		PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE		
Re	" CAB 120	691	109040	

TOP SECRET OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE P.M./412/48 SUBJECT RUSSIA THREAT TO WESTERN CIVILISATION WE 18790 3872 1,000 7/46 TCP/JR

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Pinal

22nd May, 1945.

MAR CABINET

JOINT PLANTING STAFF

OPERATION "BUTHINKADLE"

Report by the Joint Planning Staff.

We have exemined Operation UNTHINKABLE. As instructed, we have taken the following assumptions on which to base our exemination:-

- (a) The undertaking has the full support of public opinion in both the British Empire and the United States and consequently, the morale of British and American troops continues high.
- (b) Great Britain and the United States have full assistance from the Polish armed forces and can count upon the use of German manpower and what remains of German industrial capacity.
- (e) No credit is taken for assistance from the forces of other Western Powers, although any bases in their territory, or other facilities which may be required, are made available.
- (d) Russia allies herself with Japan.
- (e) The date for the opening of hostilities is lst July, 1945.
- (f) Redsployment and release schemes continue till 1st July and then stop.

Owing to the special need for secrecy, the normal staffs in Service Ministries have not been consulted.

OBJECT

2. The overall or political object is to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire.

Even though "the will" of these two countries may be defined as no more than a square deal for Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment. A quick success might induce the Russians to submit to our will at least for the time being; but it might not. That is for the Russians to decide. If they want total war, they are in a position to have it.

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

3. The only way in which we can achieve our object w certainty and lasting results is by victory in a total w but in view of what we have said in paragraph 2 above, a the possibility of quick success, we have thought it rig to consider the problem on two hypotheses;

- (c) That a total war is necessary, and on this hypothesis we have exemined our chances of success.
- (b) That the political appreciation is that a quick success would suffice to gain our political object and that the continuing commitment need not concern us.

TOTAL WAR

4. Apart from the chances of revolution in the U.S.S.R and the political collapse of the present regime - on which we are not competent to express an opinion - the climination Russia could only be achieved as a result of:

- (a) The occupation of such areas of metropolitan Russia that the war making espacity of the country would be reduced to a point at which further resistance became impossible.
- (b) Such a decisive defeat of the Russian forces in the field as to render it impossible for the U.S.S.R. to continue the war.

Occupation of Vital Areas of Russia

- Russians succeeded in withdrawing without suffering a decisive defeat. They would then presumably adopt the tactics which they employed so successfully against the Gormans and in previous wars of making use of the immense distances with which their territory provides them. In 1911 the Gormans reached the Moscow area, the Volga and the Caucasus, but the technique of factory evacuation, combined with the development of new resources and Allied assistance, enabled the U.S.S.R. to continue fighting.
- 6. There is virtually no limit to the distance to which it would be necessary for the Allies to penetrate into Russia in order to render further resistance impossible. It is hardly conceivable that the Allies could penetrate even as far as, or as quickly as, the Germans in 1942 and this penetration produced no decisive result.

Docisive Defent of the Russians Forces

7. Details of the present strongths and dispositions of the Russian and Allied forces are given in Ammeres II and III and illustrated on Maps A and B. The existing balance of strength in Central Europe, where the Russians enjoy a superiority of approximately three to one, makes it most unlikely that the Allies could achieve a complete and decisive victory in that area in present circumstances. Although Allied organisation is better, equipment slightly better and morale higher, the Russians have proved themselves formidable opponents of the Germans. They have competent commanders, adequate equipment and an organisation which,

though possibly inferior by our standards, has stood the test. On the other hand, only about one third of their divisions are of a high standard, the others being considerably inferior and with overall mobility well below that of the allies.

8. To nohieve the decisive defent of Russia in a total war would require, in particular, the mobilisation of man-power to counteract their present enormous manpower resources. This is a very long term project and would involve:

- (a) The deployment in Europe of a large propertion, of the west resources of the United States.
- (b) The re-equipment and re-organisation of German manpowers and of all the Western European Allies.

Conclusions

- 9. We conclude that .-
 - (a) If our political object is to be achieved with certainty and with lasting results, the defeat of Russia in a total war will be necessary.
 - (b) The result of a total war with Russia is not possible to forecast, but the one thing cortain is that to win it would take us a very Your time.

QUICK SUCCESS

10. It might, however, be considered, as the result of a political appropriation, that a quick and limited military success would result in Russia accepting our terms.

11. Before a decision to open hostilities were made, full account would have to be taken of the following:-

- (n) If this appreciation is group and the attainment of whatever limited objective we may set oursolves does not cause Russia to submit to our torms, we may, in fact, be committed to a total war.
- (b) It will not be possible to limit hostilities to any particular area. While they are in progress, therefore, we must envisage a world-wide struggle.
- (c) Even if all goes according to plan, we shall not have achieved, from the military point of view, a lasting rosult. The military power of Russia will not be broken and it will be open to her to recommence the conflict at any time she sook fit.
- 12. Assuming, however, that it is decided to risk military action on a limited basis, accepting the dangers set out above, we have examined what action we could take in order to inflict such a blow upon the Russians as sould cause them to accept our terms, even though they would not have been desisively defeated and, from the military point of view, would still be capable of continuing the struggle.

mox IV.

General Strate ie Situation

13. Of the Russian armed forces opposing us, the Red Army is for the most formidable part. There will be no threat from Russian strategic bombers or submarines comparable to the German threat against our baces and shipping. It is, therefore, the strongth and dispositions of the Red Army to which we must give principal attention.

III. Europe. The main strength of the Red Army is concentrated in Central Europe. Although the Russians might occupy Nerway as far south as Trendheim, and Greece, this would not materially affect the overall strategic situation. They might well overrun Turkey in Europe, and profiting by their present predominant position in South East Europe, close the Straits and provent any nevel action we might wish to take in the Black Sea. This would not of itself produce any additional danger to us, but South East Europe, including Greece, would immediately become barred to our influence and commerce.

15. Middle East. 'In Persia and Iraq an extremely dengerous situation would arise. It appears almost certain that Russia would take the offensive in this area in view of the valuable oil resources to be gained and the extreme importance of those areas to us. It is estimated that there are some cloven Russian divisions available against an Allied force of three Indian brigade groups. It is, therefore, difficult to see how we could defend this area and the loss of this source of oil supply would be extremely serious.

