathies or, at least, vaguely regressive social views which would have provided no obstacle to his being employed in operations against the left. To these general considerations still another can be added. Once people are drawn into a collaborative but dependent relationship with the security services, it is difficult if not impossible for them to unilaterally end that relationship because those agencies have over
the course of time collected even more "dirt" with which to blackmail them. And if blackmail alone fails to yield the desired results, force or the threat of force can always be used to coerce consent. In short, once having fallen into their clutches, Bertoli probably never fully escaped from the control of elements of the secret services. This factor would certainly account for the hints he dropped to the Mersis in 1973 about being trapped in circumstances from which he could not escape.

It is this very association with the intelligence services that probably provides the key to illuminating many features of Bertoli’s activities which are otherwise difficult to explain. For example, since he had previously been employed by SIFAR to locate secret communist arms caches, and in that capacity may have infiltrated the PCI federation in Venice in the mid-1950s, it is very likely that his later attempts to join anarchist circles were carried out at the behest of military intelligence for the purposes of collecting information and/or facilitating future provocations. It is even possible that some of the criminal activities he subsequently engaged in were encouraged or sponsored by SIFAR in order to provide him with a legitimate cover as a fugitive, thereby enabling him to obtain, via anarchist circles, the assistance of clandestine leftist exfiltration networks, which if necessary could then be dismantled, manipulated, or implicated in criminal activity. Furthermore, if his handlers had decided to send him abroad for a while before reactivating him for future operations, the assistance of friendly foreign secret services may well have been enlisted. Although this suggestion is based upon informed speculation rather than hard evidence, it would certainly help to explain such peculiar things as Bertoli’s uncanny ability to pass through several ID checks in Europe and Israel.
using the poorly falsified passport he had acquired with anarchist help. It also receives a certain amount of circumstantial confirmation in the judges' reconstruction of the course of events.

Traces of possible contact with, or assistance from, the French security services can be found in at least two stages of the bomber's career. Thus when Bertoli went to Milan in 1971, shortly before his successful expatriation, he visited Mersi and told him that he already possessed a fake French passport. This is significant because, if true, it would demonstrate that Bertoli did not really need to obtain a falsified Italian passport from the anarchists, which would strengthen the case for provocation. Then too, the use of a less obviously forged French passport might have accounted for his easy passage through ID checks prior to entering Germany, Holland, and France. Even more suspicious was the failure of the French authorities to produce a list of the phone numbers Bertoli called in Italy from Marseilles in May of 1973, despite receiving a request to do so from their Italian counterparts. On the surface this was an unusually uncooperative act, even for the French. Yet given the specific context, it is certainly possible that their obstructionist behavior was the result—if not of national chauvinism, petty bureaucratic disputes over jurisdiction, or outright incompetence—of some sort of effort to cover up incriminating evidence that Bertoli had made contact during that period with persons compromised in acts of subversion or linked to friendly secret services. One can only speculate, however, since the French authorities will probably never reveal the real reasons for their failure to assist Italian investigators. Finally, Bertoli's close association with the Jemmi brothers in Israel also may have brought him into contact with
French intelligence and parallel police networks.

As noted above, the Jemmis were affiliated with two neo-fascist organizations in France, both of which had documented contacts with clandestine apparatuses linked to one or more secret services. The Mouvement Jeune Révolution was created in late 1966 by a 100-strong group of previous Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS)-Métro Jeune members and sympathizers at the instigation of OAS-Métro’s former leader, Pierre Sergent. Ostensibly, it was a social and cultural grouping established to promote "intellectual and moral reform", but in reality it was designed to function as a clandestine revolutionary vanguard capable of seizing power when the political climate became favorable. To this end the movement was organized into cells, a number of front organizations were created, a cult of secrecy was fostered, and several young MJR militants participated in paramilitary training camps, where they received physical training and instruction in the French Army’s highly-developed counterrevolutionary warfare (guerre révolutionnaire) techniques. Yet despite attracting some former members of the recently dissolved organization Occident, previously its main rival, and engaging in ever-increasing activism, which involved claiming responsibility for violent confrontations and terrorist attacks, secretly infiltrating members into other organizations, and supposedly establishing networks in eastern Europe, the MJR remained numerically small and politically insignificant, at least overtly. Its members proclaimed Sergent as their leader, but after working for a short time to make that organization the backbone of a new Europe-wide political movement, the restless and ambitious Sergent soon abandoned his grandiose plans for the elitist, conspiratorial MJR and began scheming,
without success, to create a new political formation with a broader right-wing base. Later, when Ordre Nouveau appeared on the scene and established itself as the rallying point for the French extreme right, the MJR first transformed itself into the Mouvement Solidariste Français (MSF), then helped constitute the Groupe Action Jeunesse (GAJ) in 1973.50

In contrast to the MJR, which never managed to attain the level of political influence it sought, Ordre Nouveau soon developed into "the most important, the most dynamic, and the most dangerous neo-fascist movement" in postwar France, and between 1970 and 1973 its activities eclipsed those of all other extreme right movements.51

Following the shock of the leftist student and worker revolts in May 1968 and the government's dissolution of Occident, various extreme right splinter groups sought to become the cadre around which the entire right wing could regroup. The most important of these was the Groupe-Union Droite/Groupe d'Union et de Défense (GUD), a radical neo-fascist "student union" founded by former Occident leader Alain Robert whose activities were chiefly aimed at countering disruptive leftist actions in secondary schools and universities, particularly the law schools at the University of Paris II (Assas) and Nanterre. The GUD, being composed primarily of "heavies" and young extremists from Occident who carried on that organization's violent tradition, was continually involved in bloody confrontations with communist, Trotskyist, and Maoist groups.52 At the end of 1969, it banded together with some other far right elements in order to form Ordre Nouveau, although the GUD itself continued to maintain a separate existence and in fact constituted the new movement's security service. In its efforts to rally the diverse forces...
of the French right wing and attract international support, Ordre Nouveau soon obtained extensive publicity by launching a very costly leafleting campaign which provoked overreactions from leftist organizations and official bans of its projected meetings. This sudden and growing notoriety enabled it to attract representatives from the MSI (Massimo Anderson) and Nysvenska Rörelsen (Per Engdahl) when it finally succeeded in obtaining permission from the authorities to hold its first congress on 13 May 1970, a gathering which attracted 4000 to 5000 enthusiastic supporters. From then on Ordre Nouveau regularly participated in municipal and national elections, and although its candidates usually obtained only between 2% and 4% of the votes cast, this was far greater than the totals received in previous electoral efforts by overtly neo-fascist organizations.53

Nevertheless, from the outset there existed a fundamental internal division within Ordre Nouveau between the moderates who wanted to create a serious electoral party on the MSI model, and the radicals who promoted direct action against the left and, at least rhetorically, the bourgeois state. As time wore on, the increasing amount of violence perpetrated by members of the latter faction, the bulk of whom were concentrated in the heavily-armed GUD, created more and more difficulties for those legalists whose strategy was geared toward attracting support from the traditional right in elections in order to create a broader "national" front. Despite Ordre Nouveau's critiques of violent direct action tactics (except in cases of self-defense) in its publications,54 one of the most characteristic images of the period was the intimidating presence of phalanxes of GUD militants equipped with iron bars or nunchaku, reinforced wooden bucklers, heavy
boots, black leather jackets, and helmets with celtic cross emblems at both of Ordre Nouveau's public meetings and various university demonstrations. In the end this violence, which had graduated from serious brawls with leftist students to acts of small-scale terrorism and overt confrontations with the police, led to the dissolution of the entire movement on 28 June 1973. While the former Ordre Nouveau moderates then generally threw their support to Jean-Marie Le Pen's first version of the Front National, many Ordre Nouveau/GUD ultras joined together with elements from the MSF and Jean-Gilles Malliarakis' Action Nationaliste to form the volatile GAJ.

There are two crucial aspects of the activities of the MJR and Ordre Nouveau which this basic overview fails to reveal. First of all, in spite of regularly launching bitter rhetorical attacks against capitalist (as well as communist) exploitation and American (as well as Soviet) imperialism in their publications and public pronouncements, a typical characteristic of radical neo-fascist groups, these two organizations inherited the French right’s bitter disillusionment about France’s "loss" of Indochina and Algeria as well as the Manichean view, promoted by their OAS heroes, of a struggle to the death between communism and the West. It is therefore not surprising that the MJR joined together with pro-Atlantic "reactionaries" and former French combat veterans in umbrella organizations like Roger Holeindre’s Front Uni de Soutien au Sud-Vietnam, or that both organizations supported a total American victory in Vietnam and lionized the authoritarian but decidedly unrevolutionary rightist regimes in Greece and, after 1973, Chile. Indeed, one of Ordre Nouveau’s slogans was "Today Athens, tomorrow Paris", which mirrored the equally foolish and contradictory
attitudes of so many self-styled neo-fascist "revolutionaries" in Italy, who ended up tangibly contributing to the political control exercised by the very same conservative or bourgeois political forces they claimed, with varying degrees of honesty, to oppose.

