The Office of Special Investigations:
Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust

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Preface

[T]he Holocaust is one of those few issues that the more distant we are from it, the larger it looms. Each decade since the end of the war has seen greater, not lesser, attention, and that is an oddity. There are very few issues which grow in magnitude as they are further away from the event. This is one of them. Perhaps because it is the ultimate evil, because it takes so much time to absorb its lessons, and that those lessons have become universalized in Cambodia, in Rwanda, in ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, the Holocaust has taken on an even greater sense of urgency.1

The Office of Special Investigations (OSI) is often referred to as the government’s “Nazi-hunting” organization.2 While that moniker is catchy, in fact the United States does not seek to exclude everyone who had an affiliation with the Nazis, nor even everyone who fought on their behalf. OSI’s role is to identify, and to seek removal of, only those who assisted the Nazis and their allies in the persecution of civilians.

In the 1970s, the public was shocked to learn that some Nazi persecutors had emigrated to the United States. There were calls for their expulsion and legislation was passed to facilitate their deportation. OSI was created in 1979 to handle the caseload.

The obstacles to success were formidable. OSI had to prove events decades old which were committed thousands of miles away, despite the fact that most witnesses had been killed during the war. Many who survived the war nevertheless died before OSI’s founding. The witnesses ultimately available for testimony rarely knew the names of their tormentors. Moreover, by the time they were called upon to bear witness, their memories were fallible. Much of the relevant documentary proof had been destroyed — some in the rubble of war, some by Nazis intent on obliterating evidence of their horrific acts, and some by newly liberated camp inmates who, in the first blush of freedom, wanted to burn the records of their persecutors. Much
of what survived was behind the Iron Curtain. Access to this material was extremely limited until the Cold War ended – more than a decade after OSI’s founding.

The most frequently asked questions about Nazi persecutors in the United States are: how many came? did OSI find most of them? and was the government complicit in providing these persecutors a safe haven? OSI’s work sheds light, although not definitive answers, on all these questions.

One of OSI’s early Directors hypothesized in 1984 that approximately 10,000 Nazi persecutors had emigrated to the United States. In retrospect, that estimate seems high. In 1984, the Cold War was at its height; one could only speculate about information in Soviet archives. We now have access to thousands of names not available then. Running those names through computer indices of persons in the United States (a research technique also not available in 1984) has not led to anywhere near 10,000 “hits.”

The 10,000 figure has enduring significance, however, because it has been widely reported. To the extent that people believe it, it unfortunately suggests that the number of cases handled by OSI – approximately 130 – is de minimus. However, that number, which includes three cases that reached the Supreme Court, should be placed in context. There is enormous difficulty in marshaling the evidence for these prosecutions, many subjects died before investigation was complete, the cases take years to litigate to completion, and the office is small. As of this writing, more than 25 years after OSI’s founding, 83 persecutors have been denaturalized; sixty-two have left the country permanently as a result of OSI’s work. More than 170 have been prevented from entering at all.

The disparity between the number of cases filed and the number of defendants who left
the country is due to a variety of factors. Several cases are still in litigation. More than 20 defendants died while their cases were pending. Some cases were settled – generally because of health issues – with the government agreeing not to pursue deportation even though the facts would have warranted it. The government did not prevail in a few cases, and a handful of defendants who have been ordered deported remain in the United States because no other country is willing to accept them.

“Nazi hunting” so many years after the war is dramatic, tedious and difficult. It calls for the prosecutorial collaboration of litigators and historians. Because the work is so unusual, and the moral content so profound, the Department of Justice determined that the history of the office itself should be documented. This report is the result of that determination.

In preparing a report of this type, there is inevitably the question of what, and how much, to include. Any reader interested in the full scope of the litigation handled by the office should turn to the Appendix at the conclusion of this report. It lists every case filed, the charges made, and the litigative outcome. The body of the report details only a sampling of the cases. They were chosen as representative of a type of case, or of a particular issue, important to understanding the work of OSI.

Although OSI’s litigative losses are few, virtually all are discussed. This was done for two reasons: (1) to avoid any suggestion that the report is designed to aggrandize the office’s record; and (2) because the losses are rare, almost all present unique issues worthy of comment.

The history of OSI involves more than its cases, however. Although initially conceived solely as a litigating unit, OSI’s mandate has expanded over the years. As a repository of World War II knowledge, the office has been called upon by various parts of the government to prepare
reports and to assist in non-litigative matters concerning the Holocaust. The reports, all of which are detailed herein, involve World War II issues relevant to the nation and to the world community.

While the cases and projects are individually fascinating, this report was not written simply to recount a series of unrelated but interesting undertakings. It is designed to serve as a teaching and research tool for historians, the media, academics, policy makers and the general public. The project will hopefully provoke discussion about some of the legal and moral issues involving prosecution of those involved with the Holocaust. Among the questions: what kind of behavior constitutes assistance in persecution? how do people become involved in genocidal activity? did they have viable alternatives? if not, should that be a factor in determining whether they are allowed to stay in the United States? how should society handle them, 30, 40, 50 years after the fact? does the passage of time affect their ability to refute the charges? And what is society’s goal in bringing these cases? should it be to punish? to establish personal accountability? to educate future generations? to present a historical record? Whatever the goals, how can they best be met?

The issues are legion. While one would hope that the Holocaust was such an aberration that its like would never recur, the world has since learned of new and horrific genocidal undertakings. Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Rwanda, Serbia and Sudan are among the all-too-many countries involved. These societies will inevitably have to confront some of the same issues which faced OSI. The United States as well will have to revisit some of the issues as it determines how to treat those new persecutors who have emigrated to this country. It is the Department’s hope that this report will help bring some of the matters into focus, both for
historical accuracy as well as to provide some guidance on how to respond to the inevitable repetition of persecution.


3. Allan Ryan, Quiet Neighbors (Harcourt Brace, 1984), pp. 26-27. Ryan acknowledged that the figure was speculative. His calculation was based on the fact that approximately 400,000 emigrés had been admitted under the Displaced Persons Act. That statute favored persons in the Baltic states and Ukraine, two regions rife with Nazi collaborators. Because the visa screening process was woefully inadequate (see pp. 36-37), Ryan postulated that 10% of those admitted had been collaborators. Not wanting to be accused of “being hysterical on this subject,” he halved the percentage and then halved it yet again. The figure thus calculated was 10,000. Recorded Ryan interview. Oct. 6, 2000. (Ryan’s calculations do not include any admittees under the Refugee Relief Act, under which another 200,000 persons entered the country. Very few of those admittees were from the Baltics or Ukraine.)

4. Of course, not all persons who participated in the Holocaust are listed on rosters and the government does not have all relevant rosters in any event; many are missing or incomplete. Moreover, the number of “hits” does not correlate directly with prosecutable cases. Many subjects died before OSI learned their names. Some hits are cases of mistaken identity; in others there is no evidence or insufficient evidence of persecution. Although we have no reliable way of determining the precise number of Nazi persecutors who entered the United States after World War II, OSI has investigated approximately 1,500 persons since its founding in 1979.

That number overstates the universe of known potentially viable cases, however. Before 1988, a matter was “opened” as an OSI investigation as soon as a match (or sometimes a near-match) was found between a name in INS files and a name on an OSI source list. In many instances, it turned out that the person was dead, the near-match was not an actual match, or there was no reasonable basis to believe the individual was involved in persecution. After 1988, OSI generally “opened” a case only after it was clear that the subject was alive and living in the U.S. (or a U.S. citizen living abroad), the match was proper, and there was a reasonable basis to believe he had been involved in acts of persecution.


6. Not all these cases involved court proceedings. Some subjects chose to leave before a case was filed, either as part of a settlement or simply to thwart litigation.

7. As of this writing, approximately 600 subjects have died while under investigation. It is impossible to extrapolate from this number how many might have been prosecutable.

8. At its zenith, in 1983, the office had a staff of 51, 20 of whom were litigating attorneys. As of this writing, the office has 26 employees, including 5 litigating attorneys.

9. One defendant, not included in the 62, left the country and then returned surreptitiously. He was ultimately apprehended and spent 40 months in custody. His case is discussed at pp. 440-442.

10. The only omissions are (1) losses handed down before OSI was founded – even though in two instances OSI handled the ultimately unsuccessful appeals (Detlavs and Hazners); (2) one case filed by INS before OSI’s filing and then dismissed by OSI because the office concluded that there was insufficient evidence to proceed (M. Kowalchuk); and (3) one case in which OSI did not file a denaturalization case but rather unsuccessfully urged a court to reconsider its very recent grant of citizenship (Bauzys). All of these cases are included in the Appendix.
Chapter One: The Creation of OSI

Introduction

The chaos attendant upon the end of World War II is hard to overstate. Millions were homeless and unwilling to return to their countries of origin. Some were victims, others persecutors, and some who began as persecutors now saw themselves as victims.

Among the persecuted were of course Jews and other Nazi “undesirables” who feared returning to countries where they had been subjected to unmitigated degradation. Among the persecutors were many non-Germans who, at the behest of the Nazis, had helped carry out policies designed to destroy the unwanted. These accomplices included Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks and Croats. After the war ended, some of them – along with tens of thousands of innocent political refugees – sought entrance into the United States on the ground that they were anti-Communists whose homelands were under Soviet control.

The means of admission for most of these people was the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) or the Refugee Relief Act (RRA), two of the most far-reaching immigration laws ever enacted by Congress. Both statutes were intended to admit the oppressed, including Nazi victims and political refugees from Communism. Under their provisions over 600,000 emigrés from a score of countries entered the United States between 1948 and 1953.

The pressure of processing such a volume of desperate and disparate refugees was enormous. Not surprisingly, some who had assisted the Nazis had no compunction about lying and deceiving overworked consular officials who reviewed their applications for admission. More than three decades passed before OSI was created to correct these errors.
The Beginning

It was not until the 1970s that the "Nazi war criminal issue" percolated into the public's consciousness. The timing is due to a confluence of factors, including (1) the denaturalization and extradition of Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan, a German-born New York City housewife who had served as a guard supervisor at a Nazi death camp; (2) public denunciation of the INS by the investigator and prosecutor in the Braunsteiner Ryan trial, each of whom left the agency after accusing it of foot-dragging and coverup in other Nazi investigations; (3) publicity attendant the simultaneous filing of three deportation actions against alleged war criminals in 1976; (4) Congressional oversight hearings in 1974, 1977 and 1978 which highlighted deficiencies in the INS procedures for investigating Nazi cases; (5) a GAO study which concluded that the INS investigations of Nazis were "deficient or perfunctory;" (6) publicity surrounding the prosecution of a denaturalization case against the Romanian Orthodox Bishop of America for his alleged involvement in atrocities during World War II; (7) the 1977 bestseller *Wanted! The Search for Nazis in America*; and (8) NBC's 1978 broadcast of a powerful four-part miniseries entitled "Holocaust."

Until 1973, Nazi cases were handled as any other immigration matter – district by district with no central coordination. In order to increase efficiency, the INS that year designated New York as the Project Control Office to review and coordinate all Nazi cases. A year later, the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law was holding routine oversight hearings on the INS. Newly-elected New York City Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman was on the subcommittee. Having been alerted that there were Nazi war criminals in
the country, and that the INS was doing nothing about it, she threw out a skeptical question to INS Commissioner L.F. Chapman, Jr. Once he acknowledged that such Nazis were in the United States, she was riveted by the issue. In the words of her then legislative assistant, she "sunk her teeth in it and would not let it go." 

A month after the hearing, Holtzman held a news conference in which she berated the agency for inadequate investigations and proposed creating a War Crimes Strike Force within the INS. Shortly thereafter, she asked the INS for the name of every person under investigation. The INS gave her 73 names and DOJ made public a list of 37 who were under investigation.

Holtzman did not merely hector; she got down in the trenches. She met at her office with INS investigators to review the leading investigations; she visited INS' New York office and spent hours reviewing the files; and she sent the INS detailed critiques and analyses of the agency's work.

The INS was not the sole focus of Congresswoman Holtzman's concern. She wrote to the Secretary of State complaining about his Department’s "continuing failure to cooperate" with the INS in its efforts to investigate alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. Dissatisfied with the response she received, she released the exchange of letters and charged the State Department with "inaction and indifference." Eventually, the State Department acknowledged to Holtzman that it had 68 names from INS about whom it had not yet asked the U.S.S.R. for any pertinent information. The State Department went on to promise that henceforth names would be submitted "as soon as they are received." Holtzman also traveled to Germany to exhort the authorities there to file charges against a resident in her district who, as chief of a police precinct in Latvia, had assisted in the persecution of civilians during the War.
In early 1977, Holtzman and a colleague called on Congressman Joshua Eilberg, Chair of the House Subcommittee, to hold new hearings on Nazi war criminals. The INS used the hearing to announce preemptively that it was overhauling its procedures for investigating Nazis. Henceforth, a Washington task force of four trial attorneys and one lead attorney, under the purview of the INS General Counsel, would review all INS files and material connected with alleged Nazi war criminals. Denaturalization and deportation proceedings would be filed if the evidence so warranted.17

INS General Counsel David Crosland chose Martin Mendelsohn, an attorney working on the Hill, to head the new unit. Coming from a Civil Rights background, Crosland thought it especially appropriate that the head of a unit involved in World War II persecution be Jewish. While he was not actively looking to hire a Jewish chief, all things being equal, and they were, he was pleased that he was able to do so.18 The office was not fully staffed until late summer of 1978. Mendelsohn hired four attorneys, two INS agents, four graduate students fluent in German, and one archivist. The task force was called the Special Litigation Unit (SLU).

Crosland ordered all closed cases involving alleged Nazi war criminals still alive and in the United States reopened for investigation.19 In addition, the SLU had to deal immediately with cases already filed by INS and U.S. Attorneys throughout the country.20 Mendelsohn decided, on a case by case basis, what role the SLU would play. He made these determinations based on the stage of the litigation and his assessment of the local Assistant U.S. Attorneys.21

Mendelsohn also tried to establish working relationships with other nations whose cooperation he deemed essential to the SLU. To that end, he traveled to Israel and the Soviet Union, both of which were home to potential witnesses. The U.S.S.R. also was the repository for
many relevant Nazi war records which had been taken by the Russians as they conquered Nazi-held territories. Mendelsohn spoke with the appropriate authorities about access to witnesses and records. Both he and Crosland also endeavored to keep the Jewish community apprised of office plans and accomplishments. 22

Once he was chosen to lead the SLU, Mendelsohn was a frequent visitor to Congresswoman Holtzman's office - a fact which caused friction between him and General Counsel Crosland, who was neither invited to, nor informed about, the visits. Because the SLU needed immediately to get up to speed on previously filed cases, the unit made little attempt to develop cases on its own. Mendelsohn visited some of the U. S. Attorneys' Offices (USAOs) litigation these cases but felt himself at a disadvantage because they viewed him as an INS attorney rather than a DOJ attorney. 23

An additional problem concerned funding. The 1979 Department of Justice Authorization bill earmarked $2,052,000 for the SLU. However, the Appropriation bill made no mention of earmarked funds, and there was some question as to which bill had precedence. Less than half the designated amount was spent on the unit by INS during Fiscal Year 1979.

In January 1979, the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel advised that the full $2,052,000 should be set aside. Whether the SLU needed all this funding was debatable. Crosland and Associate Attorney General (AAG) Michael Egan believed the unit was overfunded; Mendelsohn (backed by Jewish groups and Holtzman) felt otherwise. 24 The solution to both the stature and funding problems, as Holtzman and Mendelsohn saw it, was to have the unit moved to the main building of Department of Justice. This would instantly provide increased visibility and access to the Department's greater support resources; the full
allocation could easily be spent in such an environment.\textsuperscript{25}

This was not a change that either the Department of Justice or INS sought.\textsuperscript{26} The Associate Attorney General, the INS Commissioner and INS General Counsel met with Holtzman to try to persuade her that such a move was unnecessary. They were unsuccessful; she threatened to legislate the move if the Department did not accede.\textsuperscript{27}

The Department of Justice bowed to the pressure. Testifying before Holtzman's Subcommittee, AAG Egan, whose supervisory aegis included INS, was candid about the reasons for the move and his reaction to it.

I have reluctantly come to agree that the unit must be moved from INS. The immediate director of the unit, Mr. Mendelsohn, has urged this for some time.

\* \* \*

I am sorry to see it pass out of my supervision before its mission is successfully accomplished. However, the unit cannot perform without the support and confidence of this Subcommittee. I trust the transfer will help to achieve that support.\textsuperscript{28}

Mendelsohn gave little thought to where within the Department his section should be placed. Holtzman, however, did. She felt the Criminal Division had the most "heft." In addition, she felt that this would be the most appropriate fit since "the cases involve murder" with an order of proof almost as high as that required in a criminal trial.\textsuperscript{29}

The transfer officially took place on September 4, 1979, the date on which Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti signed an order giving the Criminal Division:

primary responsibility for detecting, investigating, and, where appropriate, taking legal action to deport, denaturalize, or prosecute any individual who was admitted as an alien into or became a naturalized citizen of the United States and who had assisted the Nazis by persecuting any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.\textsuperscript{30}
The new section was the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and it reported to the AAG for the Criminal Division, then Philip Heymann, through his deputy Mark M Richard (DAAG Richard). The Justice Department sent a memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys advising them of OSI's primacy in the prosecution of Nazi cases.

The AAG wanted a Director with "instant credibility" to give the office an auspicious start. He asked Walter Rockler, a former Nuremberg prosecutor and then a partner in a D.C. law firm, to help in the search. Rockler contacted several people, including Telford Taylor (chief prosecutor at Nuremburg) and Charles La Follete (Nuremburg prosecutor and later a Congressman from Indiana.) No one had any suggestions.

AAG Heymann then asked Rockler himself to consider the position; Rockler was not interested. He had spent the 35 years since Nuremberg "blotting out the war." (His wife, whom he met at Nuremberg, had been an Estonian slave laborer.) Moreover, at Nuremberg he had investigated and prosecuted bankers; he did not know the "gory stuff" about concentration camps that would be central to OSI prosecutions. And finally, he thought the cases "would be a bunch of garbage. [Nuremberg] had the big-timers." But eventually, as he mulled over the issue, he decided that the cases, though less significant than the ones in Nuremberg, were still worth filing.

There were practical problems, however. Rockler had four college-aged children to support. In addition, he was litigating several tax cases against the Department of Justice, and it would present a conflict of interest if he were in litigation against the Department of Justice at the same time he was in their employ. AAG Heymann offered solutions to both obstacles: DOJ would waive any conflict of interest and hire Rockler as a part-time contract employee. He could then be paid by the government on an hourly basis and still work at the firm part-time.
arrangement would last six to eight months, by which time the office would be established and a new director in place. Rockler's firm too was accommodating, agreeing to provide his full partnership draw, less only what he earned from the government.37

The SLU attorneys were invited to transfer \textit{en masse} and all but one made the move. The students and archivist, who had been hired on a temporary part-time basis, were given pink slips and had to reapply for a permanent position. All those who did were chosen. Mendelsohn was named Deputy Director of the unit. Rockler wanted him to oversee litigation while Rockler would assess new cases and deal with the mechanics of establishing the section. As Rockler described his own responsibilities:

\begin{quote}
I had to waste an awful lot of time seeing delegations of groups, the Baltics, the Ukrainians. I had delegations descend on me to plead the case of their countrymen. They were all being potentially persecuted. I didn't know anything about it. I would listen to them and be fairly non-committal. After a while I got fairly impatient with them and I said look, we're not going to pursue anybody because they are Latvian, Lithuanian or Ukrainian. It ain't a nationality designation. If we find they've engaged in anything, why don't you help us instead of criticizing us? Why don't you come forward with stuff so we'll get done with it? And I was short tempered and I didn't understand public relations. I didn't understand the job is a public relations job. Meanwhile the Jewish groups were descending on me and they had a different pitch, which I found extremely irritating too, which was: Where the hell have you been for 30 years? How come you haven't hung anybody? I thought to myself, they're all nuts. I mean people are totally polarized. They don't know what the hell goes on and they were annoying. Some of the particular Jewish groups had particular targets in mind. They wanted us to go after Mr. X, Mr. Y or Mr. Z. So I was wasting an awful lot of time on things like that. I had a couple of public appearances. I didn't want the public relations part of it anyhow, but there was no way to avoid it.38
\end{quote}

Rockler, as Mendelsohn before him, also traveled to the U.S.S.R. and Israel to speak with his counterparts.

Holtzman, meanwhile, kept her eye on the new section and periodically summoned
Rockler to report on the office.\textsuperscript{39} She also assisted in various ways. "[T]here were mechanisms she had to help OSI that DOJ just didn’t have. DOJ had to go through the State Department and it took way too long. She could cut right through that."\textsuperscript{40}

Thus, when she learned that OSI was having trouble getting documents it needed from Romania in order to prosecute Archbishop Trifa, she testified about the problem before a House subcommittee considering whether to extend Most Favored Nation status to Romania. Romania turned over documents shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{41} And she, along with Representative Hamilton Fish (the ranking Republican on her Immigration subcommittee) was able to gather 120 co-sponsors on a 1979 resolution urging the West German government to extend or abolish its statute of limitations governing the prosecution of Nazi war crimes. (It was abolished.\textsuperscript{42})

Like virtually everyone involved with OSI at the beginning, Rockler thought the office would complete its work in five or six years. He hoped to file a couple of cases before he left and expected Mendelsohn to succeed him. The relationship between the two soured, however, and Rockler began relying more on Neal Sher, an attorney hired by Mendelsohn, to supervise the litigation. Rockler felt that Mendelsohn was spending too much time on the Hill conferring with Holtzman (something no longer Mendelsohn’s responsibility) and not enough time on the cases. Rockler kept both AAG Heymann and DAAG Richard apprised of his concerns. In January 1980, DAAG Richard, acting on directions from AAG Heymann, assigned Mendelsohn to another section. The move infuriated Holtzman and various Jewish groups; emotions ran high on all sides.\textsuperscript{43}

Rockler’s successor was to be Allan Ryan.\textsuperscript{44} Just as Crosland had sought to hire a Jew to lead the section (all things being equal), AAG Heymann and DAAG Richard sought a non-Jew
Ryan welcomed the public relations aspects of the position much more than had Rockler. One of the first tasks he set for himself was the creation of an OSI agenda, to be approved by AAG Heymann and DAAG Richard; among the items listed was the need to keep the public informed of OSI’s work.

To that end, he sought to establish ties with both the Jewish and ethnic communities. He got help on both fronts from DOJ. AAG Heymann wrote to, and met with, Jewish leaders to assure them about Ryan and to reiterate the Department’s commitment to the success of OSI.

AAG Heymann also set a goal for resolving, within one year, all matters inherited from INS; by then suit should be filed or the case closed on the 250 pending INS investigations. The Jewish community responded positively and issued a press release in support of the fledgling section.

DOJ was not as successful in reassuring the Baltic community. They had two major concerns: (1) they viewed themselves as a group target; and (2) they distrusted evidence which came from any Iron Curtain country, as much of the evidence relied on by OSI did.

Ryan and various Department officials met with ethnic group leaders and asked their help in sorting out the “heroes from the collaborators.” Ryan also met with local groups and wrote to ethnic newspapers and activists in an effort to allay their concerns. It was to no avail.

In addition to soliciting support from Jewish and ethnic groups, Ryan also sought to win over Holtzman.

She had the reputation in OSI . . . of being . . . Ghengis Khan incarnate. You’d think going to see her was like climbing Mt. Everest to see the Dali Lama. She was a supporter of Marty Mendelsohn’s and . . . I had to speak with [her] because she was the key person on the Hill . . . . I basically told her what I said to the Jewish groups: Here’s who I am; here’s what I want to do. I can’t do it all at
once but give me some opportunity to do it and I think I will prove to you that I can do it. It was the beginning of a very mutually respectful relationship.52

Although Holtzman made peace with Ryan’s ascension to the directorship, she remained vigilant about OSI matters, issuing press releases to announce OSI filings and victories, exhorting the State Department to work with OSI to update its Watchlist53 (they did), demanding that State modify its visa application form to take into account new legislation precluding the entry of Nazi persecutors (also done),54 and notifying OSI when she learned of a potential subject. The priority she gave OSI matters was evident when she left Congress in December 1980; one of her last speeches on the Floor stressed the issue of Nazi war criminal prosecutions.55 Ryan remained at OSI until 1983. Leadership then passed to his Deputy, Neal Sher.

It is hard to overstate the obstacles the office initially had to overcome. As noted earlier, many records had been destroyed. Those which remained (including German military and administrative records, newspapers and magazines published or supported by the German occupation authorities, post-war trials and transcripts) were scattered throughout the world, the bulk of them in Germany and the U.S.S.R. Within each country they were dispersed among many archives. The rules of access varied and research aids were generally limited or non-existent.

In that Cold War era, arguably the most difficult hurdle was getting information from the Soviet Union. Holtzman and Eilberg, Mendelsohn, and later Rockler, DAAG Richard and Ryan, all made trips to the U.S.S.R. to discuss the issue. Attorney General Civiletti raised the matter in a meeting at the Justice Department with the Chief Justice of the Soviet Supreme Court.56 All were promised that the United States would be allowed to take videotaped depositions of Soviet witnesses and to have increased archival access. Although the Soviets generally made good on
their deposition promise, archival access was much more difficult. The Soviets had inadequate archival indices and were not willing to grant access directly to Western scholars. OSI therefore had to rely on the Soviets to do the research, although the Soviets often gave the task to prosecutors and police investigators, rather than to historians. All this, coupled with the fact that Soviet evidentiary requirements were so different, often left OSI in need of more information.

There were also practical impediments. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries lacked the resources—both personnel and material—to accommodate many requests. It was not uncommon for a year to pass before there was a response; followups therefore often seemed impractical. Problems were often mundane but serious, including inadequate copying facilities, lack of toner or paper, and deteriorating records due to insufficient preservation. (At times OSI would provide toner and paper or bring a portable copying machine.)

Even within the United States there were enormous hurdles. Although the National Archives, Library of Congress and many private institutions have valuable resource material, too often pertinent information was destroyed in due course or so poorly kept that its value was limited. Material in private collections sometimes had restricted access. Even government agencies impeded OSI’s efforts. OSI attorneys complained that the CIA sometimes censored documents so heavily there was virtually no information provided. The Agency also narrowed research requests so that only information directly related to immigration and naturalization was shared. Moreover, it distinguished between “no identifiable information” and “no record.” Thus, if OSI asked for information about John Smith, a record of “Smith, FNU (first name unknown)” would not be considered identifiable, even if Smith FNU was a World War II figure; if the Agency had material from another governmental source, it would neither share it nor advise OSI
that it existed so that OSI could request it from the originating agency.\textsuperscript{61}

These problems got resolved, to some degree at least, in a variety of ways. The biggest and most dramatic change resulted from the collapse of Communism. Once the Berlin Wall came down, OSI was allowed access to most archives in the former Eastern bloc countries. Also, with time, many countries improved archival facilities and OSI developed and nurtured relationships with archivists around the world.\textsuperscript{62} And to the extent that OSI learned that documents were about to be destroyed in the United States, they intervened to stop the process.\textsuperscript{63} DAAG Richard helped smooth the way for greater access from the intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{64}

While the ability to gather evidence has greatly improved over the years, these are not easy cases to establish. Given the advanced age of survivors and questionable value of eyewitness testimony,\textsuperscript{65} a case is generally only as good as the archival evidence. What is extant and what is accessible varies. It generally falls on the historians—the backbone of the section—to secure the essential documentation. Their integration into the office makes OSI unique among litigating sections within the Department of Justice.
1. The INS first learned of the defendant after *The New York Times* ran a story about her past.


Before emigrating to the U.S., Braunsteiner Ryan had been convicted of manslaughter in Austria. She served 3 years in prison before being granted amnesty. The failure to report her conviction on her citizenship application was the basis for the INS denaturalization suit and trial. Braunsteiner Ryan voluntarily relinquished her citizenship. In response to Germany's request, she was extradited in 1973. After a prolonged trial, she was convicted in 1981 of "complicity in the deaths of more than 1,000 prisoners." She was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1996 she was released because of ill health; she died in 1999.

There were a significant number of female camp guards and women served in other capacities as well. It is very difficult to determine whether a notable number of women persecutors emigrated, however, since INS could only identify emigrés by the name on their travel documents; if a woman married before emigrating, INS would have no record of her maiden name. OSI believes that few women guards came to the U.S. because guards were generally selected from Austria or Germany. The post-war immigration laws did not favor emigrants from those countries. See pp. 36, 38.

INS never filed suit against another woman for her World War II activities. In 2006, OSI filed its first — and to date only — case against a woman. See discussion of Elfriede Rinkel in the Appendix.

2. Attorney Vince Schiano resigned while investigator Tony De Vito retired. Although both men faulted the INS for its handling of Nazi investigations, De Vito accused the agency of a conspiracy to thwart the investigations; Schiano opined that there might be more benign explanations, including inefficiency or personal animus toward him. "Nazis in America," *The MacNeil/Lehrer Report*, Feb. 2, 1977.


5. See pp. 203-228.

6. Howard Blum (Times Books).
7. Interviewed in 2002, Ms. Holtzman no longer recalled who had alerted her to the issue. It is possible that it was INS investigator De Vito and INS prosecutor Schiano. When interviewed on the PBS television program “Nazis in America,” The MacNeil/Lehrer Report, Feb. 2, 1977, Schiano said that they had “perhaps” spoken to then-Congresswoman Holtzman about the need for an organized task force to investigate alleged Nazi war criminals.

8. Apr. 11, 2001 recorded interview with Jim Schweitzer (hereafter Schweitzer interview). In 1979, when Holtzman became chair of the subcommittee, Schweitzer was made committee counsel.


11. Aug. 20, 1974 memo to Files from Investigator O.H. Colton re “Alleged War Criminals; Meeting with Representative Elizabeth Holtzman.”


15. Sept. 21, 1977 letter to Holtzman from John DeWitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs; Sept. 30 Holtzman press release re “State Department Accedes to Holtzman Demand for Stepped up Action on Nazi War Criminals.”

16. Sept. 24, 1975 letter from District Attorney in Landau/Pfalz to Central Office of State Judicial Administrations in Ludwigsburg. The resident was Boleslav Maikovskis. Germany refused Holtzman’s request. OSI ultimately filed charges against him and he was ordered deported in 1984. The circumstances of his departure from the United States are discussed at p. 430.


18. Apr. 10, 2001 recorded interview with Crosland (hereafter Crosland interview).

20. Among the cases already filed were Maikovskis, Detlavs, Hazners, Kaminskas (deportations); Demjanjuk, Trifa, Walus, Kowalczuk, Paskevicius and Fedorenko (denaturalizations).


22. *E.g.*, Feb. 27, 1979 letter from Crosland to Richard Krieger, Executive Director of the Jewish Federation of North Jersey.

23. Mendelsohn interview, *supra*, n. 21. Although INS was then part of the Department of Justice, it was a separate component.


26. According to Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) for the Criminal Division, the Department was opposed to assuming responsibility over an initiative designed to focus on non-criminal remedies. Moreover, the Department was reluctant to carve out jurisdiction from a component (INS). DAAG Richard interview, Apr. 18, 2001. Mendelsohn has an alternative explanation, *i.e.*, that no one expected the government to win these cases and the Department did not want to go to the Hill for appropriations with a reduced win ratio. Mendelsohn interview, *supra*, n. 21.

27. Interview with Liz Holtzman, June 12, 2002 (hereafter Holtzman interview). Congresswoman Holtzman became chair of the Immigration subcommittee after Eilberg, indicted on bribery charges, lost his reelection bid in 1978. He pled guilty and was sentenced to five years probation.


30. Holtzman interview, *supra*, n. 27.

31. Order No. 851-79. While Sept. 1979 is the official creation of OSI, in fact it was in existence before then. By memorandum of Apr. 4, 1979, the DAAG for Administration announced that the SLU would be transferred on Apr. 22, 1979; an Apr. 30 directive from Philip Heymann, AAG for the Criminal Division, announced that the new unit would be established on
May 3.