Logistic difficulties and her committeents in Central Europe make it unlikely that Russia would advance towards - Egypt in the early stages.

Russia would undoubtedly try to stir up trouble in all the Middle East countries.

- 16. Indic. Although Russin would undoubtedly try to stir up trouble in India, it some doubtful whether she would undertake military notion in this area.
- 17. Par East. In the Far East, any Russo-Japanese agreement would allow the Japanese to free forces to reinforce the Home Islands or to resume the offensive in China. They could hardly undertake amphibious operations to recover any of the areas they have lost. Since the main operations against Japan would clearly have to be postponed, the result would probably be stalemate in the Japanese war. Russian offensive action against the Allies in the Far East seems unlikely.
- 18. The rhove considerations and the present locations of the main-forces lead us to conclude that the principal theatre would impritably be Central Europe with subsidiary, but highly important, operations in the Persia-Iraq area.
- 19. We have examined in Armex I a compaign in Europe. The salient points in our examination are summerised below.

Pactors Affecting our Strategy in Bast Europe

20. Our main superiority over the Russians will be in the air and at sea. The latter will emable us to control the Daltie, but this by itself will not be an important factor in bringing about a quick success.

21. In the air our superiority will, to some extent, be offset by the fact that initially our strategic beaber force must be based in England, even if staging posts are used on the Continent. In view of the wasting effort of our air forces and the great distances involved, they cannot be expected to produce the same scale of effort as they did during the war against Germany.

22. Russian industry is so dispersed that it is unlikely to be a profitable air target. On the other hand, the great length of the Russian consumications would appear to offer us for more favourable targets, especially at the important crossings of the water barriers. To achieve any worthwhile results, however, these attacks on communications must be co-ordinated with a land offensive.

Our only means, therefore, of obtaining a guick success is by means of a land compaign, making full use of our air superiority both tastically and in attacks on Russian L. of C.

- 23. Considerations of topography and the general run of communications indicate that the main effort of a land offensive would have to be in the North. This would have the further advantage of embling us to make use of our naval superiority in the Baltic to protect our left flank and to herry the enemy's right flank.
- 24. We, therefore, conclude that the campaign must be fought primarily on land in North Rost Europe.

The Land Compaign in North East Europe (See Map C)

- 25. The Allied forces which can be made available for offensive operations will depend to a great extent upon the numbers which will be tied down by the necessity for restablishing and securing communications in the downstated areas of Germany.
- 26. After allowing for such forces and those necessary to ensure the scennity of the front as far north as Dresden Chemnitz, we estimate that a force of some 47 divisions, including 14 armoured, could be made available for offensive operations.
- 27. Against this we estimate that the Russians would be able to produce a force amounting to the equivalent in Allied formations of 170 divisions, of which 30 would be armoured. We should, therefore, be facing odds of the order of two to one in armour and four to one in infantry.
- 28. It is difficult to assess to what extent our tactical air superiority and the superior handling of our forces will refress the balance, but the above olds would clearly render the launching of an offensive a hazardous undertaking.

If this course is decided upon, however, it might take the form of two main thrusts:-

Northern - on the exis Stattin - Schneidemuhl - Rydgoszez. Southern' - on the exis Lolpsig - Gottbus - Posnan and proslau.

The main armured fighting would probably develop 29. The main armoured righting would probably develop cost of the older - Neisse line and upon its outcome the result of the compains would probably depend. If the result was favourable, we might reach the general line Danzig - Droslau. Any advance beyond this, however, would increase the length of the front to be held during the winter and increase the danger resulting from the salient formed by Dehemin and Muravia, from which the Russians would be under no necessity to withdraw. Unless, therefore, we have won the victory we require west of the line Danzig - Dreslau, it appears likely that we shall, in fact, be committed to a total war.

30. The success of a land compaign, therefore, would depend upon the result of the flighting west of the above line before winter conditions set in. There is no inherent strength in our strategic position and, in fact, we should be staking everything upon one great battle, in which we should be facing very bonvy olds.

OONCLUGIONS

- We conclude that;-31.
 - (a) If we are to embark on war with Russia, we must be prepared to be committed to a total war, which will be both long and costly.
 - (b) Our numerical inferiority in land renders it extremely doubtful whether we could nobleve a limited and quick success, even if the political appreciation considered that this would suffice to gain our political object,

(Signed) G. GRANTHIM G.S. THOMPSON W.L. DAWSON

Offices of the Mar Cobinet, 22ND MAY, 1945.

Attached are:-

- Appreciation of Compaign in Burope Annex II - Russian Strengths and Dispositions Armex III - Allied Strengths and Dispositions Annex IV - German Re-actions

- Russian Strengths and Dispositions Map B - Almod Strongths and Dispositions

Map C - Compaign in North East Europe

Map D - Vulnerable Points on Russian L. of C.

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AMOUNT

APPROPATION OF CHEVIOR IN SUROPE

COMMOT

quick, though limited, success agreement the Russians.

PACTORS APPRICATING ALBERT STRATEGY

Use of Air Power

2. In the cir, our superiority will, to some extent, be effect by the fact that initially our strategic bember force must be based in England, even if staging posts are evailable on the Continent. In view of the was time effort cannot be expected to produce the same scale of effort as they did during the was against Germany.

3. Russian industry is so dispersed that it is unlikely to be a profitable fir target. On the other hand, the great length of the Russian communications would appear to offer us far more favourable targets, especially at the important crossings of the water burriers. To achieve any worthwhile results, however, these attacks must be co-ordinated with a land offensive in order to stretch the Russian supply requirements.

An exemination of vulnerable points on the Russian An exemination of vulnerable points on the Russian L. of C. is attached at Appendix I. These vulnerable points, however, are in the main beyond the range of heavy bombers based in the United Kingdom. If, therefore, these targets are to be attacked, the bomber force must either be deployed to airfields in North West Europe or staging airfields must be used.

5. The elaborate ground organisation of the bomber force would, however, make it impracticable to move it from the United Kingdom to North fest Europe for some months, by which time the opportunity to inclict a quick and decisive blow might well have passed.

The use of staging cirrields, whilst reducing the weight of the attack, might make it possible to develop strong attacks against important targets behind the Russian lines.