Secondly, like most of their Italian counterparts these French movements were quickly infiltrated by the secret services or their front groups and thence used to carry out information gathering, acts of terrorism, or provocations. For example, Yves Guillou’s Aginter Presse network recruited most of its French "correspondents" from the MJR and, to a lesser extent, Occident. According to Aginter and Ordre et Tradition files, it appears that the latter organization exercised a hidden influence over the MJR, and several documents found at Aginter’s offices indicate not only that certain MJR leaders spent time in Lisbon but that several MJR militants received training from Aginter unconventional warfare specialists. These Aginter records, which illustrate the "privileged relations" between Aginter and the MJR, are substantiated by other sources. A former MJR student leader testified that Jeune Révolution [the MJR’s newspaper] regularly published the articles of Aginter Presse", and added that the contacts between the two organizations were "very compartmentalized and passed through the Ordre et Tradition center, which was the clandestine political organization of the MJR." And a French police report revealed that Sergent, following his return from exile after the amnesty law of 24 July 1968 took effect, immediately began solidifying his network of international supporters, and had "very frequent contacts with ex-Captain Guillou, director of the Aginter Presse agency in Lisbon, who he met with in Switzerland and who appears to guide him in his enterprise [to forge a movement throughout Europe on
the organizational foundation of the MJR]." There is no need to reiterate all that has
been said above about Guillou, but his extensive efforts to foment provocations and acts
of terrorism at the behest of various Western secret services should be recalled. Given
this connection and Sergent’s own OAS background, it is surely no accident that the MJR
created a clandestine organizational structure and provided guerre révolutionnaire
training to its militants. Moreover, within the context of the general rapprochement
between the Gaullists and their former far right/OAS enemies which occurred in the wake
of the leftist revolts of May 1968, the barbouzes of the Service d’Action Civique (SAC)
incorporated several MJR members into their units of counterrevolutionary shock
troops. Nor is it a fluke that Occident, the MJR’s chief initial rival and the parent
organization of many later GUD and Ordre Nouveau militants, was also approached by
various persons on behalf of the French services. At least one notorious mercenary with
close links to the Service de Documentation Extérieure e de Contre-Espionnage
(SDECE), Bob Denard, made attempts to recruit members of Occident, while a parallel
effort was made by mercenary Jacques Depret to recruit them for use in rival Policia
Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) and Aginter Presse operations in Africa on
behalf of the Portuguese government, a circumstance which greatly annoyed SDECE and
temporarily strained the normally good relations between the two secret services.
Furthermore, according to a former Occident militant, the French secret services
contacted the movement to enlist its aid, first in recapturing the law school at Assas from
the left and then in establishing it as a rightist base of operations, in return for which
they offered to provide whatever material assistance was necessary. Although he claimed that their approaches were rebuffed because certain Occident extremists refused to collaborate with the Gaullists, this effort may nonetheless have had some tangible impact on the creation of certain rightist self-defense groups at the school.

Later, Ordre Nouveau developed even more extensive links to secret service networks. According to Gilbert Lecavelier, a former SAC member who himself handled the operation, the utilization of Ordre Nouveau was among the most successful of the efforts undertaken by the French security services to make use of the extreme right. This particular operation was mounted by Lecavelier through an SAC front group known as Études Techniques et Commerciales (ETEC), at the behest of both the Renseignement Générale (RG) of the Paris Prefecture of Police’s 2nd Section, which was responsible for “special operations”, and SAC leader Charly Lascorz. After convincing two Ordre Nouveau leaders about the potential advantages of collusion with the RG, Lecavelier was appointed as a "technical counselor" to the neo-fascist organization’s security service and given a free hand to set up a special group of militants to collect intelligence, by means of infiltrations and the theft of files, on the radical left. The information this group gathered soon began to flow into dossiers at ETEC’s office, from whence copies were disseminated to the RG’s 2nd Section and Lascorz, who in turn made them available to the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) through an intermediary, a former Abwehr operative named Dr. Scheuermann. In exchange, Lecavelier managed, with the help of the RG, to get official bans of Ordre Nouveau’s meetings lifted and to "obtain the benevolent neutrality of the police" in various circumstances, ranging from non-
interference in the organization's leafletting campaigns to having arrested Ordre Nouveau members released from jail without being charged.63

Among the more serious examples of collusion between Ordre Nouveau, SAC, and the RG were the violent disruptions of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's political gatherings in Bordeaux prior to the September 1970 administrative elections. With the help of local authorities, Ordre Nouveau and SAC goons first started a brawl at a chic soirée being held by Servan-Schreiber in the Hôtel des Brisants, then attacked two of his political meetings, routed his security service, and threw tear gas grenades supplied by the Prefecture of Police inside, thereby creating chaos and eventually costing him votes by associating him in the public mind with civil disorders. Even more ominously, the RG persuaded the managers of the Palais des Sports arena in Paris to rent the venue out to Ordre Nouveau for a meeting on 10 March 1971, hoping to provoke a violent leftist response which would in turn generate widespread fear among the public. On the appointed evening, Ordre Nouveau's defense of the Palais was organized militarily, with ranks of heavily armed members of the security service arrayed around the building and groups equipped with bottles of acid or slingshots and ball bearings scattered about. When large contingents of armed leftists arrived and began to throw molotov cocktails, three grenades tossed by Lecavelier's men precipitated a three-hour pitched battle in which members of Ordre Nouveau and the elite Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité ( CRS) of the police fought side by side against the counterdemonstrators. In response to public outcries, weapons at Ordre Nouveau's headquarters were seized—including over a ton of iron bars—and some of the organization's militants were arrested, but the
intervention of the RG resulted in their rapid release from custody.  

Yet another example of collusion between the secret services and Ordre Nouveau/GUD was their jointly-sponsored creation in 1972 of the clandestine Groupe d'Intervention Nationaliste (GIN), ostensibly an autonomous shock troop but in reality a cover name for elements from Ordre Nouveau who were mounting systematic campaigns of violence against the left. According to a former GIN member, Serge G., the organization was created and made to seem independent so as not to implicate and threaten Ordre Nouveau with dissolution, and certain of its key terrorist actions were "conceived with the cooperation of 'special services' more or less close to the government", such as the SAC and Sûreté Militaire.  Among these actions were arson attacks on anti-militarist organizations, the sacking of the offices of Libération and other publications, the stealing of files from leftist groups (which were then provided to the Sûreté Militaire or the RG), the hospitalizing of several left-wing activists, the breaking of strikes, and arms trafficking. Not surprisingly, this collusion between elements of Ordre Nouveau and the state apparatus was denounced by some real revolutionaries, who quit the GIN in disgust because many of these violent actions "had nothing to do with the political ideas of the extreme right."  Finally, it should also be pointed out that several meetings were held between Ordre Nouveau representatives and Kostas Plevris, the leader of the neo-fascist Kinema tes 4 Augoustou (K4A: 4th of August Movement) in Greece, who was closely linked to the Greek secret services and had participated in terrorist provocations which helped to provide a pretext for the Colonel's coup in 1967.  No details about what transpired at these meetings have been made public, but
given the nature of the prior relationships Plevris seems to have established with various Italian neo-fascists, one can certainly not exclude the possibility that subversive operations were on the agenda or that some tangible forms of collaboration resulted.

Although it is possible that Bertoli's close association with the Jemmi brothers at the Karmiyah kibbutz was purely coincidental, this seems unlikely in view of Bertoli's links to the Italian far right and security services and the documented collusion between the French neo-fascist organizations with which the Jemmis were affiliated and various intelligence networks. These facts suggest that the Israeli authorities may also have been involved in a broader secret service operation to exfiltrate Bertoli from Europe and shelter him abroad, which would go a long way toward explaining how he managed, allegedly with a badly forged passport, first to obtain a visa from the Israeli consulate in Marseilles with no delays and then to renew it every three months once he arrived in Israel. As the investigating judges pointed out, the Israelis normally check visa applications--and presumably the documents upon which those applications are based--with special thoroughness. Any form of sub rosa Israeli participation in such an operation in turn strengthens the possibility that Bertoli was telling the truth when he claimed to have obtained the bomb from the kibbutz where he was staying and then brought it through Israeli checkpoints at the time of his departure for Marseilles in May 1973. In this event official Israeli denials regarding the provenance of the device would be entirely predictable, and should not be accepted at face value any more than similar denials made by other governments which are trying to hide their participation in sensitive covert operations. Nevertheless, Bertoli could have obtained an Israeli-made
hand grenade from anyone able to acquire international arms, and there is absolutely no evidence either that organs of the Israeli government furnished Bertoli with that particular grenade or that they were aware of what the final objective of his mission was. If the Israeli secret service was involved at all in the Bertoli operation, which seems quite possible, it was probably in exchange for reciprocal favors provided by one or more of its European counterparts and involved nothing more than arranging for Bertoli to stay in Israel and make contact with the Jemmis.

Throughout most of his adult life, then, Bertoli maintained contacts with elements linked to various secret services and the extreme right, most of which had at some point, if not regularly, been involved in acts of violence, terrorism, and provocation. Although attempts to clarify the actual role played by foreign intelligence agencies and neo-fascists in Bertoli's activities must remain speculative given the absence of documentary proof, the direct or indirect involvement of their Italian counterparts is scarcely in doubt. The final piece of the puzzle concerning the identity of Bertoli's sponsors is perhaps provided by Padua Judge Giovanni Tamburino's parallel investigation of the Rosa dei Venti organization. Unfortunately, the Rome Court of Appeals transferred the responsibility for handling that investigation to the more politically responsive judicial organs of the capital, and the materials accumulated by Tamburino, as well as his reconstruction of the facts, were later rendered inaccessible to the public by the authorities. However, from the citations found in the invaluable study by investigative journalist Gianni Flamini, the leading specialist on the "strategy of tension" in Italy, it appears that he at least was able to examine some of this documentation before it was covered by state secrecy laws. The
following summary is therefore based upon his reconstruction, the accuracy of which
cannot be confirmed in all of its details without access to the evidence gathered by
Tamburino.