32. The office was originally to report to DAAG Robert Keuch but due to an illness in his family, the responsibility was transferred to DAAG Richard.


34. June 7, 2000 recorded interview with Heymann (hereafter Heymann interview). All references in this chapter to AAG Heymann’s actions come from this interview unless otherwise noted.

35. May 10, 2000 recorded interview with Walter Rockler (hereafter Rockler interview). All references to his words and actions come from this interview unless otherwise noted.

36. Rockler recalled his reaction to the waiver: “I thought this was anomalous as hell but it didn’t sound bad to me.”

37. Rockler originally estimated his time would be fairly evenly divided between OSI and private practice. As it turned out, he spent approximately 80% of his time on OSI matters. He then renegotiated with his firm and took a 25% cut in draw for the duration of his government service.

38. While this memory of the Jewish groups comports with Mendelsohn’s description, both DAAG Richard and AAG Heymann recall the Jewish groups as simply seeking resolution – one way or another. According to DAAG Richard and AAG Heymann, the Jewish leadership just wanted to see some movement in the cases.

39. Rockler and Holtzman did not get along. She perceived him as having the “typical Justice Department attitude,” i.e., that the Hill should not be meddling in litigation. Moreover, she felt loyal to Mendelsohn, who she thought should have been chosen as Director. Rockler meanwhile, having worked in the same law firm as she, but 20 years prior, viewed her as “a pup.” Schweitzer and Rockler interviews, supra, notes 8 and 35.

40. Schweitzer interview, supra, n. 8.

41. See pp. 210-211.

42. H. Res. 196 (96th Cong., 1st Sess.) gave as one of its supporting reasons that the United States was “moving aggressively” against persons suspected of war crimes and had established a special unit within the Department of Justice to handle these cases. The resolution passed 401 to 0 (with 2 votes of “present.”)

The U.S. was not the only country to pressure Germany on this issue. According to an officer of the Czechoslovak political intelligence service who defected to the west, the Soviets too wanted to prevent lapse of the statute of limitations. To that end, they worked with the
Czechs to devise an elaborate ruse. "Operation Neptune" involved taking authentic German military records from Czech and Soviet archives and submerging them at the bottom of Black Lake, some 120 miles from Prague. They were then "inadvertently discovered" by a team of divers working in association with a Czech television crew. The "newly-discovered" documents were then publicized as proof that Czechoslovakia had a great number of original and important Nazi documents at its disposal, and that it would be irresponsible for West Germany to allow the prosecution of previously unidentified Nazi war criminals to become time-barred before the documents could be evaluated. The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare, by Ladislav Bittman (Syracuse University Press, 1972).

43. Holtzman accused the Justice Department of exacting retribution on Mendelsohn for his role in moving the unit from the INS. Rockler, equally blunt, claimed that Mendelsohn would not follow instructions, placed too much emphasis on public relations, and had neglected management of the office. AAG Heymann attributed the move to a "personality conflict" between Mendelsohn and Rockler, an explanation which Rockler felt was inadequate. "Justice Dept. to Oust Nazi Hunter," by Robert Pear, The New York Times, Jan. 6, 1980, p. A1; "Jewish Leaders Say Justice Department Moving Against Nazis," by James Rubin, AP, Jan. 18, 1980.

At the time, Mendelsohn declined to comment in the press. Years later, he opined that part of the problem lay in the fact that he was not a "team player." He also felt there was resentment of his ability to get funding earmarked for the section. Mendelsohn interview, supra, n. 21. Earmarked funding continued for several years, often at levels higher than the Department requested. See e.g., H. Rep. 98-759, Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1985 (98th Cong., 2nd Sess.), pp. 5-6.

44. Ryan came from the Justice Department's Solicitor General's office and had written the appellate brief and argued the seminal OSI case of United States v. Fedorenko before the Fifth Circuit. For an account of how Ryan came to be chosen, see pp. 53-55.


46. Sept. 19, 2005 e-mail from Ryan to Judy Feigin re "Query PS."


48. Jan. 16, 1980 joint press release issued by the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress.

49. See p. 547, n. 8.

50. See e.g., Feb. 23, 1981 letters from Ryan to Petro Mirchuk, President Ukrainian Society of Political Prisoners, Inc., and to the Editor of Vaba Eesti Sona (an Estonian-American newspaper).
51. See e.g., Jan. 1985 Latvian News Digest, “If You Fought Communism You must be Deported Says 1979 US Law;” Sept. 1983 Darbininkas (Brooklyn, NY) “How to Defend Oneself from Attacks by OSI.” Many Eastern Europeans were concerned since they had falsified their place of birth on their visa applications in order to avoid the possibility of repatriation to a country under Communist domination. Ryan sought in vain to explain that this was not the type of misrepresentation OSI was interested in pursuing. This distrust of OSI had two serious consequences: it cut off evidentiary sources for the government and put innocent people in unwarranted fear. Recorded interview with Allan Ryan, Oct. 6, 2000 (hereafter Ryan interview).

52. Ryan interview, supra, n. 51.

53. For a discussion of the Watchlist, see pp. 297-309.

54. Oct. 8, 1980 letter from Holtzman to Secretary of State Muskie; Oct. 24 response from Muskie to Holtzman.


57. The Soviets used a name-linked index that indicated whenever a name was mentioned, but did not cross-reference supporting documentation. Poland was the only Eastern European country that allowed OSI historians direct archival access during the Cold War.

58. Soviet cases only required proof that the defendant was a member of a certain unit, whereas OSI also needed historical context about the unit.

59. July 6, 1984 memo from OSI historian David Marwell to Director Sher re “Soviet Archives.” See also, Oct. 13, 1980 memo from Marwell to Director Ryan on the same topic.

60. For example, in 1976 all Displaced Person Commission records (other than reject files) were destroyed in due course. May 12, 1978 letter to then-SLU (and later OSI) attorney Robert Boylan from J. Adler, Chief, Reference Service Branch Federal Archives & Records Center. Preliminary worksheets completed by those seeking admission under the RRA were destroyed in 1958. Oct. 7, 1981 memo to OSI historian David Marwell from Alice Harris, Department of State re “Disposal Schedule on Foreign Service Visa Records in 1956 [sic].”

61. See e.g., Nov. 30, 1988 memo to Deputy Director Eli Rosenbaum from OSI attorney Philip Sunshine; May 23, 1989 memo to Rosenbaum from OSI Senior Litigation Counsel Ronnie Edelman.

62. Still, problems exist. Due to deteriorating diplomatic relations with Ukraine during the first years of the 21st century, American researchers have been denied access to some valuable
archival material concerning Hungarian persecution of the Jews. Mar. 5, 2004 letter to Ukraine Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych from Congressman Tom Lantos.

Another problem exists in Russia where a treasure trove of documents is housed in the FSB (formerly KGB) Archives in Moscow. While OSI researchers can view documents there (and documents in outlying archives are sometimes sent there for OSI viewing), they cannot make reproductions or even request them on-site. A request in writing is made after the OSI historian returns to the United States. The Archive itself will not respond to requests; everything is done through intermediaries. Thus, the American Citizens Service Section at the American Embassy contacts the Russian procurator (prosecutor) who in turn deals with the FSB Archive. Not surprisingly, given this labyrinthian system, the response time is painfully slow; two-year delays are not uncommon. Compounding these problems, the FSB Archives has made little effort to preserve documents, some of which are merely onion skin carbons. Reproductions, when they finally come, are sometimes unsatisfactory.

While deterioration of documents is a problem in many former Eastern bloc archives, an even more serious problem occurred in Yugoslavia. The ravages of war in the 1990s destroyed entirely many archived documents.

63. Thus, in 1982, when the Archives division in Bayonne NJ was about to destroy DPC rejection records, OSI got custody of the documents. In the ensuing years, the State Department, the CIA and the Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) granted permission to declassify most of the material in their files.

64. DAAG Richard’s contribution to the section extended far beyond liaison with the intelligence community. From its founding (and until 1999), OSI reported to him. He reviewed all cases and was the conduit between OSI and the politically changing top management within the Department. In Ryan’s words:

   Mark was the whole show... Mark was the guy who made this thing work... He was the guy in the trenches... Mark looked out for us, looked out for me, pointed us in the right direction, told me what was going on... If I had to do it on my own, it would not have been as much fun or nearly as successful.

   Heymann expressed similar sentiments. According to him, DAAG Richard “was at the center of a lot of things that I am very proud of taking credit for now, but this one more than any other... I just turned it over to Mark. Mark was the senior point man. I remember his spending a lot of time on this... Allan [Ryan] was reporting in every sense of the word on a very substantial basis to Mark... Mark who always has 2 or 3 or 5 major activities or initiatives. This was almost number one in terms of the time it took, the energy he put into it... [He got] the building space, the agents... relations with CIA, getting materials. Both Rockler and Ryan were very strong but they were both beginners in this world and... Mark was giving it a lot of time and energy. He wanted it to succeed. He knew I wanted it to succeed. He knew there was all the Congressional support we wanted and no shortage of money for it...”

65. See discussion of the Walus and Demjanjuk cases at pp. 71-100, 150-174.
The Historians

In the 1976 movie "Marathon Man," a Nazi dentist who worked in a concentration camp is seen walking in Manhattan's diamond district. A Holocaust victim recognizes him and starts screaming. As the dentist flees from the scene, others join the chase. It is great cinema but it bears little relation to reality.

In only one instance was an OSI case based on a Holocaust survivor recognizing his persecutor in the civic square. In a handful of other cases, the government was alerted to a potential defendant by "Nazi hunters." However, most Nazi persecutors found in the United States are discovered through the unglamorous and dogged review of Nazi-era documents. The work is done by multi-lingual OSI historians in archives around the world.

That the government needed individuals with combined language skills and historical expertise was not immediately self-evident. Government cases are generally developed by an investigative agent and a prosecuting attorney. When the SLU was established in 1977, the traditional paradigm was modified slightly in recognition of the need for linguists to review Third Reich records at the National Archives. As noted earlier, the SLU was staffed by four attorneys, two INS agents, four graduate students fluent in German, and one German-speaking archivist. Though the students and archivist were called "historians," in fact only one was formally trained as such.

As it turned out, no new cases were filed by the SLU; the unit assisted with, or oversaw, cases previously filed by INS or U.S. Attorney's Offices. Since OSI was established as a result of tremendous publicity and pressure about the need to get "Nazi war criminal" cases moving, there was an urgency to have the office fully staffed as quickly as possible. This was
accomplished, in part, by borrowing investigators from a variety of agencies, including INS, Fish and Wildlife, IRS, Secret Service and the State Department. None had any particular knowledge about the Nazi era and only one or two had any proficiency in German. Two historians were hired during the nine-month tenure of Director Rockler. When they were added to the graduate student pool, the ratio of investigators to historians was approximately 2:1.

Rockler began with two Deputy Directors, Martin Mendelsohn to oversee litigation, and Art Sinai to supervise investigations. Though trained as a lawyer, Sinai was, by all accounts (including his own), an investigator at heart. His role in the office was essentially that of Chief Investigator and he had a traditional investigator's approach: investigators gather the evidence, attorneys present the case in court. The historians at the time felt as if they were second class citizens. The fact that Sinai reported directly to Rockler, but the Chief Historian reported to Sinai, reinforced those feelings.  

By virtue of their differing skills, the investigators and historians approached cases differently. Investigators spent the bulk of their time trying to find the defendant, locate witnesses, and handle liaison with foreign governments and domestic agencies. Case development was defendant-specific. Were there documents detailing what he had done? Eyewitnesses who could testify to his malfeasance? In most instances, the answer was no, since the bulk of OSI investigations involved camp guards or members of auxiliary police units about whom there is rarely information involving personal wrongdoing.

Peter Black was the first formally trained historian hired by OSI. He came to the office in 1980. Following the approach Germans took in their war crimes prosecutions, he began to concentrate on the unit in which a subject served. What were the duties and responsibilities of
that unit?  Who else was in it?  What could be learned about daily life in the organization? Was this a unit – as many were – whose major purpose was persecution of Jews and other civilian “undesirables?”

He, and other historians as they were hired, spent most of their time in archives. They searched for rosters, identity cards issued to members of auxiliary police forces and camp guards, requests for services or benefits (e.g., pensions) in which the applicant listed his wartime assignments and activities, and pertinent references and statements from the hundreds of post-war trials conducted in Europe. Given their expertise in the matters under investigation, historians could recognize the significance of a document which might otherwise go unnoticed. Eyewitness testimony could corroborate archival information, but the historians did not want to rely on it as a primary method of proof.6

While their academic training led historians to seek archival evidence, there were practical considerations as well. The Walus prosecution7 had made abundantly clear the problems of witness identification. Moreover, even if memories were accurate at the outset – a dubious proposition considering the fact that victims rarely knew their captors’ names and had little occasion for direct eye contact – these memories were much less reliable as witnesses and subjects aged.

Despite the differing approaches of investigators and historians, the lines between them were not always demarked. In some instances, historians interviewed witnesses, especially if the historian had greater foreign language skills than the assigned investigator. Where both were qualified, the assignment was generally based on attorney preference.

Inevitably, there was tension between the investigators and historians, much of it related
to status. Who was going to put the case together, the investigator or the historian? Who would decide which investigations to open and which witnesses should be interviewed? Who would accompany the lawyer to the interview? 

When Allan Ryan became Director in March 1980, he began to reassess the office paradigm. As he saw it, the proportion of investigators to historians was inverse; historians needed to be the lynchpin in order for judges to understand fully the significance and context of the cases.

[W]e were not going to win cases by convincing the judge that here's a guy who had cheated on his immigration forms. We'd only win cases if we'd convince the judge that here was a war criminal with blood on his hands.... My sense that we needed to do this for the judge reflected my own unfamiliarity with the area. I had always considered myself something of a World War II buff, but I had absolutely no clue of the organization, the detail, the structure, the actions, the sequence of events, particularly on the Eastern front where most of our attention was concentrated.

There were two aspects to Ryan's approach: (1) hire trained historians to develop the cases; and (2) engage an outside "expert" historian to testify at trial.

One immediate problem in hiring historians was salary. Lawyers entered government service at the GS-11 level and moved quickly to GS-13; historians with PhDs started as GS-9s. Ryan turned to DAAG Richard who arranged for historians to be promoted quickly to GS-11s.

Two early efforts proved particularly fruitful in the search for outside experts. First, OSI reached out for Raul Hilberg, author of *The Destruction of European Jewry*, then, as now, arguably the preeminent text on the issue. Hilberg testified in a series of early cases for OSI, including *U.S. v. Kowalchuk*, the first trial handled by the office. Second, in April 1980, OSI sent two historians (and a third attended at his own expense) to a symposium on Hitler and the
National Socialist Era held at the Citadel in South Carolina. One of the main purposes in attending was to make contact with historians in the field in order to educate them about OSI. They met Charles Sydnor and Christopher Browning, two leading Holocaust historians. Hilberg and Sydnor were the two experts most used by OSI over the years; Browning also testified for the office.

An unexpected byproduct of the South Carolina conference was a handwritten list of suggestions for improving the lot of OSI historians. It was written by the three OSI attendees as they sat overlooking Fort Sumter during a break in the Conference; they dubbed it “The Charleston Manifesto.” It makes clear how marginalized the historians felt. They wanted, “like the attorneys and investigators,” to be assigned to individual cases on a formal basis. Such assignment should provide “full and ongoing briefing on legal case background, strategy and status” as well as participation in meetings concerning the case. They also sought the authority to develop and maintain contact with historical and archival experts “under the historians own names” and the right to “develop and follow up research leads” both in the United States and abroad. The latter complaint was based on the writers’ perception that travel was treated as a perquisite which generally went to investigators and lawyers rather than to historians.

Though the Manifesto was never formally presented to OSI management, its essence was passed on orally. Over the next few years, the key suggestions were all adopted. In addition, when Art Sinai left in the summer of 1981, the Chief Historian began reporting directly to the Director.

Given the subject matter of OSI cases, the attorneys were generally not well versed in the field. Before meeting with the “outside” historians in preparation for trial, the attorneys needed
reports concerning the relevant historical background. These reports, often over a hundred pages long, were prepared by OSI historians. Most attorneys soon realized that it helped to have the in-house historian along to resolve any ambiguities or questions when they met with the expert.

Other factors too affected the increasing role for historians. Some of the traditional work performed by investigators—finding defendants and witnesses—became routine and simple with the advent of computers and, much later, the internet. For example, it is no longer necessary to do world-wide searches for survivor witnesses. Internet sites and genealogy links give instant information. On-line access to government records also makes searching for a subject simple. Within a matter of minutes, OSI can ascertain whether someone in the United States is alive and, if so, where he is living. This effort used to take months of investigators’ time.

There was thus less for the investigators to do while the work for historians was increasing. Since most of the investigators were on loan from other agencies, they were simply replaced by newly-hired historians once their loan period (generally one or two years) expired.

By the late 80s, the position of the historians seemed secure. They had largely supplanted investigators and by now they were being paid as GS-14s, a salary much higher than most would have earned in academia, their most likely alternative employment. Moreover, in 1986, Peter Black assumed many of the responsibilities of the Chief Historian. Unlike his predecessor, he was formally trained in the field and was seen by his colleagues as willing to fight for their rightful place in the office.

Two things, however, served to shake the historians’ security. The first was OMB Circular A-76, first issued in 1955, and designed to privatize various government functions when the government can save at least 10% by doing so. Different administrations have attached more
or less significance to the Circular. In the late 80s, during the administration of George H.W. Bush, it received renewed emphasis. Within the Department of Justice, one of the few groups targeted for privatization was the OSI historians.

Under the A-76 plan, a private company would interview applicants and then submit a report and resumés to OSI. OSI could choose from among the names submitted, but would have no opportunity to itself interview the applicants. The contract employees would be lower paid than OSI historians and would receive no benefits. DAAG Richard and the OSI leadership were strongly opposed to the concept, fearing that it would dilute the quality of historians and therefore, ultimately, of OSI. Congressmen, alerted by OSI to the problem, intervened to prevent its application to OSI.

The second employment scare came in 1993, when OSI itself began hiring on a contract basis. Newly-hired historians and attorneys were engaged for two year terms, though at the same salary (and with the same benefits) as if they were permanent hires. The contracts were renewable for one more two year period, and then, for a final one year period. The rationale for this change of protocol was that the office was not expected to continue significantly longer and therefore there was no need for long-term hires. However, the office did not disband and in August 2004, all the contract historian positions were converted into full-time government positions.

That the office was still in existence in 2004 is due largely to the development of a research and development program which was a natural outgrowth of the archival approach adopted by the historians. INS and the SLU had been reactive—responding to information presented to them by outside sources (often the media). Once historians uncovered rosters and
other archival material, the office became proactive. It submitted lists of names to INS to determine whether any of the men had entered the United States. Without such an R & D program, the office might well have closed within the five years everyone assumed at the outset to be its life expectancy.

In addition to transforming the way OSI learns about subjects and investigates cases, the historians have increased enormously the body of Holocaust knowledge. They have done so in various ways. As part of OSI’s research and case development, the historians have amassed the largest concentration of documents in the world concerning Trawniki – a German-run training camp in Poland for concentration camp guards. Analysis of this data – often as part of the historical reports prepared for OSI litigation – has helped explain how the Nazis trained men, many of whom were prisoners of war, to brutally persecute civilians. The Trawniki story has been accepted by courts and made public in a series of OSI decisions. OSI historians have also unearthed and sorted out the role indigenous police forces played in assisting the Nazis in Estonia and Lithuania. Until the Cold War ended, and OSI historians gained access to archives previously behind the Iron Curtain, there was widespread belief that the mass murder of Jews in those two countries was done by the Germans. The much more complex story of indigenous participation is now part of the record in many OSI cases. Moreover, with some assistance from the attorneys, OSI historians have written exhaustive reports on controversial Holocaust subjects including Mengele, Barbie, Waldheim, Verbelen and some Watchlist candidates. They also contributed significantly to a State Department report on Nazi gold.

As of this writing, OSI has seven historians and one investigator. Historians are very much involved in decision-making, both on the macro and micro level. The Chief Historian is a
Deputy Director of the section and consults with the Director and Principal Deputy on almost all major decisions. Staff historians work and strategize with attorneys on individual cases.

Despite the near parity, however, there is a difference in perspective. Some historians speak privately about "historical truth" versus "judicial truth," and express some frustration about the difference. As explained by one:

You are going to, in the course of a proceeding that is like a criminal prosecution, overemphasize simply through focus, if not through rhetoric, but sometimes through rhetoric as well. You're going to overemphasize the role of this individual because that's what the trial is about. In the larger context of things, you wouldn't have sympathy for [him], though you might, but his role is much less sinister than it would appear in a trial directed about his person.
1. Jacob Tannenbaum, discussed at pp. 106-116.

2. E.g., Canadian "Nazi hunter" Steven Rambam alerted OSI that Johann Leprich, a former OSI defendant, had returned to the U.S., although Rambam could not pinpoint his location. See p. 441. Simon Wiesenthal notified The New York Times about Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan. See p. 14, n. 1. The Simon Wiesenthal Center brought Harry Männl to OSI's attention. Männl is discussed at pp. 300-301, 456-457. In some instances, however, Nazi hunters have publicly identified people as persecutors who turned out not to be so.

3. Some SLU documents reference four historians rather than five. However one of the students was working out of New York and therefore may have inadvertently been omitted.

The students had an advantage to INS beyond their language skills. They were much cheaper to hire than INS agents who, because they were authorized to carry weapons, were entitled to mandatory overtime payments. INS "historians" were thus seen, in part, as a way to get investigators more cheaply. Apr. 11, 2001 telephone call with former INS General Counsel David Crosland.

4. Oct. 11, 2000 recorded interview with former OSI historian (and later Chief Historian) Peter Black (hereafter Black interview); Apr. 2, 2001 recorded interview with former OSI historian David Marwell (hereafter Marwell interview); Apr. 25, 2002 discussion with OSI historian Steven B. Rogers. The Chief Historian had been hired by Rockler. He had been a translator at Nuremberg and had thereafter worked at the Center of Military History.

5. One major exception concerns guards at the Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria who were responsible for the deaths of persons in the camp. An OSI historian, doing research at the National Archives, found a book entitled "Unnatural Death Book," in which the Nazis recorded all instances of Mauthausen guards killing internees. Incident reports and diagrams were kept. (Natural deaths included death from starvation, overwork, and disease. Shooting of an alleged potential escapee was considered "unnatural").

6. A dramatic example of this involved preparation of the Waldheim Report (discussed at pp. 310-329). OSI historians recognized that "O3" was Waldheim's rank in the military, and that documents hand initialed "W" from the O3 officer in his unit on certain dates had to have been from him. Oct. 20, 1986 memo to Sher from OSI historian Patrick Treanor re "Propaganda documents initialed by Waldheim."


8. See pp. 71-100.


10. Oct. 6, 2000 recorded interview with Allan Ryan. All Ryan references are to this interview unless otherwise noted. All the historians of that era who were interviewed agreed that it was
Ryan who focused on, and changed, the role of historians in the office.

11. "GS" stands for Government Service. Salaries within most of the federal government are based on one's GS level; the higher the level, the greater the salary.

12. Information about the Charleston Manifesto comes from the Black and Marwell interviews, supra, n. 4, as well as informal discussions with OSI historian Steve Rogers.

13. Black and Marwell interviews, supra, n. 4.

14. Under the rules of evidence then in effect, the report was not shown to the outside expert or defense counsel. In 1993, a modification of the Federal Rules of Evidence required the testifying expert to provide a written report to the defense before trial. As a practical matter, this did not alter the role of the OSI historian. In most cases, the report is drafted by an OSI historian and then modified, as warranted, by the testifying witness.

There is a downside for the OSI historians with this change in procedure. To the extent that their research becomes a report issued under the name of another historian, it impedes their ability to present the material as original work of their own. In a field where publications matter for academic appointments (which some OSI historians still see as a future employment option), this can diminish their ability to enhance their curriculum vitae.

15. In a 1982 television appearance, Allan Ryan, then OSI Director, described OSI historians as "people who know the city of Riga in 1941 better than they know the city of Baltimore in 1981." "After Hours," Jan. 7, 1982. This depth of knowledge was essential. "If a defendant were to say he had turned a corner and seen X, OSI needed to know if X was there or not." Remarks by Ryan at Oct. 24, 2004 luncheon commemorating OSI's 25th anniversary.

16. He was formally named to that post in 1989 when the Section's first Chief Historian left.

17. While this change in policy impacted both historians and attorneys, it is the historians who felt most concerned. They reasoned that the Department would always find a place for an attorney of proven worth; they felt less sanguine that there would be options for them.

18. In fact, the precariousness of being a contract employee did not lead to a diminishment in the quality of applicants or hires. This may be due in part to the fact that academia, an obvious alternative for well-credentialed PhDs, stopped hiring with the abandon of a generation ago.

19. In addition to serving as a training camp, Trawniki also was the site of a forced labor camp. On November 3, 1943 more than 6,000 men, women and children incarcerated there were shot to death. It was one of the largest single massacres of the Holocaust.

Trawniki men assisted in Aktion Reinhard ("Operation Reinhard"), the Nazi project whose ultimate goal was the annihilation of Polish Jewry. Under the aegis of Operation Reinhard, an estimated 1,700,000 Polish Jews were murdered, the labor of able-bodied survivors was exploited in slave labor camps under armed guard, and the personal belongings of the murdered Jews were stolen and distributed to benefit the German economy.
In 1990, shortly after Czechoslovakia’s “Velvet Revolution,” OSI historians were granted access to Czech and Slovak archives. They found a collection of rosters from the SS Battalion Streibel, a unit formed in the summer of 1944 during the evacuation of Trawniki. The rosters list hundreds of Trawniki men by name, rank and identity number. The information from this material eventually led OSI’s historians to the Central Archive in Moscow where they found a treasure trove of Trawniki material, including personnel files, deployment orders, and additional rosters.

As of this writing, the Trawniki documents have been used in at least 15 OSI cases.


21. Their role in Latvia first began to emerge as a result of German criminal investigations in the 1960s.

22. For example, there was apparently nothing mentioned during the Nuremberg investigations and trials about the Saugumas’ (Lithuanian security police) role in annihilation of Lithuania’s Jews.


Chapter Two: The Limits of the Law

Introduction

Those who OSI investigates have allegedly been involved in persecution of civilians based on their race, religion, national origin or political beliefs. No matter how egregious the persecutory activity, the United States cannot file criminal charges because the alleged crimes—committed on foreign soil against non-U.S. citizens—violated no U.S. law of the time. Any legislation to criminalize such activity retroactively would be constitutionally barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Unable to prosecute and incarcerate Nazi persecutors for their crimes, the government's goal is to remove them from the country. Their spouse and children, whether or not born in the United States, are not part of the litigation.

The most oft-used method of removal is deportation. However, the government cannot deport U.S. citizens. Therefore, if the subject became a naturalized U.S. citizen after emigrating, the government must first file suit to have his citizenship revoked. If that is accomplished, a deportation case can be filed.

Both denaturalization and deportation are civil matters. There is no statute of limitations controlling the filing of either of these proceedings. Given that OSI was not founded until 34 years after World War II ended, and continued investigating Nazi persecutors for over a quarter

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of a century thereafter, the defendants are invariably elderly. Since each phase of the two-step litigative process – denaturalization and deportation – takes years to complete, a significant number of OSI defendants die before litigation is finalized.

An understanding of the statutory bases for OSI's filings – including the limitations of the statutes under which it operates – is essential to assessing what OSI has been able to accomplish.
Statutes and Procedures

The basis for OSI’s cases, and sometimes even the decision to bring a case at all, depends in part on when the person entered the United States. Changing immigration laws established differing criteria for admission.

The exclusion of aliens deemed dangerous to the United States dates back to the Alien Act of 1798. However, it was not until passage of the Quota Act in 1921 that the U.S. imposed restrictive limitations based on nationality. The number of aliens to be admitted in any given year was capped at 3% of the number of persons of that nationality then in the U.S. Given the emigration patterns at the time, these restrictions favored western Europeans. The 1924 Immigration Act perpetuated this disparity.

Following World War II, millions of displaced persons sought to emigrate to the United States. Many were Jews hoping to start a new life after the decimation of the Holocaust. An even greater number, however, were non-Jews fleeing Communist rule in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Baltics. The situation was chaotic. Refugees were living in camps, often in countries other than their own, and without sufficient documentation to establish their identity or their history. In 1947, the U.N. created an International Refugee Organization (IRO) to help with issues of repatriation and resettlement. The IRO’s mandate did not include anyone who had “assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations,” or who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces.”

In 1948, the United States enacted the Displaced Persons Act which provided for the issuance of 205,000 visas over a two year period without regard to statutory quota limitations. The Act defined displaced persons in the same manner as had the IRO but added the additional
requirement that applicants have been in a displaced persons camp by December 22, 1945.

Congress' overriding concern at the time was in helping refugees escape Communist rule. Forty percent of the admittees had to be from the Baltic nations (newly incorporated into the Soviet Union) and 30 percent had to be farmers (as were many from the U.S.S.R.). A Baltic emigre who was a farmer thus had a double preference. Very few Jews were farmers or Balts. Moreover, many otherwise-qualified Jews did not meet the camp cutoff date. While the Act focused mostly on those seeking to escape Communist oppression, it recognized the possibility that some unwelcome former enemies might seek to settle in the U.S. It therefore precluded issuing visas to anyone who had assisted the enemy in persecuting civilian populations or had been "a member of, or participated in, any movement...hostile to the United States." Applicants who "wilfully misrepresented" or concealed "material facts" were also ineligible for admission under the DPA.

Congress created a Displaced Persons Commission (DPC) to carry out the Act's mandates and to determine the eligibility of applicants. Eligibility depended on a variety of factors, including personal interviews, medical examinations, sponsorship by a U.S. citizen or organization and investigative reports prepared by the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). This multi-tiered process was designed to provide reliable and detailed scrutiny of all applicants. In practice, however, the process was difficult to implement. Many relevant records had been destroyed during the war. Of those that survived, a significant percentage were in the Soviet Union, which had swept up huge caches of German material as the Nazis retreated westward. The Soviets did not give the U.S. access to the material. Even when records were available in the west, they often could not be accessed easily. They were dispersed in various countries and had
not yet been organized.

Despite these problems, there was enormous pressure to process the applicants quickly. This pressure came from a variety of groups, including non-governmental organizations in the U.S. which were sponsoring applicants for admission as well as Congressmen intervening on behalf of constituents. U.S. ships bringing the refugees to the United States could not wait endlessly. As a result, even when records were available in the West, they often could not be accessed in time. Many applicants were allowed to board ships with the proviso that they might be sent back if negative information were later found.3

In 1949, the State Department issued a regulation precluding issuance of a visa to any person:

who has advocated or acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf of the Axis countries during . . . [World War II].6

Anyone entering after 1949 (no matter under what law), also had to meet the standards set forth in this regulation.

In 1950, the DPA was extended two more years (and the immigration quota raised). In addition to the restrictions in the 1948 Act, Congress added a provision denying admission to anyone who had “advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national origin.” It also extended the camp eligibility date to 1947, thereby allowing more Jews to qualify.

Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1952. It established criteria for issuing entry visas and set quotas for emigration based on country of origin. Although there were no restrictions directly based on World War II activity, the Act denied visas
to anyone who either misrepresented or concealed pertinent information on his visa application.

Approximately 400,000 refugees entered the U.S. under the DPA. Of these, about 68,000 were Jews. More than 70% of the 400,000 were from countries occupied or dominated by the U.S.S.R. Hundreds of thousands more Eastern bloc refugees fled to western Europe. The pressure of this influx on countries trying to rebuild after the war was enormous. In order to alleviate some of the burden, Congress passed the Refugee Relief Act in 1953. It authorized the admission of additional non-quota refugees, i.e., refugees in addition to those admissible under the INA.