In considering the employment of our bombers, we must, however, take into account the great memorical superiority of the Russian armies and tactical air forces, that would be deployed against us. This superiority is such that our heavy bombers should in the main be employed to supplement our factical ir Forces in giving direct support

7. The bamber force in the Mediterranean would also be employed in these reles.

Topography

8. Study of the topography and communications of Mastern Europe leads ismodiately to the conclusion that the main effort on land should be in the north. South of a line approximately Edicken - Chemnitz - Drosden - Corlitz, there are few good west-cast avenues of advance except the Damibe valley, and the generally mountainous nature of the country will limit the possibilities of mobile warfare.

Scourity of the Left Plank

9. It will be essential to guard against a Russian countermove from the North German ports or from Dernholm to Sweden or Denmark. Our navel superiority in the Baltic would be able to guard against this; nevertheless, it would be wise to aim for the early cepture of Stettim. This would appear to indicate that one of the main thrusts should be along the north German coast, assisted by amphibious hooks which would allow us to exploit our superiority in amphibious warfare.

In addition, our naval forces in the Baltic would out the enemy's see communications and destroy any part of his Navy which came to see. Reither of these would have any important effect on the Russian capacity or will to resist.

Logistics

- 10. In the area now occupied by the Allies, the German communications system has been almost completely destroyed, whereas in that part of Germany accupied by the Russians, destruction has been far less and the railways are working. From the Allied point of view, it is, therefore, in our rear areas that the legistical difficulties will arise.
- II. Heavy demands upon troops and resources are likely to be made in order to provent occupied Germany becoming a liability. It is not possible to forecast how heavy these demands will be. From the logistical point of view, however, provided it is possible to start an offensive at all, it does not seem that administrative considerations need limit the depth of the advance until the change from narrow to broad gauge is reached. The broad gauge on the main routes may now have reached the general line of the oder. Normal employment of M.T. resources will allow a further radius of action of some 150 miles beyond this line.

Summery

- 12. Consideration of the above frators leads to the conclusions:-
 - (a) That the compaign must be fought primarily on land in North East Europe.

(b) That the best area for an offensive will be the area mosts of the line Zwicken -Ghemnitz - Dresden - Gorlitz.

LLIED STOROT LVALLED FOR THE OPPURIVE

Land Forgon

13. Annex III shows that the total illied strength in North jurge on lat July, should be of the order of:-"

20 Amoured Divisions 50 Infinity Divisions irborne Divisions 8 Equivalent Divisions in Armoured end Infentry Brigndos.

Situation in Occupied Cormany

the Occupied Germany will form the base from which any offensive will have to be mounted. Adequate measures must, therefore, be taken to ensure the security of this area. The situation likely to obtain is examined at Annex IV, from which it is clear that internal security forces will be necessary.

- 15. More serious are likely to be the implications, on the availability and mobility of our forces, of the state of choos existing in Germany as the result of Allied operations. In order to ensure that the Allied L. of C. orn function, a considerable diversion of engineer, transport and naministrative resources may be necessary. The extent of this diversion cannot be assessed with any accuracy at present.
- 16. All possible pressure will, however, presumebly be brought to bear on the Vestern European Allies to assume increased responsibilities in Germany. Balancing this
 against the commitments given above, we think it fair to
 assume that the British and United States occupational forces orn be reduced to:-

10 Infantry Divisions

It may be possible to reduce these still further when it can be seen how and to what extent Gorman co-operation develops. Since, however, little, if any, preparation for this situation will have been possible, we consider that the above represents a minimum in the initial stages.

Defensive Commitment

the Russians will undoubtedly have the strength to attempt an offensive in Austria. The country as far as the norther boundary of Austria is, however, mountainous and difficult and we consider that the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, should be able, with his available forces, to undertake the defence of this even as far north as Salzburg. This will however, Dally account the three Salzbirg. This will, however, fully occupy the three armoured and twelve infantry divisions available.

M See also Map 'B'

18. North of selaburg, a strong defensive position is available along the line of the Bohmer Weld Hountains to Zwicken. In view, however, of its length (250 miles) and of the Russian numerical superiority, we consider that a force of some five amounted and tronty infantry divisions will be necessary to ensure the security of this sector of the front.

Gerran Assistance

19. The possibility of dorson assistance is dealt with in annex IV where it is estimated that 10 German divisions might be referred and re-equipped in the early stages. These could not, however, in any event be available by lat July. Although, therefore, they might be referred in time to take part in the fighting by the autumn, we have not included them in our calculations.

20. The referming of any larger derman force would be a much longer term project since it would depend on whole-sale re-equipment from Allied sources.

Conclusion on Availability of Porgos

21. We, therefore, calculate the availability of Allied forces for offensive operations in the north as follows:-

	Armi. Divo.	Inf.	Airborne Diva.	Equiv.	Total
Total available lst July Internal Security Defensive	20 1 5	50 5 20	<u>5</u> ,	8 .	83 11 25
Available for offensive	24	25	5	3	47

Air Porces

Provided that no reduction are made in first line strongth, the Allied Tactical Air Forces in North West Europe and the Mediterranean consist of 6,714 first line nireraft. The Dember Potential sensists of 2,464 nireraft, of which 1,840 are based in the United Kingdom and 624 in 22. the Mcditerrancen.

23. The United States redeployment after 1st June, 1945, is not known. These totals may, therefore, be subject to considerable reduction due to continued redeployment during June, should this occur.

Maval Forces

24. In spite of the restrictions on operations imposed by ice during the winter months, a force of the following order would be required in the Bultio:-

or 3 Cruisers 2 or 3 Cruisers
2 Destroyer Flotilles (including 1 Fleet Flotille)
1 3/M Flotille (small type)
4 M.T.D./M.G.D. Flotilles
1 Assault Force.

25. This force would probably have to be based at Brunsbuttel with advanced bases on the North German coast, close behind the Army, and in Sweden where Karlekronn (the main Swedish navel base) and Lid Fjord would be switched.