According to Flamini, it was a letter Bertoli received in Israel from Mestre
sometime around the beginning of May 1973 which provided him with instructions about
the mission he was to carry out, a mission for which Eugenio Rizzato, the civilian leader
of the Rosa dei Venti group in the Veneto, was to provide technical assistance and
monetary compensation. Due to delays in receiving funds from the Rosa's Genoan
financial backers, Rizzato began to have second thoughts about the operation, but a bomb
detonated outside the window of his home in Padua on 14 May 1973 persuaded him to
follow through with his agreed upon contribution to the mission. Having already
supposedly missed a scheduled appointment with Bertoli, Rizzato hastily visited his co­
conspirator Major Amos Spiazzi, an artillery and intelligence officer who was then
participating in military exercises in Calabria, in an effort to contact CISNAL activist
Roberto Cavallaro, Spiazzi's intermediary to the financiers. After meeting with Cavallaro
in Verona and pressuring him to make contact with the Genoese, within two days Rizzato
managed to obtain a portion of the 1 million lire Giancarlo De Marchi consigned to
Cavallaro, then allegedly provided it to Bertoli in accordance with Spiazzi's instructions.
Flamini hence concluded that "parallel SID", a top secret clandestine apparatus within
the military intelligence service that was linked to both the "Gladio" stay/behind
paramilitary networks and the Rosa dei Venti structure, was the organization which
covertly sponsored the "anarchist" Bertoli's attack on the Milan Questura. According to
this reconstruction, the latter’s bloody provocation was meant to spark civil disturbances which would in turn precipitate the long-planned intervention of certain military units.70

In support of this interpretation, Flamini provided a number of details that point to Veneto links in the attack, which would in any case be logical to expect given Bertoli’s prior interactions with extreme rightists and secret service personnel in that area. First of all, Flamini postulates that at some point during his previous stays in Padua Bertoli had been in contact with Franco Freda, a key figure in the "strategy of tension" and one of those accused of material involvement in the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing. After all, Padua was the place where Bertoli committed the robbery that resulted in the issuance of an arrest warrant in his name, as well as the site where he allegedly participated in neo-fascist attacks in 1969. In this connection, it should be remembered that Freda had close contacts with members of MSI youth groups, Ordine Nuovo, and Avanguardia Nazionale, and that his Ezzelino bookstore on Via Patriarcato in Padua was a well-known hangout for local right-wing extremists. It is thus all the more interesting to learn that the Italian-language copy of Max Stirner’s Der Einzige und sein Eigentum which was found in Bertoli's baggage at the Milan train station turned out to have been published by the Casa Editrice Ennesse, one of the publishing houses owned by Freda’s long-term collaborator, Giovanni Ventura.71 Furthermore, there was a certain neo-fascist and secret service operative nicknamed "Jesus Christ" who was involved in arms trafficking in the Veneto and had links to the Rosa plotters. Flamini speculates that this could have been the long-haired, bearded figure seen with Bertoli on the morning of the massacre, and that he could have provided the latter with the grenade.72 Although this
is certainly possible, especially considering that various radical rightists were then posing as leftists by growing their hair long and adopting a countercultural image (as the case of Mario Merlino perfectly illustrates), there is no proof that "Jesus Christ" was the person with Bertoli. Flamini further claimed that a car awaited Bertoli near the Questura, perhaps to drive him to the train station to pick up his baggage, and that he received radio instructions before tossing the bomb.73 All of this fits in with the supposition of a Veneto source for that device.

These suggestive details, which presumably derive from material gathered in the course of Tamburino’s investigation, are of course impossible for an outsider to verify. Nevertheless the judge himself, who had access to a vast corpus of now inaccessible material, concluded that "Bertoli appears indubitably linked to some Rosa dei Venti bigwigs [personaggi]" and that "profound connections" existed between his own investigation and the one concerning the massacre in Milan, an opinion shared at least in part by Judge Antonio Lombardi, who was conducting the latter.74 Lombardi made it a point to question some key Rosa dei Venti protagonists, including Cavallaro and Giampaolo Porta Casucci, and ended up accusing Rizzato of participating in the attack. Bertoli also came under investigation in the Movimento d’Azione Rivoluzionaria/Carlo Fumagalli inquest. In the end, however, due to the artificial jurisdictional separation of all these interrelated inquiries and the usual docility of the Rome magistrates in the face of political pressure, the charges against Rizzato were dropped for lack of evidence at the Bertoli trial, and Bertoli’s name was extracted from both the MAR and the Rome Borghese/Rosa trials. Once again, the most fruitful but elusive trails were sabotaged and
prematurely abandoned by those charged with getting to the bottom of an important terrorist incident.

If it is assumed that Bertoli was manipulated or controlled by someone connected to the Rosa dei Venti or "parallel SID", the question then becomes what faction within that organizational complex was directing him and what was the real purpose of his attack. Was his act really meant to provoke an outright military intervention, as Flamini assumed, or was it intended to derail the plans of those military and civilian extremists who genuinely sought to instigate such a coup? Cavallaro later testified that the projected 2 June 1973 date of the plotters' planned military response was shipwrecked because someone committed a "false move" and failed to carry out their task. Although this remark could refer to Fumagalli's inaction in the Valtellina, it may be even more applicable to Bertoli's bungled attack on Rumor, a regular target of the radical right in those years. However, it remains possible that Bertoli's action was sponsored by more "moderate" groups connected with the political establishment, which sought to exploit fears of a coup so as to promote either a "presidentialist" takeover or to preserve and extend their own base of power within the existing system, precisely in order to shipwreck the coup the ultras had scheduled for summer. On the basis of the currently available evidence, it is impossible to be certain.

In either case, there was an embarrassing postscript to the Bertoli affair for the powerful domestic and international political circles which had fomented subversive actions and sought to derail the course of various judicial inquiries during the 1970s. At the end of 1990, in connection with the revelations about "Gladio", an almost empty file
with the name Gianfranco Bertoli was found by Judge Felice Casson among the classified "gladiator" records which were stored just outside Rome at the Servizio Informazioni per la Sicurezza Militare's (SISMI) archive in Fort Braschi. The secret services immediately claimed that this was not the same Bertoli who had made the 1973 attack, and that it was a case of a simple homonym. Their hurried rebuttal came as no surprise to anyone, since if they had admitted that this was the same Bertoli it would have confirmed the widespread suspicion that the names of other perpetrators of terrorist violence would be found if the lists of "gladiators" were all made public. Although it is true that Bertoli is a fairly common Italian surname, the authorities provided no evidence that Bertoli the "gladiator" was someone other than Bertoli the terrorist, something that would have been easy enough to do had they really been two separate people. In lieu of such proof, one is certainly entitled to doubt these official claims given the strong possibility that the attack was covertly sponsored by elements of those very same secret services. Regardless of what the precise truth is concerning this question of identity, it is absolutely certain that there are many obscure features of the Bertoli case which, if fully clarified, might help illuminate important aspects of the history of Italian terrorism and subversion during the early 1970s.
1. According to right-wing ultra Vincenzo Vinciguerra, the confessed perpetrator of the Peteano bombing, the attack on the Milan Questura might be the "key episode" in comprehending the strategy of tension, since it revealed "in an exemplary fashion" the union between political power, the state apparatus, and elements of the neo-fascist group Ordine Nuovo. See his testimony to the District Attorney and Investigating Magistrate in Brescia, cited in Giovanni Salvi, ed., La strategia delle stragi, dalla sentenza della Corte d'Assise di Venezia per la strage di Peteano: Dal tentato golpe del 1964 alla P2, i depistaggi, il ruolo dei generali, l'operato dei servizi segreti (Rome: Riuniti, 1989), p. 321.

2. Calabresi was assassinated on 17 May 1972 just as he was leaving his home. The investigation was initially oriented toward far left circles, in particular the organization Lotta Continua, but nothing tangible emerged in the way of evidence. Following the arrest of a wanted neo-fascist named Gianni Nardi in September 1972, an investigation into possible rightist links to Calabresi's murder was undertaken, but again without definitive results. This stalled inquiry was later renewed, since in early 1974 Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID) operative Guido Giannettini told a reporter from L'Espresso that the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) had arranged for Calabresi's assassination when they learned that he had discovered that the West German service was furnishing concrete assistance to certain extreme right groups in Italy, and in June 1974 right-wing militant Marcello Bergamaschi testified that his MAR chief, Carlo Fumagalli, knew many things about Calabresi's death. Even so, this investigation also petered out. Then, in 1979, a document was discovered at a secret Prima Linea base that termed Calabresi's execution an "act of proletarian justice", reactivating the investigation of Lotta Continua. Within a year certain Prima Linea pentiti, including Roberto Sandalo, confirmed that this was the correct trail. Finally, in July 1988 a former Lotta Continua militant, Leonardo Marino, turned himself in to the Carabinieri and testified that he and Ovidio Bompressi, acting on the orders of Adriano Sofri and Giorgio Pietrostefani, committed the assassination, and as a result he and the others were arrested and brought to trial. In spite of a lack of any material evidence supporting Marino's sometimes contradictory testimony, they were eventually found guilty. However, various observers have raised serious doubts about both the guilt of some of the accused and the judicial methods used to convict them. See, for example, the work of the well-known historian Carlo Ginzburg, Il giudice e lo storico: Considerazioni in margine al processo Sofri (Turin: Einaudi, 1991), a personal friend of Sofri's.

3. For basic descriptions of the attack and Bertoli's proclaimed motives, see Corte d'Assise di Milano, Presidente Mario del Rio and Giudice Estensore Antonio Stella, Sentenza n. 12/75 del 1 marzo 1975 nel procedimento penale contro Bertoli,
Gianfranco [hereafter Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli], pp. 1, 3, 32-4, 36; and Tribunale di Milano, Giudice Istruttore Antonio Lombardi, Sentenza del 30 luglio 1976 nel procedimento penale contro Bertoli, Gianfranco [hereafter Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli], p. 29, 36. Compare also newspaper accounts on 18 May 1973, for example, Corriere della Sera. For the controversial circumstances surrounding Pinelli’s death, see the partisan journalistic accounts of Camilla Cederna, Pinelli: Una finestra sulla strage (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1971); Comitato di Controinformazione, Pinelli: Unomicidiodipolitico (Padua: Galilei, 1970); and Marco Sassano, Pinelli: Un suicidiodistato (Padua: Marsilio, 1971).