The RRA was similar to the DPA but differed in three respects pertinent to this report. First, it eliminated the "movement hostile" provision. Second, without any explanatory legislative history, it modified slightly the provision barring admission to those who "assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national origin." Under the RRA, admission was barred to those who personally assisted in such acts. Finally, the statute mandated that every country sending someone to the United States issue each emigrant a certificate of readmission guaranteeing reentry if the U.S. later determined that the emigrant had procured a U.S. visa by fraud. Refugees could not enter under the RRA if their country of embarkation did not accept this condition.

Screening under the RRA was not significantly better than it had been under the DPA since most of the same pressures remained. Approximately 200,000 people were admitted under the RRA before it expired at the end of 1956. Almost all were refugees and escapees from Communist persecution, natural calamity and military operations, or close relatives of citizens or permanent resident aliens of the U.S.
In order to revoke the citizenship of someone who became a naturalized U.S. citizen, the government files a case in federal district court. There is no applicable statute of limitations nor is there a right to a trial by jury; the matter is heard by a judge alone. The government must prove its case by "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence, a standard which the Supreme Court has equated to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The suit can be predicated on the ground that the naturalization process itself was flawed or that the applicant's admission into the country — without which naturalization would not have been possible — was faulty. Most commonly in OSI cases, the government alleges that the applicant's assistance in persecution made him ineligible to enter under the DPA or RRA and/or that he misrepresented or concealed material information in the process of applying for a visa or acquiring citizenship. The government may also assert that the applicant lacked the "good moral character" necessary for citizenship. Assisting in persecution, or misrepresenting and concealing the fact that one has done so, are bases for establishing lack of good moral character.

If the court revokes citizenship, the defendant can appeal to a federal court of appeals and, thereafter, seek review from the Supreme Court. The entire process takes years. Only after it is completed (and assuming that the revocation of citizenship is upheld), can the government begin deportation proceedings. For emigrés who never became naturalized U.S. citizens, however, deportation is the first court proceeding.

In deportation cases, the government must prove its case by "clear and convincing evidence." The matter is handled by an immigration judge. Again, there is no statute of limitations and no jury. However, unlike denaturalizations, hearsay is admissible. The court's ruling may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), from there to a federal
appellate court, and then to the Supreme Court. This, too, can take years.

Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts can provide the basis for deportation as well as denaturalization. However, anyone ordered deported on these grounds—even if the misrepresentation or concealment relates to persecution or war crimes—can ask the Attorney General to exercise his or her discretion in order to prevent deportation. One basis for such discretionary relief is that deportation would subject the defendant to persecution abroad. Another is that deportation would cause personal or family hardship.

Most OSI defendants could ask for a waiver on one or both of these grounds. Many had joined with the Nazis in opposing Communism. During the Cold War years, they feared retaliation if they were deported to an Eastern bloc country. Moreover, because of their advanced age, many have medical problems or spouses with medical needs. Their children are generally U.S. citizens. All these factors present potential equitable bases for the Attorney General to grant discretionary relief from an order of deportation. If the Attorney General does exercise such discretion, the government’s court victory—generally achieved after years of investigation and litigation—is pyrrhic.

To eliminate this problem, Congress in 1978 passed the eponymously named Holtzman Amendment, sponsored by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman. It makes participation in Nazi persecution on the basis of race, religion, national origin or political opinion an independent basis for deportation. The law applies retroactively and covers anyone in the United States, regardless of which law provided their admittance into the country. Most importantly, if an immigration judge orders deportation based on participation in persecution on behalf of the Nazis (even if other grounds for deportation are cited as well), the Attorney General is statutorily precluded
from providing discretionary relief.

The Holtzman Amendment was passed shortly before the creation of OSI in 1979. It has been key to OSI's efforts to deport those who persecuted on behalf of the Nazis.

Once a court determines that a defendant should be deported, the question of where he should be sent looms large. That issue is discussed in various parts of this report. There is a statutory scheme to determine the appropriate destination. However, in the end, it depends upon the designated country being willing to accept the deportee.

The fate of a defendant in the receiving country varies. Most deported OSI defendants spend the remainder of their lives in freedom and peace. In some cases, however, the recipient country has jurisdiction to try him criminally for his World War II activities. It may or may not choose to do so.

Countries that are anxious to prosecute OSI defendants can expedite their removal from the U.S. by asking the U.S. to extradite them. Extradition is the process whereby a foreign government asks the United States to send someone to the requesting country to stand trial on criminal charges. The United States and the requesting country must have a treaty providing for extradition and specifying which crimes may constitute the basis for an extradition request. Once extradition papers are filed, the defendant is arrested and is generally not eligible for release on bond.

Evidence from the requesting country is usually presented in court by the U.S. government. The court must determine whether criminal charges are pending in the requesting state, whether the defendant is the person named in those charges, whether probable cause exists to believe that he committed the crimes alleged, and if so, whether, under the treaty between the
two countries, these crimes are extraditable offenses. If the answer to all these questions is yes, the defendant is extraditable. Whether he in fact should be extradited is then determined by the Secretary of State; (s)he alone has the power to issue a warrant of extraditability.

In making their determinations, neither the judge nor the Secretary of State decides ultimate innocence or guilt. If the defendant is extradited, his culpability is decided at trial in the requesting country.

While extradition is a much speedier process than denaturalization and deportation, with their multiple levels of appeal, it is rarely used in OSI cases. Its use depends on an unlikely confluence of factors – an extradition treaty between the U.S. and a country with jurisdiction to prosecute criminally, sufficient admissible evidence in the foreign jurisdiction to satisfy the burden of proof in a criminal trial, and the political will and commitment by the foreign country to prosecute these cases decades after the crimes occurred.

Since these factors rarely converge, denaturalization and/or deportation are the traditional means for expelling from the United States someone who was involved in persecution on behalf of the Nazis during World War II. These are the cases which OSI was created to handle.

2. Immigrants admitted under the DPA were to be counted against the nationality quota in future years.


President Truman, who had urged Congress to pass liberalizing immigration legislation, signed the DPA bill with much hesitation. He felt that some of its categorizations were "wholly inconsistent with the American sense of justice." "New DP Measure Called Unworthy," The New York Times, June 28, 1948.

4. Whether a movement qualified as "hostile" was determined by reference to a list of "inimical organizations" prepared by the Displaced Persons Commission. The list was periodically revised although some organizations were permanently listed. Among them were indigenous police groups who worked with Nazi mobile killing units and the SS Totenkopf battalion, whose members served as camp guards.


7. America and the Survivors of the Holocaust by Leonard Dinnerstein (Columbia Univ. Press). An additional 40,000 Jews had entered between 1945 and June 30, 1948 (when the DPA was enacted). The 40,000 were admitted under a Dec. 1945 directive by President Truman which gave priority to displaced persons within existing American quota laws. Review by Leonard Dinnerstein of "Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945 - 1948," by Arieh Kochavi. The review is posted at www.politicalreviewnet.com/polrev/reviews/diph/R_1045_2096_046.asp (last visited Nov. 2005).


12. As of 2004, lack of good moral character can be proven more directly. Section 5504 of The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended the INA to specifically make assistance in Nazi persecution a bar to good moral character for aliens. *See* 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f)(9).


14. *See* e.g., pp. 271-295, 426-453.

15. Immigration law provides a three-step process for determining a country of deportation. First, the defendant himself may designate a country. If that country is unwilling to accept him, or the U.S. contends his deportation there would be prejudicial to the United States, he can be deported to any country of which he is a subject, national or citizen, so long as that country is willing to accept him. Barring that, there are a series of options which take into account the shifting boundaries and sovereignties following World War II:
   (1) the country from which he last entered the United States;
   (2) the country which contains the foreign port from which he embarked for the United States;
   (3) the country in which he was born;
   (4) the country in which the place of his birth is situated at the time he is ordered deported;
   (5) any country in which he resided prior to entering the country from which he embarked for the United States;
   (6) any country that had sovereignty over his birthplace at the time of his birth.
There is no order of priority among these choices. If none of them is feasible, the alien may be sent to any country willing to accept him.

16. Only three OSI defendants have been extradited: Bruno Blach, John Demjanjuk and Andrij Artukovic. The *Demjanjuk* and *Artukovic* cases are discussed at pp. 150-174 and 239-258, respectively.
Chapter Three: Case Studies of Various Persecutors and How the Law Handled Them

Introduction

The Holocaust did not occur in a vacuum or through the operation of some social imperative set in motion by the actions of a few fanatical individuals. Its horrific scope - in terms of duration, geographical range and organizational efficiency - required the participation and acquiescence of untold numbers of people.

Those who "only" acquiesced - by standing on the sidelines while their countrymen committed atrocities in their name - are not within OSI's purview. The focus of OSI's endeavors is the participants - those who in some way assisted the Axis powers in their persecution of civilians. These participants came from all walks of life, social strata and ethnic backgrounds. OSI's roster of defendants reflects that diversity.

High-ranking Nazi officials were generally German or Austrian. The DPA and RRA greatly favored those fleeing Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, even if they could have hidden their wartime past, relatively few Nazi leaders were eligible to enter the United States under these expansive statutes. They could have sought admission under the country quotas set forth in the INA, but the number admissible from Germany and Austria at that time was quite limited.

In such circumstances, it is not surprising that very few OSI defendants were leaders in the Nazi cause. Most were camp guards. A few held "white collar" positions. The cases detailed in this chapter give a sampling of the OSI prosecutorial spectrum; the Appendix provides a synopsis of all cases.

The statutes on which OSI prosecutions are based do not distinguish among levels of
culpability. Whether one “assisted in persecution” is the core issue. Whether one lied about that assistance is also often a factor. Yet the meaning of “assistance in persecution” is not self-evident. Does it — should it — encompass unwilling assistance? What about assistance willingly rendered, but only because the alternative might be death? And what should be actionable in misrepresenting information on a visa or citizenship application? Does every false statement, no matter how tangential, carry legal consequences? And if not, where should the line be drawn?

The cases filed by OSI helped clarify the law in all these areas.

While the courts gave legal answers, detailed in the cases reported herein, the issues remain haunting when considered in the context of actual OSI cases. Is a police official who was “merely” following orders when he rounded up Jews and confiscated their property different in any meaningful way from a camp guard? Are there distinctions to be drawn among the camp guards themselves? Were those who chose such duty (and received pay) more responsible than those who were drawn from the ranks of German POWs? In making that determination, should one consider the barbaric conditions of POW camps and the fact that POWs faced a Hobson’s choice? They knew they would likely perish if they remained in German captivity for an extended period of time. Does a POW who “volunteers” in such circumstances differ from a Jewish kapo who, also fearing imminent death, wants only to better his chances for survival?

And what about propagandists? Although the Nuremberg trials made clear that propagandists were culpable because they made genocide palatable to the public, how does the prosecution of propagandists comport with our concept of free speech and freedom of the press?1

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1 In 1966, the world community view on propagandists was codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. Article 20 provides that:
Although the First Amendment does not apply to writings by foreign nationals overseas, should we consider the spirit of the Amendment before filing a case against a propagandist?

How too should society view the scientists, industrialists, politicians and mid-level bureaucrats who contributed to the horrors of the Holocaust through direct and indirect efforts to keep the killing machines going? Are they more or less guilty than the camp guards, police officers and others who came in direct contact with their victims?

Should age be considered in these matters? Does the fact that one was 17 or 18 during the war make him less responsible than those who were older? And what about age now? Should the government prosecute people who have spent decades as law abiding citizens in the United States and are now nearing the end of their lives? Whether or not age is relevant, can a persecutor expurgate his guilt by postwar activities that benefitted the United States and possibly others as well? These are among the many issues which come to mind when examining the role of OSI subjects in the Nazi genocidal program.

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

The covenant was signed by President Carter in 1978 and ratified by the Senate in 1992, subject to a reservation proposed by the George H.W. Bush administration: that it "does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." The United States also attached a declaration stating that the provision was not self-executing.
Hands On Persecutors

Feodor Fedorenko – “Assistance in Persecution” Under the DPA

_Fedorenko v. United States_ is OSI’s seminal case. It gave the Supreme Court’s imprimatur to OSI’s mission and made possible numerous prosecutions that would otherwise have been foreclosed.

Feodor Fedorenko, a Ukrainian draftee in the Soviet Army, was captured by the Germans in 1941. POW camp conditions were brutal, with many dying of overwork, disease and/or starvation.¹ After being held prisoner in various German camps, he, along with several hundred other POWs, was sent to Trawniki, Poland, a training area for men who were to assist the Nazis in implementing Operation Reinhard – a program to dispossess, exploit and murder the Polish Jews.² Once his training was complete, Fedorenko served as a guard in various locations, including a Jewish ghetto and the Treblinka death camp, where approximately 800,000 Jews were murdered.

Believing his wife and children had died during the war, he emigrated to the United States in 1949. His visa application falsely stated that he had been born in Poland and spent the war years there, first as a farmer and later as a factory worker.

Fedorenko remarried in the United States and became a naturalized citizen in 1970. He later learned that his first family had survived and was still in the Soviet Union. He returned to visit them in 1972, 1973 and again in 1975-76. During the second trip he was interrogated by Soviet authorities about his role during World War II. The Soviets concluded that he was “not criminally liable” for his activities, and they informed him as much.³

The INS opened an investigation in November 1975 after an article in _The Ukrainian_
News reported that Fedorenko had participated in atrocities during World War II. At INS' behest, the Israelis interviewed various Treblinka survivors. Most picked him from a photospread and recalled beatings and brutalities he had administered. When interviewed by the INS, Fedorenko admitted having been a guard at Treblinka, though he contended he had gone under duress and had not personally been involved in any persecution. Although some POWs volunteered for camp guard duty in order to improve their lot, the government had no evidence that Fedorenko had done so.

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida filed a seven-count denaturalization complaint in August 1977. Four of the counts turned on Fedorenko's having committed war crimes. The remainder involved his failure to disclose pertinent information (his birthplace and war service) and his lack of the good moral character necessary for citizenship. Coincidently, the very month the complaint was filed, the SLU was established. An SLU trial attorney was sent to assist in the Fedorenko prosecution. His main contribution was to find and prepare a witness to testify about State Department procedures.

Trial lasted two weeks. As described by an evidently angry district court:

If ever a case supported the Judicial Conference ruling barring cameras from the courtroom, this case does. From the beginning it was like a Hollywood spectacular and polarized the residents of South Florida.

As an example of some of the emotional intensity surrounding the trial, the Jewish Defense League ran ads in newspapers offering chartered buses from Miami Beach to Fort Lauderdale on opening day. A demonstration outside the courtroom ensued with a chant: "Who do we want? Fedorenko. How do we want him? Dead." After the court was interrupted twice and the first three warnings were ignored by the demonstrators, a leader who was using an amplified bullhorn was arrested.

Six Treblinka survivors testified that Fedorenko had beaten or shot Jewish prisoners at
the camp. In addition, a Vice Consul (the OSI-prepared witness) who had reviewed displaced persons applications after the war, told the court that an armed guard would have been ineligible for a visa – even in the unlikely circumstance that he had been importuned to serve. The denial of a visa would have been based on the ground that he had assisted in persecuting civilians.

Fedorenko testified in his own behalf. He explained that as a POW he had been surviving on grass and roots; he would have died had he not been sent to Trawniki. Even so, he had not volunteered. He admitted knowing that Jews were murdered at the camp but insisted that, having served as a perimeter guard, he had no hand in their death. Although he admitted shooting in the direction of the prisoners during the 1943 Treblinka uprising, he said he had not aimed to kill. He explained that he had falsely listed Poland as his place of birth in order to avoid repatriation to the Soviet Union.

The trial judge found Fedorenko a very sympathetic character.

Defendant has retired on a social security pension and a pension from his 20 years labor . . . . He doesn’t own a car; he doesn’t own a house; he owns no real estate except a cemetery lot, and he has a burial insurance policy. He has accumulated a life savings of $5,000 but owes his attorney an unknown fee . . . . He has never been arrested in 29 years not even for a traffic offense. His one failure as a resident and citizen in 29 years: he received one parking ticket. Feodor Fedorenko has been a hard-working and responsible American citizen.

The court’s benign view of Fedorenko contrasted sharply with its sense of the prosecution. The court questioned whether the action should have been brought at all, suggesting that doing so violated DOJ protocol. The court relied on a 1909 DOJ Circular Letter which stated that denaturalization actions should be brought only rarely, and then only as a means of promoting "betterment of the citizenry." The court was at a loss to understand how the country would be bettered by the prosecution of someone who had been an upstanding citizen.
Moreover, the court excoriated the government for squandering taxpayer funds on daily transcripts and two Russian interpreters.

The court was not any kinder to the government on the merits of the case. It concluded that the Israeli photospread was impermissibly suggestive and that it tainted the subsequent in-court identification of each of the survivors asked to identify Fedorenko in the courtroom. The court also feared that the witnesses had been discussing the trial among themselves, or, even worse, may have been coached on the identification. The court rejected the in-court identifications "in toto."

The court then turned to a statutory analysis. Only “displaced persons” were eligible for a visa under the DPA. The Act specifically excluded persons who could be shown:

(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries. . . or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . . . in their operations against the United States.

Although the word "voluntarily" was not used in subsection (a), the court concluded that it should be read into that section. Failure to do so would lead to the "absurd" result that anyone who assisted the enemy – even those who did so under duress, such as kapos and working prisoners – would be excludable. The crux of the case therefore was whether Fedorenko’s service was voluntary. The court concluded that it was not. In so ruling, he credited Fedorenko’s testimony that he had been assigned to Trawniki rather than the Vice Consul’s testimony that guard duty was a voluntary assignment. Though Fedorenko might have escaped (testimony was that some had done so) the judge refused to impose retroactively an obligation that a prisoner of war risk his life in such an attempt.
Under this reasoning, Fedorenko was not automatically barred from applying for a visa. The court then considered whether anything about his visa application itself warranted revocation of citizenship. There was no dispute that Fedorenko had lied about his place of birth and wartime assignment. But under Supreme Court precedent, such misrepresentations had to be "material" if they were to be the basis for revoking citizenship. The Supreme Court had set up two tests to determine materiality: (1) were facts suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship; or (2) might disclosure of the facts have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.6

The government did not contend that guard service at Treblinka would, in and of itself, have warranted denial of citizenship (though ultimately the case came to stand for that very proposition.) The government argued only that if it had known of his work at Treblinka, it would have investigated, and that investigation would have shown he committed atrocities that would have precluded his becoming a U.S. citizen. The court disagreed on the ground that there was no evidence that Fedorenko had participated in atrocities. Even his shooting at prisoners during the uprising did not qualify because the court doubted he did anything other than "shoot over their heads."

The court was no more bothered by Fedorenko's failure to report that he had served with the German army. The court held that Fedorenko reasonably viewed himself a prisoner of war rather than a soldier. As for good moral character, the court focused on his 29 exemplary years in the United States; his conduct in the war was too fraught with "conflict and uncertainty" to be determinative. In sum, the court found no statutory basis for revoking citizenship and the government lost the case on the merits. The district court then went one step further and ruled
that even if the law did not warrant denial of the government’s claim, it would have ruled for the defense on equitable grounds. To reach this conclusion, the court focused on Fedorenko’s exemplary behavior in the United States rather than his conduct during the war.

The Solicitor General of the United States determines whether to appeal a government loss. He does so after reviewing recommendations from various DOJ components and the relevant agency or agencies involved, plus an overview from one of the lawyers in his office. In this case, the U.S. Attorney from the Southern District of Florida, the Criminal Division and INS all recommended appeal. Martin Mendelsohn, head of the SLU, wrote that: "There were no neutrals at a death camp; the choice was killer or victim;" he put Fedorenko squarely in the first category. The Israelis, not normally participants in this decision-making process, weighed in with Congress. They feared that the wholesale rejection of eyewitness testimony would make survivors reluctant to testify in future cases. They were also horrified that the district court would even suggest that kapos had aided persecution.

The case was assigned to Allan Ryan, then working in the Solicitor General’s office. As he saw it, the crux of the complaint was that Fedorenko had committed war crimes. Yet there was no documentary evidence on the point and the district court opinion was “so heavily reliant on observation of demeanor that no court of appeals will reverse.” As for the misrepresentations (concerning his birthplace, wartime whereabouts and German army service), Ryan feared that none were “material” as the Supreme Court defined the term.

I thus think we are at a dead end in this case. To be sure, there is a very limited category of cases where appeal, even if foredoomed, must be taken to show the flag – to demonstrate the government’s indignation at the judgment below and its determination to reverse, even when the chances of reversal are almost nil. If we had extrajudicial evidence that Fedorenko was in fact a war
criminal, such a pyrrhic appeal might be worthwhile. But we do not. The fact is
that we do not know today for sure if Fedorenko is a war criminal or not. He may
be, or he may be the unfortunate victim of innocently mistaken identification, or
indeed he may be the target of a group of Treblinka survivors who saw family and
friends slaughtered and who are determined to bring vengeance on any Treblinka
guard, guilty or not. We simply do not know.

For some reason, the case haunted Ryan. After submitting his memorandum, he asked
for a copy of the transcript — a request not routine in the preparation of appeal memos by
associates in the Solicitor General’s office. The transcript changed Ryan’s opinion. He did not
quarrel with the court’s ruling that the government must prove voluntariness, but he became
convinced that Fedorenko’s service to the Nazis was voluntary. He analogized it to the Patty
Hearst scenario — that while Fedorenko’s capture was by force, over the course of time he threw
in his lot with his captors and thereafter participated actively in their crimes. Moreover, Ryan
believed Fedorenko’s service had been brutal as well. Therefore, the government “must appeal
regardless of the prospects of reversal.”

The war crimes and voluntariness issues could be decided without reaching the murkier
question of what constituted a “material” misrepresentation. Yet if the court wanted to reach that
issue, Ryan felt the government had strong arguments to present. He had originally believed that
a misrepresentation would be material under the Supreme Court’s test only if the government
could actually prove war crimes. On further reflection, he believed that the government need
establish only that an investigation would have been opened and that it might have led to the
discovery of some disqualifying information. If the latter standard was applied, the Vice
Consul’s testimony would make the case, since he testified that if it had been known that
Fedorenko were a guard, he would have been denied admission. The Solicitor General
Attorneys in the Solicitor General's office argue cases before the Supreme Court. It is extremely rare for them to handle cases in the lower courts. However, the INS asked if Ryan could do so. By this point, he was well immersed in the issues and happy to take on the case. With the Solicitor General's approval, he wrote the brief and argued the case before the Fifth Circuit.

The government made three arguments: (1) that Fedorenko's deception about his wartime service when he applied for a visa was material and justified revocation of his citizenship; (2) that the district court used the wrong standards in judging the credibility of the survivor witnesses; and (3) that the court erred in holding that equitable considerations (Fedorenko's conduct in the U.S.) may serve as an alternative ground for its judgment. The government did not challenge the district court's reading of a voluntariness requirement into the statute. On the contrary, the government expressly endorsed that position.

The government won the appeal, with the Circuit adopting the government's position on the misrepresentation and equitable relief issues; it did not rule on the question of eyewitness testimony. The decision came down in June 1979, when OSI was in its infancy. Ryan sent the decision and appellate brief to AAG Heymann, telling him that if there was anything he could do to help the new section get launched, he would be happy to do so. At the time, he thought he might be able to help with some briefs even while he remained in the Solicitor General's Office. Instead, Heymann convinced him to join OSI with the intention of taking over in a few months when Director Walter Rockler returned to private practice. Ryan went to OSI in January 1980. A month later the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fedorenko.
Attorneys General usually argue at least once before the Supreme Court during their term in office. The case is of their choosing. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti selected *Fedorenko.* It was the only argument he presented as Attorney General and he had several reasons for the choice: (1) the record was fairly small and so could be mastered despite the daily demands of his office; (2) he felt an affinity for OSI both because the section had been established during his tenure and because he had met with the Soviet Chief Justice and secured through him greater access to the Soviet archives containing Nazi records; and (3) he had long been "revolted" by the Holocaust.\(^{15}\)

Civiletti was aware of legend within the Department that one of his predecessors, preparing for his only argument, had sent a note advising the Court that he was making a ceremonial appearance and would appreciate not being asked questions. While that story may be apocryphal, Civiletti did not want to take any chances. He sent a note to the Chief Justice saying he would welcome questions during his presentation.

There were two issues before the Court: the meaning of "materiality" and whether the district court could rule on equitable grounds. Both sides were peppered with questions on materiality.\(^{16}\) Yet in the end, the Court's ruling did not turn on this at all.\(^{17}\) Instead, it reexamined the language of the DPA and the testimony of the Vice Consul to reach conclusions entirely different from those of the district court judge. Whereas the district court read the word "voluntary" into Section (a) of the statute, the Supreme Court declined to do so. Given that the word was in one section but not the next, the Court assumed the omission was intentional. Thus, those who had assisted in persecution were ineligible for a visa — whether or not they acted voluntarily.\(^{18}\)
The question then became whether Fedorenko had assisted in persecution. In answering affirmatively, the Court relied on the testimony of the Vice Consul who said that camp guards were routinely denied admission on the ground that they had assisted in persecution. Given that, Fedorenko had been unlawfully admitted. Everything flowing therefrom was tainted, including his citizenship. It had been "illegally procured" and must be revoked.¹⁹

Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court was not concerned that such an analysis could apply to kapos.

The solution . . . lies, not in "interpreting" the Act to include a voluntariness requirement that the statute itself does not impose, but in focusing on whether particular conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians. Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians.²⁰

(emphasis in original).

The Court also ruled that the trial judge had no discretion to deny denaturalization on equitable grounds once the statutory requirements for denaturalization had been satisfied. Fedorenko's citizenship was therefore revoked.

Justices White and Stevens dissented. Stevens' dissent was passionate. He believed that voluntariness should be the key. Without it, the Court's effort to distinguish kapos from guards did not hold up.

[T]he kapos were commanded by the SS to administer beatings to the prisoners, and they did so with just enough force to make the beating appear realistic yet avoid injury to the prisoner. . . . I believe their conduct would have to be
characterized as assisting in the persecution of other prisoners. In my view, the reason that such conduct should not make the kapos ineligible for citizenship is that it surely was not voluntary.

Stevens accused his colleagues of reacting to the horrors of Treblinka rather than following the logic of the law: "The gruesome facts recited in this record create what Justice Holmes described as a sort of 'hydraulic pressure' that tends to distort our judgment."

With the denaturalization complete, OSI filed a deportation action. Fedorenko was ordered deported in 1983 and he chose the U.S.S.R. as his destination. It probably appeared a wise choice at the time, given that the Soviet Union had earlier assured him he faced no criminal liability.

While Fedorenko was in the midst of appealing the deportation order, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow informed OSI of a recent trial and execution in the Soviet Union of a naturalized Belgian citizen accused of war crimes. His war history was similar to Fedorenko's. He had been a prisoner of war "convinced to join" the German ranks; he emigrated to Belgium after the war but had been arrested by the Soviets during a 1968 visit to his homeland. He was detained in the Soviet Union until his trial in 1983.

The Embassy recommended that Fedorenko be told of the case and the possible risks he faced if deported to the U.S.S.R. The Criminal Division argued otherwise. It pointed out that Fedorenko had been back to the U.S.S.R. in years after the Belgian had been detained, yet he had not been arrested; it was thus not clear he would be arrested if deported now. Moreover, since the Belgian case had been well covered by the U.S. media, Fedorenko and his attorney could learn about it and make an independent assessment of his circumstances.

Fedorenko was deported to the Soviet Union in December 1984. Shortly before his
departure, a Soviet Embassy official opined that Fedorenko would be treated leniently in light of his age. And indeed, the following June the American Embassy in Moscow passed on a tip that Fedorenko was living in the Crimea and seeking private pension benefits. The telegram concluded: "This . . . would seem to indicate that Fedorenko is alive and well and that he expects to be in a position to enjoy his pension for the foreseeable future."

It was not to be. Just one year later, the Soviets tried him for desertion, taking punitive actions against civilians, and participation in mass executions. According to reports in the Soviet press, several witnesses testified that Fedorenko had beaten Jews as they walked naked toward a gas chamber. He was found guilty and sentenced to death. The execution was carried out in 1987.

The case has reverberated for OSI. The vast bulk of OSI prosecutions have been of camp guards. By focusing on conduct rather than intent, Fedorenko made it possible to prosecute these cases without showing that service was voluntary — a showing that in most cases could not easily be made. Under the Supreme Court ruling, if a visa was improperly procured, denaturalization is mandatory. Just as importantly, the Court eliminated the possibility of asserting equitable defenses in these cases. Had the holding been otherwise, a variety of equitable arguments (e.g., the difficulty of defending against claims arising from activity so long in the past, the government's opportunity to have learned of the events sooner, the defendant's upstanding U.S. citizenship) might have resulted in the dismissal of OSI cases. Without Fedorenko, OSI would have had a very short docket.

Its significance extends beyond that however. In the words of DAAG Richard:

It served to refute the notion that the mere passage of time and the leading of a
quiet life in the U.S. somehow made amends for the past. It established the correctness of OSI’s effort and gave it a legitimacy that others could never give. It said that the issue wasn’t merely one for the Jews, but what kind of a nation we want to be — a refuge for the repressed or a safe haven for the oppressor.
1. Conditions in some POW camps were so dire that there were instances of cannibalism. *See*, e.g., Doc. 63: Transit Camp 140 to the 285th Security Division, Jan. 20, 1942, in NARA microfilm collection T-501 (Records of German Field Commands), reel 8, frame 1114. Of the roughly 3.5 million Soviet POWs who fell into German hands in 1941—the year of Fedorenko’s capture—over two million were dead by Feb. 1, 1942. Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941 - 1945*, 4th ed. (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1997), p. 136.

2. *See* p. 31, n. 19.


5. According to the OSI attorney (interviewed on Jan. 16, 2002), and the Israeli liaison on the case (who spoke with SLU attorney Thiroff after trial), there was no basis for this conclusion. The witnesses, who had never before been in a U.S. courtroom, were not individually prepped nor even told how the courtroom was organized. Having testified at war crimes trials in Germany, some thought that the defendant must be seated in the audience.


9. Sept. 12, 1978 memorandum from Allan Ryan to the Solicitor General. All references hereafter to Ryan’s first memo are to this document.

10. Recorded Ryan interview, Feb. 7, 2002. All references hereafter to Ryan’s actions and motivations come from this interview unless otherwise specified.

11. Ryan could point to no external factor which led him to read the transcript. It should be noted however, that INS’ appeal recommendations (they actually wrote two, one of which had Mendelsohn’s dramatic view of Treblinka) both arrived shortly after Ryan wrote his first memo.

12. Patty Hearst was an heiress kidnapped by a radical group in the 1970s. She was convicted for participating in a bank robbery with her captors. (Years later, and long after Ryan’s memo, she was granted a pardon by President Clinton.)
13. Sept. 27, 1978 memorandum from Ryan to the Solicitor General. All references hereafter to Ryan's second memo are to this document.


15. His feelings on the issue were so strong that in 2001 he still had never visited Germany. Recorded interview with Civiletti, March 30, 2001. All references to Civiletti’s actions come from this interview unless otherwise noted.

16. Supreme Court arguments are recorded and the tapes are kept on file in the Motion Picture Sound and Reference Room at the National Archives. The Fedorenko argument is 267.326, No. 79-5602.


18. In fact, however, it was not Congress which crafted the language in sections 2(a) and (b); the language was adopted from the IRO. Nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress focused on these subtleties in the IRO. Therefore, it arguably presumes too much to say that Congress made a conscious distinction; it was simply taking definitional terms from another document.

19. The Court’s opinion did not clearly distinguish between citizenship that is “illegally procured” or citizenship procured through “misrepresentation” or “concealment of a material fact.” The Supreme Court seemed to be saying that Fedorenko had both procured his citizenship illegally and through misrepresentation.

20. The factors enumerated by the Court were those which applied to Fedorenko. An argument could be made however that two of the factors – the stipend and leave – have nothing to do with persecution.