26. Some of the above forces could be withdrown from the Mose Floot since the Russian navnl threat in the North Sea would be extracely slight but the reminder would have to be provided at the expense of our build up in the Far Zast.

waters and the Moditerromean in order to destroy may ense ships which might venture out of the North Ressian ports or through the Darianelles into the Moditerranean,

RUSSIAN STRESOTH AVAILABLE

Land Porces

26. The strength of Russian forces in Europe is examined in Annex II. The total force available amounts

169 Shook Divisions 347 Ordinary Divisions 112 Shock Took Brigades 141 Ordinary Tank Brigades

- 29. It is not possible to foresee what changes in Russian dispositions are likely to have occurred by let July. It must be assumed, however, in view of the necessity of bringing Allied public opinion to a point at which war with Russia will be accepted, that any attack will not come as a complete surprise. They will probably appreciate that any attack we may launch is likely to be in the north. the north.
- 30. The Russians may have a considerable internal scourity commitment in Folund. The wast am jority of Poles are believed to be violently anti-Russian; even the Berling Army, which now amounts to ten divisions, could not be relied upon to support the Russians or even to remain neutini.
- 51. Even inking some allowance for this, however, we must recken that our effensive will be faced by the strength of the following Russian Army Groups:-

2nd Baltic lat Boltic and 3rd Belorussian 2nd Belorussian 1st Belorussian

let Okreinian

These Army Groups comprise a total of:-32.

> 100 Shook Divisions 220 Ordinary Divisions 86 Shock Tank Brigades 71 Ordinary Tenk Brigades.

m Ses also Map 'A' .

33. As a rough guide, it is estimated that these represent the equivalent in Allied formations of; -

140 Infentry Divisions 30 Armoured Divisions 24 Tank Brigades.

Air Forces

34. The Russian Army Air Porce in the West consists of some 14,600 mireraft of which 9,380 are fighters and ground attack direcast and 3,380 are bombers of unspecified type, although some 1,000 of them constitute a heavy bomber force.

35. There are also nearly 2,000 miscellaneous or unidentified types, 800 of which are in the Russian Havel Air Arm.

PROBABLE RUSSIAN STRATEGY

36. In the opening stages, Russian stratery is likely to be defensive. If they have had adequate warning, they may have stiffened up their forward positions in order to hold us on the line of contact. In view of the great numerical superiority of force which they will possess; they may well be able to provent any advance by our forces. The bulk of their armoured forces is likely to be held well in page to each us a strategic passage and to be ready to in roor to not as a strategic reserve and to be rough to counter-attack should we be able to effect a breakthrough. If this becars, the Russian strategy may be to effor "cushion" resistance back to the Oder - Neisse line with the object of engaging the main armoured battle in the areas east of those rivers.

They will be under no necessity to make a percilci-withdrawel from Dehemia and Morevia and should they decide to retain their hold on these crees, supported as they are likely to be by the Czechs, the further we advance the more awkward will this salient in our line become.

- 37. In the opening stages of the lend compaign, the Russian Air Force is likely to be used mainly in providing direct support to their land forces. It is probable that the Russian Long Rango Domber Force would also be employed in this role as it has so far proved ineffective when employed strategically.
- 38. The Russians are likely to attempt extensive substage activities on Allied lines of communication, especially in France, Belgium, Holland and to a lesser extent in Germany. The normal method will probably be the employment of local Communists strengthened by infiltration of Russians specially selected from those repatriated offer specially selected from those repatriated ofter spending some time in the areas concerned as prisoners or forced labourers.

Outline of Ormpoint (see Mrp 0)

39. The Rubsian superiority of land forces clearly makes the Launchini of any offensive a hazardous operation. If herever it were decided to launch such an offensive on the grounds that we might effect a very considerable measure of surprise and thus eatch the Russians off their balance, the factors outlined above load to the conception that there might be two main thrusts carried out by two Army Grouns as fallows: Groups no follows:-

Northern - on the exis Stattin - Schneideruhl -Dydgonzoz.

Southern - on the axis Leipzig - Cottbus - Posman and Broslau.

40. The first objective might be the line of the oder and Meisse. This might be followed by a further advance to the general line Danzig - Dreslau. How far, however, it would be possible to advance east of the oder - Meisse line would depend upon the result of the main argument righting which as shown above, would probably develop at this stage, i.e. in the area Schneidemihl - Endgoszez - Dreslau - Glacou. Breslau - Glognu.

41. Account must be taken of the fact that unless the Russians withdraw from Bohemia and Meravia, the deeper any advance is pushed, the longer will be the southern flank which we should have to watch. Owing to the south-easterly trend of the mountains from Gorlitz eastwards moreover the length of front will increase as the advance proceeds.

12. If, therefore, by the suturn we have reached the line Danzig - Broslau and hostilities are still in progress, we may find curselves in a difficult position, faced with the prospect either of pushing on with lengthening communications hampered by bad weather, or holding during the East European winter a front too long for the forces available. If an advance beyond this line is necessary, it appears that we shall, in effect, be committed to a total war and that in order to falfil the hypothesis on which this appreciation is based, we must win west of the general line Danzig -Broslan a victory sufficient to cause Russia to submit to our terms.

CONCLUSIONS

- We, therefore, conclude that;-
 - (a) The campaign would take the form primarily of land operations in North East Aurope.
 - (b) Air action would take the form primarily of direct support of the land operations. We should be able to inflict a severe defeat upon the Russian Air Force and soriously interfere with Russian rail communications in rear of their front.

- (c) We should have virtually complete mayal superiority in the Baltic and should be able to prevent any Russian move to Sweden or Dommark.
- (d) The main land operations would take the form of an Allied offensive north of the line gwicken Chemnitz Drosden Cerlitz, the remainder of the front being held defensively.
- (e) The forces which we could make available for an affensive would depend to a great extent upon the diversion necessary to ensure that the Allied L. of C. through the devastated areas of Germany will work.

 In the area given in (d) above, however, it appears likely that we should be facing odds of the order of two to one in armour and four to one in infantsy.

four to one in infentry.

- (f) Such olds clearly render any offensive a hazardous undertaking.
- (d) If, on the grounds that we could achieve f, on the grounds that we could achieve surprise and throw the Russians off their balance, an advance castwards is considered possible, the result would depend upon the outcome of the main armoured fighting which would probably develop east of the oder - Neisse line. Superior handling, and air superiority might enable us to win this battle, but there is no inherent strength in our strategic position and we should, in fact, be staking everything upon the tactical outcome of one great engagement.
- (h) Any advance beyond the general line Danzig -Breslau may lead us into formidable difficulties if hostilities continue. In fact, it seems that if we have not won the victory we require west of this line, we shall be cormitted to a total war.