4. See, for example, Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism (Boulder & London: Westview, 1987), p. 58. Their interpretation is based solely on the account in La Stampa the day after the attack.

5. This account of his shifting political orientation is based on the testimony of a court-appointed psychological expert, which was in turn presumably based on an analysis of Bertoli’s own accounts of his background. See Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, p. 36. There is no mention in the sentence of any tangible, corroborative evidence of his earlier Bolshevism, links to the PCI, or conversion to anarchism.

6. For his criminal background, see Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 18, 34-7; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, pp. 31, 42-3.

7. For Mersi’s background and earliest links to Bertoli, see Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 19, 36; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, pp. 31, 41.

8. For Bertoli’s collaboration with the police and secret services, see Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 36-7. Although no effort was made by the judges to identify precisely which "international secret services" Bertoli may have been collaborating with, a reference to one or more Western secret services is implicit. For Casardi’s admission that Bertoli was working with the Italian counterespionage service, see Giuseppe Nicotri and Leo Sisti, "L’Enigma Bertoli", L’Espresso 36:47 (25 November 1990), p. 13; Gianni Flamini, Il partitodel golpe: Le strategiedellatensione edelterrorredalprimo centroantisinistraorganicoadalsequestromoro (Ferrara: Bovolenta, 1981-5), volume 4:1, p. 44. It is very doubtful that Bertoli’s employment by this service was actually terminated in 1960, as Casardi claimed, since there is much circumstantial evidence suggesting that Bertoli maintained links to various secret services up until 17 May 1973, the day of his attack. Note further that due to its involvement in a number of political scandals, including both abortive "coup"s and acts of terrorism, the Italian military intelligence service underwent three reorganizations and name changes in a little over a decade, from SIFAR to SID in 1966 and from SID to the Servizio Informazioni per la Sicurezzamilitare (SISMI) in 1978. Unfortunately, none of these "reforms" succeeded in ridding the service of corrupt and undemocratic elements.
9. For Bertoli’s arms trafficking, the Fronte Anticomunista Italiano, and the mission to discover PCI arms deposits, see Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 36-7; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 31; Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, p. 345, and 4:1, p. 43. The backgrounds of Togni and Marinotti are worth noting. Togni was a former Minister of Industry who helped facilitate Luigi Gedda’s 7 September 1947 “Catholic March on Rome” by urging the police and transportation authorities to permit the free circulation of vehicles utilized by the nearly 70,000 participants, this at a time when there were severe restrictions placed on Sunday vehicular traffic. See Pier Giuseppe Murgia, Il vento del nord: Storia e cronaca del Fascismo dopo la Resistenza, 1945-1950 (Milan: Sugar, 1975), p. 355. Gedda, then head of Azione Cattolica, would soon after organize the anti-communist Comitati Civici, a vast network of lay Catholics funded covertly by Confindustria and, via the Vatican bank, elements of the American national security establishment. For the Comitati Civici, see Carlo Falconi, Gedda e l’Azione cattolica (Florence: Parenti, 1958), pp. 125-40; Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, Gli Americani in Italia (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), pp. 276-8, 318-24. Marinotti was the owner of the giant SNIA Viscosa chemical company. From the Fall of 1944 on, he served as a mediator between SS Brigadeführer Wilhelm Harster, head of the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst in northern Italy, and the British Intelligence Service. He then made contact, through Monsignor Bernardini (the papal nuncio in Switzerland), with local Office of Strategic Services (OSS) leader Allen Dulles. Marinotti sought to persuade Dulles, apparently with the backing of some influential members of the Curia, to allow twenty-five German divisions to withdraw from the peninsula so that they could be sent to fight the Russians. In return, the Germans would abandon northern Italy to the Anglo-Americans. This proposal was rejected, and in early 1945 Riccardo Lombardi, the new Socialist prefect of Milan, ordered the arrest of Marinotti and several other industrialists who had prospered under fascism. See Murgia, Vento del nord, pp. 36-7, note 11, 60, 110. Nevertheless, he and other compromised chemical industrialists were thence protected and courted by the British, who sought to use their firms as points of penetration into the Italian economy. Perhaps more importantly, Marinotti and Francesco Odasso, chairman of the board at SNIA Viscosa, were accused in an internal PCI intelligence report of being among the promoters of an anti-communist movement designed "to eliminate all the philo-communists from the Italian political sphere." This was to be done through the financing of squads of killers recruited from among professional gangsters and former fascists. Using false designations, these squads were to make attacks on government officials and perpetrate public massacres that would then be blamed on the communists. The relationship between this supposed movement and the later Fronte Anticomunisti Italiano is unclear. See Faenza & Fini, Americani in Italia, pp. 69 (citing an OSS report from 24 October 1944 [1945?]), 152, note 2.


11. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, p. 345. Although he cites no source for this specific claim, it probably derives from Judge Giovanni Tamburino’s investigation of the Rosa dei Venti group. For the origins of Pace e Libertà, an international CIA-funded...
organization first established in France (as the Union Démocratique pour la Paix et la Liberté) in March 1949, see Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), pp. 150-1, 293; René Sommer, "Paix et Liberté? La Quatrième République contre le PC[F]", L'Histoire 40 (December 1981), pp. 26-35. Under the leadership of Jean-Paul David, it engaged in both extensive propaganda against communist "peace" initiatives and various covert intelligence operations until 1954, when it was compromised in the so-called "leakages" scandal. Some of its operatives later participated in anti-communist labor union activities, and—according to journalists linked to the Parti Communiste Français—did not hesitate to resort to violence. For an example, see Marcel Caille, Les truands du patronat (Paris: Sociales, 1977), pp. 57-8. The leader of the Italian branch was Edgardo Sogno, a former "white" partisan with close links to the British and American secret services who was subsequently implicated in a number of intelligence-linked covert operations against the left, including "presidentialist" coup plots. For various aspects of the checkered career of Sogno and his key Pace e Libertà associate Luigi Cavallo, see Franco Fucci, Spie per la libertà: I servizi segreti della Resistenza italiana (Milan: Mursia, 1983), esp. pp. 142-56; Giuseppe De Lutis, Storia dei servizi segreti in Italia (Rome: Riuniti, 1984), pp. 145-55; Alberto Papuzzi, Il provocatore: Il caso Cavallo e la Fiat (Turin: Einaudi, 1976); Tribunale di Torino, Giudice Istruttore Luciano Violante, Sentenza-ordinanza n. 831/73 del 6 marzo 1974 nel procedimento penale contro Sogno, Edgardo + altri; Norberto Valentini, La Notte della Madonna: L'Italia tragi-comica del golpe... (Rome: Monde, 1978), pp. 171-87. Compare Edgardo Sogno, Il golpe bianco (Milan: Scorpione, 1978); idem, La Seconda Repubblica (Florence: Sansoni, 1974).

12. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volumes 2, p. 58, and 3:2, pp. 344-5.

13. Ibid, volume 3:2, p. 357. For an account of this attack, see the same source, volume 2, pp. 34-6. Due to the notorious laxity of the Paduan authorities toward acts of right-wing violence, the charges against the accused were all later dropped.


15. The crime for which Bertoli and another man, Gastone Faccin, were accused was the attempted armed robbery of an elderly couple in Padua. Faccin was arrested by the Carabinieri, but Bertoli managed to flee and escape arrest. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 2, p. 200.

16. For the details of Bertoli's expatriation and the subsequent internal leftist investigations of the Bertoli case, see Tribunale di Milano, Giudice Istruttore Antonio Lombardi, Sentenza del 15 marzo 1980 nel procedimento penale contro Del Grande, Umberto + 2 [hereafter Sentenza 15 III 80 contro Del Grande], pp. 46-9. Interestingly, Calabresi had begun a file on Bertoli in connection with this expatriation operation, which contained a picture identical to the one affixed to Bertoli's falsified passport. It was Enrico Rovelli, another member of the Circolo Ponte della Ghisolfa, not
coincidentally the same group to which Pinelli had belonged, who provided a copy of this photo to Calabresi. See ibid, p. 47; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, pp. 32-3. According to Flamini (Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, p. 345), Calabresi had received additional information about Bertoli's movements from Veneto neo-fascist informant Gianfranco Belloni. In 1972, Magri was a PCdI/M-L candidate for the Chamber of Deputies. See Nicotri and Sisti, "Enigma Bertoli", p. 14.

17. Sentenza 15 III 80 contro Del Grande, pp. 47-8. Although the rightist press emphasized this BR link to Bertoli in order to discredit the left, the indirect involvement of BR member Bonomi in the expatriation of Bertoli has been viewed by some leftist journalists as further evidence of secret service penetration and manipulation of the BR. See Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 4:1, p. 43; Antonio Cipriani and Gianni Cipriani, Sovranità limitata: Storia dell’eversione atlantica in Italia (Rome: Associate, 1991), pp. 140-2. Both of these interpretations seem overly partisan, though neither can be absolutely ruled out.


19. Or perhaps Armand Martín. See Sentenza 15 III 80 contro Del Grande, p. 49. Since I have not been able to obtain further information about this person from Spanish or French sources, I suspect that the name was a pseudonym used to cover his real identity.


23. Ibid, pp. 5-10. According to a leftist magazine, the bomb Bertoli threw was a SIPE hand grenade, but the judicial sentences do not identify the type of explosive device he employed. See "Bertoli: Un 'anarchico' di fedeltà atlantica", Maquis Dossier II (June 1985), p. 72.


25. Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, p. 11.

26. Ibid, pp. 10-12. However, this sudden reluctance would be understandable if he was in fact carrying the grenade from Israel.

27. Ibid, pp. 12-13; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 38. There is a disagreement between the two sentences about whether Bertoli even slept at the hotel one night; according to the former he did not, whereas the latter claims he did sleep there his first
night in Marseilles.

28. Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, p. 15.

29. Ibid, pp. 16-17; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, pp. 39-40.

30. Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 20-1; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 41.


32. For judicial reconstructions of the sequence of events, based on the testimony of eyewitnesses, see ibid, pp. 24-30. The detail about Bertoli’s Christ-like companion is based on the account in Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, p. 351.

33. Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, p. 3.

34. Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 43.

35. Ibid. This is an interesting example, since the French police have long been accused or suspected of supplying Vaillant with the bomb he used, though there are disputes about whether the latter was a willing provocateur or a genuine anarchist who was unwittingly manipulated by the state. See, for example, Jean Maîtr, Le mouvement anarchiste en France, 1880-1914 (Paris: Maspero, 1975 [1951]), vol. I, pp. 230-3; and Bernard Thomas, Les provocations policières: Quand la politique devient un roman (Paris: Fayard, 1972), pp. 55-70. However, Jean-Paul Brunet has recently argued that the police were probably not involved in fomenting or facilitating Vaillant’s attack, since the bomb design was too unstable to give any assurance that the intended targets would be hit and since carrying out the operation would have required the cooperation of 10-15 officials, including the Interior Minister, all of whom would have had to been willing to risk their entire careers and then remain silent to preserve their secret. See La police de l’ombre: Indicateurs et provocateurs dans la France contemporaine (Paris: Seuil, 1990), pp. 263-74. Although the first argument may well have some merit, Brunet’s psychological reasoning escapes me. Since the end of the nineteenth century, there have been numerous successful provocations and "false flag" operations carried out by more than ten or fifteen government officials and agents willing to take such risks. There is absolutely no reason to think that similar actions could not have been successful in Vaillant’s time, as indeed they often were.


37. Ibid, p. 42.

38. Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 27-30, 32-4. Here, I think the judges may be reading too much into Bertoli’s failure to attack the two high-ranking officials.
39. Ibid, p. 38; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, pp. 43-4.

40. Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 43.

41. Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 44 ("unknown persons...pulled the strings"); Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, p. 1 ("...linked to a vast and obscure criminal design").

42. Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, p. 20; Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 38.

43. Sentenza 15 III 80 contro Del Grande, pp. 48-9. Although he would have also been motivated to lie if he had been involved in the massacre, the most probable explanations for Bertolo's provision of false testimony in this context are that he did not want to be charged with helping a wanted criminal elude the police, and wished to avoid being implicated in a terrorist attack which he had taken no part in.

44. In this connection, it is interesting to note that many apparently bona fide anarchist organizations continue to maintain that Bertoli was a genuine anarchist and that those who have labelled him as a rightist provocateur are participating in a "squalid maneuver", specifically a campaign of disinformation and defamation, sponsored by the bourgeois power structure. See, for example, Centro di Iniziativa Luca Rossi, ed., Gladio, stragi, riforme istituzionali (Milan: Cento Fiori, 1991), p. 46. Curiously, among the organizations later found defending Bertoli was the Circolo Anarchico Ponte della Ghisolfa in Milan, one of the groups which Bertoli's actions implicated, and seemingly were designed to implicate. Although further efforts should be made to definitively determine Bertoli's true allegiances and sponsors, as these younger generations of anarchists have demanded, it is hardly logical in this context to suggest that persons connected to the Italian state would have had any rational motive to label a genuine anarchist as a rightist provocateur with links to the secret services. This approach would only have been politically useful if Bertoli was a genuine anarchist who was very influential in anarchist circles, in which case the goal would have been to "snitch-jacket" him, that is, to smear his reputation and discredit his image among his comrades. There was clearly no reason to do this in Bertoli's case. On the contrary, in this instance government functionaries would have had every reason to claim that a state-sponsored provocateur was really a left-wing extremist, as in fact they regularly attempted to do throughout the period when Bertoli perpetrated his massacre.

45. Sentenza 15 III 80 contro Del Grande, pp. 49-50; Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 17-18.

46. Sentenza 1 III 75 contro Bertoli, pp. 18, 41-2.

47. Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 32.
48. Ibid, p. 33. Presumably, the calls in question were those Bertoli made from his hotel room following his arrival or just prior to his departure, since otherwise his calls to Italy could not have been monitored unless he was being continually shadowed by the French police.


52. For the GUD, see ibid, pp. 87-8; Bergeron and Vilgier, De Le Pen à Le Pen, pp. 79-83; and Duprat, Mouvements d'extrême droite, pp. 180-2, 192-6. Compare Gregory Pons, Les rats noirs (Paris: Simoen, 1977), pp. 7-29, for an insightful depiction of the GUD's general political milieu and the organization's role at Assas.


54. Compare, for example, the April 1970 Charte Politique d'Ordre Nouveau, cited by Duprat, Mouvements d'extrême droite, p. 276; and "Pour en finir avec les theories stupides", Pour un Ordre Nouveau 1 (July-August 1971), cited by Pons, Rats noirs, pp. 222-5.

55. The anti-capitalist, pan-European thrust of the MJR was particularly evident, and indeed the organization seems to have been ideologically influenced by Jean Thiriart's Belgium-based Jeune Europe movement. See especially Bergeron and Vilgier, De Le Pen à Le Pen, pp. 98-101, who cite such MJR goals as the search for a "third way...neither of the right nor the left...neither capitalist nor Marxist" along with MJR slogans like "no to demo-plutocracy, no to Marxist dictatorship" and the promotion of a "solidarist revolution for a communitarian society". Yet with the passage of time the MJR and its "solidarist" successors sometimes adopted, at least for tactical reasons, certain themes

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characteristic of the classical right, such as opposition to abortion and immigration. Ordre Nouveau, though less left-leaning than the MJR, nevertheless made bitter attacks on capitalism as well as communism. See, for example, the material compiled from various Ordre Nouveau publications in the volumes *Ordre nouveau* (Paris: Pour un Ordre Nouveau, 1972) and *Ordre nouveau* (Paris: Pour un Ordre Nouveau, 1973). However, both movements associated their revolutionary values with the defense of Western civilization previously waged by the OAS, which opened the way for their de facto collaboration with explicitly pro-Atlantic elements.

56. For the MJR’s participation in Holeindre’s organization, along with over thirty other groups (including Occident and the Association des Combattants de l’Union Française), see Algazy, *Extême droite en France*, p. 55; Bergeron and Vilgier, *De Le Pen à Le Pen*, p. 76; and Duprat, *Mouvements d’extrême droite*, p. 153. Ordre Nouveau’s support of an American victory in Southeast Asia is revealed by some of its slogans, including "Vietnam and Cambodia, victory for the West" and "To Hanoi with the [U.S.] Rangers, liberate Vietnam". Compare also the "Special Vietnam" supplement published along with *Pour un Ordre Nouveau* 11 (May 1972), in which the government of South Vietnam and its American allies were described as "ramparts of the West" and urged on to final victory against the communist aggressors. See Algazy, *Extême droite en France*, pp. 103-4, 109. However, Duprat emphasized (*Mouvements d’extrême droite*, p. 152) that it was the cause of South Vietnam, more than that of the U.S., which was popular in French right-wing circles. This is not surprising, especially given the neo-fascist conception of Europe as a "third force" in opposition to "stateless [that is, anti-national] capital" and American as well as communist imperialism.

57. For the extreme right as a privileged and especially fruitful source of recruitment for the French security services, see Serge Ferrand and Gilbert Lecavelier, *Aux ordres du S.A.C.* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982), pp. 75-6, wherein the intense rivalry between the various services for rightist recruits is emphasized. Compare "Patrice Chairoff" (pseudonym for Ivan-Dominique Calzi), *Dossier B...comme barbouzes* (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1975), p. 45, who specifically notes that extreme right groups were used by SAC and the Ministry of the Interior to detonate "a confrontation between extremists of both sides", which thence provided a pretext for, and was soon followed by, a wave of anti-revolutionary repression. This was directed primarily against the left, but was also used to smash the revolutionary right when the latter became too independent or its services were no longer needed. Chairoff also correctly points out that such "infiltration/repression" methods had become the "classical system" for state crackdowns in France, and their analogies with the "strategy of tension" and the use of the "opposing extremisms" theory by Italian authorities is certainly no coincidence.

58. See Laurent, *Orchestre noir*, p. 131. As noted in Chapter Two, Aginter Presse was a Lisbon-based center for countersubversive warfare which had been set up in 1966 by Yves Guillou and other OAS veterans who had taken refuge in the Iberian peninsula. In exchange for funding, logistical support, and "cover" provided by the Portuguese secret police, the agency carried out a number of "plausibly deniable" terrorist and provocation
operations at the behest of various Western secret services, most of which were aimed at suppressing independence movements in Africa or neutralizing far left groups in Europe.


60. "Chairoff", Dossier B...comme barbouzes, p. 162.

61. Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 370. He cites a 10 January 1968 SDECE report on the activities of Depret and his associates which was sent to PIDE (the Portuguese secret police), wherein SDECE claimed, in an effort to discourage PIDE contacts with Occident, that the movement was "filled [truffé] with police informants and provocateurs". For Depret's own account of his exploits in Africa, see "Jacques Debreton" (pseudonym for Depret), Coup d'état à Brazzaville (Brussels: Espace, 1976), the preface of which was co-authored by Jean-Marie Laurent, a key Aginter Presse operative. Several years later, Depret authored another book in his own name, Aujourd'hui la guerre: Le dossier de la Troisième Guerre Mondiale (Monaco: Rocher, 1982), whose preface was written this time by retired General Robert Close, a hardline Belgian military officer and top-ranking NATO official with close links to the extremist World Anti-Communist League (WACL).