22. Nov. 8, 1984 memo to AAG Trott from Director Sher re “Deportation of Feodor Fedorenko to the U.S.S.R.”

23. Nov. 26, 1984 memo to Attorney General Smith from AAG Trott re “Deportation of Feodor Fedorenko.”


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25. It is unknown why the Soviets changed their view on his wartime culpability.

Georg Lindert and Adam Friedrich – "Assistance in Persecution" Under the RRA

The stone quarry at the Mauthausen concentration camp was infamous for its brutality.

The prisoners were forced to extract large quantities of granite from the quarry without significant safety measures and without regard to the health of the prisoners. The quarry included a set of one hundred and eighty-six stone stairs from the floor to the top of the quarry. Some guards forced prisoners to march up and down the stairs carrying heavy stone as a form of punishment.¹

Georg Lindert served as a guard at the quarry.²

Lindert first applied to enter the United States in 1951, under the DPA. Rather than listing his guard duty on the visa application, Lindert claimed to have served in a combat division of the Waffen SS. At the time he applied for entry, administrative regulations made membership in the Waffen SS an automatic disqualifying factor. Accordingly, his visa request was denied.

Three years later, the DPA had been supplanted by the RRA. In addition, the administrative rules had been modified so that the Waffen SS was no longer a per se visa disqualifier. Lindert reapplied for a visa, again making no mention of his guard service. In response to a question asking for a list of his residences, Lindert wrote "1942-1945 with the German Army." The visa was issued, and he came to the United States in 1954.

Several years later, when applying for U.S. citizenship, Lindert completed a form which asked for a listing of all organizations of which he had been a member. He did not list the military.

The RRA's use of the word "personally" when describing assistance in persecution was a cause of concern to OSI. The addition of this word – absent from the DPA under which most OSI cases are brought – could arguably require the government to establish individual culpability. In DPA cases, it is sufficient to show that the defendant was one of a group all
responsible for activities which amounted to assistance in persecution. OSI was concerned that it
could not meet the potentially “heavy burden of proof” necessary to establish Lindert’s
“personal” assistance in persecution, especially since some camp guards had obtained visas under
the RRA even after disclosing their camp service. Therefore, when it filed suit against Lindert
in 1992, the government did not base its claim on his having assisted in persecution. He was
charged only with illegal procurement of citizenship.

The complaint set forth three bases for its claim: (1) service as a camp guard showed that
Lindert lacked the good moral character required for naturalization; (2) he misrepresented and
concealed a material fact on his citizenship application when he failed to list the military as an
organization to which he belonged; and (3) he lacked good moral character because he had been
untruthful both in failing to list Mauthausen as a place of residence and in not referencing the
military as an organization to which he had belonged.

Lindert was the first case in which OSI charged “lack of good moral character” based on
guard service for someone who had entered under the RRA. Following a three week trial with
over 300 government exhibits, the district court rejected all the government’s theories. The
court acknowledged that Lindert had served as a guard in a brutal camp. However, absent
“evidence that Lindert ever fired his gun or took any other action hostile to any prisoner,” the
court was unwilling to conclude that his moral character “was irreparably soiled by his actions or
inactions while he was a guard.”

The court excused Lindert’s misstatements on the ground that the forms he completed
were ambiguous. No question had specifically asked about military service. Not everyone asked
to list organizations of which they were a member would think that called for a reference to the
military. Nor, in the court's view, was it self evident that a listing of residences would mandate a specific reference to a concentration camp, when in fact the defendant had responded that he was in the military during the relevant period. Because of the ambiguity, the court found no evidence that Lindert had intended to mislead. Without such intent, there was neither a "wilful" misrepresentation nor evidence of bad moral character. He was allowed to retain his citizenship.

In ruling against the government on the question of whether service as a camp guard per se established lack of good moral character, the court relied in large part on its assessment of witness credibility. The court believed the defendant's testimony that he had served "only" as a perimeter guard, and that, as such, he had no role in persecution. It discounted the testimony of OSI's expert, an historian who testified that guards rotated responsibilities. It also rejected OSI's argument that perimeter duty alone would establish lack of good moral character in any event, because perimeter guards kept persecuted civilians from escaping.

The Lindert ruling came in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court had held in Fedorenko that service as a perimeter guard amounted to "assistance in persecution" under the DPA.

Although Fedorenko did not have a "good moral character" count, the Lindert court found Fedorenko instructive. Since Fedorenko, unlike Lindert, had admitted shooting at escaping inmates, the Lindert court concluded that it took that type of direct abusive action to establish lack of good moral character.5

The Lindert court was not the first to rule against the government on issues concerning misrepresentation about place of residence or organizations joined. However, none of the other cases involved a defendant who had entered under the RRA. Moreover, the other courts had accepted alternative theories offered by the government for revoking citizenship. The Lindert
court did not and the case was therefore an outright loss.

Despite its frustration with the court's ruling, OSI recommended against appeal. The office assessed the chance of reversal as slim because (1) appellate courts are reluctant to overturn a district court's credibility finding; and (2) the appeal would be to the Sixth Circuit, where OSI had already lost two cases. OSI determined it would rather distinguish a loss in the district court than run the serious risk of another adverse appellate ruling. The Criminal Division and Solicitor General agreed and no appeal was filed.

Although Lindert was only a district court opinion, its impact on OSI was significant. Even before Lindert was filed, the office was reluctant to file a case based on "personal assistance" in persecution. After Lindert, it became wary of charging a guard who had entered under the RRA with "lack of good moral character." Although there were several RRA cases under investigation at the time of the Lindert loss, they were put aside.

Years later, an attorney who joined the office after Lindert was decided urged OSI to reexamine the matter. Based on new research, the office proposed filing a test case to litigate the "personally advocated or assisted in persecution" issue directly, as it had not been done in Lindert. The Criminal Division authorized the filing, and in 2002, seven years after Lindert, a case was filed against Adam Friedrich.

Friedrich had entered the country under the RRA after serving as a guard at two camps. His duties twice included guarding prisoners on forced marches during camp evacuations. Neither his visa application nor his 1962 citizenship papers mentioned his guard service. The government filed a denaturalization case and argued that the word "personally" was inserted into the RRA only to ensure that individuals were excluded based upon conduct, rather than mere
membership in an organization. Since the defendant had been a camp guard, the government contended that this alone established impermissible conduct.

The district court, citing Fedorenko and its DPA progeny, agreed. It never even cited Lindert. The Circuit court, also ignoring Lindert, affirmed and issued an even broader ruling. It held that the word “personally” modifies “advocated” or “assisted;” it does not concern whether one “engaged in direct persecution.” “[B]y impeding prisoners’ escape,” Friedrich was “actively and personally involved in persecution” even if he “never saw a prisoner escape, never harmed a prisoner, never discharged his weapon while guarding prisoners, and never saw any prisoners die during the forced evacuation marches.”

The Friedrich prosecution ended the pall cast by Lindert and opened the way for a series of cases that OSI had been holding in abeyance for years.

2. He also stood guard at a Mauthausen subcamp where inmates were forced to build a tunnel through a mountain pass.

3. May 20, 1996 memorandum from Director Rosenbaum to DAAG Richard re "Defendant’s Allegation of ‘Bad Faith’ in Seeking Attorney’s Fees in United States v. Lindert, Case No. 4:92CV1365 (N.D.Ohio)."

4. The historian, Charles Sydnor, has worked on approximately two dozen cases for OSI. He believes that all camp guards performed a variety of duties including night patrol, escorting inmates to and from work details, guarding them at work, serving in the watchtower, and patrolling the perimeter of the camp. The primary documentary evidence in support of this view is the German Wrong/Right picture book and its narrative companion, "Instruction on Tasks and Duties of the Guard," as well as the 1933 service regulations for the Dachau concentration camp.

5. Interestingly, the *Lindert* court made no mention of *U.S. v. Schiffer*, 831 F. Supp. 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 31 F.3d 1115 (3rd Cir. 1994), decided just a year earlier. In that (non-RRA) case the court concluded that lack “good moral character” depended on a showing that the person voluntarily engaged in “some morally reprehensible conduct.” For instance, a person who was forced into service under a constant threat of death might not lack good moral character simply because of his service. Similarly, it is not entirely impossible that a member of the SS had responsibilities, such as minuscule clerical duties, so insignificant and unrelated to the Nazi program that his contribution is negligible.

831 F. Supp. at 1198. (The court concluded that Schiffer, whose service was voluntary and significant, did lack good moral character.)


10. Unlike the DPA, the RRA did not preclude issuance of visas to persons who were members of a “movement hostile” to the U.S. The government contended that the word “personally” reinforced the new statutory emphasis – focusing on persecution committed by an individual rather than by a group. As such, it had nothing to do with one’s subjective intent to persecute others.


12. As of this writing, three RRA cases are in litigation. The defendants are John Hansl, Josias Kumpf and Anton Geiser. Both Hansl and Kumpf had their citizenship revoked, and in each case the court relied heavily on *Friedrich*. *U.S. v. Hansl*, 364 F. Supp.2d 966 (S.D. Iowa 2005), *aff’d*, 439 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 2006); *U.S. v. Kumpf*, 2005 WL 1198893 (E.D. Wis. 2005), *aff’d*, 438 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2006). *Geiser* is still pending.
Frank Walus – Lessons Learned by OSI

I. The Prosecution

Early critics of OSI often cited the *Walus* case as an example of the office overreaching. Their criticism was misdirected. In fact, the prosecution and appeal were handled by the Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office before OSI’s founding. The Circuit ruling – excoriating the prosecution and remanding the case for retrial – was issued shortly after OSI was established, making *Walus* one of the first cases with which the office had to contend. OSI’s role was palliative.

Frank Walus was born to Polish parents residing in Germany. His father died when he was a youngster and the family returned to Poland. Where he spent the war years became a matter of intense dispute, as discussed below. After the war, he lived in Poland, spending seven years in the town of Kielce. He entered the United States in 1959 under the INA. Several months later he returned to Poland, but then came back to the United States in 1963. He settled in Chicago, where he was naturalized in 1970.

A letter from Simon Wiesenthal brought Walus to the attention of the INS in 1974. Wiesenthal reported that Walus had delivered Jews to the Gestapo in the Polish towns of Czestochowa and Kielce. INS contacted representatives of various Jewish survivor organizations to determine if they had any information about Walus. None did. The agency also spoke with eleven of his neighbors, eight former boarders in his home, and Walus himself. Nothing supporting the allegations came from these interviews. Walus told INS that he had spent World War II in Germany as a forced laborer.

In response to an INS request, Israel placed advertisements in Israeli newspapers asking
anyone with information to come forward. The ads mentioned Walus by name and explained that they were seeking witnesses for an investigation of war criminals in the Polish towns of Czestochowa and Kielce. Those who came forward were shown one of two photospreads. In each, the picture of Walus showed him at age 36 although he had been a teenager during the war.

Israel gathered six survivor affidavits, with five of the affiants claiming to be eyewitnesses to atrocities committed by Walus. The sixth stated that he delivered mail to Gestapo headquarters in Kielce, and some of the letters were addressed to a Frank Walus.

The eyewitness accounts were dramatic. Several recalled seeing Walus in uniform or at Gestapo headquarters, although they were divided as to whether he had been in Kielce or Czestochowa. (The towns are 60 miles apart.) One claimed Walus had shot a woman in the neck after forcing her and two young girls to disrobe. Although the witness turned away after the first shot was fired, he heard two additional shots. When he looked back, the three bodies lay motionless. On a different occasion, he saw Walus shoot a Pole who had been trying to escape.

Another witness claimed that Walus dragged a neighbor from his apartment to a waiting automobile. He saw Walus strike the neighbor and later learned that the neighbor had died. A third saw Walus beat an elderly Jew to death with an iron bar. The fourth reported seeing Walus separate children from adults. She later heard that the children had been killed. The fifth had witnessed Walus beating Poles and Jews. All but one witness picked Walus from the photospread.

INS attorneys went to Israel to interview the witnesses themselves. The information they developed was generally corroborative, though in some cases more detailed than had previously
been known. For example, the witness who originally reported the delivery of mail to a Frank Walus at Gestapo headquarters now recalled personally handing some of those letters to Walus. Moreover, he recalled seeing Walus shoot an elderly and sick woman as well as several crippled and undernourished ghetto residents. He told one INS lawyer that he did not give the Israelis full information because he believed the Israeli interviewer was inexperienced and not seeking an in-depth account of events. He told another that he had been reticent with the Israelis because he knew that Walus was living in the U.S. and therefore assumed the Israelis would be unable to do anything about him. And while he earlier had been unable to pick out Walus' photograph, he could now do so, explaining that he had not been wearing his glasses during the prior interview.

The witness who recalled Walus beating a Jew now said that he witnessed Walus beat five other Jews as well.

The INS attorneys compared the statements they had taken with those given to the Israelis. They generally found reasons to accept the later and more detailed accounts given to them, in part because they believed the INS questioning was "more specific and detailed" than had been the Israelis'. They expressed concern over only one witness because she "was very emotional and it was very difficult to obtain direct answers." They suggested she not be called to testify.

Additional investigation by INS turned up several witnesses in the United States. One said he was within 50 feet of Walus in the Czestochowa ghetto in 1941. He heard shots ring out and then saw Walus with a pistol in hand standing over the dead bodies of a mother and daughter who had been walking down the street. Another recalled Walus breaking into her room and pointing a pistol at her husband. She pled with Walus to spare her husband's life. He did so but
then ran into another apartment and shot the inhabitant therein.

Despite the discovery of these eyewitnesses to persecution, there was no ready basis for deportation since the Holtzman amendment had not yet been enacted. However, Walus could still be denaturalized, although the ready ground for denaturalization—assistance in persecution—was unavailable since Walus had not emigrated under the DPA or RRA. In January 1977, Walus was charged with procuring his citizenship illegally, both because he concealed material facts (wartime atrocities and his membership in the "Gestapo, SS or other similar organization") and because he lacked the good moral character required (as evidenced by his having committed war crimes and having concealed his membership in the Gestapo).

Before the case went to trial, the SLU was established. SLU chief Mendelsohn had confidence in the Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) assigned to the Walus prosecution and allowed them to continue without supervision from the SLU.

Trial began in March 1978 before Senior Judge Julius Hoffman. Hoffman had received much notoriety and negative publicity nine years earlier when he presided over the trial of "The Chicago Seven," a group of protestors at the 1968 Democratic convention. The judge’s outbursts and inability to control the courtroom were the basis for overturning those convictions on appeal.

At the time of the Walus trial, Judge Hoffman was 82 years old. By unfortunate happenstance, the role of the Nazis during World War II was then a headline story in Chicago as well as the rest of the nation because of a planned march of Nazi sympathizers through Skokie, Illinois.

Skokie, a Chicago suburb which was home to many Holocaust survivors, had enacted
three ordinances designed to restrict demonstrations.\textsuperscript{10} A month before the Walus trial, a court ruled the ordinances unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{11} The appeal of that ruling was argued during the Walus trial.

Courthouse security during the trial was unusually tight for the times; it included a metal detector at the courtroom door and an armed guard at the elevator. The government presented twelve eyewitnesses, eight from Israel and four from the United States. Each testified to having seen Walus in Poland (either in Czestochowa or Kielce) between 1941 and 1943.

By and large, the survivors testified consistently with their pre-trial interviews and depositions, though in some instances testimony was expanded on the witness stand. The witness who told the INS he had turned away after seeing Walus murder a woman, only to hear two more shots ring out, now claimed to have actually witnessed the murder of all three victims. Another told of Walus killing an old woman and shooting two of his best friends, though he had not mentioned the murder of his friends when he first spoke with Israeli interrogators. The witness who one INS attorney had deemed too emotional to testify was, nonetheless, called by the government. Her testimony did not hold up well on cross examination.

Beyond these individual problems, there were overarching issues which affected the credibility of the eyewitness identifications. Not only had the perpetrator gone from a youth to a middle-aged man in the 35 intervening years, but the very circumstances of ghetto life made it questionable whether the survivors could rely on their visual memories. Testimony included the following:

\begin{quote}
I wouldn't look at him. I tried not to see him. I tried to avoid him as much as one avoids a dog.
\end{quote}
I never looked in his eyes. I was afraid to look in his eyes. I thanked God every time I left the Gestapo.

At that time there wasn’t even 5 percent of hope in me that I will survive this time. Therefore, I didn’t really make any special mental remarks.

Nor did the mental image survivors recalled match well with the defendant in the courtroom. Despite Walus’ diminutive stature (he stood approximately 5'4"), the witnesses generally described the assailant as average height or taller.

The government also presented several witnesses who first met Walus in the United States. They testified about statements of his which were inconsistent with his claim of having been a farm laborer in Germany during the war. Two said that Walus spoke of being in a labor camp and inadvertently gassing prisoners. He told them that the Germans had tricked him into turning on the shower without telling him that the system was designed for executions.

A key witness presented by the government was Michael Alper, a former boarder in the Walus home and one of the two men whose report to Wiesenthal had triggered the government’s investigation. In his pre-trial deposition, Alper conceded that Walus told a different story every day; Walus’ wife had admitted to Alper that even she did not know what to believe. Alper, however, showed no such doubts during his trial testimony. He described Walus boasting about helping the Gestapo liquidate ghettos and arresting Poles who assisted Jews. According to Alper, Walus told of having thrown Jewish babies against a wall. Alper’s wife had similar stories, involving tales of killing Jewish children and pregnant women and rounding up Poles who hid Jews.

The defense suggested that both Alpers were biased because of the strong animus between them and Walus: Walus had accused Alper of cheating both him and another tenant out
of money, maligned Alper to a social service agency, reported him to the INS, told Alper's new
neighbors that Alper was a murderer, and written derogatorily about Alper to the president of a
Polish organization in Vienna when Alper went to Austria.

Judge Hoffman thought pursuit of the bias angle "inappropriate." He cut off fruitful areas
of cross-examination with other witnesses too, including probes about the height and voice
timbre of the person whom the survivors were recalling. At times the court was so antagonistic
to defense counsel that the government joined with the defense in an effort to salvage the
record.14

The defense began with Walus' testimony. He recounted being taken from Poland to
Germany and being forced to work on various farms. He named the farmers, recalled local
friends, and described the area and surrounding terrain with great particularity. He even
introduced pictures of himself on some of the farms during the war years. The pictures had
stamped on their back the date and place of development. German farmers, their relatives and
neighbors verified that Walus had indeed been at these locations. A Polish priest testified that
Walus had attended church fairly regularly until 1940 and then was not seen again until 1947.
The priest also confirmed that the pictures of Walus submitted by the defense accurately depicted
the way Walus looked at the time.

Walus also presented abundant documentary corroboration, most of which his attorneys
had turned over to the government before trial. There were records from the German Health
Insurance Office (an organization analogous to Blue Cross) showing that payments were made
for a farmhand named Walus who worked during the relevant periods on the farms about which
Walus testified. And Red Cross records, created in 1949, listed Walus as a foreigner in the
appropriate farm towns of Germany during the war.

The absence of certain records was also telling. The Germans had no record of Walus having served in the military and the Polish war crimes commissions in Kielce and Czestochowa had no record of him either.

The trial lasted 17 days. During the six weeks that the case was under submission, the Holocaust was much in the news. The governor of Illinois proclaimed Holocaust Remembrance Week, NBC aired a powerful four-part mini-series on the Holocaust and the Seventh Circuit ruled the Skokie ordinances unconstitutional. In addition, Simon Wiesenthal gave an interview to The Chicago Sun-Times in which he acknowledged informing the INS about Walus and boasted that he never had a case of mistaken identity.

Judge Hoffman revoked Walus’ citizenship. He found the survivor witnesses “powerful and convincing,” noting “a high degree” of consistency among them. The court was also persuaded by the defendant’s statements of wartime escapades—especially his statements to the Alpers. Although the court acknowledged “strong illwill” between Walus and the Alpers, the Alpers’ testimonial demeanor persuaded Judge Hoffman that they were credible.

By contrast, he found the defense witnesses unconvincing. The very fact that Walus’ former employers were supportive bespoke their disingenuousness as far as the judge was concerned. He found it “curious” that a forced laborer would have formed friendships and kept contact with those for whom he worked. And the fact that some of the witnesses (or their relatives) had been members of the Nazi party tarnished their credibility in Judge Hoffman’s eyes.

The documentary evidence did nothing to bolster the defense case in the court’s view. He
found the date and place stamps on the photographs irrelevant because they established only
where the film had been developed, not where the photographs were taken. The medical
insurance records were disregarded because they were incomplete (some having been destroyed
during or after the war).

Walus filed a series of motions to vacate the judgment based on newly discovered
documents and witnesses. The documents included residence permits recently found in a
German archive. The permits, which included a photograph of the defendant, had been issued in
1940 and placed Walus on two of the farms about which he testified.

New eyewitness testimony came from a French prisoner of war shipped to Germany as a
forced laborer. He had come in contact with Walus during that time and was coming forward
"in order to rectify a miscarriage of justice" after reading about the trial.

Two other witnesses, who had been known to the defense but had refused to come to the
United States to testify, were now willing to do so in light of the verdict against Walus. One was
a Pole who had been forced to work in Germany. His affidavit was accompanied by four
photographs of Walus with other Polish farm workers in Germany between 1941 and 1945. The
second was a German priest who had been too ill to travel to the trial. His affidavit stated that
Walus had attended services in his parish during the war years. Walus also offered a statement
from the University of Munich stating that he could not have been in the SS or the Gestapo both
because he was Polish and because he was too short to meet the entrance criteria.18

Judge Hoffman was not persuaded. Since some of the witnesses had been known to the
defense before trial, their statements did not qualify as "newly discovered." Other evidence was
rejected on the ground that it was merely cumulative of material presented during the trial.19 As
for the nationality and height restrictions, Hoffman noted that they were not absolute.20

Several months later, Walus sought assistance from the court in securing the testimony of yet more newly discovered overseas witnesses. Walus' Polish father-in-law had been contacted after the verdict by several Poles who had been forced laborers with Walus. The defense lacked resources to travel to Poland and interview these new witnesses and had twice asked the Polish War Crimes Commission to conduct the interviews. The Commission had not responded and Walus wanted the court to issue an order stating that they should do so.

Judge Hoffman denied the request without opinion. Two days later, defense counsel received a letter from the Polish War Crimes Commission stating that it would provide information if so ordered by a court. The defense urged the court to reconsider its ruling in light of the Polish offer. Judge Hoffman refused.

Walus appealed the original district ruling both on its merits and for alleged bias by the judge. He appealed also the denials of his post-trial motions. The cases were consolidated and argued one week before OSI was established. The Seventh Circuit issued its opinion ten months later.21 Although the Court noted "instances of attitude we find somewhat disturbing on the part of this experienced trial judge," it declined to reverse on the ground of bias. The Circuit was more equivocal about the merits of the case itself, characterizing as "persuasively presented" the argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. In the end, however, the court opted for a remand. It did so on the ground that the government's case "was sufficiently weak, particularly as to impeachment of the defendant's documentary evidence, that the newly-discovered evidence would almost certainly compel a different result in the event of a new trial."

The Circuit was particularly concerned about the reliability of the government's
witnesses, upon whom the district court so heavily relied. Especially disturbing was the way the witnesses had first learned of the investigation and the procedures used during the photograph displays. Not only were the photospread pictures taken almost 20 years after the events in question, but the picture shown to eight of the twelve eyewitnesses was of particularly poor quality. The court was dismayed also by Judge Hoffman's heavy reliance on the Alpers despite the fact that the "evidence of hatred" between them and the defendant was "extremely strong."

Although the government had argued that the defense documents were forged or altered in order to create an alibi, the Circuit would have none of it. In light of the newly-discovered evidence, the court found the government's theory "impossible to believe" and concluded that affirming Judge Hoffman's decision would be "an intolerable injustice." The case was remanded for trial before a different judge.

Since OSI had not been in existence at the time of the Circuit argument, review of the opinion was its first input on the case. Allan Ryan, then Deputy Director, urged against seeking rehearing or Supreme Court review. His concerns were both pragmatic and legal.

I have the distinct impression, from reading the opinion, that it was originally drafted as an outright reversal, and that the portions relating to a remand for a new trial on the newly discovered evidence question were added at the last minute. The Assistant United States Attorneys who handled the appeal have the impression that the two Seventh Circuit Judges, Pell and Wood, were originally a majority to reverse, but that Judge Moore of the Second Circuit prevailed on them to remand on the new evidence question, in an opinion which all three judges could join.

***

Assuming that it is so, we would have much to lose if we sought rehearing en banc in this case. There are nine judges on the Seventh Circuit, and thus we would have to win over five of the remaining seven. If we fail in that, we could well face not merely an affirmation of the panel's decision but an outright
reversal, ending the case against Walus once and for all. I don't like those odds. I think we are much better off with what we have—which is the opportunity to try Walus again.

***

I have directed that this Office reopen its investigation of Walus as a matter of the highest priority.... If we were to seek rehearing or certiorari now, I could not ignore the possibility that we might be proceeding against the wrong man. Finally, the evidence we turn up in our present investigation may well place us in a stronger position at trial than we were originally—or than we are now in seeking further review.23

The Criminal Division and the Solicitor General agreed with Ryan's analysis. In the end, it was Walus who petitioned for rehearing, arguing that a retrial would pose a devastating financial burden. He also asked the court to consider an outright reversal without remand. The Circuit rejected both arguments, though it noted that reversal was "an exceedingly close question." The panel made even more clear than it had originally its disdain for the case as tried.

[W]e are hesitant to believe that the Department of Justice will decide to relitigate this case without first determining that it has a stronger case than it did in the first trial. In that respect, it is of interest that with the resources at its command, the Government has apparently been unable to demonstrate more persuasively than it has heretofore that Walus was indeed in Poland during the crucial years.... It is somewhat incredible that if Walus spent his boyhood in the area in Poland where he allegedly committed his Nazi activities in his late teens that not one witness has been brought forward who remembered the boy growing into manhood and who, on that basis of personal knowledge, identified him as the perpetrator of the atrocities attributed to him.24

The ball was now squarely in OSI's lap.25 Ryan sent two investigators to Europe to examine the case "down to its floor nails."26 They interviewed current and former residents from the area of Germany where Walus claimed to have spent the war years. Some of the witnesses had testified at trial; others were newly found. All supported the defense theory of the case. So too did employees at the German Health Insurance office. To the extent that OSI was allowed to
examine their records, that too was corroborative of Walus' claims.

Over the course of this trip and another, OSI compiled a list of 25 Germans who would have been in a position to know Walus if he had worked for the German police in Czestochowa or Kielce. Of the 25, they located six. Two refused to answer any questions; the other four were shown a photospread. They could not identify Walus by picture or name.

The canvassing and research was exhaustive and took approximately seven months to complete. It included the following: asking the Polish War Crimes Commission to interview Walus' first wife and his European employers as well as to review all investigations of Nazi operations in the areas of Poland where Walus had allegedly been stationed during the war; having the Israelis review all defense documents for authenticity; reviewing records at the National Archives and the YIVO Institute in New York City for documents relating to the vicinity in Poland where Walus had allegedly been posted; reading reports from survivors of the Kielce and Czestochowa ghettos to see if there was any mention of Walus; contacting the Polish Archives, the Berlin Document Center (repository of membership records of the Nazi party and the SS), the German equivalents of the CIA and FBI, the Hoover Institute, the Bavarian State Archives, and various agencies in the area in which Walus claimed to have been a farm worker; subjecting the records Walus had submitted to forensic examination; having the Polish government interview the Poles who filed post-trial affidavits on Walus' behalf; and interviewing Jews from Czestochowa and Kielce now living in the United States.

Aside from one survivor in the United States who claimed to recognize Walus, everything supported Walus' defense or led to a dead end. There was even new reason to doubt the Alpers' testimony: Walus had filed a lawsuit against Michael Alper in October 1974.
Two OSI attorneys reviewed the case. Jerry Scanlan did so before all the additional investigation was complete, Robin Boylan at the end of the process. After personally interviewing the four American witnesses (including the Alpers) and reading all the trial testimony, Scanlan recommended eliminating seven of the twelve eyewitnesses, in some instances because their current memory contradicted their trial testimony. Scanlan suggested some additional investigative steps be taken before a decision was made.

After Boylan reviewed the case, he concluded that the government could not in good faith stand by any of its witnesses. He stressed the bitterness between the Alpers and Walus and drew a profile of Walus based on the more than 150 people and institutions the authorities had contacted over the years. These included twenty-two witnesses who had lived or worked with Walus. They had differing memories of Walus’ wartime accounts, which included claims that he had escaped from a German concentration camp and served with the Polish underground. His neighbors described him as acrimonious. In Boylan’s view:

a picture emerges of an uneducated youth from Poland who spent the war as a farmhand in a backwater of Germany and who built himself up afterwards by recounting a series of completely imaginary escapades involving the underground, the Polish army and daring escapes from concentration camps. His craving for recognition is as apparent in these stories as in his tempestuous relations with his neighbors and in his attempts to play “godfather” to the Polish immigrants who stayed in his house.

Boylan found the evidence overwhelmingly supportive of Walus’ defense. His former farm employers, fellow forced laborers, and two priests all swore to facts in Walus’ favor. In addition, there was documentary evidence which OSI’s own experts had authenticated. And beyond this direct proof, there was compelling circumstantial evidence, including the “complete absence of any [contrary] documentary evidence” despite thorough searches. Moreover, Walus
had returned to Poland after the war. Boylan knew that, as a general proposition, "the culpable ones headed west, away from the scene of their crimes."

Boylan compared the government's case to that presented by the defense.

We are faced with two mutually exclusive versions of five years in Walus' life. If we believe one, we must necessarily disbelieve the other. The choice is this: either the twenty people, the documents and the photographs have been bribed, forged and faked to show that Walus was in Germany, or the government's twelve eyewitnesses (seven of whom we are ready to abandon in a retrial) are mistaken. Because I find it absurd to believe that Walus' defense is the product of a massive conspiracy, I am compelled to conclude that the government was wrong, and that Walus did spend the war in Germany.

Clearly, there is no question of retrying the case. The only issue we face is how to back away from it. Many options are available, each of which is characterized by one of three underlying attitudes: (a) "We were right about Walus but we can't prove it"; (b) "We were wrong"; or (c) "We don't know."

He analyzed the options. The first was appealing since "it is more comfortable to be right than wrong. It also avoids sticky questions about the reliability of eyewitnesses' identifications which occur forty years after the crime." But there were drawbacks too, the most notable being that there was no plausible reason for doubting the defense witnesses, documents and photos. Yet to admit error also presented risks.

It would leave us open in future cases to serious attacks on the validity of identifications by eyewitnesses. It would also have adverse short term effects of bad publicity and lack of credibility. It could cause hard feelings on the part of the Israeli police and Simon Wiesenthal. The feelings might spread throughout the Jewish community in the United States and lead to political repercussions.

Only the "know nothing" option avoided all these pitfalls, yet Boylan recommended against it. He believed Walus was innocent, and that "no reasonable person who has examined the file could conclude otherwise." A failure to admit the government's error would therefore create the false impression that Walus was a war criminal. This would be particularly egregious
since the government had the evidence in hand, before trial, to realize that the case against Walus could not stand.

Had we done an adequate job, Walus would not be saddled with the heavy financial burden under which he now labors. The least we can do at this point is to avoid saddling him with the suspicion that he got away with murder.

Ryan agreed and discussed details for the dismissal with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Both offices determined that a statement should be issued. Ryan insisted, however, that the government stand by its eyewitneses in order to preserve our relationship with the Israelis and to "protect our flank."

On November 26, 1980, the U.S. Attorney, with the approval of the Criminal Division, moved to dismiss the case. He read a statement prepared by himself and Ryan. It included a review of the exhaustive investigation conducted by OSI in the wake of the Circuit opinion and noted that the government had "no doubt that the witnesses who testified on behalf of the government — the survivors of the Nazi persecutions of Czestochowa and Kielce — testified sincerely and honestly." The government noted too that the defendant had told various acquaintances and coworkers that he had been a Nazi agent and that he had committed acts of violence on innocent and defenseless Jews. "Although he later denied such admissions, the law has traditionally and properly accorded such admissions significant weight and, indeed, the District Court found these statements critical to its decision." Nonetheless, the "striking absence" of corroborating evidence, and the plethora of evidence supporting Walus’ claims, "compels the conclusion that we could not responsibly go forward with a retrial." The government, mindful of its obligation "to take special care that the processes of the law not be brought to bear against those who are not guilty" expressed its "regret" to Walus.
The court granted the motion to dismiss and acknowledged the enormous emotional toll on all the participants.