ANDREX II

RUSSIAN STRUMENTHS AND DISPOSITIONS

DOCTOMIC

- 1. Russia is at present producing a vast flow of war material for ber land and air forces. The bulk of these are transported to the Armies along lengthy and tensous lines of communication which would be particularly vulnerable to air attack.
- 2. Her war potential will have been substantially increased during the first helf of 1945 by the industrial resources and raw materials of the territories which she has everum, especially Upper Silesia. These territories are now being reorganised by the Russians and much of the industrial equipment is reported to be in the course of being dismentled and transferred to Russia. Therefore the Russians will het benefit immediately by the acquisition of these resources and they will not adequately replace the loss of Allied supplies. On the other hand, the Russian Armed Forces would derive some immediate benefit from the loss of Allied supplies. On the other hand, the Russian Armed Porces would derive some irrediate benefit from the copture of German equipment - especially M.T. and anti-tank weapons.
- 3. The finished war products for which she relies most extensively on allied supplies are N.T. and high grade aviation spirit or which imports account for about half her aviation spirit of which imports account for about half her supplies. To maintain the flow of her own war production at its present rate, Russia is at present dependent to a considerable extent on Allied supplies, particularly of explosives, rubber, sluminium, copper, magnesium and some ferro-alloys. Even when she lost these supplies, however, it cannot be said with assurance that Russia, with the sid of her speils of war, would be unable, if she chose, to continue war with undiminished overall efficacy for a period of some months. The specific fields in which the loss would be most felt would be in aircraft performance, military transport, and in explosives.
- t. Russia would probably manage to meintein her present ration levels without Allied food supplies, even if necessary by exacting heavy contributions from all the areas which she occupies in Europe.
- Russia will be faced with a very considerable task in fully restoring her lines of communication by let July. The vast majority of bridges will still be temporary wooden attractures and she will not have been able to re-gauge and restore the rail net-work west of the Vistula, except, perhaps, the main lines running from East to West. These will be vulnerable to air attack.

She will suffer from an increasing shortage of locomotives and motor vehicles due to wear and tear and air attacks. This will be intensified by the long haul required from the main industrial regions in the Urals and east of Mos cott.

The Russians will not be faced with shortage of manpower for work inside Russia owing to their return of prisoners of war and displaced personnel and the wholesale conscription of manpower in occupied territory.

RUSSIAN ABIED FORCES (See Map A and Appendices I and II)

6. After allowing for total permanent easualties in the present war estimated at between ten and cloven millions, the total mobilised strength of the Russian land forces on 1st ruly will probably be just over 7,000,000 men. Over 6,000,000 of these are estimated to be in the European theatre of operations. In addition, there will be some 600,000 Special Security (NAVD) troops. The Russian Army has developed a capable and experienced High Command. The Army is exceedingly tough, lives and moves on a lighter scale of maintenance than any Western Army and employs bold tactics based largely on disregard for losses in attaining a set objective. Security and deception are of a high quality at all levels. Equipment has improved rapidly throughout the war and is now good. Hnough is known of its development to say that it is certainly not inferior to that of other great powers. The facility the Russians have shown in the development and improvement of existing weapons and equipment and in their mass production has been very striking. There are known instances of the Germans very striking. There are known instances of the Germans capying basic features of Russian armment. There has been a marked improvement during the war in such matters as wireless communications and in the technique of river crossings, recovery of A.F.V.'s and the restoration of rail communications. Russian ongineer training is of a high standard.

7. On the other hand, the Russian Army is now suffering from heavy casualties and war-weariness. The standard of tactics and training is, on the whole, lower than that of the German Army. Due to the comparatively low standard of general education in the Red Army, the Russians have been forced to reserve their best mannower for specialist arms; i.e. the Air Porce, Armoured Treops, artillery and engineers. This has left their infantry greatly deficient in the type of soldier who could be trained to any stendard comparable to the infantry of a western Power. There is a marked shortage of well-educated and trained Staff Officers and intermediate commanders, which inevitably results in and intermediate commanders, which inevitably results in and intermediate commanders, which inevitably results in ever-controlisation. There is widespread evidence that the Russian Command is finding considerable difficulty in maintaining discipline in the Russian Army abroad. Lecting and drunkenness are prevalent and are symptoms of a warwary army in contact with higher material standards than obtain at home. Any renewal of war in Europe would prove a severe strain on the Red Army. Their troops would be dighting outside Russia and the High Command might have difficulty in maintaining the morals of the rank and file. difficulty in maintaining the morale of the rank and file, particularly in the low grade infantry formations. This offect would be increased by the effective application of Allied propaganda.

Air Forge

8. The morele of the Russian Air Perce is considered to be him. Their pilots are always reasonably competent, constinue brilliant, and they have west experience in short range tectical operations in support of the Army. It must be berne in mind that they have long enjoyed numerical superiority over the dermine. They are not nearly as well trained or disciplined as the Allied Air Forces.

9. The Russian Air Porce has a total first line strongth of 16,500 operative circuit comprising four arms;

The Army Air Porce of over 14,000 aircraft equipped to give close support to the Army's ground operations. Defence against enough air attack in a accordary consideration.

The Mavel Air Perce - This force of over 1,100 electrical corresponds, in its relations with the Russian Fleets, more to Constal Command and the mineleying branch of Bomber Command, than to our Fleet Air Arm. It has been concerned primarily with enti-submarine operations.

The Long Renge Bomber Porce consists of about 1,000 aircraft. It has so far proved inerfective in a strategic role,

The Fighter peronce Force - This force of some

300 hirarift is allotted the duty of defence of
important targets in the rear areas. There are
additional fighter defence aircraft included in
the fighter strength of the Air Armies. The
aircraft illotted for the defence of important
targets can have had little experience in target
defence. derence.

10. Russian discraft are of modern type and adequate for their tank. They are, however, generally inferior to Allied types. The Russian Air Force is meither organised nor equipped to oppose a modern day or night force of long range benders, to combat a modern day righter force or to operate in a strategic role. In particular, Russian redertechnique is believe to be much below Western standards.


of 3,000 directift has been attained. This production was able to meet wastage on the scale suffered against Germany. When, however, aluminium from allied sources is denied them and if, as is confidently expected, the allied inflict heavy lesses on them, their production will be totally inadequate to meet the demands made upon it.