62. Laurent, Orchestre noir, p. 370, citing the May 1977 issue of the Parti des Forces Nouvelles' publication, Initiative Nationale, a far right source.

63. For these details, see Ferrand and Lecavelier, Aux ordres du S.A.C., pp. 76-9.

64. Ibid, pp. 79-85. Amongst the men recruited by Lecavelier for the defense of the Palais was a group of fifty Hungarians led by a certain Rigoni, former head of the Hungarian 2nd (Military Intelligence) Bureau and an adjutant to General Paul Vanuxem in the World Anti-Communist League. Vanuxem, who was purportedly a former OAS leader codenamed "Verdun", had earlier been placed on trial for various subversive activities. See Le procès Vanuxem (Paris: Saint-Just, 1963), for details. The CRS were the heavily-armed and highly mobile riot units of the French national police, and were thus equivalent to the Celere units of the Pubblica Sicurezza corps, the Italian national police.

65. Quoted by Pons, Rats noirs, pp. 226-7. SAC and RG links to the GIN were also reported in the 25 May 1974 edition of Libération, whose office had just been sacked by a GIN commando group. Cited by Chairoff, Dossier B...comme barbouzes, pp. 47-9.

66. Pons, Rats noirs, pp. 227-32. Others, instead, became so caught up in their role as "guerrillas" or "dinamiteros" that they became more and more willing to participate in "covered" state-sponsored political "dirty work".
67. Serge Dumont, Joseph Lorien, and Karl Criton, Le système Le Pen (Anvers: EPO, 1985), p. 110. For more on K4A and the activities of Plevris, see Chapter Two. According to the bulk of the available secondary sources, Plevris was closely linked to both the Kratiki Ypiresia Pliroforion (KYP: State Intelligence Service), the Greek secret service, and General Demetrios Ioannidis, head of the Ethniki Stratiotiki Astinomia (ESA: National Military Police).

68. After consulting Israeli sources—and making a serious but ultimately vain attempt to obtain a response from Israeli officials concerning Bertoli’s sojourn in Israel—Richard A. Webster discovered that the Karmiyah kibbutz, located a couple of miles from the coast to the north of the Gaza strip, had been established in 1950 by French and Tunisian Jews who were members of an extreme left-wing Zionist organization. He therefore suggested that the real reason why the Jemmis and Bertoli stayed at Karmiyah was because French-speakers would logically have been placed there by the Israeli authorities. Personal communication with Webster, 2 October 1992. This innocuous interpretation is certainly plausible, but in order to consider it the most likely explanation a couple of additional questions would have to be answered. First of all, how many Israeli kibbutzim have been established by, and thus serve as magnets for, French-speakers? If the number is very small, perhaps it was only a coincidence that all three of these men resided there. If not, what is the statistical probability that their joint sojourn at Karmiyah was random? Secondly, there is no indication in the sources I have consulted that Bertoli speaks French. His stay in Marseilles may seem suggestive, but there are, after all, many visitors to foreign countries who manage to get around and conduct affairs without knowing the language of their hosts. Moreover, the original left-wing orientation of Karmiyah only adds to the possible confusion about Bertoli’s political orientation. Was he sent to this particular kibbutz by genuine leftists or by rightist elements who wanted to strengthen his leftist "legend"? There is no way to know, given the current state of the documentation.

69. Sentenza 30 VII 76 contro Bertoli, p. 32.

70. Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, pp. 344-7.


73. Ibid, p. 352.

74. Quoted in ibid, pp. 352-3.

75. Quoted from Tamburino sentence by Flamini, Partito del golpe, volume 3:2, p. 354.

76. See, for example, Nicotri and Sisti, "Enigma Bertoli", p. 12; Giovanni Maria Bellu and Giuseppe D’Avanzo, I giorni di Gladio: Come morì la Prima Repubblica (Milan:
Sperling & Kupfer, 1991), pp. 153, 243. These same sources reveal that Bertoli was not the only "homonym" found among the names in the files and lists of gladiators. Among the others were Enzo Maria Dantini, former leader of the "Nazi-Maoist" Organizzazione Lotta di Popolo, neo-fascist activist Gianni Nardi, and Marco Morin, the ballistics expert from Venice who was accused of helping to lay a false trail during the judicial investigation of the Peteano bombing and was later assigned to analyze the weaponry used in the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination case.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION—THE DARKER RECESES OF THE COLD WAR

The campaign of right-wing terrorism and subversion that falls under the rubric of the "strategy of tension" continued, in one form or another, up through the early 1980s. However, it took novel and distinctive forms in the period after 1976. As the above-cited testimony of neo-fascist pentiti like Paolo Aleandri and Sergio Calore suggests, during the late 1970s a number of new clandestine neo-fascist groups emerged which adopted a more decentralized organizational structure and advocated an operational approach based upon "armed spontaneism". In part this represented an attempt to create new organizational forms which would be less subject to monitoring and penetration, but in part it also reflected the realization by some older neo-fascist leaders that a new radicalism and revolutionary spirit was infecting the younger generation of neo-fascist militants, many of whom admired the apparent efficiency of the Brigate Rosse and had been influenced more generally by the critiques of bourgeois society and the fashions and modes of cultural expression associated with the extraparliamentary left. However, although these young ultras may have believed that they were in this way avoiding the errors of the older generation, which, as was becoming increasingly apparent, had been systematically compromised and manipulated by the security services, what they failed to realize was the extent to which the second generation organizations, such as Terza Posizione and Costruiamo l'Azione, were also controlled by elements collaborating with those services. When this later became clearer, and the radicals made an effort to break away from their controllers and carry out independent actions against the state, they were

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quickly suppressed by the security forces. Only those activists who were wittingly or
unwittingly carrying out provocations for the benefit of the state, such as those affiliated
with the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR), were allowed to conduct their activities
undisturbed. Among the key figures in the latter organization was Giuseppe Valerio
("Giusva") Fioravante, who together with his girlfriend Francesca Mambro was later
formally charged with carrying out the 1980 bombing of the Bologna train station.²

These remarks are not intended as the prologue to a detailed discussion of the
later phases of the "strategy of tension", but rather to suggest why the 1973-1974 period
constitutes a watershed beyond which this particular study should not proceed. By the end
of 1974, the "classical" phase of that strategy had exhausted itself, in part because Giulio
Andreotti had helped, for entirely instrumental motives, to rip asunder strands of the web
of quasi-official protection that had until then been extended to cover terrorists associated
with historic neo-fascist groups such as Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale. A
new historical phase in the development of right-wing terrorism in Italy then began.
There was a two-year transitional phase during which leaders of the two organizations,
often from sanctuaries abroad, sought to forge a joint operational alliance. With the
collapse of those initiatives, the new "spontaneous" organizations mentioned above began
to emerge. In short, right-wing violence in the period between 1975 and 1980 deserves
to be the subject of another study altogether.

At this juncture the chief desideratum is to make some general observations, by
way of conclusion, about the wider significance of the "strategy of tension". A number
of issues are involved here which need to be addressed briefly. The first is whether what
occurred in Italy was reflective primarily of Italian traditions and conditions, or whether it constituted merely one example of a far broader political pattern in the postwar era. The second has to do with the motives of the parties involved in this terrorist strategy. What induced radical neo-fascists, who professed a revolutionary ideology which was virulently anti-capitalist and anti-American, to make common cause with the conservative guardians of Atlanticism, both in Europe and across the Atlantic? And what induced elements of ostensibly democratic and humanitarian regimes, like those in Western Europe and the United States, to collude with political extremists who professed a worldview which millions of people from their own countries had died opposing in the first half of the 1940s? In short, what does this operational alliance reveal about the larger political context, and the methods by which the various groups involved pursued their own interests? Finally, what methodological relevance does this study have for future political and historical research?

There are a number of ways to interpret the terrorist and anti-constitutional activities recounted in the chapters above. One can, of course, ascribe them primarily to domestic factors, as many have sought to do. There are in fact some good reasons for taking this approach. A long historical tradition of political disunity and foreign domination seems to have prompted significant numbers of Italians to have recourse to deception, manipulation, and conspiratorial politics, which in turn may have lent the praxis of furbizia—the skillful manuevering of others, largely through trickery, for one's own advantage—a degree of cultural importance it might not otherwise have had. Moreover, the failure of Italian statesmen to develop a powerful, efficient, and
centralized state capable of resolving basic social problems and thereby inspiring a broader civic loyalty which transcended traditional familial and regional loyalties, both in the wake of the political unification of the peninsula and after the fall of Fascism, allowed these ingrained traits which had earlier facilitated survival and compensated for political weakness to flourish and become institutionalized in the form of clientelistic patronage networks and party factions. Hence there are indigenous historical and structural reasons for the development and extension of the so-called sottogoverno, the great influence of the poteri occulti, and the salience of conspiratorial and clandestine politics in postwar Italy. On the surface, at least, it would appear that this sort of political activity reached a scale and intensity there that was unusual, if not unique.