This case demonstrates the human fallibility of the trial process, and the continuing need for a careful and vigilant system of review of trial court decisions. But for the painstaking review given this case by the Court of Appeals, the defendant would have been stripped of his United States citizenship.

In addition, the case is a manifestation of a worthy and courageous government and its servants who are able and willing to investigate evidence favorable to an accused, and to reexamine and withdraw charges made against an accused which are unsupported by the evidence.

In granting the Government’s motion, we do not forget the abominable atrocities inflicted at the hands of the Nazis on those and the families of those who testified against the defendant. But those outrages cannot be undone and certainly not by an unjust conviction of the defendant. Indeed, we are confident that those who survived the atrocities and seek vindication in memory of those who did not would not want their honor stained by a conviction which could not withstand careful, dispassionate scrutiny.37

Reaction came from all quarters. Walter Rockler, back in private practice, wrote to Ryan expressing some concern about the government’s statement to the court.

I think it is a good statement and agree that the Office had no real choice except to abandon the prosecution. ... [I]t is likely that the case involves mistaken identification but it is not certain.

I would not, however, under any circumstances, have expressed regret to Walus. In good part, he brought the case on himself by telling cronies that he had actively participated in persecuting Jews and in making other anti-Semitic remarks. In my view, the circumstances call for no apology from the Government.38

Ryan explained the "story behind" the statement.

Tom Sullivan, the United States Attorney, felt very strongly that we should make an outright apology to Walus. I flatly refused, and Mark Richard backed me up. Sullivan said that if the Department of Justice did not tender an apology, that he would issue his own statement of apology. Such a statement obviously would have boomeranged against us and put us in the position of answering.
embarrassing questions from the press highlighting our refusal to make an 
apology. Sullivan and I compromised on a statement of "regret", the idea being 
that it is always a regrettable experience to have a trial based on mistaken identity 
or insufficient evidence. In formulating the statement, I took pains to point out 
Walus' own bragging to cronies and anti-Semitic remarks lest the public be under 
the mistaken impression that this fellow was entirely blameless for his 
predicament. 39

Articles appeared in the press castigating the government for the original prosecution. 40

The Israelis, on the other hand, castigated the government for not re prosecuting Walus. Israel's 
Chief Superintendent for the Investigation of Nazi War Crimes wrote Ryan about the impact of 
the dismissal on the Israelis who testified. After having "revealed to the world their wounds, 
which will never be healed" they felt as if they had "been deceived in that the trial in Chicago 
was no more than a well-directed show, with their participation." He described the witnesses as 
"spiritually broken" by Ryan's decision, "tears in their eyes, as though blood was still running 
from their wounds, not believing their own ears that a decision had been taken not to renew the 
Walus case." An Israeli Justice Ministry official expressed similar concerns to U.S. Attorney 
Sullivan. The Israelis shared these concerns with the media. 41

After the case was dismissed, Walus sued Simon Wiesenthal for having made false 
allegations. Walus accused Wiesenthal of forging documents and Wiesenthal countersued for 
libel. Wiesenthal was represented in the litigation by Martin Mendelsohn, chief of the SLU when 
the Walus case was tried. The Walus/Wiesenthal suit was settled for an undisclosed amount, 
with damages awarded to Wiesenthal and not to Walus. 42

Walus had one final interaction with OSI. In 1984, he went to Poland with counsel for 
Ivan Demjanjuk. Demjanjuk had lost his citizenship after a district judge concluded that, as 
alleged by OSI, he was Ivan the Terrible, a particularly brutal guard at the Treblinka death camp.
As detailed elsewhere in this report, the Demjanjuk prosecution, like Walus', involved a case of mistaken identity, to the extent that Demjanjuk was charged with having been Ivan the Terrible. (He was later denaturalized on the basis of having been a guard at the Flossenbürg and Majdanek concentration camps as well as at the Sobibor death camp.) Walus went to Poland seeking witnesses to clear Demjanjuk's name and testified on Demjanjuk's behalf at his 1983 deportation proceedings. Walus died in 1994.

II. The Fallout

The *Walus* trial showcased a variety of issues relevant to OSI litigation, including the appropriate way to contact survivors, the proper use of photospreads, and the potential unreliability of eyewitness testimony.

A. Eyewitness Testimony

Conventional wisdom in the late 1970s was that eyewitness testimony was the key to identifying "Nazi war criminals." The prosecution went forward in *Walus* believing that everything depended on their eyewitnesses and confident that these witnesses would be sufficient to overcome whatever documentary evidence Walus might submit. That confidence was based not only on their assessment of the witnesses, but also on a belief that the more horrific the memory, the more likely it would be etched indelibly. This view was shared by Jewish groups and even had some support in the scientific community.

In the context of the times – the Cold War at its height and therefore limited access to documents behind the Iron Curtain – the exaggerated reliance on eyewitness testimony is perhaps understandable. But even then, not everyone shared this view. The West Germans, conducting a series of war crime trials, were beginning to doubt the reliability of survivor memories.
March 1979 – after the Walus trial but before the appellate ruling – German prosecutors moved to dismiss, mid-trial, a case against four former Nazi SS guards accused of participating in the murder of 250,000 Jews. The prosecutor said the age of the witnesses and their emotional reaction to the trial rendered many of them ineffective. The motion to dismiss was granted, with the Chief Judge commenting that faded memories, misidentification and the general effects of the passage of 30 years precluded the conclusive proof needed.

OSI attorney Robin Boylan, in his memo to Director Ryan about the Walus case, attached excerpts from a German war crimes tribunal which heard testimony on the vagaries of memory. As summarized by Boylan:

The theory advanced by the expert and accepted by the court is really a matter of common sense and every day experience: the details of an incident are not remembered as readily as the central facts. Consequently, the description of a remembered event changes as the witness thinks more about it and recalls more details. Sometimes, though, the details are not actually recalled, but are filled in by the witness on the basis of his experience or perhaps with information the witness thinks the interrogator wishes to hear.

Other psychological factors may also come into play, subconsciously but nevertheless profoundly. As one court noted in another OSI case:

A witness who is aware that the commandant or deputy commandant . . . worked hand-in-glove with the Nazis in persecuting Jews, and who learns years later that the defendant has been charged with having served as the commandant or deputy commandant, might readily achieve a firm present recollection that indeed it was the defendant who participated in particular incidents.

The infusion of historians into OSI advanced reliance on documentary evidence over eyewitness testimony. Moreover, the case law developed in such a way that it is not necessary to identify a defendant as having personally committed atrocities or acts of persecution. It is enough to show that he served in a unit whose main purpose was persecutory (e.g., camp guards)
or that he was in a particular unit at a time when it is known to have committed persecutory acts.\textsuperscript{53}

That is not to say that OSI in the historian era \textit{never} filed a case based primarily on eyewitnesses. There were at least three such filings.\textsuperscript{54} However, as a general proposition, survivors now testify for strategic purposes rather than historical ones. Director Rosenblum believes that survivor testimony "balances the old man in the defendant's chair" because "if you can’t win the judge’s heart, you are not going to win."\textsuperscript{55} It serves another purpose as well. To the extent that OSI cases receive media coverage, it is often the survivor testimony that is carried on the local news. Publicity about the cases sends a message, to the nation as well as to other subjects, that the U.S. will not knowingly allow persecutors to remain in the country.

\textbf{B. The Search for Witnesses}

One of the criticisms leveled by the Seventh Circuit against the Walus investigators was their manner of contacting and interviewing potential witnesses. As the court noted, witnesses were alerted at the outset that a specifically named person was being sought in connection with war crimes allegations in a specified town.

Ryan opined on the impact such notification might have on survivors.

You pick that paper up, you see the Justice Department has caught a guy and he may go free unless witnesses come forward. . . . It places it seems to me an intolerable burden on someone to look at that picture. "Could he have been the guy? What if he goes free and there was an SS guy and maybe it's him."\textsuperscript{56}

The more neutral tone adopted by the office is set forth in an early memorandum from OSI to the Department of State asking that newspapers in Stockholm run an advertisement with the following text:
The United States Department of Justice seeks information regarding the imprisonment or execution during World War II of Estonian citizens in Tartu, Estonia by the German occupying forces or persons cooperating with them. Persons having information on this subject are requested to contact the United States Embassy (address and telephone) or the Office of Special Investigations, Department of Justice (address).37

This type of notification remains the OSI standard.

C. Photospreads

Hand in hand with the more neutral search for witnesses was a revised presentation of photospreads. The Seventh Circuit had been concerned both by the poor quality of one of the Walus photos and by the fact that the pictures shown were taken some 20 years after the events the witnesses were asked to recall. Moreover, the fact that some of the witnesses were told that they had identified the proper person, and one witness had been directed to the proper photograph after he was unable to recognize Walus, all tainted the in-court identifications. As an OSI attorney noted in a memorandum to Director Ryan, "although some of the Israeli witnesses claim to have remembered Walus' name from their alleged contact with him in Poland during the war, it is probably impossible at this point to determine whether any of them remembered it prior to hearing it from the investigators or seeing it in the paper."38

The Israelis alone are not to blame for improper photospread procedures. OSI has made its own errors in this area.39 So too have other foreign governments.60

Ryan sought to make the photospread non-suggestive in accordance with the standards applied in criminal cases. Even before the Walus prosecution was dropped, he had an OSI attorney prepare a memorandum on the issue of pretrial photo identification procedures. The memo discussed the relevant case law, emphasizing the need to avoid suggestiveness, and
contained a form to be completed by the investigator and signed by the interviewee. The form lists (and is to be signed by) all persons present. If a photograph is chosen, it is to be signed by the witness; all other photographs viewed are to be initialed.\(^6\)

That form became the standard protocol until 2001 when Director Rosenblum, reacting to a magazine article, made some changes. The article reported that sequential lineups – where a witness views one person at a time and is asked to decide if (s)he is the culprit before the next person is brought in – are significantly more reliable than the traditional simultaneous viewing.\(^6\) Rosenbaum was persuaded by the data in the article and determined that it would be just as relevant to photospreads. He asked that all photospreads thereafter involve such a sequential showing of pictures.\(^6\) In fact, however, OSI has so decreased reliance on eyewitness testimony that use of photospreads is virtually obsolete.

D. OSI's Image

Most unquantifiable of the \textit{Walrus} ramifications is its impact on OSI – both internally and externally. The courage it took to dismiss the case should not be underestimated. Only four months before, the office had dismissed the prosecution of Tscherim Soobzokov, discussed elsewhere in this report.\(^6\) And now a case which had been won below was being abandoned, with regrets (sounding very close to an apology) being given. OSI did not yet have a cushion of victories from which to draw comfort.

The Jewish community was not pleased with the dismissal\(^6\) and Ryan, in whose name the decision was being made, was still a newcomer to them. He had barely had time to establish his \textit{bona fides}. He proceeded in the belief that his track record over time would leave no doubt about his commitment to prosecuting those against whom the government had sufficient
evidence. That Ryan ultimately won the respect and admiration of the Jewish community is clear. In 1991, he was appointed to the Executive Committee of the New England Region of the Anti-Defamation League – the first non-Jew ever to be so honored.

2. Dec. 12, 1974 letter from Simon Wiesenthal to INS in Wien, Germany.


4. Walus ran a boarding house for recent emigrés. Reports of the early INS interviews are no longer in the OSI file. Information about them comes from OSI attorney Robin Boylan’s Nov. 6, 1980 draft memorandum to Director Ryan re U.S. v. Walus (hereafter Boylan memo). According to Boylan, only one of the neighbors had any war information about Walus. (She claimed he had been in the Polish underground.) The others recounted disputes and clashes with Walus, suggesting that he was difficult to get along with. One of the boarders recalled Walus saying he had spent the war years with the Communist underground. Another said he had seen a picture of Walus with Goering or Geobbels.

5. Feb. 10, 1976 memo to Eastern Regional Commissioner from N.Y. District Director re “Frank Walus.”

6. The statements of five of the witnesses are set forth in a July 6, 1976 memorandum to District Director (Chicago) from Regional Commissioner, Eastern Region. The sixth is in an Oct. 28, 1976 Summary Report of Investigation by Ralph C. Johnson.


10. The first established a permit system for parades and public assemblies and required applicants to post public liability and property damage insurance. The second prohibited the dissemination of material that incited racial or religious hatred with intent so to incite, and the third prohibited public demonstrations by members of political parties in military style uniforms.


12. Poland would not allow Wiesenthal’s other source to travel to the United States to testify. According to the Poles, he could add little to what was already known because he had been only fourteen when the war ended and had no personal knowledge of Walus’ wartime activities. Cable 1008227, Jan. 10, 1978 from Amer. Emb. Warsaw to Secretary of State re “Judicial


15. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). Ultimately, the neo-Nazis abandoned their effort to assemble in Skokie and gathered instead in Chicago’s Marquette Park.


18. Letter of Sept. 21, 1978 from Gotz Pollzien to defense counsel Charles Nixon, attached to Supplement to Motion to Remand to Trial Court to Consider Motion Re: Newly Discovered Evidence.


20. Judge Hoffman was at least partially correct about this. In a Feb. 27, 1980 memorandum to Director Ryan, OSI historian Peter Black reported that height requirements existed only for the SS, not for the Gestapo. Although the SS standards were stringent until 1939, they relaxed as the war progressed.


22. The district court had considered the time span but found it unimportant. Judge Hoffman reviewed pictures of himself from twenty years earlier and found it "remarkable how much I look today as I did then, even though the curl is now out of my hair."

23. March 12, 1980 memorandum from Ryan to AAG Heymann.


25. Unless otherwise noted, information on OSI’s investigative efforts comes from a Sept. 23, 1980 memo by OSI attorney Jerry Scanlan to Ryan as well as a June 12, 1980 Report of Investigation (ROI) by OSI investigator Ed Gaffney.

26. Recorded interview with Ryan, Oct. 6, 2000. Unless otherwise noted, all statements about Ryan’s actions and motivations come from this interview.

27. German privacy laws placed some limits on access.

28. Israel was anxious to have the case proceed and had offered to assist in any way it could.
29. Bundesnachrichtendienst.

30. Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, equivalent to the counterintelligence branch of the FBI; and Bundeskriminalamt, analogous to the Criminal Division of the FBI.

31. The Hoover Institute at Stanford University is one of the largest private archives in the country and contains a large Eastern European collection.

32. Most of Neu Ulm was destroyed during the War. Some surviving records were later destroyed as a matter of course. (The Neu Ulm police destroy records after 25 years.)


34. The witnesses Scanlan would retain all placed Walus in Czestochowa, thus avoiding the awkward problem in the first trial of having him working in two towns sixty miles apart.

35. Boylan memo, supra, n. 4.

36. Boylan was also on the call and made handwritten notes of the conversation.

37. The statement was included in the court’s unreported memorandum order of Nov. 26, 1980. The court later granted Walus $31,000 in court costs. "Frank Walus – Nazi Exterminator or Victim of Mistake?" Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Mar. 18, 1981, p.1. He had sought $83,466.81, which included $35,209.31 in out-of-pocket expenses, and $48,257.50 in attorneys fees. Motion for Assessment of Costs by Defendant. Since the law barred recovery of attorney’s fees, he was, in fact, reimbursed almost to the full extent possible.

38. Dec. 12, 1980 letter from Rockler to Ryan. Others, however, faulted the statement for not apologizing enough. See e.g., The Reader, n. 1, supra, which deemed the government’s statement "ignoble" because it "left the impression, duly conveyed by reporters, that Walus may yet be guilty."


40. See n. 1, supra.


42. Mendelsohn interview, supra, n. 8.

43. See pp. 150-174.

44. See e.g., the opening remarks of Chairman Joshua Eilberg, "Alleged Nazi War Criminals," Hearing before the Subcomm. on Imm., Cit., and Internat’l Law of the House Judiciary


51. Boylan memo, *supra*, n. 4. There is no indication of which German trial is referenced. As he recalled the events years later, Boylan attributed his skepticism to more than just the *Walus* decision. He remembered one witness found by the Israeli police who gave the same statement, regardless of the case. Interview with Robin Boylan, Sept. 27, 2000.


54. In *U.S. v. Kowalchuk*, *supra*, n. 52, the court was struck by the fact that there was "not one scrap of documentary evidence relating to the pertinent facts." 571 F. Supp. at 75. However, relying primarily on the testimony from the defendant and his witnesses, the court concluded that Kowalchuk's activities during the war warranted revocation of citizenship. In the case of Jacob Tannenbaum, there was no doubt he had been a kapo; he admitted it. The only question was what he had done in that capacity. For that OSI intended to rely entirely on the statements of fellow prisoners. Their credibility was not tested in the end as the case ultimately settled (see pp. 106-116). Finally, in 2002, the office filed a denaturalization action against John Bernes. The government intended to rely on eyewitnesses and Bernes' own admissions to establish the personal role Bernes had played in sending approximately 1,300 Jews and other civilians in
Lithuania to their death. However, Bernes left the United States several days before the complaint was filed. A default judgment was later entered stripping him of his citizenship.

55. Not all judges, however, want their heartstrings pulled. E.g., in United States v. Szehinskyj, the judge ruled that all evidence was to be submitted through affidavits; only cross examination would be in court. Since the defense indicated pre-trial that they would not cross examine the survivors, the affidavits alone told their story. They were powerful nonetheless. The court quoted dramatically and extensively from them in its opinion stripping Szehinskyj of citizenship. United States v. Szehinskyj, 104 F. Supp.2d 480, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2000), aff'd, 277 F.3d 331 (3rd Cir. 2002).

In United States v. Bucmys, the judge issued a pre-trial order precluding the introduction of survivor testimony in the government's case-in-chief. The court ruled that the testimony might be admissible in rebuttal, depending on the defense presented. The case settled before trial.


57. July 31, 1980 memorandum from OSI Deputy Director Sinai to Charles Wyman, CA/OSC/CCS/EUR, Department of State.


59. See discussion of photo identification in the Demjanjuk case at pp. 154 and 156.

60. In 1987, a questionable photospread procedure was used by the Soviet authorities on behalf of OSI. It contained 8 pictures, two of which were of the subject. It is unknown whether the photospread was prepared by OSI or by the Soviets. In any event, the court did not find the procedure disqualifying. In re Kalejs, A11 655 361 (BIA 1992), p. 31.

61. May 23, 1980 memorandum from Rod Smith to Ryan re "Pre-Trial Photographic Identification Procedures." Martin Mendelsohn had tried to institute similar, though not quite as rigorous procedures. In an Apr. 2, 1979 letter to Israel's Chief Superintendent for the Investigation of War Crimes, he forwarded several sets of photospreads, asked that the witness sign the picture chosen, and that once a photo was signed it not be shown to any other witness.


63. Jan. 8, 2001 e-mail from Rosenblum to all OSI re "Photospread Procedures: Important Update."
64. See pp. 342-355.

Elmans Sprogis – When Are Law Enforcement Officers Persecutors?

Elmans Sprogis was an assistant police chief in Latvia during the early war years. He listed this on his visa application and signed a form stating that he had never advocated or assisted in persecution based on race, religion or national origin. He entered the United States in 1950 under the DPA and became a citizen twelve years later.

Based on statements from several former police colleagues and two internees, OSI believed Sprogis had participated in three incidents of persecution. The first involved the arrest, transportation and confiscation of property from nine Jews; the second concerned transporting 100 - 150 Jews to the site of their execution and guarding them until they were murdered; the last involved appropriating furniture from the homes of arrested Jews.

In 1982, the government charged Sprogis with illegal procurement of citizenship, both because he had assisted in persecution (as set forth in the above three incidents) and because he had falsely denied such assistance. It claimed also that his assistance in persecution showed a lack of the good moral character necessary for citizenship.

By the time of trial, only two witnesses were available concerning the last two allegations of persecution. One had been a prisoner and the other a colleague. Their testimony was videotaped in Latvia, then a Soviet Republic. Based on the witnesses’ demeanor, the court feared that the environment had been coercive. Moreover, the court found the statements inconsistent (either with earlier statements the witnesses had made or with statements from Sprogis), conflicting with one another, and uncorroborated by external evidence. Accordingly, it gave them no credence.

The one remaining allegation of persecution pertained to Sprogis’ role in the fate of the
nine Jews. To establish that, the government relied on Sprogis' admissions as well as contemporaneous documentary evidence. Sprogis conceded knowing that the Jews had been arrested simply because they were Jewish; he also knew that they would likely be killed after they were taken from the police station. As the highest ranking official on duty during the hours of their detention, he had signed a document naming the Jews and listing the amount of money confiscated from each. Another document signed by him showed that he gave some of that money to the men who had brought the Jews to the police station; he turned the rest over to the city administration. He gave property confiscated from the Jews to the town's mayor.

The district court characterized all these activities as "ministerial" and, as such, concluded they did not amount to assistance in persecution. The government appealed this holding. The Second Circuit acknowledged that it was "a difficult and troubling issue" but concluded that the district court assessment was correct. As the Circuit saw it:

Rather than personally carrying out Nazi-ordered oppression . . . Sprogis seems only to have passively accommodated the Nazis, while performing occasional ministerial tasks which his office demanded, but which by themselves cannot be considered oppressive. There is no clear evidence that he made any decision to single out any person for arrest and persecution or that he committed any hostile act against any persecuted civilian. Sprogis' passive accommodation of the Nazis, like that of so many other civil servants similarly faced with the Nazis' conquest of their homelands and the horrors of World War II, does not, in our view, exclude him from citizenship under the DPA. To hold otherwise would require the condemnation as persecutors of all those who, with virtually no alternative, performed routine law enforcement functions during Nazi occupation.

The case seemed to set a high bar for finding "assistance in persecution" since Sprogis' activities had clearly aided the Nazis' persecutory scheme by helping them dispose of the Jews and their property. Indeed, on facts arguably similar to those in the Sprogis case, two other courts previously had found sufficient evidence of assistance in persecution.
OSI feared that after Sprogis courts would require "active participation" in persecution in order to establish illegal procurement of citizenship. The evidence against most OSI subjects would not meet that standard. Some had passively followed orders which enabled the Nazis to pursue their genocidal policies.

OSI wanted the government to seek review in the Supreme Court. However, the Criminal Division did not support this request because it doubted:

whether the court's distinction between active and passive assistance is all that meaningful. Judges are going to decide these cases based on their "feeling" that the statute should or should not apply to the particular conduct before them, and not based on whether the conduct fits into a cubbyhole labeled "active" or "passive."

The Solicitor General declined to authorize further review and the Criminal Division's analysis proved correct. Sprogis in fact has had very little precedential value. Other Circuits were dismissive of the decision; ultimately even the Second Circuit seemed to reject its reasoning. Jurisprudentially, the case is a footnote in OSI history.
1. Since Sprogis had truthfully listed his service as a Latvian policeman, there was no allegation of misrepresentation. In this respect, the case differed from most brought by OSI in its early years.

   It is, of course, impossible to determine what ultimately persuaded the judge. However, Jeffrey Mausner, trial attorney in the case, posited a theory. According to Mausner, in an off-the-record discussion with the attorneys, the trial judge asked whether the government intended to deport Sprogis to the Soviet Union. Mausner told the judge that no decision had yet been made. Nonetheless, he sensed that the judge was troubled by the possibility that the Soviet Union would be the ultimate destination since this increased substantially the likelihood that Sprogis might be executed for his World War II activities. (At the time of the Sprogis trial (Oct. 1983), no OSI defendant had yet been sent to the Soviet Union, but the concern was not frivolous. The U.S.S.R. had years earlier sentenced two other OSI defendants – Boleslav Maikovskis and Karl Linnas – to death in absentia for their wartime activities.) See pp. 271 and 430.

3. The government did not appeal the judge’s determination as to the other two alleged instances of persecution. The judge’s ruling concerning those incidents turned on his assessment of witness credibility, a matter in which the judge had enormous discretion. The government felt that an appeal of that discretionary determination would not be successful.

4. U.S. v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 122 (2nd Cir. 1985). Although all three appellate justices agreed that the district court opinion should be affirmed, one judge wrote separately to express some concern.

   I do not share the majority’s view that Sprogis’ conduct amounted to mere “passive accommodation of the Nazis.”

   This is not the case of a minor employee performing some insignificant or subordinate ministerial tasks without knowledge of Nazi oppression. It is the story of a person who volunteered to become a policeman and Assistant Precinct Chief . . . after his country had been overrun by the Nazis. We can almost take judicial notice that at that time Nazi pogroms and persecution of the Jews was generally known, particularly to persons engaged in law enforcement and possessed of Sprogis’ education and background. Under these circumstances a volunteer must have reasonably anticipated that as a police official he would probably be relied upon by the Nazis for assistance in the performance of their unsavory tasks . . . [H]e performed so satisfactorily that within two months he became Assistant Chief of Police in a larger city . . .

   Id. at 124. (emphasis in original)

5. In U.S. v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d en banc, 773 F.2d 488 (3rd Cir. 1985), the defendant, a Ukrainian policeman during the war, typed the daily reports of police
activity. While the police were involved in various acts of persecution against the Jews, including beatings and confiscation of valuables, there was no evidence that Kowalchuk himself participated in any of these activities or that he knew that Jews were to be liquidated. See also, U.S. v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981), where the defendant served as an armed, uniformed street policeman and interpreter for the Ukrainian and German police.


7. See e.g., U.S. v. Koreh, 59 F.3d 431, 441-42 (3d Cir. 1995); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1986); Hammer v. INS, 195 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1999).

8. In Ofosu v. McElroy, 98 F.3d 694 (1996), an asylum case, the court was interpreting a statute which denied asylum to anyone who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of . . . political opinion.” The defendant had worked as a senior officer in a quasi-police force in Ghana. Without citing Sprogis, the court held that “personal involvement in killing or torture is not necessary to impose responsibility for assisting or participating in persecution.”
Jacob Tannenbaum - The Kapo Dilemma

It is not an easy thing to pass judgment and determine a sentence for those poor souls whom the Nazis dehumanized and whose human feelings were destroyed. It is difficult for us, the judges of Israel, to free ourselves of the feeling that, when we punish such a human worm, we are reducing, even by the least bit, the abysmal guilt of the Nazis themselves.¹

Kapos were inmates (some Jewish and others not) who collaborated with their Nazi persecutors by serving as overseers at the camps. In return, they received limited privileges — generally better food, clothing and/or bunk space — within the camp hierarchy. Jewish reaction to kapos varied, ranging from "street justice" to "courts" in survivor camps and other areas where displaced Jews were concentrated.²

In the 1950s, the INS filed deportation cases against three Jewish kapos — Heinrich Friedman, Jakob Tencer and Jonas Lewy. None of the prosecutions was ultimately successful. In both Friedman and Tencer, the courts concluded that the dilemma faced by the kapo mitigated his actions.³ The Lewy court held otherwise. Lewey was ordered deported for having participated in activities contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf of the Axis. However, after the decision was affirmed, it was learned that the government had not turned over certain witness statements. A new trial was ordered, but by then two of the government’s key witnesses were unavailable. The government chose not to reprosecute and Lewy remained in the United States until his death in 1980.

When OSI was established in 1979, the office inherited several kapo investigations from INS. One involved Jacob Tannenbaum, an observant Polish Jew who, before the war, had been active in Zionist activities. His wife, six-month old daughter, parents and five siblings perished during the Holocaust. Tannenbaum served as a forced laborer from 1941 to 1944 at a series of
concentration camps. In Goerlitz, the last camp at which he was incarcerated, Tannenbaum was made head kapo.

He entered the United States under the DPA in 1950. He told the investigating authorities that he had been a forced laborer in Goerlitz from September 1944 until May of 1945, never mentioning his time as a kapo. He became a United States citizen in 1955, settling in Brooklyn, New York, where he became an active member in an Orthodox synagogue. His yearly charitable contributions included donations to the Simon Wiesenthal Center, a Nazi-hunting organization.

In 1976, a Holocaust survivor recognized Tannenbaum and reported him to the INS. INS opened an investigation and interviewed dozens of Goerlitz survivors. Almost all described Tannenbaum as particularly sadistic. Twelve had themselves been beaten by Tannenbaum and all but one had witnessed his beating others. Six reported inmate deaths as a result of Tannenbaum’s actions. Survivors recalled, among other things, that Tannenbaum had brutally beaten inmates even when no Germans were present, that the Germans shot two inmates after Tannenbaum reported their rifling through a pigsty in search of food, and that the SS executed inmates who Tannenbaum reported for trying to avoid an evacuation march. Many said Tannenbaum was more brutal than the camp’s SS leader.

When interviewed, Tannenbaum acknowledged that he had been a head kapo, opining that he was chosen because he was “tall and presentable and spoke a little German.” Admitting that he had beaten prisoners as part of his duties, he claimed to have done so only when German authorities were present — and then only to “protect” the prisoners from being shot by the Germans for whatever infraction had allegedly occurred.

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By the time INS transferred its caseload to OSI, 38 witnesses had been interviewed. OSI reviewed all the witness statements and spoke with ten of the survivors. The OSI attorney on the investigation felt confident of only one. His emotions were under control, his memory precise, and his recollections were based on personal observations rather than hearsay. Problems with the others ranged from excessive aggressiveness to excessive passivity. Some expressed such hatred for Tannenbaum that the attorney feared emotional tirades; others had a "turn the other cheek attitude" and showed no emotion; one saw himself as a "man of God" and preferred not to testify against anyone. However, since names of new witnesses were still surfacing, the attorney believed the case had potential.

Director Rockler disagreed. As a matter of policy, he viewed kapos as victims rather than persecutors.

I thought [it] was absolutely insane... You could bring charges against them for other reasons but not on the ground that they were Nazi persecutors. They were concentration camp inmates, generally Jews who were assigned supervisory responsibility with respect to other Jews. Were they lovable? No. They stayed alive. But they were themselves inmates and were in many cases exterminated. Kapos were the last target group I had in mind.8

That Tannenbaum was Jewish was irrelevant. Rockler had earlier closed an investigation of a Catholic kapo incarcerated for her work with the underground.

It was not until 1984, when Director Sher expressed interest in the case, that the investigation again became active. He knew, of course, that the matter would be controversial. Therefore, although various attorneys worked on the case, Sher was the public face. "I felt if there was any grief to be had, it should come on my head... I interrogated the bum; I deposed the bum."9
The interrogation (interview) was in October 1984. Tannenbaum readily conceded, as he had to the INS, that he had been the chief Jewish kapo, and acknowledged that benefits had been bestowed on him as a result of his position. These included having his own room, wearing a civilian jacket, and leaving the camp unguarded to get supplies in town. He offered explanations or denials for the brutality which inmates had reported.

OSI continued to reinterview survivors. Sher recalled comments along the line of: "He's still alive? Give me his address and you won't have to worry about him." People claimed to have current nightmares about him. Sher had many "sleepless nights" as he agonized over the case. OSI consulted with rabbis and various segments of the Jewish community during the course of the investigation for their reaction to the prosecution of a kapo.

Every available survivor who knew Tannenbaum favored prosecution. Simon Wiesenthal and the Israelis had no objection in principle. Indeed, the Israelis themselves had prosecuted several kapos. The message OSI took from the Israelis was that it would be immoral not to proceed with the case. Ultimately, Sher recommended prosecution.

At first I felt I had to discount the fierceness of [witness] attitudes because by viewing him as a traitor they might have unintentionally exaggerated what he had done. Because he was a Jew, they might consider it more egregious than it was. But the evidence increased so dramatically and was so strong. What made me cross the line is that he was involved in the use of deadly force with his own hands outside the presence of Germans. We knew from reading and talking with survivors and experts that there were kapos who were basically benevolent. They took the job to save their lives. Did what they had to do in front of Germans but never more. This guy was cruel beyond belief. This was very hurtful for me because I knew he had lost his first family. I felt no matter where you drew the line, no matter how much leeway and benefit of doubt you gave him, he crossed the line.