12. Russia depends upon the Allies for nearly 50% of her aviation fuel. She is unlikely to obtain substantial quantities from former derman plants in unless six months.

Mayy

officient vergen of ver and it is clearly not within the competence of the various fleets to show any initiative in a war at see under modern conditions. The equipment is largely old, the standard of education and training of personnel is low. Officers and men are immurant of modern developments in neval sarrare, particularly as regards alress as operation. Warship building yards at Lamingrad have suffered from damage and those in the Black See from complete destruction.

-17-



APPENDIX I TO ABBENTI

STRINGTH OF RED JULY (exclusive of satellite armies)


Pronte	AF	mics	Div	isions	Tank 1	rigndes
Arons	Shock	ordinary	Shook	Ordinary	Shock	Ordinary
Finland and	- XX+	3 .		, 9	143 S = 14	5250 3
Leningred and 3rd Boltic	No.	3	1	15	1	12
2nd' Doltic'	3	4	19	40	7	17
lst Doltio 3rd Delorussion)	1 3	. 8	25	54	9	29
2nd Belorussian	2	5	16	40	20	12
1st Belorussian .	5.	5	16	50	31	. 13
lst Ukrainian	4	4	24	36	21	10
4th Ukrainian	10	3	12	32	3	2
2nd Ukrainian	3	4	32	28	7	21
3rd Ukrainian	1	. 4	19	36	7	' 6
(Unlocated)	, -	1	5	15	6	29
a. Caucasus	+	1	· -	. п	7	1
Total in West	22	45	169	366	112	143
Por East	7	1 mg - 40	36	-	13	12.2
FRAND TOTAL	29	45	205	366	125	143

74 Armies

571 Divisions 268 Tank Brigades

Equivalent Value in Terms of Allied Divisions

Pronts or Areas	Infantry/Ogvalry Divisions	Armoured Divisions ,	Army Tonk Brigndes
Western Europe, S. Caudasus and Iran	235,	36	. 47
Par East	214	4	
ORAND TOT/A	259	tio.	47



TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

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PRIME MINISTER


In the attached report on Operation
'UNTHINKABLE', the Chiefs of Staff have
set out the bare facts, which they can
elaborate in discussion with you, if you
so desire. They felt that the less was put
on paper on this subject the better.

Thomathalban, the Derry on aguan

H. Ism

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8th June, 1945



TOP SECRET.

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

PRIME MINISTER.


In accordance with your instructions, we have considered our potential ability to exert pressure on Russia by the threat or use of force. We have confined ourselves in what follows to the barest outline of facts and figures. We could amplify these in discussion if you so desire.

2. The relative strengths of Russian and Allied forces in Europe can briefly be summarised as follows :-

(a) Land Forces

The Russian division is not comparable in establishment with an Allied division. We have, therefore, translated the figures for Russian divisions into divisions equivalent to ours. The following is our estimate of the total forces in Europe on 1st July:-

<u>Total</u>	105 divisions (including 25 armoured)	<u>Total</u>	264 divisions (including 36 armoured)
British and Dominion Polish	35 divisions 4 divisions		
U.S.	64 divisions		
	<u>Allies</u>		Russian



OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

(b) Air Forces


	Allie	<u>s</u>	Rus	sian
-12 H × 15 L	Tactical	Strategical	Tactical	Strategical
U.S. British&	3480 a/c	1008 a/c		ing disease to
Dominion Polish	2370 a/c 198 a/c	1722 a/c 20 a/c	÷	
Total	6048 a/c	2750 a/c	11802 a/c	960 a/c

The preponderance in numbers of Russian aircraft would for a time be off-set by the vastly superior handling and efficiency of the Allied Air Forces, especially the Strategic Air Forces. After a period of operations, however, our lack of replacement aircraft and air crews would seriously impair our air strength.

(c) Naval Forces.

The Allies could, of course, achieve dominating superiority at sea.

3. It is clear from the relative strength of the respective land forces that we are not in a position to take the offensive with a view to achieving a rapid success. Since, however, Russian and Allied land forces are in contact from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we are bound to become



OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

involved in land operations. In support of our land forces we should have our technically superior, but numerically inferior, Tactical Air Forces. As regards Strategic Air Forces, our superiority in numbers and technique would be to some extent discounted by the absence of strategical targets compared with those which existed in Germany, and the necessity for using these Strategic Air Forces to supplement our Tactical Air Forces in support of land operations.

4. Our view is, therefore, that once hostilities began, it would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we should be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds. These odds, moreover, would become fanciful if the Americans grew weary and indifferent and began to be drawn away by the magnet of the Pacific war.

(Signed) A.F. EROCKE
ANDREW CUMNINGHAM
D.C.S. EVILL
(For C.A.S.)

8TH JUNE, 1945.

Office of the Minister of Defence

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

I submit for your approval a draft minute to the Chiefs of Staff about "UNTHINKABLE".

LOHours.

9th JUNE, 1945

E.R.


GENERAL ISMAY

I have read the Chiefs of Staff note on "UNTHINKABLE" dated 8th June, which shows Russian preponderance of 2-1 on land.

- the bulk of their forces back to the United States and to the Pacific, the Russians have the power to advance to the North Sea and the Atlantic. Pray have a study made of how then we could defend our Island, assuming that France and the Low Countries were powerless to resist the Russian advance to the sea. What Naval forces should we need and where would they be based? What would be the strength of the Army required, and how should it be disposed? How much Air Force would be needed and where would the main airfields be located? Possession of airfields in Denmark would give us great advantage and keep open the sea passage to the Baltic where the Navy could operate. The possession of bridgeheads in the Low Countries or France should also be considered.
- 3. By retaining the codeword "UNTHINKABLE", the Staffs will realise that this remains a precautionary study of what, I hope, is still a purely hypothetical contingency.

(Intld) W.S.C.

10.6.45



E.R.

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

PRIME MINISTER

In accordance with your instructions, we have considered our potential ability to exert pressure on Russia by the threat or use of force. We have confined ourselves in what follows to the barest outline of facts and figures. We could amplify these in discussion if you so desire.