There are, however, two objections that can be made to this thesis, despite its general plausibility and at least partial validity. For one thing, it is debatable whether this sort of behind-the-scenes maneuvering and plotting was more common in Italy than elsewhere. An argument can be made that such activity constitutes politics-as-usual almost everywhere. Certainly, the list of scandals that have afflicted other influential countries in the postwar era is scarcely less noteworthy. It may also be that one hears more about conspiratorial politics in Italy simply because Italians tend to interpret politics in that way due to the historical factors identified above. Given that background, it would be natural—albeit somewhat paradoxical—for there to be a greater amount of open and public discussion about such secret machinations. But there were certain other features which also seem to have made the Italian case unique. For example, a higher proportion of these activities in Italy involved the use of political violence, as opposed to being
limited to economic corruption and the illicit behavior typically associated with political elites. Moreover, the scandals in Italy were frequently related to one another in a convoluted but nonetheless organic fashion, which again may reflect the peculiarities of the Italian context, particularly its high degree of political polarization.⁵

Even so, without minimizing the undeniable importance of these domestic influences, national factors alone cannot account for the omnipresence of subversion and terrorism in postwar Italy. The strategic position of the Italian peninsula, which dominates the central Mediterranean basin, the existence of the largest communist party in western Europe, and the apparent political instability of the government have inevitably prompted powerful international forces to intervene regularly in Italian domestic politics. It has already been noted that this type of intervention began on a massive scale even before the elections of 1948, and it has since continued in different forms on numerous other occasions, especially in periods of acute international crisis and bipolar hostility. The importance of such interventions, many of which have been carried out covertly in order to ensure "plausible deniability", should therefore not be underestimated or overlooked. This is all the more true given the fact that indications of the involvement of one or more secret services in Italian terrorism, particularly right-wing terrorism, have repeatedly surfaced. It can in fact be argued that a good deal of the serious "neo-fascist" violence that afflicted the Italian people for over a decade can be laid at the doorstep, whether directly or indirectly, of factions within those services which were most closely affiliated with the security apparatus of the Atlantic Alliance. Such an interpretation receives additional corroboration when an explicitly comparative
perspective is adopted. After all, a similar pattern of intervention has occurred in many other countries which have, often despite themselves, found themselves on the "front line" in the secret wars waged by the superpowers and their client states.

Perhaps the best example, in this context, is provided by the network of paramilitary "stay/behind" networks which were created throughout Europe by the United States and its allies within the security forces of various nations during the height of the Cold War. Such networks were briefly alluded to above in connection with acts of subversion and terrorism in Italy, but only a more holistic view is capable of illuminating the role they sometimes played in acts of political violence or other sorts of anti-constitutional activities. The purpose here is not to reconstruct the history of these networks, either in Italy or elsewhere, but rather to provide a few illustrative examples of the activities they have been involved in which to one degree or another exemplify the issues under consideration here. These networks were originally formed in order to serve as behind-the-lines resistance organizations in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe. Although some observers have since claimed that their real purpose all along was to control the domestic left-wing opposition, that view is a short-sighted one reflecting either blatant political partisanship or an overly cynical post facto interpretation which fails to take account of the historical context at the time when those networks were created. The truth is that during the late 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, leading elements of the security establishments of the United States and most western European countries were genuinely and justifiably concerned about hostile Soviet intentions. Some believed that outright war with the Soviets was imminent, and therefore felt it necessary
to prepare actively for such a war without further delay. Although in retrospect such an assessment can be recognized as having been overly pessimistic if not alarmist, this was by no means apparent in 1948 and 1949, when truculent Soviet behavior made it seem all too plausible.

On the other hand, recent critics are quite right to point out that, whatever their original purpose, these networks did later become involved in internal security functions. Before providing some examples of this, however, it would be wise to note another important characteristic of these organizations. In every country the personnel recruited into these groups were drawn, as one might expect, from ultraconservative and right-wing forces. Sometimes these stemmed from conservative anti-Nazi groups, as in Holland, but in several countries they were drawn from ex-fascist or neo-fascist formations. In West Germany, for example, the stay/behind network was made up primarily of activists from the postwar Bund Deutscher Jugend (BDJ), almost all of whom were unreconstructed Nazis. In Sweden, the original cadres for the network were recruited from the ranks of the wartime Sveaborg organization, a pro-Nazi collaborationist group. Elsewhere they tended to include members of both categories, former anti-fascists and former fascists who had decided to bury their past differences in the interests of the anti-communist cause. Given the personnel involved, their periodic involvement in anti-constitutional actions should not be a cause for surprise.

There are three noteworthy examples of the involvement of personnel from the stay/behind networks in internal repression which may well have a bearing on the situation in Italy. In Greece the stay/behind organization, known by the codename "Red
Sheepskin", consisted of specially-trained commandos from the Units of Mountain Raiders (LOK), which had been placed under the operational control of the Kratiki Ypiresia Pliroforion (KYP: State Intelligence Service). A good deal has been said about the KYP's subversive and anti-democratic activities above, but the important point to note here is that the LOK and its commander not only participated in the 21 April 1967 right-wing military coup, but also in the brutal 16-17 November 1973 repression of protesting students at the Polytechnic University in Athens, apparently in accordance with the prearranged "Keravnos (Thunderbolt) Plan". Perhaps even more revealing was the systematic involvement of the Turkish stay/behind group, the Kontr-Gerilla (KG: Counter-Guerrilla) organization, which was attached to the Özel Harp Dairesi (ÖHD: Special Warfare Department) of the Armed Forces General Staff, in terrorist and pro-coup actions. The KG, whose civilian personnel were recruited from the ranks of neo-fascists affiliated with the Milliyetçilik Hareket Partisi (MHP: Nationalist Action Party), specialized in carrying out terrorist provocations designed to provide a pretext for a military intervention, as well as other sorts of covert operations in conjunction with the Army and the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT: National Intelligence Agency). A final example of this type is provided by the Belgian stay/behind network, the 8th Section of the Service de Renseignements et d'Action (SdRA-8), which was under the control of the military intelligence service, the Service Général de Renseignement (SGR). Elements of this complex network were later implicated in actions designed to promote a miniature "strategy of tension" in Belgium during the early 1980s, as well as in earlier covert anti-communist operations, including the 18 August 1950 assassination of Parti Communiste...
de Belgique leader Julien Lahaut.¹⁰

What these examples suggest is that the Americans and their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies set up organizations that, whatever their original purpose, later engaged directly and to some extent systematically in anti-constitutional "countersubversive" operations. The rank-and-file of these organizations consisted largely of civilian right-wing extremists with openly anti-democratic sentiments. Viewed from this perspective, especially in light of the documented Allied recruitment of Nazi unconventional warfare specialists after World War II and the undeniable existence of many other parallel networks set up by the Americans to fight communism in postwar Europe, it is hard to view the events associated with the "strategy of tension" as a strictly Italian phenomenon. Furthermore, when account is taken of United States covert operations in Latin America and other parts of the Third World, which very often involved the creation of paramilitary apparatuses that subsequently carried out brutal campaigns designed to terrorize the general population—which constituted the "water" within which the "fish" (guerrillas) swam—there can scarcely be any doubt that similar operations might have been secretly set in motion in Europe if the situation appeared threatening enough.

A number of qualifications need to be made, however. First of all, it may be that elements of these networks operated autonomously or independently in certain instances. To put it another way, it is not always clear that they were following orders, either those issued by their nominal superiors within their own nation's command structure or those issued indirectly by their ultimate international referents. They may have been pursuing
their own anti-democratic agendas under the "cover" provided by these official but clandestine security organizations. Secondly, even if they were instructed to take action by officials linked to NATO or the Atlantic Alliance, this may only mean that personnel associated with hardline factions within certain security bureaucracies were interested in pursuing such actions, perhaps even unbeknownst to or against the express wishes of other factions within their own agencies or home governments. Thirdly, it is clear that such drastic measures were only adopted in circumstances that were perceived as particularly threatening. In marked contrast to their behavior in many Third World countries, the governments of the United States and its NATO allies did not wish to set up authoritarian right-wing regimes in place of formal parliamentary democracies on the European continent. Indeed, they often preferred to support moderate social democratic parties, especially in the early postwar period, since they felt that such political forces were better able to neutralize the appeal of the communists, who had emerged from World War II with greatly increased prestige. Finally, as noted above, such extreme measures were restricted to strategically important countries that were considered especially unstable, untrustworthy, or vulnerable. There is no evidence, for example, that the stay/behind networks established in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden engaged in political subversion of any type. The political situation in those nations simply did not warrant it. Italy, unfortunately, was not blessed with the same degree of stability. In any event, it should be obvious that ignoring the international context within which the "strategy of tension" was carried out would be a serious oversight.

A second major problem that requires some explanation is the reason why radical
neo-fascists, conservative intelligence officers, and ostensibly democratic statesmen made common cause. This was only possible due to the presence of certain cross-cutting issues that they all could agree upon. The most important of these was undoubtedly anti-communism, which provided the glue that held this disparate coalition together in the face of profoundly different and often antithetical values and political goals. There were a number of reasons why certain groups of neo-fascists participated in these operations, which in the end strengthened the very same "reactionary" and "bourgeois" forces they professed to detest. In the Italian context, one reason was that the ideas of Julius Evola, the esoteric traditionalist who exerted a major influence on the thinking of postwar neo-fascist ultras, provided a justification for doing whatever it took to oppose communism. Although Evola believed that the values embodied by the United States represented a greater long-term threat to European civilization, he recognized that the communists represented the chief danger in the short run, for if they were able to seize power the very survival of eternal European values would be placed in jeopardy. Hence the communists had to be dealt with first.

Moreover, as right-wing terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra has made clear, Evola had so emptied fascist ideas of their genuinely revolutionary content that this had the effect of encouraging "neo-fascists" who did not even understand the essence of fascism to believe that elements of the Italian military and police were their chief allies. In his view, the naive ultras who promoted an alliance between neo-fascist "soldiers without uniforms" and "militants in the service" had utterly failed to understand the Army's shameful betrayal of the fascist regime and its subsequent collaboration with elements of
Unfortunately, this disastrous misconception was further reinforced by the dramatic rebellion of the seditious French Army officers, whose exploits fired right-wing civilians throughout Europe with enthusiasm and thus came to constitute a model for the latters' own actions. The subsequent direct interaction between neo-fascists and these guerre révolutionnaire specialists only compounded this tendency, and it was in part this identification which led radical fascists to mistake backwards-looking dictatorships like that of the Greek Colonels for genuine revolutionary regimes, with all the practical consequences that this entailed.