The Criminal Division agreed. Before the complaint was filed, however, the
investigation was leaked to *The New York Law Journal.* Other papers picked up the story.

Former Director Rockler read the articles and wrote to Sher.

I regard such a suit as more than a little dubious as a matter of law, and as improper, if not outrageous, as a matter of policy.

***

Over the years, it seems to me, the thrust of OSI activities, and publicity attendant thereon, seems to have been to suggest that German Nazi programs were really programs of East Europeans – Ukrainians, white Russians, Baltics and Poles. As we know, some of these people may have been willing accomplices and collaborators, but they were not directors or principals. To suggest that Jews were willing participants in the program of extermination of Jews carries this misdirection one step further toward absolute nonsense – to say nothing of lending aid and comfort to the enemy.

Rockler wrote again several days later, advising Sher that he wanted to represent Tannenbaum, without compensation, if the complaint were filed. He sought an opinion from the Department of Justice as to whether such representation presented a conflict of interest because of his prior leadership of OSI. He was told that it would.

Rockler was not the only one reacting to the pre-filing publicity. Someone smashed the windows in Tannenbaum’s home and his second wife, from whom he had been separated since the late 1960s, was abruptly fired from her job.

The complaint was filed on May 12, 1987. The government charged that Tannenbaum was ineligible to enter under the DPA because he had assisted in persecuting civilians and, as a kapo, had been a member or participant in a movement hostile to the United States. The complaint also alleged that his entry was barred by the State Department regulation excluding persons who advocated, acquiesced or engaged in activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf of the Axis, and that he lacked the good moral character required
for U.S. citizenship.

By and large the Jewish community did not criticize the filing. The director of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) told the press that "No one should be able to cloak themselves in some collective ethnic garb to escape justice." The president of the American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors stated that despite the dire conditions of camp life, "our human background says you must remain a human being even under the worst of circumstances."

Tannenbaum denied all the charges, admitting only that he had been a kapo, a position which had been forced on him. He raised four defenses: (1) that the United States had a "duty and obligation to conduct a complete and thorough investigation" before issuing a visa; (2) his actions were done "to prevent his being killed;" (3) the government delayed bringing suit so long that he could no longer participate in his own defense; and (4) his actions helped preserve the lives of fellow inmates.

He was deposed by Director Sher over three days in August 1987. It was a tense confrontation. Less than an hour into the third day, Tannenbaum fell ill. He was taken by ambulance to the hospital where he remained for almost three weeks with heart problems.

Citing health reasons, his attorneys proposed settling the case. A doctor chosen by the government conducted an independent examination. He concluded that Tannenbaum suffered from diabetes, as well as an organic mental syndrome which left him somewhat confused, and possible underlying coronary disease. A stressful situation could aggravate his condition and place him at "high risk;" it might even be life threatening.

DAAG Richard knew that an agreement in the Tannenbaum case might be viewed skeptically. Among other things, the medical evidence was "less than overwhelming." More
importantly:

inasmuch as Tannenbaum is Jewish, this settlement may be erroneously viewed by some as a "sell out". The facts, however, speak for themselves – if we wanted to "sell out" we could have declined to bring the case in the first instance.19

The settlement called for Tannenbaum to agree to denaturalization based on his having participated in persecution "by brutalizing and physically abusing prisoners outside the presence of German SS personnel."20 The government agreed not to institute deportation proceedings unless Tannenbaum’s health – which the government was to monitor – improved.

The parties appeared before Judge I. Leo Glasser on February 4, 1988. It was apparent that the judge himself was torn.

THE COURT: I dreaded the day when this case was to come to trial. . . . I was one of the very early soldiers into Dachau in World War II, but I have often wondered how much moral and physical courage we have a right to demand or expect of somebody in the position of Mr. Tannenbaum. . . . I sometimes wonder whether I might have passed that test.21

Tannenbaum was not the first to have what amounted to a medical deferment, although OSI used the procedure sparingly. As DAAG Richard saw it, the government "should not use [its] prosecutorial discretion to undercut the Congressional decision to deny [Nazi persecutors] waivers on deportability."22

Public response to Tannenbaum’s plea was mixed. Many Goerlitz survivors were disappointed. "Tannenbaum deserves not less than any regular Nazi deserves." "I would have hanged him with my own hands. I am only partially satisfied." "Is this all he is getting, for all he did?" "Why did they not call me for the trial? . . . Had he wanted to, he could have saved the entire camp."23 The Baltimore Jewish Times opined that "the government skirted its legal and moral duties" by issuing a medical deferment to Tannenbaum when it had not done so for Karl
Some Jewish organizations interpreted the plea as a humane compromise based on the moral dimensions of the case, rather than a result brought about by health concerns. The WJC opined that "the Justice Department handled a very sensitive matter in a most fair and equitable way, insuring that justice was applied in a firm but proper manner" while the Simon Wiesenthal Center (SWC) called the plea "an appropriate action from both a moral and legal point of view."

Sher's memory of Tannenbaum is nuanced:

We were right to investigate it; we were right to bring it; and we were right to settle it. Of all the defendants and subjects that I came into contact with, he was the only one to have exhibited any morsel of remorse. He was so conflicted. He was a tragic figure. He was also a murderer.

Tannenbaum died of a heart attack in June 1989. Although OSI investigated several other kapos, they felt the evidence was sufficient in only one other case. Because the subject was bedridden and terminally ill, however, the government forewent prosecution. Tannenbaum therefore remains the only kapo prosecution brought by OSI.
1. Beisky v. Israel (Crim. Appeal No. 149/59, 1959) (Beisky was sentenced to three years).


3. In *Tencer*, the immigration judge dismissed the case. In *Friedman*, the court ordered his deportation but it was reversed on appeal. The Friedman case was more nuanced than Tencer's. More survivors testified on Friedman's behalf than for the government. While government witnesses recalled Friedman beating Jews and stealing their footwear, defense witnesses recounted his protecting the sick and injured, destroying a list of inmates scheduled to be shot, and allowing prayers to be said despite SS orders forbidding Jewish worship.

4. Goerlitz was a subcamp of the Gross Rosen concentration camp in Poland. The camp held approximately 1,000 male prisoners separated by a wire fence from a smaller women’s section. Internees were forced to work for a German firm manufacturing mobile field kitchens, tanks and rockets.


6. Not all these allegations were sustainable once OSI began its investigation.


9. Sher recorded interview, Apr. 30, 2001. All references in this chapter to Sher's views come from this interview unless otherwise specified.


11. Recorded Einhorn interview, Oct. 2, 2001. All references in this chapter to Einhorn's views come from this interview unless otherwise specified.


15. Tannenbaum deposition, Aug. 26, 1987, p. 10. Attacks on OSI defendants or their property were not uncommon in the 1980s. See pp. 349-350, 527-528.

16. \textit{Long Island Newsday}, "Nazi Hater or Holocaust Henchman?" by Kevin Flynn, May 22, 1987. Eli Rosenbaum was General Counsel for the WJC at the time.

17. \textit{Id}.


20. The admission of brutality was essential to Director Sher. He insisted that without it, he would not have recommended the settlement. In this respect, the agreement was different from others entered into by OSI. In the typical agreement, defendants were required to admit only that they had served in some capacity which, had they advised U.S. authorities, would have precluded their entry into the United States.


As of this writing, at least 20 cases have been resolved through written settlement agreements allowing the defendant to remain in the U.S.: Artischenko, Baumann, Berezowskyj, Bernotas, Bucmys, Didrichsons, Ensin, Gudauskas, Habich, Kaminskas, Kirstens, Klimavicius, Koreh, Kungys, Lehmann, Quintus, Schuk, Tannenbaum, Virkutis, and von Bolschwing.

Twelve of these were based on medical condition (Baumann, Berezowskyj, Bernotas, Didrichsons, Ensin, Habich, Kirstens, Koreh, Lehmann, Quintas, Tannenbaum and von Bolschwing.) The others were litigative concerns.

There were also cases dismissed for medical concerns without written settlements to that effect \textit{e.g.}, Paskevicius (aka Pasker).

23. The survivors were contacted by OSI. Their responses are contained in a Feb. 9, 1988 letter to OSI attorney Sunshine from Ruth Winter, an OSI staffer.


26. *Id.*
Edgars Laipenieks – When There are No Good Choices

Edgars Laipenieks was a track and field star who competed in the 1936 Olympics on behalf of his native Latvia. His prosecution by OSI is notable for several reasons: (1) it led to the CIA’s public acknowledgment that Laipenieks had worked with the agency; (2) it is a case involving political more than religious persecution; and (3) it highlights some of the nuanced and difficult choices faced by persons in the Baltic states during World War II.

Latvian history is tortuous. Long under Russian domination, Latvia gained independence after World War I. Its independence was short lived, however. Germany invaded in 1938 and then, in accordance with provisions in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviets annexed the country in 1940, declaring it a Soviet Socialist Republic. Thousands of Latvians were deported to Siberia; many were murdered. The following year, Germany invaded and drove the Russians out. Germany remained an occupying force until the end of World War II, after which the Soviet Union again annexed the country.

Laipenieks worked as an investigator and interrogator for the Latvian Political Police (LPP), a group which coordinated with, and reported to, the Germans. The LPP pursued a German agenda, hunting Jews and Communists as enemies of the German state. The search for Jews was largely complete by autumn of 1941. At that point, those Jews not yet killed were confined to ghettos; most were murdered by early December. After rounding up the Jews, the LPP focused its attention on Latvians suspected of having denounced fellow citizens during the Soviet occupation.¹

Laipenieks was a member of the LPP from July 1941 until some time in 1943. He admitted occasionally roughing up prisoners as part of the interrogation process. As he
described his wartime activity, he captured about 200 Communist spies who were later shot by persons other than himself.2

After the war, Laipenieks was convicted by a tribunal of the French Military Government of Austria on charges of possessing arms. He emigrated to Chile in 1947 where he became a citizen and coached Chilean athletes for the 1952 and 1956 Olympics. In 1960, the University of Denver sought his services as head track coach. His U.S. visa application made no mention of his service with the LPP or his Austrian conviction. Laipenieks entered the United States under the INA; he never applied for U.S. citizenship.

Laipenieks moved to Mexico in 1964 to train their Olympic hopefuls, but returned to the United States five years later. In 1974, he was one of the 37 people who the Department of Justice acknowledged were being investigated by the INS for their wartime activities.3 Simon Wiesenthal claimed that Laipenieks had personally murdered Jews, and the Israelis identified him as a “war criminal.”4 Although nothing in OSI’s investigation substantiated such a claim, Laipenieks’ local newspaper linked him to the deaths of 60,000 Latvian Jews.5

Between 1958 and 1967, Laipenieks had occasionally acted as a “spotter” for the CIA, helping the Agency to assess and develop “targets of interest” in Communist bloc countries. His work involved approaching touring athletes and Latvian emigrés about defecting or providing information to the United States.6 Although the Agency had played no part in his emigration to the United States, Laipenieks contacted the organization when he learned he was being investigated. He then released their written response to the press. It stated in relevant part:

[W]e have been corresponding with the Immigration and Naturalization Service about your status. We have now been told that you are “not amenable to deportation under existing laws”. It is our understanding that INS has advised
their San Diego office to cease any action against you.

If such does not prove the case, please let us know immediately. Thank you once again for your patience in this instance, and your past assistance to the Agency.7

In addition to this written confirmation of his assistance, then CIA Director George H.W. Bush, in response to a reporter's questioning, publicly acknowledged Laipenieks' work with the agency, although he characterized Laipenieks' service as "minor."8 William Colby, a former CIA Director, made reference to Laipenieks' assistance during a television show about Nazis in America.9

Laipenieks opined on the reason for the INS investigation. As he saw it, "[a]ll the top Communists in Latvia were Jews," one of whom might have escaped and started rumors about him. He thought that Americans were prone to believe such stories because both the Secretary of State (Henry Kissinger) and the Attorney General (Edward Levi) were Jewish. According to Laipenieks, "[t]hey are smooth together."10

Despite all the publicity, the INS never filed charges, apparently frustrated in part by the fact that there was no statutory basis for deporting those who entered under the INA because of their World War II acts of persecution.11 By the time OSI was established, however, the newly-enacted Holtzman Amendment had closed this loophole. In 1981, after discussing the issue with the CIA, OSI filed suit.

The complaint alleged that Laipenieks' visa had been obtained by fraud and willful misrepresentation of material facts, in that it omitted any reference to his work with the LPP and his later conviction in Austria. The government also contended that service with the LPP constituted persecution of civilians based on race, religion, national origin or political opinion.
The immigration court gave short shrift to the misrepresentation counts. In part the court was moved by the fact that the visa application was printed in English, a language which Laipenieks neither spoke nor read at the time. (Laipenieks had given his responses orally in Spanish, and they had been translated into English by consular officials.) Moreover, evidence at trial showed that Laipenieks had told the CIA in 1962 about his service with the LPP. The court therefore thought it unlikely that he had "wilfully" concealed the same information from the American Consul when he applied for his visa; the court surmised that the concealment was due either to imprecision in the questioning or to the language barrier. The court did acknowledge that Laipenieks might have acted wilfully in concealing his conviction. However, it deemed this immaterial on the ground that full disclosure would not have barred his admission under then-existing law.

Most of the opinion was devoted to the persecution charges. Testimony on these counts had been presented largely through videotaped depositions from witnesses in Latvia, then a Soviet Socialist Republic. The deponents claimed to have been victims personally beaten by Laipenieks, to have seen others who were beaten or to have been told of such events by people at the scene. The immigration court largely rejected the deposition testimony, finding that the atmosphere in which it was given was "intimidating," in part because the presiding Soviet official referenced the "Nazi war criminal Laipenieks" and restricted cross-examination. The court also doubted the credibility of the witnesses. Many could not identify a photograph of the defendant; others remembered details which seemed implausible; and many relied on hearsay to establish the defendant's role. Although hearsay is admissible in deportation hearings, the court viewed it with particular skepticism since it involved conversations and memories from 40 years
earlier.

The court was no more impressed with the few eyewitnesses who, having settled in the United States and Israel, testified in court. In each case, their courtroom testimony was contradicted in some respects by statements they had made earlier. The court worried too that witnesses might be confusing the defendant with his brother; both worked at the same location as interrogators for the LPP.

Most importantly, however, even if the witnesses were to be believed, the immigration judge was not persuaded that Laipenieks’ actions were based on persecution due to race, religion, national origin or political opinion. He thought it more likely reprisal for betraying Latvia during the period of Soviet occupation, since each of the victims had been a pro-Soviet Latvian activist. There was only one Jewish victim and he was the father of persons who allegedly persecuted the Latvians during the Russian era; the court therefore saw his religion as an incidental fact unrelated to Laipenieks’ actions. In such circumstances, the court declined to order Laipenieks’ deportation.

The government appealed, and the ruling was reversed. The BIA noted that many of the Latvian victims had been punished for their involvement in killings and deportations of Latvians following Soviet occupation of the country. While punishment for such crimes did not violate the Holtzman Amendment prohibition against persecution based on political opinion, Laipenieks had admitted in court that he gathered information against “all kinds of communists.” This included persons who had done nothing more than show sympathy to the Communist cause. As such, the Board concluded that he had engaged in political persecution of the type covered by the Holtzman Amendment. He was ordered deported to Chile, the country he had designated should
the court rule against him.

The BIA decision was a total vindication for OSI. However, Laipenieks appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and once again the decision was reversed. Rather than focusing on whether the LPP (of which Laipenieks was indisputably a member) persecuted individuals because of their political beliefs, the court focused on Laipenieks himself. Had he persecuted people because of their political opinion or committed acts which led to the persecution of individuals because of their political beliefs?

In concluding that the answer was no, the Circuit shared the immigration judge's skepticism of government witnesses who claimed that their incarceration had been for political belief rather than criminal activity. Even if the witnesses were to be believed, however, the Circuit was left wondering what it meant to be a Communist sympathizer. The court tried to place the defendant's activities in context.

During Laipenieks' service with the LPP, Latvia was a war-torn nation. Only months before, the country had suffered terrible atrocities at the hands of Soviet rule. Latvia was at war with Russia and had reason to fear spies, saboteurs and pro-Soviet conspirators working to undermine the government in power. Thus, Laipenieks and the LPP certainly had reason to concern itself with the behavior of Soviet "activists" and "sympathizers."

* * *

When individuals are singled out and victimized on the basis of religion, race or national origin there is no legitimate reason for doing so. For instance, there was no rational basis for the persecution perpetrated against the Jews during the Holocaust. There can be only one explanation for the persecutorial acts; the Jews were persecuted because they were Jews. In contrast, the present case is much more troublesome. Laipenieks and the LPP had a legitimate basis for investigating Communists. The Communists remaining in Latvia were sympathetic to a hostile nation who was presently at war with the Latvians and who only a few months earlier had exterminated thousands of Latvian citizens.
One judge vigorously dissented. He felt that the Circuit had not given sufficient
deferecnce to the decision by the BIA. Moreover, he believed that the court had virtually
disregarded the testimony of the government's expert historian as to the role played by the LPP
and had improperly focused on Laipenieks' personal motivation - a factor the dissenter thought
irrelevant.

OSI and the Criminal Division urged the Solicitor General to seek rehearing. The thrust
of their argument was a technical one: that the Ninth Circuit had improperly given due deference
to the findings of the immigration judge rather than to the Board of Immigration Appeals. OSI
also feared that the Circuit was imposing a standard of personal involvement in persecution that
was not warranted by the statute and that the court had been too dismissive of the deposition
testimony. The Solicitor General agreed and a petition for rehearing by the full court was filed.
However, the Ninth Circuit declined to reconsider the case.

Although some of the language in the opinion was potentially very troubling to OSI, in
retrospect it appears that the impact of the case was limited. The role of saboteurs in a political
climate as charged as Latvia's is difficult to determine. Very few OSI cases present the
question. To the extent that it suggests there must be a personal role in persecution (as opposed
to membership in a group that can be shown to have persecuted), other courts have simply
rejected it. The Second Circuit alone used it as precedent. That was in Sprogis, a case which,
as noted earlier, is confined generally to its facts.

Perhaps Laipenieks stands for nothing as much as recognition that the world during
World War II was not as black and white as it is often portrayed. For those in countries like
Latvia, where the dilemma was fighting Communism or fascism, it was not always easy to see
where one should turn. The difficulty the courts had in deciding *Laipenieks* (with the ultimate decision in the Court of Appeals decided by a 2 to 1 vote) may simply be testimony to that fact.

Laipenieks died in the United States in March 1998.


4. “Area Man Accused by Top Nazi Hunter,” supra, n. 2.


10. “Former Track Coach in La Jolla Accused of Being War Criminal,” supra, n. 5.


12. Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).

13. At one point, the court indicated that the government had to prove that an individual was persecuted solely because of his political views. Elsewhere in the opinion, indeed twice on the very same page, the court omitted the word “solely.” 750 F.2d at 1437.

14. Hammer v. INS, 195 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1999); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1986). Indeed, another panel of the Ninth Circuit seemed to reject the reasoning in Laipenieks, when it refused to grant asylum to an Egyptian police officer who had rounded up fundamentalist Moslems and turned them over to others who he knew would torture and abuse them. Riad v. INS, 161 F.3d 14 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpub’d). The asylum statute is almost identical to the language in the Holtzman amendment, yet the Riad panel held that one can assist in persecution even if he “has not physically taken part in the offense.” The Riad decision is unpublished, however, and therefore of no precedential value within the Ninth Circuit. It establishes only that some members of the court disagree with the Laipenieks reasoning; it does
not overrule *Laipenieks*.

15. *See p. 103.*
Juozas Kungys – When is Misrepresentation Actionable?

On the macro level, Kungys was a significant win for OSI; on the micro level, it was a loss.

Juozas Kungys emigrated to the United States in 1948. He entered under the INA and became a citizen in 1954. In 1975, the *Morning Freiheit*, a New York daily Yiddish newspaper, reported that Kungys was implicated in the murder of approximately 2,000 Lithuanian Jews during World War II. INS opened an investigation which ultimately passed on to OSI. Based on statements supplied by the Soviets from witnesses in Lithuania, OSI concluded that Kungys had rounded up and transported thousands of Jews to an execution site, distributed firearms and ammunition to an execution squad, forced the victims into a mass grave, shot some of them, and exhorted the execution squad to do the same.

In 1981, OSI filed suit to revoke Kungys' citizenship. The government charged that his admission to the country should have been barred by the State Department regulation excluding anyone who had been guilty of, or who had advocated or acquiesced in, activities or conduct “contrary to civilization and human decency” on behalf of Axis countries during World War II. In addition, the complaint asserted that false statements on Kungys’ visa and naturalization forms (concerning date and place of birth, as well as residence and occupation during the war) rendered his admission and subsequent naturalization unlawful. Finally, the government charged that Kungys’ conduct during the war, as well as his false statements, showed that he lacked the good moral character required of persons seeking to become naturalized citizens.

The crux of the complaint was Kungys’ role during World War II. To establish that at trial, the government introduced videotaped depositions taken in Lithuania in which the
witnesses detailed Kungys' involvement in the massacre of Jews. Lithuania was then a Soviet republic, and the depositions were presided over by a Soviet official with questioning by OSI attorneys and defense counsel. After viewing the videotape, the district court discounted entirely the witnesses' statements.²

The court's reasoning was multi-faceted. It concluded that: (1) because the Soviets treated war crimes as "political cases," there was often pressure to tailor evidence; (2) the Soviet Union had an interest in the United States finding that Kungys participated in the killings because this would diminish the influence of Lithuanian emigrés (such as Kungys), and thereby help suppress Lithuanian nationalism; (3) the manner in which the depositions were conducted was suspect; (4) the content of the depositions suggested that inculpatory statements were fabricated as a result of undue pressure by the Soviet authorities; and (5) the Soviets' failure to release statements the same witnesses had given in the 1940s cast doubt on the accuracy of the more recent testimony.

The court's criticism was leveled not only at the Soviets but at OSI itself, for showing "extreme deference" to the overbearing and intimidating Soviet procurator, posing "blatantly" leading questions, and interposing "silly" objections to the defense cross-examinations. The sum of all this led the court to accuse OSI of "collaborating" with a totalitarian state and to conclude that the use of the deposition testimony against Kungys "would violate fundamental considerations of fairness."

Without evidence of Kungys' role in persecution, the only remaining issue was whether his misrepresentations and concealments warranted revocation of citizenship. The court concluded that they did not, because neither singly nor in the aggregate were they material
(relevant) to his having been allowed to enter the United States or to become a naturalized citizen. The same reasoning motivated the court’s conclusion that the false information did not establish lack of good moral character: the falsehoods were not deemed material.

The government appealed on a variety of grounds – arguing that any false statement was evidence of bad moral character, regardless of whether it was material; that the defendant’s false statements had in fact been material; and that the court should have considered the deposition testimony taken in the Soviet Union. The latter issue was of particular importance to OSI. Not only was the testimony crucial to a determination about Kungys’ wartime activity, but the Criminal Division feared that the court’s ruling:

and inflammatory language could cripple OSI’s enforcement effort. Many of OSI’s subjects and defendants committed their war crimes in Eastern Bloc countries and the Soviet Union. Successful prosecution depends upon courts receiving into evidence the testimony of witnesses and documents found behind the Iron Curtain.³

Although that may have been the most important issue to OSI, the appeals court did not issue a ruling on the point. Instead, the court focused on whether Kungys’ misrepresentations had been material. Concluding that they had, the court found sufficient basis to revoke his citizenship on that ground alone; the court did not need to determine whether he in fact had played a role in the murder of 2,000 Jews.⁴

Kungys appealed to the Supreme Court which agreed to hear the case. The Court was interested in two issues, neither of which involved the deposition testimony crucial to a determination of Kungys’ role in World War II. Rather, the Court was concerned with how to determine whether facts concealed in a citizenship application are material, and whether false statements alone establish lack of good moral character for citizenship or whether those false
statements too have to be material.

On the first issue, both the government and Kungys agreed that the standard for materiality should be determined from a prior Supreme Court ruling; the two sides disagreed only on what that ruling established. As to good moral character, the government took a middle ground:

> We're not saying that any lie, regardless of its significance, is enough to show that you lack good moral character. What we're saying is that here in the context of lies that could have proven the basis for perjury... where somebody has repeatedly committed perjury, that he has demonstrated lack of good moral character.

After the argument, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court notified the parties that it wanted the case reargued. It also asked the parties to submit another set of briefs, focusing on a series of questions including whether the materiality standard in the prior Supreme Court ruling ought simply to be abandoned, and if so, what should take its place.

The opinion ultimately issued showed a very divided Court. A majority did agree, however, to abandon the earlier test of materiality and to establish a less stringent one than even the government had originally urged. Under the new test, a misrepresentation or concealment is material to a citizenship application if it would have a "natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified." The Court also held that any false statement made under oath in order to obtain an immigration benefit can establish lack of good moral character; there is no requirement that the statement be material.

This was a major victory for the government. Henceforth, it would be much simpler to establish both materiality in denaturalization proceedings and lack of good moral character in cases in which the defendant was charged with misrepresentation. From that perspective — and
that is the big picture – the government was vindicated.

The impact on Kungys himself, however, was less clear. The Court did not determine whether he had made material misstatements nor whether he lacked good moral character. Nor did the Court discuss whether the depositions, essential to establishing his role in persecution, should have been admitted. It sent the case back to the lower courts to resolve the materiality and good moral character issues.

Neither the government nor defense counsel was interested in prolonging the litigation. From OSI's perspective, the chance that the lower courts would reconsider the deposition issue was minimal. Nothing in the Supreme Court ruling required such reconsideration, and even if the lower court were willing to reopen the issue, OSI was not confident that the original decision would be reversed. Without that, the government could never establish Kungys' role in persecution. The best the government would obtain was a denaturalization and deportation based on his misrepresentations. While this would ostensibly still be a victory, there was a big loophole. Unless he was deported under the Holtzman amendment (for reasons involving his role in persecution), the law allowed him to apply for discretionary relief from the deportation order. Given his age and the fact that his wife was a U.S. citizen with serious health problems, OSI believed his request would likely be granted. Therefore, the most the government would achieve would be to strip Kungys of his citizenship without being able to remove him from the United States.

Defense counsel was the first to propose settlement: Kungys would consent to denaturalization – conceding that he had misrepresented facts which were material to his citizenship application – if the government would agree not to seek his deportation. OSI and
DAAG Richard believed that nothing more could be achieved through litigation. 10

In November 1988, the district court entered an order along the terms proposed. As of this writing, Kungys remains in the United States.
1. This was the first case in which OSI based a denaturalization count on the State Department regulation. He could not be charged with assistance in persecution since he had not entered under the DPA or the RRA.


4. *U.S. v. Kungys*, 793 F.2d 516 (3rd Cir. 1986). On a separate issue, the Circuit agreed with the lower court that a misrepresentation must be material to show a lack of good moral character.


8. If the government proves that the misrepresentation had this tendency, a presumption of ineligibility is raised. The naturalized citizen can then rebut the presumption. The government had originally contended, both in its brief and first oral argument, that materiality is established when the government can prove that if the truth had been revealed, there would have been an investigation that might have uncovered disqualifying facts leading to loss of citizenship.

9. Aug. 11, 1988 memo to OSI Director Neal Sher from Bruce Einhorn, Deputy Director for Litigation.

10. Sept. 6, 1988 memorandum from Sher to DAAG Richard, recommending that the case be settled; Sept. 8, 1988 cover memo from DAAG Richard to AAG Ed Dennis, urging approval on the ground that "denaturalization is probably all we can achieve;" and approval granted by AAG Dennis on Sept. 9, 1988.
 Leonid Petkiewytsch – An Aberrational Loss

Leonid Petkiewytsch was born in Poland where his father served as mayor of their town during the German occupation. In 1944, the family fled to Austria to avoid the advancing Russian Army. The Austrians routed the family to Germany where the 21-year-old Petkiewytsch was assigned to serve as a civilian guard in a labor education camp. These camps, run by the Gestapo, were originally intended to accustom indolent or unproductive foreign workers to “proper work” during eight weeks of incarceration and indoctrination. The camp to which Petkiewytsch was sent also housed political prisoners and Jews who were segregated from the rest of the population. Their incarceration was longer and they were subjected to especially harsh forced labor, beatings and torture. Some were executed.

Although Petkiewytsch was a civilian employee, he was issued a German military uniform and carried a loaded rifle. During his seven months at the camp, he guarded the inmates and escorted them to factories and farms where they served as forced laborers. At war’s end, Petkiewytsch was arrested by the British. He remained in custody for three years, though no charges were ever filed.

Shortly after his release, Petkiewytsch applied for a visa under the DPA. His application was rejected because of his guard service. In 1955, after both the DPA and RRA had expired, Petkiewytsch was admitted under the INA. He answered “no” to a question on his visa application asking whether he had ever been arrested.

Petkiewytsch did not apply for U.S. citizenship until 1982. In response to questioning at that time, he stated that he had served as a guard in a labor camp and had been arrested by the British. INS contacted OSI which, unaware of Petkiewytsch until then, opened an investigation.
INS meanwhile placed his citizenship application on hold.

While investigating Petkiewytsch's wartime activities, OSI learned that the British failure to file charges did not necessarily mean that they believed a person was not guilty. Often they were unable to locate key witnesses or realized that the subject had already spent more time in custody than he would receive if tried and convicted.

OSI filed deportation charges in 1985. The filing alleged that Petkiewytsch was deportable because he had assisted in persecution and concealed material information (that he had been arrested by the British) in his visa application.

In an unusually brief opinion (3 pages), the immigration judge rejected the government's claims outright. He concluded that Petkiewytsch was "a victim of the times he lived in" and that his wrongful conduct was "at most... his acceptance under duress of his duties as a civilian labor education camp guard." The court determined that Petkiewytsch's service had been involuntary and that he had never abused any inmates. Based on these findings, it ruled that he had not assisted in persecution.

The ruling was reversed on appeal. The BIA accepted the premises upon which the immigration judge had relied, i.e., that Petkiewytsch had been "a rather reluctant guard who performed his duties as ordered in order to escape imprisonment or death," and that he never physically harmed the prisoners or fired a shot. However, it found these emotionally powerful arguments irrelevant to legal disposition of the case. Relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Fedorenko, the Board focused solely on the "objective effect" of Petkiewytsch's conduct. From that perspective, his work had assisted the Nazis in their persecution of Jews. The Board was unfazed by Britain's failure to file charges after the war since the British did not focus on
whether Petkiewytsch violated U.S. statutes. The decision was a complete victory for OSI.

The victory was short-lived. Petkiewytsch appealed to the Sixth Circuit which reversed the decision yet again. The Circuit acknowledged that the labor camp was "a place of persecution" and that the Holtzman Amendment, the statute under which OSI had filed suit, was aimed at those who "assisted in persecution." However, after examining the legislative history of the amendment, the court concluded that it was intended to prevent true "war criminals" from entering the country. Petkiewytsch, who had "never struck a prisoner and never personally inflicted any form of abuse upon prisoners beyond impeding their escape through his presence as a civilian guard," did not qualify.

The ruling was very troubling for OSI. Most of its cases involve camp guards, and it is difficult to establish that such individuals had "hands on" interaction with inmates. If there was an altercation, the victim is likely dead and it is rare that there is a written record to which OSI can turn. The bulk of OSI cases rely on the proposition that prison guards performed a variety of duties, generally along the lines acknowledged by Petkiewytsch, i.e., they were an armed presence to preclude inmates from escaping and to escort them to and from work stations. A series of courts had already ruled that this was sufficient to establish assistance in prosecution. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Fedorenko, had held that a prisoner of war who involuntarily served as a camp guard could be stripped of his citizenship. In an effort to distinguish Petkiewytsch's situation from Fedorenko's, the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that Fedorenko had admitted shooting his gun at escaping inmates; Petkiewytsch, by contrast, had never fired a shot.