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U.S.	64 divisions	The same of	
British and Dominion Polish	35 divisions 4 divisions	piejos ef	ererelas in
<u>Total</u>	103 divisions (including 23 armoured)	Total	264 divisions (including 36 armoured)

(b) Air Forces

	Alli	08	Russi	en .
	Tactical	Strategical	Tactical	Strategical
U.S.	3480 a/c	1008 a/c		THE RESERVE
British & Dominion Polish	2370 a/c 198 a/c	1722 a/c 20 a/c	Par Maria and Maria	
Total	6048 a/o	2750 a/o	11802 8/	/o 960 a/o

The proponderance in numbers of Russian aircraft would for a time be off-set by the vastly superior handling and efficiency of the Allied Air Forces, especially the Strategic Air Forces. After a period of operations, however, our lack of replacement aircraft and air crews would seriously impair our air strength.

(c) Naval Forces

The Allies could, of course, achieve dominating superiority at sea.

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
E.R.

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(Signed) A.F. BROOKE ANDREW CUNNINGHAM D.C.S. EVILL (For C.A.S.)

a/o 2/30 s/a 11000 s/a

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- circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 15

Final

11th July 1945.

PRINCIPLE SELECTION AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY A

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CHILIPS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

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JOINT PLANNING STAFF

OPER.TION "UNTHINKABLE"

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

As instructed, we have examined a Minute from the Prime Minister dated 10th June, 1945, concerning Operation UNTHINKABLE.

- 2. We attach at Annex a short appreciation which we recommend the Chiefs of Staff should forward to the Prime Minister in answer to his Minute.
- the normal staffs in Service Hinistries have not been consulted.

(Signed) G. GRINTHAN
G.S. THOMPSON
W.L. DAISON

A F1/2012年 - 公公司经过农用的基础

Offices of the Cabinet and Minister of Defence, S.W.1.

11th July, 1945.

AIDEX

DRAFT MINUTE TO THE PRINC MINISTER

this paper has been writtly licited

OBJECT

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In accordance with the instructions in your minute dated 10th June, we have considered what measures would be required to ensure the security of the British Isles in the event of war with Russia in the near future.

PORIS OF ATTACK

- 2. The following are the main methods by which the Russians might attempt to attack the British Isles after they had reached the shores of the North Sea and Atlantic:-
 - (a) By cutting our sea communications.
 - (b) By invesion.

ft in introd for the passeons und of

- (c) By mir attack.
- (d) By rocket or other new methods.

Attack on Sea Communications

3. The Russians would be unable to develop, either by submarine or air attack, any immediate threat to our sea communications which would be comparable to that exerted by Germany.

It would certainly take them a period of years to develop a submarine fleet or a maritime air force capable of producing a decisive threat to our sea communications, even though Germany provided the Russians with production facilities and technical advice for the construction of submarines.

Invasion

4. In planning an invasion either by sea or air, the Russians will be greatly handicapped by lack of experience in this form of warfare. Provided, therefore, that we have not unduly reduced our defence forces, it is probable that the Russians would only attempt an invasion when they could employ very large forces, of which they would hope that a proportion would get ashore in the British Isles.

We rule out the practicability of decisive invasion by airborne operations alone.

In mounting a large scale seaborne operation, the Russians would be faced with the considerable task of constructing a large amphibious fleet and training their personnel in a new method of warfare. Their lack of a Merchant Havy would add to their difficulties, particularly as we should presumably have withdrawn or destroyed all merchant shipping in the western ports of Europe.

"Te cannot rule out the eventual possibility of an invasion, but it would clearly be a matter of years before the Russians could build up the necessary amphibious forces and Merchant Mavy to give them even a slight chance of success against proper defensive measures.

Air Attack

5. The Russian Air Force as at present constituted is predominantly designed as an integral part of the Russian Army and is, therefore, trained and equipped chiefly to give close taction! support to the ground forces. It is, however, possible that the Russian ir Force would attempt to attack all types of important target in the United Kingdom with its existing equipment and without regard to lack of experience beyond the close support role. By virtue of numbers alone it would constitute a threat to this country that would require energetic counter-measures.

It is considered, however, that our Air Forces should be able to inflict such losses on the Russian Air Force as to prevent it from achieving any decisive results.

New Developments - The Rocket and Pilotless Aircraft

6. The Russians are likely to make full use of new weapons, such as the rocket and pilotless aircraft. They are fully aware of the capabilities of these weapons, relevant developments and technical data.

The Russians are, therefore, likely to begin large scale production of these weapons at an early date. To must expect a far heavier scale of attack than the Germans were able to develop, and we do not at present see any method of effectively reducing this.


This would be the main threat over the considerable period which must elapse before, the Russians can contemplate any attempt at invasion.

RETENTION OF BRIDGEHDADS ON THE CONTINENT

7. The desirability of retaining bridgeheads on the continent has been considered, particularly with a view to reducing the danger from rockets and other long range weapons.

In view of the Russian numerical superiority on land, there can be no question of holding a continuous continental front. Any bridgeheads would, therefore, have to be selected so as to enclose a comparatively large area, but be defensible by relatively small forces. Areas which might be considered are:-

Denmark
Western Holland
Havre
Cherbourg Peninsula
Brittany Peninsula



Such bridgeheads would, however, offer the energy a well defined, compact target. Their defence would, therefore, impose a heavy and continuous drain on our resources. In return for this we should not gain any appreciable compensating advantage since:-

- (a) The range of the present rocket would necessitate the holding of a continuous front well into France and the Low Countries, if the scale of attack by this method is to be seriously affected.
- (b) If used as bases for a return to the continent, we should be sacrificing surprise and would enable the energy to build up against us at leisure.
- (c) Except in the case of Denmark, use of which is limited by lack of harbours on the north and west coasts, the air forces we could station in the bridgehead would be little greater than those required to support the troops defending it.

We do not, therefore, consider that there would be an operational advantage in retaining bridgeheads on the continent.

DISPOSITIONS FOR DEFENCE

8. Although in the initial stages invasion appears to us extremely improbable, we have thought it right to set out what we consider should be the dispositions of our forces in the initial period after the Russians have reached the Testern Coast of Europe. We clearly cannot disregard the threat represented by an enemy in possession of the coasts of France and the Low Countries and it will be necessary to guard against raids and possible airborne landings.

We should rely primarily on naval and air action to prevent the invasion of the British Isles, but sufficient mobile land formations would also be necessary to ensure the defeat of any enemy bodies which might land. It would also be wise to provide garrisons for the more important urban, industrial and port areas.