Finally, there were a number of practical and emotional benefits that neo-fascists could obtain by collaborating with factions within the armed forces and the security services. These included all the forms of tangible "assistance" discussed at length above, including the provision of technical aid, logistical support, "cover", and other sorts of protection which enabled these ultras to carry out acts of violence and terrorism with impunity—at least until such time as their services were no longer needed. Another important benefit, at least from the psychological point of view, was the thrill of engaging in clandestine and covert operations under the direction of real professionals, which is just the sort of thing that can easily appeal to youthful political activists searching for both meaning and a place in the world. Such intangible emotional factors should not be overlooked in this context. Finally, working for the secret services enabled certain neo-fascist leaders both to enrich themselves and devote their full attention to the far from dull tasks associated with covert action and subversion. In short, they were able to profit tangibly by doing the kinds of exciting "work" they enjoyed most. This was
certainly true of Delle Chiaie.

For the secret services, there were likewise benefits to be had by associating with right-wing extremists. The most important of these was the ability to contract out especially compromising jobs to seemingly autonomous forces, thereby covering up their own behind-the-scenes involvement in them. Maintaining this sort of "plausible deniability" was absolutely essential, for otherwise the entire purpose for conducting covert operations would have been defeated. After all, if governments were not anxious to conceal their involvement in delicate anti-democratic and anti-constitutional activities, they could simply carry them out directly and then openly claim responsibility for them. This is why the utilization and manipulation of intermediaries was so crucial to the ultimate success and effectiveness of such operations. At the opportune moment, of course, such intermediaries could be and often were "burned", either by being physically eliminated or publicly compromised in some way. For both parties, then, there were generally finite limits to the utility and durability of these sorts of arrangements, but it was the secret services that invariably had the upper hand. They had the resources, expertise, and institutional power to be able to discard their agents when these became more of a liability than an asset. The ultras were thus invariably the junior partners in these temporary working relationships, partners whose positions were only assured as long as they served the interests of the services.

Indeed, the neo-fascists who colluded with the Italian security forces were systematically manipulated from the very beginning. They were encouraged to carry out a series of violent actions whose ultimate effects, far from laying the groundwork for a
coup d'etat and a revolutionary transformation of society, served only to strengthen the U.S.-dominated Atlantic Alliance and the corrupt partitocrazia in Italy which they themselves had hoped to overthrow. What the international and national sponsors of the "strategy of tension" were actually conducting was a complex strategy designed to keep the communists from entering the corridors of power on a national level and, in the process, assure Italy's continued fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance. As noted above, these sponsors were themselves divided into two main factional groupings, those who sought to preserve the current political structure from which they derived tangible benefits, and those who sought to replace that dysfunctional system with a "presidentialist" arrangement that would strengthen the executive branch at the expense of Parliament. To accomplish these tasks, however, these rival factions both employed the tactics of destabilization by making instrumental use of right-wing radicals. What they were really engaged in all along was "destabilizing in order to stabilize", as Vinciguerra and many other knowledgeable insiders and observers have emphasized. In that sense, the participating neo-fascists were also political victims, at least to the extent that one can refer to those who intentionally place bombs in public places as "victims". In the end, with some noteworthy exceptions, they did not benefit any more from the "strategy of tension" than their counterparts on the extraparliamentary left. The beneficiaries were almost invariably their sub rosa sponsors.

Alas, this pattern of manipulation dated back to the nineteenth century, if not much earlier. According to former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Paul W. Blackstock, "the myopia and political
fanaticism of extremist groups makes them especially vulnerable to manipulation in political warfare operations".\(^{12}\) This is all the more true when the extremists in question glorify authority and idealize state power, as is typical of both fascists and Marxist-Leninists. A rather more cynical version of the same idea was expressed in 1870 by a French police inspector, who noted that "[i]n a group of ten secret society members there are always three stool pigeons working for the police (mouchards), six well-meaning imbeciles, and one dangerous man".\(^{13}\) If one extends the point about mouchards to include agents provocateurs as well as simple informants, this statement appears to have a good deal of validity. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has rarely been the subject of systematic historical study, despite its great potential importance in the development of social and political movements, rightist and leftist. In the Italian context, Philip Willan has made an important distinction between the type of secret service manipulation to which neo-fascist and far left terrorists were subjected. He argues that neo-fascists, due to their generally favorable view of state authority, were manipulated in the fashion of a glove puppet, whereas left-wing ultras, given their hostility to the existing state, were manipulated in the fashion of a marionette which was held secretly by an unknown party.\(^{14}\) There is much truth to this, particularly if one restricts it to the "historic" neo-fascist groups like Ordine Nuovo and Avanguardia Nazionale. However, in the later, "spontaneous" phase of neo-fascist terrorism, state manipulation of the revolutionary right often assumed a form more similar to that employed against the revolutionary left.

In any event, in order to understand the wave of neo-fascist terrorism which Italy was subjected to between 1968 and 1980, one needs to go beyond the conventional
approaches to the phenomenon. Given the often tendentious nature of the sources and the overall complexity of conspiratorial politics, it would be rash to assume that every single detail in the above historical reconstruction will end up being corroborated if and when additional sources of information become available. But the overall pattern seems unmistakable. The unpalatable truth is that elements within various Western security and intelligence services have all too often played a considerable covert role in the sponsorship and political manipulation of terrorism in postwar Europe. The same may well prove to be true of some of their erstwhile East Bloc counterparts. It would seem, then, that far more attention needs to be paid to the activities of these and other powerful, behind-the-scenes forces. To ignore the clandestine and covert dimensions of recent political violence is to miss a good deal of the picture.
NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

1. For the radicalization of the neo-fascist milieu, the split between the older and younger generations, and the later phases of right-wing terrorism, see Franco Ferraresi, "La destra eversiva", in La destra radicale, ed. by idem (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1984), pp. 74-96; Vittorio Borracetti, "Introduzione", in Eversione di destra, terrorismo, stragi: I fatti e l'intervento giudiziario, ed. by idem (Milan: Angeli, 1986), pp. 21-4; Giancarlo Capaldi et al, "L'eversione di destra a Roma dal 1977 al 1983: Spunti per una ricostruzione del fenomeno", in ibid, pp. 198-244. For the cultural and intellectual background of this dramatic shift, see Marco Revelli, "La nuova destra", in Destra radicale, especially pp. 119-37; Monica Zucchinali, A destra in Italia oggi: Destra missina, moderata o reaganiana, destra radicale e nuova destra (Milan: Sugar, 1986), pp. 113-97; and Enzo Raisi, Storia ed idee della nuova destra italiana (Rome: Settimo Segillo, 1990), passim.


3. On the Italian context within which these traits flourished and an excellent evaluation of the poteri occulti, see Angelo Ventura, "I poteri occulti nella Repubblica italiana: Il problema storico", in I "poteri occulti" nella Repubblica: Mafia, camorra, P2, stragi impunite, ed. by Comune di Venezia, Ufficio Affari Istituzionale (Venice: Marsilio, 1984), pp. 17-52. In my opinion, Ventura is one of the shrewdest analysts of recent Italian politics, particularly those with a clandestine dimension.


5. For more on Italian scandals, see the excellent article by Judith Chubb and Maurizio Vannicelli, "Italy: A Web of Scandals", in The Politics of Scandal: Power and Process in Liberal Democracies, ed. by Andrei S. Markovits and Mark Silverstein (New York
and London: Holmes and Meier, 1988), pp. 122-50. This entire volume is a very useful anthology of articles on recent scandals in various countries, although the editors’ thesis that "scandals" can only occur in liberal democratic regimes is debatable.


8. For the Greek stay/behind group, see Müller, *Gladio*, pp. 54-5. For the LOK's involvement in the coup plot and the attack on the Polytechnic, see C.M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), pp. 21, 135.

9. For the identification of the KG organization as the stay/behind group in Turkey, see Müller, *Gladio*, pp. 56-7. For more on the KG and its activities, see Süleyman Genç, *Bıçakın Sirtindaki Türkiye: CIA/MIT/Kontr-Gerilla* (Istanbul: Der, 1978); Emin Değer, *CIA, Kontr-Gerilla ve Türkiye* (Ankara: Çağlar, 1977); and *Kontr-Gerilla ve MHP: CIA’nin Türkiye’deki Kontrgerilla Teorisi ve Uygulaması* (Istanbul: Aydınlık, 1978). As the titles above indicate, it is generally believed that there were close links between the KG and the CIA. The above sources are, however, products of the far left.

1987). For the violent and subversive activities afflicting Belgium from the 1960s to the
1980s, see René Haquin, Des taupes dans l’extrême droite: La Sûreté de l’État et le
WNP (Anvers: EPO, no date); Walter De Bock et al, L’Extrême droite et l’État
(Berchem: EPO, no date); Hugo Gijsels, L’Enquête: 20 années de désstabilisation en
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l’État: Histoire d’une désstabilisation (Ottignies: Quorum, 1993). This is an immensely
complex matter which I hope to study in the future.

11. Vinciguerra, Ergastolo per la libertà: Verso la verità sulla strategia della tensione
(Florence: Arnaud, 1989), pp. 3-6.

12. See his fascinating work The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of

13. Quoted in Howard C. Payne, The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, 1851-

14. See Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy (London: Constable,
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