A member of the Solicitor General's office, joining OSI and the Criminal Division in
urging the Solicitor General to seek a rehearing of the case, saw no meaningful distinction between Fedorenko's wartime service and Petkiewytsch's.

[A camp guard] makes the prisoners available for persecution — he is like the accomplice pinning back the victim's arms while the principal administers the blows. Once we accept the notion that a camp guard who puts down a prison uprising under order of the camp commandant assists in persecution as a matter of law (the Supreme Court's holding in Fedorenko), then it is easy to see why a guard who is never called on to fire his weapon equally assists in persecution. The function of armed guards . . . is not only to shoot escaping inmates, but by their very presence to deter the attempt. That [Petkiewytsch] did not need to fire his rifle to keep the . . . inmates available for persecution does not diminish his assistance in persecution. It might even mean that [his] assistance was more effective.11

The Solicitor General authorized the government to seek rehearing. The Circuit, however, declined to reconsider the case. On the theory that bad facts — at least as the Sixth Circuit had articulated the facts — make bad law, OSI and the Criminal Division did not ask the Solicitor General to file a petition for certiorari.12 The Sixth Circuit ruling was therefore the final word.

In 1992, with litigation complete, INS asked OSI to return Petkiewytsch's immigration file. The agency was set to remove its hold on his naturalization application and to grant him citizenship. OSI advised INS that if it did so, the government would bring a denaturalization action. The INS retained the hold and Petkiewytsch remained a resident alien in the United States until his death in January 2000.

The holding in Petkiewytsch had tangible as well as intangible consequences for OSI. Intangibly, it made the office for years more reticent to file a case which could ultimately be appealed to the Sixth Circuit. Tangibly, another case was lost when the court followed the Petkiewytsch weapon analysis.13 OSI feared that a "shoot the gun" test was developing: if a
guard had not used a weapon offensively, the court would conclude he had not assisted in persecution.

In fact, however, no other appellate courts were willing to follow suit; indeed, they were openly dismissive of the ruling. One went so far as to describe it as not merely wrong, but “doubly wrong.” Only eight years after the Sixth Circuit decided Petkiewytsch, another panel of the same court interpreted it to apply only to those required to serve involuntarily as civilian guards in labor education camps. The chance that these three factors will coalesce in another case is remote, as the court inevitably realized. By giving Petkiewytsch such a narrow interpretation, the Circuit essentially neutered it as precedent.

2. Aug. 16, 1982 memo to Charlie Gittens, OSI Deputy Director from Peter Black, Historian. It is unusual for OSI to learn of a subject in this manner. For one similar occurrence, see pp. 303-304.


5. The court bolstered this conclusion by noting that Petkiewytsch had been released by the British. As for not acknowledging his time in custody, the court concluded that this misrepresentation was immaterial to the issuance of the visa.


8. It can happen, however. See p. 30, n. 5 re Nazi records of killings at Mauthausen.

9. See e.g., Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 188, 1192 (7th Cir. 1987); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1986); Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 445-46 (2nd Cir. 1985).

10. The Sixth Circuit did not decide whether involuntariness was a factor to be considered in deportation proceedings. (In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court said that someone who entered the United States under the DPA could be denaturalized if he served as a camp guard, even if that service was involuntary.) The Holtzman amendment, under which the Petkiewytsch deportation action was filed, has wording very similar to the DPA.

11. OSI was concerned not only with the shooter analysis, but also by the Circuit's conclusion that Petkiewytsch's misrepresentation about his arrest was not material. In so ruling, the Circuit ignored the definition of materiality established by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Kungys, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), discussed at pp. 127-133.

12. Oct. 27, 2002 discussion with Susan Siegal, Principal Deputy Director of OSI and lead counsel in the Petkiewytsch prosecution.


14. Titjiung v. Reno, 199 F.3d 383, 398 (7th Cir. 1999); Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1992); Szehinskyj v. Attorney General, 432 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir. 2005).

16. *Hammer v. INS*, 195 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 1999). The *Hammer* panel could not overrule *Petkiewytsch* since that can only be done by a full complement of the Sixth Circuit judges or by the Supreme Court. In fact, *Hammer’s* narrow reading of *Petkiewytsch* is questionable since it wrongly suggests that involuntariness was key to the *Petkiewytsch* ruling.

17. See, *Negele v. Ashcroft*, 368 F.2d 981, 984 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 125 S.Ct. 815 (2004), in which the court notes that “the mitigating factors in *Petkiewytsch* are not present in this case.”
Aloyzas Balsys and Vytautas Gecas – Self-Incrimination in OSI Cases

The decision in *United States v. Balsys* was arguably the most far-reaching of the three OSI cases to reach the Supreme Court. It will likely impact terrorism and international drug prosecutions even more than it does OSI matters.

The ruling concerns the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. That privilege guarantees that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Supreme Court had long held that the privilege precludes the government from requiring a person to answer questions if the answers could be used against him in a state or federal criminal prosecution. This was so even if the answer would provide only “a link in the chain of evidence” needed to prosecute him in the United States. The Court had not resolved, however, whether someone could be required to answer if he feared prosecution *abroad* rather than in the United States.

In the course of pursuing its denaturalization and deportation cases, OSI seeks to question and depose defendants and witnesses.¹ They cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment on the ground that they fear their statements will be used against them in OSI proceedings because OSI cases are civil matters. However, some have declined to answer on the ground that their answers might subject them to criminal prosecution overseas. Courts have handled this in a variety of ways. Some ruled that the Fifth Amendment can never be invoked based on fear of prosecution abroad;² others suggested it applies in limited circumstances;³ and some skirted the issue based on the facts in the particular case.⁴

The issue was resolved in *U.S. v. Balsys*.³ Aloyzas Balsys, a Lithuanian who emigrated to the United States in 1961, never applied for U.S. citizenship. OSI opened a deportation
investigation based on wartime documents found in Lithuania. Those documents showed that someone with the name Aloyzas Balsys had served in a Lithuanian secret police organization that had liquidated a Jewish ghetto. However, OSI was not certain that the subject of their investigation was the same person who had served in the police unit.

In September 1993, an OSI attorney and an OSI investigator went to Balsys' home to question him. Balsys denied that he had served in any military or police organizations during the German occupation of Lithuania. When pressed further, he terminated the interview. Ten days later, OSI served him with a subpoena, ordering him to answer questions and bring various documents concerning his wartime activities and his emigration to the United States. He appeared at the appointed time and place, accompanied by a lawyer. He refused to answer any questions, other than his name and address, on the ground that the answers might incriminate him abroad (in Lithuania, Germany or Israel). He also declined to turn over any documents covered by the subpoena other than his alien registration card.

OSI filed suit in district court to enforce the subpoena. After reviewing the criminal statutes in all the countries where Balsys feared criminal liability, the court concluded that he did indeed face a "real and substantial" danger of prosecution. However, the court ruled that the Fifth Amendment did not extend to fear of prosecution overseas. It reasoned that the amendment was designed to protect individuals from "governmental overreaching," a consequence not possible if the feared prosecution was by a foreign power.

The ruling was reversed on appeal. The Second Circuit court concluded that "individual dignity and privacy values"—which it saw as some of the core purposes of the Amendment—were best protected if an individual could avoid the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury,
or contempt.” The Circuit acknowledged that “governmental overreaching” was also a core value inherent in the Amendment. Unlike the district court, however, it posited that such overreaching was possible with an overseas prosecution because we now live in an era of “cooperative internationalism.” To illustrate its point, the court noted that the Justice Department was interested in having OSI defendants prosecuted abroad and was willing to share its evidence with foreign governments.

The ruling was of substantial import to the United States for reasons well beyond OSI cases. When the government seeks testimony from an individual who has a “substantial and legitimate” fear of prosecution by federal or local authorities, the government can grant the witness immunity from all domestic prosecution. He can then be compelled to testify because nothing he says can be used against him in any criminal proceeding; the Fifth Amendment interest against self-incrimination is thus preserved. However, the United States has no ability to grant immunity from foreign prosecution. Therefore, any statements made in the United States might be used in a criminal proceeding abroad if the United States makes the statements available. Many witnesses in cases involving international organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, antitrust conspiracies and securities frauds might legitimately have such a fear. If they can invoke the Fifth Amendment, investigation of these crimes would be severely hampered.

Because of these concerns, as well as the fact that the Circuit’s decision conflicted with rulings in other Circuits, the government asked the Supreme Court to review the case. In its brief to the Court, the government stressed the impact on domestic prosecutions of crimes with international reach, but noted too the direct impact of the lower court ruling on OSI’s investigations. The government acknowledged that there were “many” cases where OSI did not
have sufficient evidence without the requested testimony. Were the Circuit ruling to stand, the United States might have "to tolerate . . . within its borders . . . participants in persecution or genocide."

After reviewing the history and purpose of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the privilege was intended to apply only to domestic prosecutions. The Court acknowledged that the United States had an interest in having foreign governments prosecute OSI matters. However, there was no evidence that such foreign prosecutions were being brought on behalf of the United States. If they were, the Fifth Amendment would apply. But the "mere support of one nation for the prosecutorial efforts of another does not transform the prosecution of the one into the prosecution of the other."

The Court’s ruling meant that Balsys would now have to answer questions posed by OSI or face incarceration for contempt of court. Shortly after the ruling, Balsys' attorney advised OSI that his client would rather abandon his permanent resident status and leave the country than answer questions about his wartime activities. His voluntary departure allowed OSI to achieve its potential ultimate goal – removing Balsys – without further investigation or litigation. Balsys left the country in May 1999.

The Supreme Court ruling had repercussions on other OSI subjects as well. Most immediately, it affected Vytautas Gecas, an OSI subject who had, almost simultaneously with Balsys, litigated his right to assert the Fifth Amendment based on fear of foreign prosecution.

OSI historians had found several documents referencing a Vytautas Gecas who served in Lithuania’s Second Battalion, a unit so notorious for persecution that courts have ruled service in the Battalion is sufficient in and of itself to constitute assistance in persecution. However,
none of the government's Gecas documents had identifying information, such as date or place of birth. Just as with Balsys, the government could not be certain that it had the right person.

In 1991, Gecas answered some questions from OSI investigators. He claimed to have spent the war years in a vocational school in Kaunas, Lithuania. The government later issued a subpoena to compel Gecas to answer more questions and bring pertinent documents. Gecas, newly represented by counsel, refused to comply. OSI filed suit to enforce the subpoena and, after much litigation, won a ruling that the Fifth Amendment could not be invoked based on fear of prosecution overseas.\footnote{11} On the day after the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Balsys, it declined to review Gecas' case.

Despite the definitive court rulings against his position, Gecas maintained his silence. At the government's request, the district court held him in contempt for refusing to comply with a court ruling. The court ordered him imprisoned for eighteen months – the maximum period allowed by law – or until he agreed to answer questions. He remained consistent in his refusal to respond and therefore spent the full eighteen months behind bars.

He was released in November 2000, having spent more time in U.S. custody than any other OSI defendant up to that point.\footnote{12} Still, the government was no closer to being able to file its case. In an effort to obtain more information, an OSI attorney and an investigator interviewed inmates and employees at the two institutions where Gecas had served his sentence. OSI thought he might have discussed his situation with one of them, and, perhaps inadvertently, made statements that would be helpful to the government's investigation. He had not.

Inmates in federal custody are advised that their phone conversations (other than those with defense counsel) may be recorded. OSI retrieved audiotapes of 78 telephone conversations
Gecas had had with family members. Nothing in any of those conversations was useful to the government.

In November 2002, an OSI historian searched all vocational school records in Kaunas, Lithuania to determine if Gecas' alibi was credible. There had been seven vocational high schools in Kaunas during the war. The records of only three survived, and those only partially. Miraculously for OSI, the historian found pertinent material. In addition to Gecas' graduation certificate (June 1941) there was a letter from his father in a folder containing material about Gecas' brother. The father had written to request a stipend for his younger son because elder brother Vytautas was not providing any family support. He "voluntarily joined the Second Battalion and has gone away..."

This was the last piece of evidence the government needed. OSI filed a deportation action against Gecas shortly after finding the new material. Rather than face trial, Gecas agreed to admit that he had served in the Second Battalion, to relinquish his green card, and to leave the United States permanently. He flew to Lithuania in August 2003.

There is no way to estimate the number of domestic criminal prosecutions impacted by *Balsys*. That would involve answering a counterfactual question: how many people would have asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege based on fear of foreign prosecution had the Supreme Court not ruled as it did. However, it is safe to assume that the impact of the case is substantial. The privilege had been asserted with some frequency in OSI investigations and there are many more wide-reaching criminal investigations than OSI matters. Indeed, at the time the Supreme Court briefs were filed in *Balsys*, more than twenty grand juries in the United States were investigating international cartel activities that involved businesses and individuals located in
twenty countries on four continents.\textsuperscript{14} The number of investigations has undoubtedly increased in the post 9/11 era, given the proliferation of international terrorist activity.

There is a new twist to \textit{Balsys} on the horizon. At this writing, the Justice Department is entering an era of international task forces. The line between U.S. and foreign prosecutions will inevitably be blurred. Whether the Fifth Amendment will apply to prosecutions abroad emanating from such task forces is an open question. The only certainty is that resolution of the matter must begin with an analysis of \textit{Balsys}.\textsuperscript{12}
1. Before a case is filed, a citizen is under no obligation to respond to questioning. Non-citizens, however—and many OSI defendants never became citizens—must do so if the government issues an administrative subpoena pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1225 (d)(4).

   Over the years, the format and purpose of the interview has evolved. It was originally intended as an opportunity for the defendant to persuade the government it was mistaken before a case was filed (recorded interview with DAAG Richard, Apr. 25, 2001). The early interviews were scheduled in advance, the subject had the option of appearing with an attorney, he was placed under oath and a court reporter was present.

   In the mid-1980s, the office began doing more drop-in unannounced interviews in the hope of catching the subject unawares. The subjects are told that they need not answer any questions, that they can consult with an attorney, and that if they do choose to answer, they can stop at any time. Although some refuse to talk, many submit to the questioning. As one OSI historian posited, “They are of a place and time where you respond to authorities.” The interview has thus gone from a last chance for exoneration to an interrogation designed to develop evidence. DAAG Richard voiced concern about this evolution. He feared that, rightly or wrongly, a process designed to be “fairness driven” had come to be seen as a “pressure tactic,” a “knock on the door”—ironically one of the very things feared by those persecuted in Nazi Germany. Interview, Apr. 21, 2001.


3. U.S. v. Inde, No. 3-88-50 (D. Minn., Aug. 22, 1989 as amended Dec. 6, 1989); U.S. v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1981); and U.S. v. Palciauskas, 559 F. Supp. 1294 (M.D. Fl. 1983) (the defendant could decline to answer some questions but not others); Juodis v. Mikutaitis, 800 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1986) and U.S. v. Bartesch, 643 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (an order sealing testimony was sufficient protection against the likelihood of prosecution overseas; therefore all questions must be answered); U.S. v. Lileikis, 899 F. Supp. 802 (D. Mass. 1995) (if there is a “real and substantial” likelihood of prosecution abroad, the United States must establish that a “governmental interest” is involved in securing the testimony and that there is a “legitimate need” for the testimony in order to “further[ ] that interest.”)

4. U.S. v. Linnas, No. 79 C 2966 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (where the defendant had been convicted in absentia by the U.S.S.R., the earlier conviction meant that there was no longer reason to fear prosecution); U.S. v. Stelmokas, No. 92-CV-3440, 1995 WL 464264 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d on other grnds, 100 F.3d 302 (3rd Cir. 1996) and U.S. v. Klimavicius, 671 F. Supp. 814 (D. Me. 1985) (after analyzing facts, it appeared there was no “real and substantial” likelihood of prosecution abroad).

5. 524 U.S. 666 (1998). It was a significant enough matter to have come before the Court twice prior to Balsys. However, in neither case did the Court reach the merits. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm’n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) (no “real and substantial” risk of foreign prosecution); Parker v. U.S., 397 U.S. 96 (1970) (per curiam) (remanded for dismissal because of
mootness).


9. The Court cited both OSI’s mandate—which includes maintaining liaison with foreign prosecution, investigation and intelligence offices—and treaty agreements such as one which requires the United States to cooperate with Lithuania in developing evidence for the prosecution of war criminals. 524 U.S. at 699.


12. Several defendants were prosecuted abroad and incarcerated as a result of those prosecutions.

   Within the United States, John Demjanjuk, Andrija Artukovic and Bruno Blach were imprisoned pending their extradition. (Demjanjuk also spent 10 days in custody after failing to appear at a deportation hearing.) Konrads Kalejs was in custody briefly after he was caught fleeing the jurisdiction in the midst of his deportation proceeding. Karl Linas spent a year in custody while he fought his deportation order. Several other defendants were detained for short periods prior to their deportation hearings.

   Johann Leprich was arrested in July 2003 when he was found in the U.S. after having told the court he would leave the country once his citizenship was revoked. He remained in custody until Oct. 2006. The court ordered his release when it became clear that no country was willing to accept him. Leprich now holds the record for the longest incarceration in the United States of an OSI defendant.

   Unbeknownst to OSI, in Sept. 2004 DHS (successor to INS), arrested OSI defendant Mykola Wasylyk. DHS cited 8 U.S.C. 1231(a), which allows for the detention of an alien who has been ordered deported if he fails to pursue in good faith all means necessary to assure his departure. He was released in Aug. 2005 because the law does not justify unlimited detention.

13. *See notes 2-4, supra.*

14. Supreme Court Brief for the United States in *Balsys*, p. 34.
John Demjanjuk – An Appropriate Prosecution Initially Brought, in Part,
Under the Wrong Factual Predicate

1. Litigation

Unfortunately for OSI, the greatest media attention the office ever received involved the
greatest mistake it ever made: prosecuting John Demjanjuk as “Ivan the Terrible,” a sadistic
guard who operated the Treblinka gas chamber and took particular delight in mutilating and
taunting inmates as they marched from a railroad siding to the gas chambers. Although
Demjanjuk was not Ivan the Terrible, he in fact had served as a guard at various camps, including
the death camp at Sobibor.

Demjanjuk entered the United States from Germany under the DPA in 1952. He became
a naturalized citizen in 1958 and changed his given name from Ivan to John. In 1975, the New
York editor of a Soviet weekly notified the INS that Demjanjuk had trained for guard service in
Trawniki, Poland and then served as a guard at the Sobibor death camp, also in Poland. A 1977
article in the Soviet weekly showed a Trawniki identification card with Demjanjuk’s picture and
a notation of his Sobibor posting. This article quoted Ignat Danilchenko, a fellow guard, who
claimed to have served with Demjanjuk at Sobibor as well as at Flossenbürg, a concentration
camp in Germany.

While investigating Demjanjuk, INS was also looking into Feodor Fedorenko. INS sent
photographs of Demjanjuk, Fedorenko and 15 other Ukrainians suspected of war crimes to Israel.
The Israelis prepared an album of pictures; by happenstance, Fedorenko and Demjanjuk were on
the same page. (Demjanjuk’s picture was from his visa application.) Several Treblinka
survivors, interviewed as part of the Fedorenko investigation, picked out the picture of
Demjanjuk and identified him as Ivan the Terrible. So too did eyewitnesses in Germany and the United States.

Based on these eyewitness identifications, the USAO in Cleveland, Ohio filed a denaturalization action in 1977. The complaint charged Demjanjuk with having unlawfully gained admittance and citizenship by concealing his Treblinka service. It did not reference the sobriquet “Ivan the Terrible,” but accused Demjanjuk of “cruel, inhumane and bestial treatment of Jewish prisoners and laborers” at Treblinka. And while there was no allegation that he had served at Trawniki, Sobibor or Flossenbürg, the complaint charged him with falsely listing Sobibor on his visa application as a place of residence during the war.

Coincidentally, at almost the same time that the case was filed, the Justice Department established the SLU. The SLU and the USAO agreed to prosecute the case jointly. There was, however, inevitable tension between the offices. Martin Mendelsohn lobbied for control. He gave several reasons, one of them particularly prescient:

The Special Litigation Unit, regardless of the degree of its involvement, has been, is, and will be blamed for any shortcomings in the presentation of the evidence and the result in this case.  

The Justice Department designated the SLU lead counsel.

During the course of the Fedorenko litigation, which came to trial before Demjanjuk, the government learned that the Soviets had interviewed several Treblinka witnesses. The SLU sought to get reports of the interviews from the Soviets. The reports, called “protocols,” arrived after the Fedorenko trial was completed. They came to be known as “the Fedorenko protocols.”

By the time anyone read them, the SLU had been replaced by OSI. Since the protocols involved Treblinka, they were reviewed by the attorneys assigned to handle the Demjanjuk
investigation. The protocols included a statement made by Fedorenko while visiting the Soviet Union. He recalled two gas chamber operators, Nikolai and Ivan. Another guard remembered the two as Nikolai and Marchenko; a third recalled only one name, Nikolai Marchenko. No one mentioned the name Demjanjuk.

OSI asked the Soviet Union for additional material, including new statements from Danilchenko, the guard quoted in the Soviet magazine, as well as from the two Treblinka guards still in the Soviet Union. (Fedorenko was by then in the United States.)

The Soviets reinterviewed Danilchenko and one of the guards, the other having been executed for war crimes. Danilchenko reiterated that he knew Demjanjuk from guard service at Sobibor. He identified three photographs of Demjanjuk and claimed that he and Demjanjuk were transferred from Sobibor to Flossenbürg. The Treblinka guard could not identify Demjanjuk's picture. However, he said an Ivan Demedyuk or Demjanjuk had worked as a cook at Treblinka. After leaving Treblinka, the guard was told that Demedyuk (or Demjanjuk) had become the gas chamber operator. From his own time there, however, the guard remembered the gas chamber operator as Nikolai Marchenko. These new Soviet interviews came to be known as the "Danilchenko Protocols."

OSI also sought information from Poland. The Poles had nothing on Demjanjuk, but sent an article which included a partial list of guards who had served at Treblinka. Among them was an Ivan Marchenko; there was no listing for anyone named Demjanjuk.

OSI personnel conducted many interviews. A Treblinka medical aide named Otto Horn and eighteen Treblinka survivors identified Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible.

Based on the fact that Demjanjuk had given his mother's maiden name as Marchenko on
his visa application, one of the two original OSI attorneys assigned to the case hypothesized that Marchenko and Demjanjuk were one and the same. The other attorney (George Parker) had a different thought: Demjanjuk seemed ubiquitous. The evidence had him at Sobibor and Treblinka during overlapping periods, even as various witnesses said Ivan rarely left Treblinka. Parker placed little faith in the eyewitness identifications because of the passage of time since the events in question.

In February 1980, Parker wrote a memorandum to the OSI director and his deputy. The memo reviewed the evidence, suggesting that it was so contradictory and inconclusive that proceeding with the case raised ethical concerns.

The government did not drop the case, but did strive for more precision in the charges. The complaint was amended to add Sobibor and Trawniki to the Treblinka allegations.

The case went to trial in 1981. Neither the Fedorenko protocols, contemporaneous reports of the Otto Horn interview, the list of names from Poland, nor the Danilchenko protocols were given to the defense. The OSI trial attorneys explained that they did not believe there was any significant or exculpatory material in the Fedorenko and Danilchenko protocols nor in the material from Poland. They claimed never to have seen contemporaneous reports of the Horn interview.

The government obtained Demjanjuk’s Trawniki card from the Soviets and introduced it into evidence. This was the first Trawniki card ever seen by scholars and it differed from many other known German identity documents in that it did not have a date and place of issuance. Moreover, Demjanjuk’s picture, glued to the card, was not properly aligned.

The government’s case rested on the testimony from Horn and the survivor witnesses,
which placed Demjanjuk at Treblinka, as well as on the Trawniki card, which established that Demjanjuk was a guard at Sobibor; the card did not mention Treblinka. Horn testified that he had been shown two stacks of pictures, each containing one photograph of Demjanjuk; he had recognized Demjanjuk’s picture in each set. A handwriting expert testified that the German signatures on the Trawniki card matched signatures on other documents signed by the same personnel. The alignment of markings on the card and photograph showed that the picture had originally been attached properly.

Demjanjuk’s defense was that he had been a prisoner of war when he was compelled to join a German-sponsored anti-Soviet army; the Trawniki card was a forgery; and the witness testimony was based on mistaken identity. He admitted lying on his immigration documents about where he had spent the war years; he said he feared that if he acknowledged the truth, he would be repatriated to the U.S.S.R. and executed for having fought against the Russian army.

The court ruled for the government and revoked Demjanjuk’s citizenship, concluding that he had trained at Trawniki and then, as Ivan the Terrible, operated the gas chamber at Treblinka. The court made no determination as to whether he had also served at Sobibor.

At some point after the denaturalization trial was completed, DAAG Richard went to Israel to discuss potential extradition of OSI defendants. As he recalled it, there was much internal debate over the issue. Some Israelis feared that any extradition would dilute the impact of the Adolf Eichmann trial, which, two decades earlier, had galvanized world attention. Others believed another significant war crimes trial was needed to educate the current generation about the horrors of the Holocaust. The latter view prevailed, and the Israelis chose to make “Ivan the Terrible” their first war crimes extraditee from the United States.
The Department of Justice filed its deportation case before the Israelis formally requested extradition. The thrust of the deportation suit was that Demjanjuk's wartime activity, as proven in the denaturalization trial, showed that he had persecuted civilians on behalf of the Nazis. As such, he was deportable under the Holtzman Amendment.

After the deportation hearing was completed, but before the court ruled, the extradition process was begun. The two cases thereafter were on parallel tracks. The extradition papers alleged that Demjanjuk, as Ivan the Terrible, murdered thousands of Jews and non-Jews while operating the gas chambers at Treblinka. The extradition was before the same district court judge who had issued the denaturalization ruling.

The deportation decision came down first. Demjanjuk was found deportable and the U.S.S.R. was designated as the country of deportation. While that ruling was on appeal, the district court ordered him extradited to Israel to face murder charges. Demjanjuk spent nine months in custody while he appealed the extradition order. His appeal was unsuccessful and he was flown to Israel in February 1986. There he was charged with crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against persecuted people. The thrust of the charges concerned Demjanjuk's role as Ivan the Terrible, operator of the gas chambers in the Treblinka death camp. There was mention as well of his having trained at Trawniki and having served briefly at the Sobibor death camp.

The Israeli trial lasted 14 months. Testifying, Demjanjuk denied that he had ever been at Treblinka or Sobibor, despite the fact that he had listed Sobibor on his visa application as a place of residence during the war. He now maintained that after being captured by the Nazis in 1942, he spent 18 months in a prisoner of war camp in Poland. Following that, he had been sent to
Austria to serve in Shandruk's Army, a unit of Ukrainians organized by the Nazis to fight the Soviets; the Nazis then sent him to Germany to join Vlasov's Army, a unit composed primarily of Russians organized for the same purpose. The Israelis countered this with evidence that Shandruk's Army had not yet been organized at the time Demjanjuk claimed he was first a member.

Much of the Israeli evidence of criminality was the same as that presented by the Department of Justice at the naturalization, deportation and extradition hearings. The Israelis also had newly prepared affidavits from two former OSI employees, one an historian and one an investigator, who had interviewed Otto Horn. Each affiant claimed that Horn pointed directly to the picture of Demjanjuk and confidently said "That is him."

Unbeknownst to OSI or the Israeli prosecutors, the defense also had new material — documents taken from OSI trashbins. The material had been gathered by emigrés opposed to OSI and distributed by them to the Demjanjuk defense team. It included contemporaneous notes taken by the historian and the investigator. Nothing in those notes suggested that Horn said "That is him." On the contrary, he had trouble identifying the defendant. He did so only after he was shown a second stack of photos which also had a picture of Demjanjuk (though there was no repeat of anyone else from the first set.) According to one of the accounts, Demjanjuk's picture, and his alone from the first set, was kept face up in Horn's sight while he viewed the second set. Only after comparing both pictures did Horn choose Demjanjuk's.

Based on this new material, the defense accused OSI of both concealing and falsifying evidence in the U.S. litigation. In 1988, the Israeli court found Demjanjuk, as Ivan the Terrible, guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people.
He was sentenced to death and spent the next five years in isolation on death row while his conviction was on appeal.\textsuperscript{18}

By the time the appeal was heard, however, the Soviet Union had collapsed. This opened a treasure trove of new archival material. None of it supported the charge that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible. On the contrary, there was much to indicate that he was not. Most significant was a statement from one Nikolai Shalaev, who said that he and Ivan Marchenko were the two gas chamber operators at Treblinka. Other Treblinka guards reported the same, and they, along with several female inmates, picked Marchenko’s picture from a photospread.\textsuperscript{19}

Although none of the new evidence linked Demjanjuk to Treblinka, it did tie him to Trawniki, Sobibor, and Flossenbürg, as well as to Majdanek, another Polish camp. The Israelis uncovered in the former Soviet archives German orders posting Demjanjuk to both Sobibor and Flossenbürg; they also found three pertinent Flossenbürg records in West Germany. An OSI historian found in Lithuania a disciplinary report for Demjanjuk from Majdanek. OSI gave the document to the Israelis. Demjanjuk walked a fine line with the new evidence – relying on it to establish that he had not been at Treblinka, but questioning its reliability to the extent that it showed service elsewhere in the Nazi camp system.

Even before the Israeli Supreme Court ruled, the defense moved to overturn the U.S. denaturalization and extradition. The defense cited the new evidence as well as alleged improprieties in OSI’s handling of the earlier proceedings. Publicity about the new evidence and OSI’s alleged misconduct was extensive,\textsuperscript{20} and the Justice Department announced that it was reviewing the case.\textsuperscript{21} The Sixth Circuit (which had earlier affirmed both Demjanjuk’s denaturalization and extradition orders) twice wrote to the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division, seeking the results of the inquiry. Receiving no response to either letter, the Circuit reopened the case, appointing a district court judge to serve as a Special Master. The Circuit wanted his view on whether the courts had granted the extradition request only because the government had misled them in ways that amounted to prosecutorial misconduct or fraud on the court. Although the Justice Department sought to limit the inquiry to its handling of the extradition proceeding, the Special Master ruled that the government’s handling of all lawsuits emanating from this case should be considered.

Over a six-month period, the Special Master considered more than 300 exhibits, heard testimony from six attorneys who had worked on the case, and reviewed depositions from nine other participants. He issued a 210-page unpublished report with his findings and conclusions. Although he found that the government had failed to turn over some material that would have been helpful to the defense, he excused this on circumstances, including the attorneys’ plausible understanding that the law did not require them to turn over the material and such a lack of continuity in the prosecution team that a given attorney was often not aware of material his colleagues or predecessors had handled. All this was compounded by government attorneys who, despite having committed before the court to be cooperative, instead “played hardball” by narrowly interpreting defense requests for documents, and a defendant whose alibi was so preposterous as to raise the government’s suspicion “that he lied about everything.”

As the Special Master saw the case, it was:

[ultimately . . . about questions that were never asked, and questions asked that went unanswered. . . .

Government attorneys failed to challenge the evidence they possessed, and this led them to abandon leads which contradicted their interpretation of the
evidence.

Nonetheless, the Special Master concluded that the prosecution team had acted in good faith.

They did not intend to violate the Rules or their ethical obligations. They were not reckless; they did not misstate facts or the law as they understood them. . . . Although they were blinded to what we may now perceive to be the truth, they were not wilfully blind.

Moreover, each of the attorneys involved . . . [has] cooperated fully in this investigation. I believe that they testified truthfully, and that they are now, and were then, principled, albeit fallible.

He found no prosecutorial misconduct.

While the Special Master believed that the new evidence from the Soviet Union cleared Demjanjuk of being Ivan the Terrible, there was nothing to refute the U.S. court's original finding that Demjanjuk had served at Trawniki. Since the Trawniki allegations formed an independent basis for Demjanjuk's denaturalization and deportation, the Special Master concluded that those rulings should stand.