On this basis, we estimate that the broad composition and distribution of our forces in the British Isles should be as follows:-

Mayal Forces

Our essential security requirements should be met by local naval forces on the south and east coasts backed by a Home Floet in Northern Waters. Forces of the following order appear necessary:-

Home Fleet - 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 3 destroyer flotillas, 3 submarine flotillas.

Enst Const - 3 destroyer flotilles, 6 flotilles

South Const - 2 cruisers, 3 destroyer flotilles, 6 flotilles HTM/MOB.

Convoy escorts may be required at a later date, depending on how the Russian threat develops.

Air Forces

The Russians would not be able to develop a major air threat to this country immediately after their arrival in Testern Europe. In the initial stages we estimate that by concentrating the Dritish and American garrison squadrons from Europe in the United Kingdom, we could defend this country adequately. In order to maintain the R.A.F. country adequately. In order to maintain the R.A.F. to stop the flow of R.A.F. aircraft and prews to the Far East. Enst.

In order to take the offensive in the nir, to reduce the threat from rockets, etc., and to guard against a mounting Russian air threat, we consider that we should aim to build up as quickly as possible to inglo-American air forces of the following order (approximately what we had at the end of the German war):-

Day and Night Fighters Tretical Bombers 200 squadrons
Henvy Bombers. Henvy Bombers.

230 squadrons 100 squadrons


Land Forces

Some 20 divisions would have to be built up as soon as possible. The main body of this force, including the majority of the armoured formations, would be located south of a line Wash - Severn with the highest concentration in the south-cost. the south-east. -loun dies, but succlaims

AVAIL BILITY OF FORCES

9. There will be no difficulty in providing the navel forces required, though this would entail some withdrawals from foreign stations.

In so far as land forces are concerned, the manpower provided by the British and United States forces at present in this country and Vestern Europe should be sufficient. It must, however, be enticipated that, in the process of withdrawel from the continent considerable losses of equipment will occur; and we should therefore withdraw from the continent as much we should, therefore, withdraw from the continent as much heavy equipment as possible as soon as war with Russia appears imminent. Moreover, we should have to maintain from now onwards production capacity necessary for forces of the size given above.



Both to maintain the air forces required initially and to build up to the strength subsequently required, we shall need the full support of the United States. Both our own and the United States training organisation and their aircraft production would have to be expanded to full war production as quickly as possible. This is, however, a long term project and the only source of reinforcement in the interim would be American unite, at the cost of the Japanese war.

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CONCLUSION

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10. Our main conclusion is that:-

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It is only by use of rockets and other now weapons that the Russians could develop any serious threat to the security of this country in the initial stages. Invasion or a serious attack upon our sea communications could only be undertaken after a period of preparation which must last some years.


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
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IMMEDIATE

FROM : J.S.M. WASHINGTON.

TO : CABINET OFFICES.

FMW. 271.

30th August, 1946.

Private and Eyes Only for General Ismay for Chiefs of Staff from Field Marshal Wilson.

Reference COS(W) 364.

- We had lunch with the United States Chiefs of Staff today and a very frank and informal discussion afterwards.
- The United States Chiefs of Staff felt strongly that the state of affairs in Europe had reached a stage when the uncontrollable developments of events arising from some local incident might grow into a major conflict however unwilling Russia or ourselves might be to become involved and that it would be reprehensible if we did not start immediately to prepare an appreciation of the broad European situation as opposed to the local situation regarding Venezia Giulia. This appreciation would be with the object of uncovering the many diverse problems which would inevitably lead to the production of an inter-Allied plan to be used in the event of aggression by Russia.
- Their thinking agrees with ours in that any reinforcements despatched to stabilise an attack in the Venezia
 Giulia area would no doubt arrive in that area too late to be
 of use in the preliminary stages, as at that time the conflagration would have ceased to be local and would probably
 have spread to central Europe. Therefore, any reinforcement
 plans would have to be based on the possibility of their being
 utilised in any area to support operations which might grow
 out of a local act of aggression.
- Assuming that an attack in the Venezia Giulia area would rapidly develop into a general conflict in Europe, with Russia as main aggressor, it was apparent that planning should cover two phases (A) stabilisation of the situation and formation of a bridgehead (B) offensive operations to readjust the situation.

-2-

Stressed that the opening phase would have to take the form of a withdrawal from our respective zones of occupation into a bridgehead. General Eisenhower discussed possible areas but appeared to favour one comprising the low countries. He gave the following obvious main reasons why retention of a foothold in the low countries would be preferable to withdrawal from central Europe into Italy or elsewhere.

- (i) Provision of air cover and air striking forces based in the U.K.
- (ii) Short lines of communication with our bases in the U.K.
- (iii) Denial of a possible area of operation for socalled V or other novel weapons against the U.K.

Whether the low countries were decided upon or not it was essential to agree between us in the first instance where a bridgehead was to be held and to coordinate an overall plan for a strategic withdrawal to that area.

- 6. With regard to (B) little was said except Eisenhower stressed that any plan to readjust the situation must be self-contained and must not involve us in reinforcing an area where there will already undoubtedly be considerable disorganisation. As an instance of the detailed points requiring consideration in the later stages of planning arising out of the problems which the overall appreciation would uncover Spaatz instanced the existing restrictiveness of air strips in the U.K. from which to operate B-29 squadrons, and the Naval representative raised the question of the necessity for the reoccupation of Iceland.
- given above we were told that the United States planners would be instructed to commence preparing an overall appreciation immediately. They proposed all future discussion to be restricted to a Chiefs of Staff and Planners level, with the possible exception of the incorporation of a Ministry of Transport planner. On no account at this stage should discussions be permitted outside this level on either side of the Atlantic and the absolute minimum should be committed to paper. When an outline plan of action had crystallised from the overall appreciation our respective Commanders-in-Chief designate in Europe and their Chiefs of Staff should then be brought in. The Americans are anxious to agree on the command organisation to be set up for the various fronts which operations might cover and that their composition should be considered at an early date.
- 8. We put your views in paragraphs 7 and 8 of COS(W) 364 to the United States Chiefs of Staff and they were most emphatic that the United States Government would not be

prepared, owing to the political aspect, to issue such a statement now or in the near future.

9. We had the impression the United States Chiefs of Staff feeling was that the Venezia Giulia or any other localised problem was an integral part of the overall European problem; but only supplementary to 10.

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