The report was issued in June 1993. One month later, the Israeli Supreme Court acquitted Demjanjuk of the charge that he was Ivan the Terrible. The Israelis had no doubt that Demjanjuk had been at Trawniki, Flossenbürg and Sobibor. He had been extradited principally to stand trial for murder as Ivan the Terrible, however, and of this the court was not convinced.

Doubt began to gnaw away at our judicial conscience. . . . By virtue of this gnawing -- whose nature we knew, but not the meaning -- we restrained ourselves from convicting the appellant of the horrors of Treblinka.

. . . . This was the proper course for judges who cannot examine the heart and the mind, but have only what their eyes see and read. The matter is closed -- but not complete. The complete truth is not the prerogative of the human judge.
The law of extradition is circumscribed. One can only be tried for the charges which formed the basis for the extradition. In Demjanjuk's case, Trawniki, Flossenbürg and Sobibor were part of the extradition case – but only in passing. The thrust of the case had clearly been the charge that he was Treblinka's Ivan the Terrible. While he could be convicted for his activity at other camps, the Israeli court declined to pursue this option. To change the thrust of the extradition at such a late date would necessitate giving Demjanjuk another opportunity to defend himself. Since he had already spent seven years in Israeli custody, the court felt that prolonging the proceedings any further would be unreasonable.

The Israelis were prepared to release Demjanjuk, but it was uncertain where he would go. Having lost his U.S. citizenship, Demjanjuk was stateless and did not have authorization to return to the United States. Indeed, the Department of Justice maintained that he was barred from reentry by the Holtzman Amendment, since he had – at Trawniki, Sobibor, Flossenbürg and Majdanek – assisted in persecution of civilians on behalf of the Nazis.

Ukraine was willing to have him return to his country of birth, but he wanted to be in the U.S. with his family.²⁵ He asked the Sixth Circuit to order the Attorney General not to bar his reentry. The court obliged, giving several reasons, including (1) Demjanjuk's need to assist his new counsel with the pending prosecutorial misconduct litigation; and (2) "basic humanitarian considerations embodied in our Constitution" which required the court responsible for sending him to Israel to ensure that he "is not injured or rendered permanently homeless."²⁶ He returned to the United States amidst much fanfare, accompanied by Congressman Trafican.²⁷

Shortly after he arrived, a three-judge panel from the Sixth Circuit ruled on the prosecutorial misconduct issue. It skeptically accepted the Special Master's finding that no OSI
attorney deliberately withheld from Demjanjuk or the court information he believed he had a duty to disclose, but nevertheless found the government’s conduct unacceptable.

The attitude of the OSI attorneys toward disclosing information to Demjanjuk’s counsel was not consistent with the government’s obligation to work for justice rather than for a result that favors its attorneys’ preconceived ideas of what the outcome of legal proceedings should be.\textsuperscript{18}

The Court held that the government should have given the defense the Fedorenko Protocols, the list of Treblinka guards from the Polish government and the information about the Horn photospread. Because the government had “recklessly disregarded” its duty to do so, the court concluded that OSI had perpetrated a fraud on the court, without which Demjanjuk would not have been denaturalized, deported or extradited.

Given the government’s conduct, the Circuit rescinded the extradition order. The court made no determination about any of the other charges against Demjanjuk, including whether he had served at Trawniki, Sobibor or any other camp.

The Circuit also vastly broadened the government’s obligation to share exculpatory information with the defense. Although the government had long been required to provide the defense with all potentially exculpatory material in criminal cases, that rule had never been extended to civil lawsuits. In Demjanjuk, the Sixth Circuit applied the rule to denaturalization and extradition proceedings if those proceedings are predicated on the defendant’s involvement in criminal activity. Demjanjuk, having been charged as a mass murderer, fit within that category.\textsuperscript{29} The Supreme Court denied the government’s request that it review the case.\textsuperscript{30}

Following the Circuit’s ruling, the Justice Department asked the district court to reopen the denaturalization case. Given the “extraordinary public scrutiny” attached to the case, the
government believed that giving Demjanjuk "a final opportunity in an American court to refute the evidence of his Nazi involvement will bolster confidence in the denaturalization proceedings." The judge who had ruled in the denaturalization (and extradition) matters had died, and the case was assigned to a new judge.

Rather than reopening the matter, the district court vacated the earlier denaturalization order, based on a new determination that OSI had acted with "reckless disregard" for its duty. The court cited OSI's failure to disclose the memorandum of an interview with a Trawnik clerk who said he had "no useful information" about Demjanjuk. (This memorandum was independent of those discussed earlier.) According to the court, the clerk might have had information useful to the defense about the authenticity of the Trawnik card. The court restored Demjanjuk's U.S. citizenship, but left open the possibility that a new denaturalization case could be filed.

By this time, the matter had been in litigation for over two decades. The parties spent several months in settlement negotiations, ultimately to no avail. In April 1999, the United States filed a new complaint seeking denaturalization based on Demjanjuk's having assisted in persecution by having served as a Trawnik-trained guard at Sobibor, Majdanek and Flossenbürg, his having been a member of, or participant in, a movement hostile to the United States, and his having wilfully misrepresented material facts about his wartime activities.

The second denaturalization trial differed markedly from the first. The earlier case had relied almost entirely on eyewitness testimony; the only document offered into evidence by the government was Demjanjuk's Trawnik pass. This time, the government presented no eyewitness testimony but relied extensively on wartime documents which had become available since the first trial. This included over 40 Trawnik cards which, like Demjanjuk's, had no date
or place of issuance. Their similarity to Demjanjuk’s card was used to establish the authenticity of the Demjanjuk document.

Rather than claiming that the documents relating to him were forgeries, Demjanjuk argued that they either referenced a cousin of his, who, coincidently, had the same name, or else that they must have been used by someone in a case of identity theft. The court rejected these defenses and, once again, stripped Demjanjuk of his U.S. citizenship. The ruling was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme Court denied review. OSI filed a deportation action in December 2004. Six months later, the court found him deportable under the Holtzman Amendment because his wartime service – at Trawniki, Majdanek, Flossenbürg and Sobibor – involved assistance in persecution based on race, religion or national origin.

The government requested that Demjanjuk be sent to Ukraine or, if that country refused to accept him, to Poland or Germany. Demjanjuk sought to preempt a decision to remove him to Ukraine by filing an application with the immigration judge for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He contended that if sent to Ukraine, he would be likely be prosecuted as Ivan the Terrible and tortured. To support his claim, he submitted reports issued by the State department and Amnesty International asserting that torture is common in Ukrainian prisons. The immigration court rejected Demjanjuk’s argument and ordered him deported to Ukraine in December 2005. That ruling is on appeal as of this writing.

2. Impact

It is hard to overstate the impact the Demjanjuk litigation has had on OSI. The case is still in litigation as of this writing even though it was filed before the office was founded. It has had enormous consequences for many of the persons involved, it resulted in a series of ethics
investigations, and it changed OSI’s operating procedures in a variety of ways.

(a) Procedural

(1) At the time Demjanjuk was tried, there was no one historian assigned overall responsibility for a given case; various historians worked on pieces of the litigation. The debacle reinforced for OSI the value of the holistic approach to cases that had begun in the 80s.36

(2) Although protocol even before the garbage raids called for shredding or burning sensitive material, much more care was placed on this thereafter.

(3) Before Demjanjuk, OSI generally turned over to the defense only those documents which had been requested as part of the discovery process. The law in civil cases and extradition matters called for no more. OSI began to provide potentially exculpatory material, whether or not there had been a request, in August 1992.34 Determining if something is potentially exculpatory is sometimes difficult to determine, however. Therefore, this policy soon evolved into one in which all material arguably relevant is provided.

The amount of material is staggering. In the typical case involving a Trawniki-trained defendant, OSI produces 11 CD roms with generic historical material, plus hard copies of documents relevant to the particular case. This gives the defense between 100,000 and 150,000 pages of documents.

The new policy has had unintended consequences. The enormous resource drain involved in assembling this material (by lawyers, historians and paralegals) cuts into the office’s ability to investigate new cases. It also prolongs litigation. The defense, understandably, needs a significant amount of time to go through the material. (In the second Demjanjuk trial, the court at first granted a year. Due to issues that arose over the material, this was extended some months
beyond.) Given the age of OSI defendants, this is a matter of much moment.

(4) The ruling ended reliance on victim eyewitnesses for identification. The *Wais* prosecution had first taught that lesson. Perhaps because that case had not been prosecuted by OSI, the lesson was not fully absorbed. Other cases presented witness problems, but until *Demjanjuk*, none had caused OSI to lose in court. Survivors are now used to corroborate documentary evidence, to make vivid the conditions in the camps, and to serve as a counterweight to the grandfatherly figure in the defendant's seat. They are asked to establish identity only in the rare case where the identifier knows the defendant from pre-war days (e.g., the town policeman who later rounded up Jews).

(5) There has never been another extradition of an OSI defendant from the United States. Whether there would have been, even without *Demjanjuk*, is unclear. Israel had suggested to DAAG Richard that Demjanjuk would be the first and others might follow. However, there has not been another OSI defendant since with the degree of culpability that Ivan the Terrible possessed. The typical OSI defendant is a camp guard or member of an auxiliary police unit. Israel has never been interested in extradition of persons at that level of responsibility.

(b) Ethical Investigations

The local Bar reviewed the conduct of both Allan Ryan and Norman Moskowitz. Ryan had been Director of OSI; Moskowitz was an attorney assigned to the case. Each was cleared of any wrongdoing. There were also five internal DOJ investigations of matters emanating from the Demjanjuk litigation.

(1) In 1987, at OSI's request, the Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR) opened an investigation into how the defense and media came into possession of OSI material. OSI’s suspicions were first aroused when a Chicago magazine ran a story on the case containing some classified and sensitive documents. In addition, FOIA requests by the defense referenced internal OSI documents which had not been provided to defense counsel.

OPR determined that between June 1985 and May 1987, two members of the Latvian emigré community arranged for OSI’s trash on the street to be delivered to them each weekday. They then sorted through it and directed it to persons opposed to OSI, including people being investigated and prosecuted and their attorneys. The Department concluded that this was a “wholly legal ‘trash cover’” and that OSI personnel had “negligently discarded” sensitive and classified documents. Material retrieved from the garbage impacted not only the Demjanjuk litigation; other subjects learned that OSI was investigating them.

Apart from information retrieved from the trash, there was apparently an entirely separate source of information uncovered by OPR. A former OSI employee admitted that he had identified to persons outside OSI the names of five subjects under investigation; he also admitting releasing some documents from OSI files. OPR was unable to corroborate this information, however, since the subjects notified were unable or unwilling to cooperate. The former OSI employee, working for another government agency by the time of the OPR investigation, left government service rather than have the government administratively pursue the matter.

(2) An investigation into alleged misconduct by OSI was undertaken at the request of individuals associated with the defense team. They claimed that OSI attorneys and investigators had knowingly submitted false affidavits and testimony relating to Horn in both the
U.S. and Israeli proceedings. In addition, they alleged that OSI had concealed the names of guards and survivors who might have exculpatory evidence and concealed notes and reports of interviews. In July 1991, OPR concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated.

(3) Reacting to media reports suggesting misconduct by the government, AAG Robert Mueller asked OPR to investigate whether OSI improperly failed to produce the Fedorenko protocols to the defense. Based largely on the Special Master's report, as well as some additional inquiry of its own, OPR concluded in the summer of 1993 (before the Sixth Circuit issued its ruling), that there had been no prosecutorial misconduct.

(4) Chief Judge Merritt of the Sixth Circuit asked the government to investigate former OSI Director Ryan. This request was based on information which came to light after the Sixth Circuit ruling.

While the Supreme Court was considering the government's request that it review the Sixth Circuit's order, a member of the Solicitor General's office recalled having a conversation with Ryan shortly after Ryan joined OSI. According to this colleague, Ryan had mentioned a case in which the government knew that a defendant had been a Nazi guard but might have conflicting evidence as to where he had been stationed. The colleague recalled Ryan saying that he did not believe he had an obligation to bring this conflict to the attention of the defense because the Supreme Court ruling requiring disclosure of potentially exculpatory information in criminal proceedings would not apply to this civil proceeding. This recollection differed markedly from Ryan's testimony before the Special Master (that he applied a full disclosure doctrine in OSI cases.) The government advised defense counsel of the discrepancy, telling him also that Ryan denied ever saying or implying that he would withhold such material information.
At the request of defense counsel, the government also notified the Supreme Court of the new information. It was the government's position that whatever, if anything, had transpired in conversation between these two colleagues, had no bearing on the current status of the case—which concerned only the standard to be applied in determining fraud on the court.

Judge Merritt, who had been a member of the panel which issued the Circuit ruling, though not the author of the opinion, wrote to the Attorney General about this latest development. He suggested that the allegations, if true, indicated that Ryan "as Director of the Office of Special Investigations" intentionally committed outrageous prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, he urged the Department to consider whether Ryan had committed perjury in his testimony before the Special Master. Judge Merritt went on to say that it appeared that outside pressure on the Department from "Jewish special interest groups" had "obviously influenced Ryan and the OSI." The judge's allegations were referred to OPR (though Ryan was no longer with the Department of Justice.) OPR found no merit to the charges.

(5) OPR considered the district court's finding of fraud on the court based on OSI's not turning over the interview report from a Trawniki clerk. After preliminarily determining that the court's conclusion was not supported by the facts, OPR declined to do any further investigation. OPR noted that the attorneys who had handled the case were no longer with the Department. (While this was also true of Ryan, the allegations against him were in a well publicized published order, prompting the Department to respond. This allegation was unpublished and had received no publicity; the Department therefore felt no need to pursue the matter.)

(c) Intangible
It was the second loss for OSI in the Sixth Circuit. This increased the Department's hesitancy to seek review from that Circuit in cases where the district court ruled against OSI. Much more importantly, however, it cast a pall on the office. It was a loss with international repercussions. Based partly on evidence unavailable to OSI, the Israelis had concluded he was not Ivan the Terrible. That ruling received worldwide publicity. That the Israelis also concluded he had served at Trawniki, Sobibor and Flossenbürg did not get as much attention. The impression therefore remained that OSI had erred badly. The subsequent Sixth Circuit ruling, finding that the office had committed a fraud on the court, reinforced that message. And although Demjanjuk was again denaturalized and ordered deported, this did not receive the same media attention as had the earlier rulings. As a result, many members of the public still know of OSI only as the mistaken prosecutor of Ivan the Terrible.


5. The Soviets provided a translation of the statement which said that Demjanjuk had become the driver of a gas chamber van. However, when OSI reviewed the original document, they realized that the translation was inaccurate.

6. The memo is reprinted in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 369-71 (6th Cir. 1993).

7. Whether the amendment was the result of the memorandum is unclear. Neither the Director nor his Deputy recalled seeing the memorandum and no copy was found in OSI's files. Shortly after the memorandum was written, however, there had been a meeting to discuss the case.

8. The expert could not establish with certainty that the signature on the card was that of the defendant, although he testified that there were strong indications that this was the case. He noted that the spacing, height ratios and baseline habits matched with a current exemplar from the defendant. However, since approximately 35 years had passed since a poorly educated person had signed his name using a different alphabet than he was now accustomed to using, a positive identification was difficult to establish.

9. The government acknowledged that Demjanjuk had been a German prisoner. However, the government's evidence established that many Soviet POWs captured on the Eastern front were sent to Trawniki to be trained for guard service in Nazi extermination and concentration camps.


13. The issue of obtaining evidence from the Soviet Union presented problems for Israel since the two countries did not have diplomatic relations. OSI had already returned the Trawniki card, so essential to the case, to the U.S.S.R. The fact that evidence had already been credited by United States courts was not sufficient to establish its authenticity and credibility under Israeli...
criminal law. Nov. 18, 1986 memo to DAAG Richard from Sher re “Linnas – Summary and Evidence of Wartime Activities.”

The problem was solved by using Armand Hammer, a Jewish businessman and philanthropist in the U.S., as an intermediary. Hammer had worked with the Soviets since the Russian revolution and he arranged for them to loan the Trawniki card to Israel.

14. See discussion at pp. 165-166 on OPR’s investigation of the matter.


The investigator and historian affidavits were not the only ones prepared for the Israeli trial about which the defense raised doubts based on contradictory information found in the garbage. Another OSI investigator prepared an affidavit saying he had presented a photospread seven years earlier to a Treblinka survivor. Discarded drafts of the affidavit suggested that the investigator may not have been the person displaying the photos. Testimony that the witness could not speak English cast further doubt on whether the OSI investigator could have conducted the interview. Id. at 284, 292.

There were problems with the defense case as well. The court suggested that someone (apparently, though not provably, with the defense team) had tricked Otto Horn into signing a new affidavit contradicting some of his earlier statements. Id. at 298, 305-06. The court also questioned whether the defense had tried to influence the testimony of a Treblinka survivor. Id. at 306, 433.


18. Demjanjuk had also spent the two years preceding trial in Israeli custody. His appeal was postponed several times. The first postponment dramatized how emotionally charged the case was for all concerned. A week before the appellate argument, one of Demjanjuk’s counsel committed suicide. At his funeral, a 70-year old Holocaust survivor threw acid in the face of another Demjanjuk attorney. The acid thrower was sentenced to three years’ custody.

19. The defense had other evidence as well. This included statements from a Polish farmer and his wife who claimed that the Treblinka gas chamber operator caroused in their town; they knew him as Ivan Marchenko. Their story was featured on the CBS Newsmagazine 60 Minutes, Feb. 25, 1990.


22. The letters were dated Jan. 7, 1992 and May 4, 1992 and were released to the press by the court. “Justice Dept. Probing U.S. Nazi Hunters,” by Ronald Ostrow, *The Los Angeles Times*, June 12, 1992. AAG Mueller received conflicting advice on how to respond to the letters from his two deputies, Robert Bucknam and Mark Richard. DAAG Bucknam urged that the government confess error because so many mistakes had been made. DAAG Richard argued that the government should persevere since there was no doubt that Demjanjuk had served at other camps, including Sobibor, even if not at Treblinka. Discussion with DAAG Richard, Sept. 30, 2002.

23. In addition to the denaturalization, deportation and extradition litigation, there had been two post-denaturalization actions alleging fraud on the court based on the withholding of evidence. The district court had found neither of the claims convincing. 518 F. Supp. at 1384 *et seq.* There was also a series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from Demjanjuk’s family and defense team, and at least two FOIA requests from Rep. James Traficant (D. Ohio). The family succeeded in getting the Danilchenko protocols; Rep. Traficant’s request yielded, among other things, the Fedorenko protocols.


26. The Justice Department sought, unsuccessfully, to have the Circuit reconsider this unpublished ruling. Not only did the Criminal Division believe that reentry violated the Holtzman Amendment, but the Department’s Office for International Affairs was concerned that the ruling might lead to other extradited defendants returning if they were acquitted after trial overseas.

27. Traficant was not Demjanjuk’s elected representative. Nevertheless, he took a special interest in the case. For additional discussion of Congressman Traficant and OSI, see pp. 336, 340, n. 19, 543.

28. *Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky*, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993). The Circuit particularly chastised former OSI Deputy Director, and then Director, Allan Ryan, at one point taking some of his testimony “with a grain of salt,” at another point referring to his “professed” policy of turning over exculpatory information. Indeed, the court went so far as to suggest that Ryan had been coopted by Jewish interests because the ADL had sponsored a lecture trip by him to Israel. (In fact, Ryan had left government service three years before the trip. Although Ryan and the ADL later requested that the court remove this scurrilous accusation, it declined to do so.) The court was equally skeptical that trial attorney Norman Moscowitz had not read the contemporaneous accounts of the Horn photo identification, which would have alerted him to the fact that Horn’s
trial testimony conflicted with those reports.

29. In making that ruling, the Circuit noted that former OSI Director Ryan testified before the Special Master that OSI policy was to turn over exculpatory information even if it was not requested in discovery. 10 F.3d at 349. Ryan acknowledged to the Special Master, however, that he was not certain if, when or how he communicated that policy to the office. All other office members who appeared before the Special Master denied knowing of any such policy. Special Master Report, p. 180.

In 1980, just four months after Ryan joined the office, an OSI attorney recommended turning over an arguably exculpatory document in the Trifa case. The attorney noted that the office had already concluded that it did not have to turn the document over pursuant to a request for exculpatory material; he was urging reconsideration of that decision. This suggests that exculpatory material was not routinely turned over at that time or at least that the definition of exculpatory was not expansive. Apr. 25, 1980 memo from Eugene Thirofto Director Ryan and Deputy Directors Neal Sher and Arthur Sinai re “Oct. 9, 1979 report entitled ‘Viorel Trifa, a/k/a Bishop Trifa, Valerian, Foreign Counter-Intelligence - Romania.’” OSI Director Rosenbaum lends credence to that view. He describes the early OSI era as one in which the office “tended to construe requests very narrowly.” “Nazi Hunter Battles Time to Ferret Out Hitler’s Foot Soldiers,” by Stephen Koff, Newhouse News, Nov. 13, 2002.

30. One of the reasons the Solicitor General decided to seek Supreme Court review was to vindicate the OSI attorneys who he felt had been “unfairly harm[ed].” May 20, 1994 Memorandum to the Attorney General from the Solicitor General re “Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).”


32. Demjanjuk filed a $5 million counterclaim, alleging that he had been a victim of torture for which the U.S. was responsible. In support of this claim he contended, among other things, that the government had falsely claimed he was a mass murderer, mocked his refusal to confess, and caused him to be tried abroad in a “circus atmosphere” where he had been placed in solitary confinement and sentenced to death. The district court dismissed the counterclaim on jurisdictional grounds.


35. Matter of Demjanjuk, A08 237 417 (Imm. Ct., Cleveland, Ohio 2005).

36. See pp. 22-23.

37. See n. 29 supra re Ryan’s testimony to the contrary.
38. Aug. 3, 1992 memorandum from OSI Director Neal Sher to OSI attorneys.


40. In Maikovskis, the Israeli witnesses had the defendant in various places at the same time. The district court was so hostile to this portion of the case that the government dropped several counts and focused only on those for which it had documentary proof. In Trifa, victims held the defendant accountable for numerous beatings and killings in Romania. OSI ultimately pursued it as a propaganda case which was not based on this testimony.

41. Latvia had just begun the process of seeking extradition of Konrad Kalejs in 2001 when Kalejs died. Although Kalejs had been an OSI defendant, the extradition would have been from Australia, the country to which OSI had him deported. See pp. 466-475.


43. Oct. 20, 1994 letter to Attorney General Reno re “Conduct of Allan A. Ryan in connection with the various cases brought by him to denaturalize, deport and extradite John Demjanjuk.”

44. The other was U.S. v. Petkiewytch, 945 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1981), discussed at pp. 134-140.


Johann Breyer – An American Persecutor

Several factors distinguish the prosecution of Johann Breyer from other OSI cases: (1) it raised unusual equal protection and gender discrimination issues; (2) it involved expatriation (renunciation of citizenship) as well as denaturalization; and (3) the defendant sued the media over its coverage of the case. The convergence of these factors made for arguably the most arcane and convoluted litigation in OSI’s history.

Breyer’s mother was born in the United States, emigrated to Czechoslovakia as a teenager, and married a Czech national. She never returned to the U.S. Both her children were born in Czechoslovakia.

Under the law at the time of Breyer’s birth, foreign-born offspring of U.S. citizen fathers were U.S. citizens at birth; foreign-born offspring of U.S. citizen mothers were not. The law was amended in 1934 to be gender neutral: any child born abroad to a U.S. citizen father or mother obtained U.S. citizenship at birth. The amendment was not retroactive, however. It therefore did not confer citizenship on Breyer, who had been born in 1925.

In 1939, the area in which Breyer lived became the separate state of Slovakia. The country allied with Nazi Germany during the war. At age 17, Breyer joined the SS and was assigned to the Totenkopf (Death’s Head) battalion, an organization whose members served as guards at Nazi concentration and death camps. Breyer served at Buchenwald and then Auschwitz. Although he knew that prisoners at these camps were killed, tortured and used for gruesome experiments, he denied any personal role in the brutality. He acknowledged only that he had served as an armed guard and escorted prisoners to and from their work sites.

Breyer emigrated to the United States in 1952, entering under the DPA. His application
form stated that he had been with the German military, but made no mention of his membership in the SS or his service as a camp guard. In 1957, Breyer became a naturalized U.S. citizen.

OSI learned of Breyer through routine case research and development; he was listed on a document as an Auschwitz guard and a cross-check with INS showed that he had emigrated to the United States. In 1992, the government filed a denaturalization action. The complaint alleged that Breyer had been ineligible to enter under the DPA because he had assisted in persecution and, as a member of the Death's Head battalion, been part of a movement hostile to the U.S. ⁵

Breyer did not contest these points. Instead, he challenged the government's right to denaturalize him, asserting that in retrospect he should be deemed to have entered the country lawfully as a U.S. citizen since his mother had been born in the United States. He argued that the statute granting derivative citizenship only patrilineally was unconstitutional because it denied to women a right granted to men (i.e., the right to pass U.S. citizenship to one's child). If the statute had been applied in a gender-neutral manner, Breyer would have been a U.S. citizen at birth and free to enter the country at any time. His eligibility to enter under the DPA was therefore irrelevant. So too was the validity of his 1957 naturalization since he was already a U.S. citizen.

There is an administrative procedure for establishing derivative citizenship. One must file an application with INS for a certificate of citizenship and, if it is denied, file suit in district court. Before the court ruled in his denaturalization case, Breyer began this administrative quest for citizenship. As a result, the case for years preceded on parallel tracks: OSI's lawsuits (denaturalization and deportation) on one track, and Breyer's effort to get a declaration of citizenship on the other.
In the denaturalization lawsuit, the district court found merit in both OSI's arguments and Breyer's defense. The court agreed that Breyer had been ineligible to enter under the DPA and therefore that the citizenship he obtained in 1957 was invalid. However, it also ruled that the statute denying Breyer citizenship at birth was unconstitutional. The court concluded that if his mother had indeed been born in the United States — a contention which OSI disputed — then Breyer's citizenship should have been conferred at birth. The court ordered a hearing to resolve the issue of Katrina Breyer's birthplace.

There was no contemporaneous record of the birth. After reviewing conflicting secondary evidence, the court concluded that Breyer's mother had been born in Pennsylvania. That did not resolve the question of Breyer's citizenship, however. His mother's citizenship could only pass to Breyer if his mother was a U.S. citizen when Breyer was born. Had she, perhaps, done anything to renounce her citizenship? And even if not, had Breyer done anything to expatriate himself before he came to the United States? (U.S. law lists a series of acts which, if done voluntarily with the specific intent of relinquishing citizenship, will have the desired effect.)

Rather than resolving these questions, the court opted to defer to the INS, which still had before it Breyer's request for a certificate of citizenship. The district court therefore abstained from deciding the ultimate issue — whether Breyer was a U.S. citizen by birth — until the administrative process was complete.

Breyer appealed the district court rulings. The Third Circuit affirmed the denaturalization but also held that the district court should not have considered the derivative citizenship claim at all. As the Circuit saw it, derivative citizenship had nothing to do with the denaturalization
litigation. The denaturalization concerned only the validity of the citizenship granted to Breyer in 1957. The sole way for Breyer to establish derivative citizenship, according to the appellate court, was through the INS (where his application for a certificate of citizenship was still pending). If the INS granted his application, his 1957 certificate of naturalization would be extraneous and the court’s revocation of it would have no effect on his standing as a U.S. citizen. If the INS denied his request for a certificate, Breyer could ask the district court to consider the matter of derivative citizenship.8

Three weeks before this ruling (but not referred to in it), Congress again amended the derivative citizenship law by making its earlier gender-neutral provision retroactive.9 Under the amendment, anyone born overseas to a U.S. citizen mother acquired U.S. citizenship at birth, even if the child was born before 1934. At the behest of the Department of Justice, however, Congress placed a singular exception into the statute.10 The exception denied retroactive application of the law to anyone who would not have been eligible to enter the United States under the DPA or the RRA.11 The amendment was designed, in part, to avoid jeopardizing pending Nazi expatriation cases.12 Since the district court had already determined that Breyer should not have been admitted under the DPA (because he had assisted in persecution and been a member of a “movement hostile”) he came squarely within the exemption. As such, he still did not qualify for derivative citizenship.

The INS cited the new statute in finally denying Breyer’s request for a certificate of citizenship.13 Shortly thereafter, OSI filed its deportation case. Before the deportation was resolved, Breyer appealed the INS ruling. As procedurally required, he did so by filing a lawsuit in district court seeking a determination that he was entitled to citizenship.
This new case was handled by the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) rather than by OSI since it was not directly part of OSI’s denaturalization or deportation cases. However, OIL consulted OSI throughout.

Breyer’s suit challenged the retroactivity amendment on several grounds. His key contention was that it preserved some gender discrimination and therefore violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Gender discrimination remained because a group of people (those inadmissible under the DPA or RRA) were denied derivative citizenship only if the citizenship came from their mothers; the same was not true if the citizenship passed through their fathers. Breyer also argued that the new law was a bill of attainder – legislation written to punish him alone – and that it was unconstitutional on that ground as well. Moreover, he maintained that it had been improper for DOJ to lobby for passage of the legislation. And finally, Breyer accused the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, and various unnamed officials within the Department of conspiring to have INS delay acting on his administrative request for a certificate of citizenship until the new statute – with its exemption targeting him – had passed.

The court rejected all his arguments. While it acknowledged that the statute retained some disparate treatment, it concluded that remedial legislation need not “strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way.” And since the prohibition on bills of attainder applies only to laws that target individuals for “punishment,” the court found no constitutional impediment. Case law has traditionally held that neither the loss of naturalized citizenship nor deportation constitutes punishment. The court also found nothing improper with the Department’s role in lobbying for the legislation.
I find no provision of law that prevents DOJ or its employees from advancing the agenda of the executive branch by seeking a change in proposed legislation, even if they intend such a change to adversely affect people already engaged in litigation or the administrative process. Even if such conduct would be egregiously abusive if it were directed toward a citizen — and I do not so conclude — nevertheless, governmental conduct that may be considered “shocking” when it serves to deprive the life, liberty or property of a citizen may not be unconstitutional when directed at an alien.¹⁸

Without determining whether INS had delayed acting on Breyer’s claim, the court noted that the only remedy available for undue delay would be to vacate INS’ earlier decision and to have the agency reconsider the matter. Given that the law had changed to Breyer’s detriment in the interim, he would be unable to advance his cause in any event. Accordingly, the court denied Breyer’s claim of derivative citizenship.¹⁹

In addition to losing his derivative citizenship claim, Breyer also lost the deportation case. An immigration court found Breyer deportable and ordered him sent to Slovakia or, if that country were unwilling to accept him, to Germany.²⁰

He appealed both losses. The Third Circuit adopted at least part of Breyer’s argument concerning derivative citizenship. It agreed that the retroactivity amendment did not fully eradicate the discriminatory effects of the prior immigration law and that the disparity was “arbitrary and irrational.”

The foreign-born children of American fathers will acquire citizenship at birth and lose it only by intentionally committed expatriating acts. The foreign-born children of American citizen mothers will be prevented from obtaining American citizenship if they, with or without intent, have committed similar expatriating acts. The subjection of American women to this additional burden for the transmission of citizenship to their foreign-born offspring is in fundamental tension with the principle of equal protection.²¹

To remedy the problem, the court held that Breyer was entitled to American citizenship.
relating back to the time of his birth. Once again, however, outstanding issues remained. The Circuit noted that Breyer's wartime acts might have amounted to a voluntary renunciation of that citizenship. This was so notwithstanding the fact that Breyer was not a citizen during World War II and could not have believed he was such because the law then denied him that right. The Circuit reasoned that a voluntary oath of allegiance to a nation at war with the U.S., and to the Death's Head battalion, was fundamentally incompatible with the principles of American democracy; indeed, it would amount to an "unequivocal renunciation of American citizenship whether or not the putative citizen is then aware that he has a right to American citizenship."

The court sent the case back to the district court, yet again, for a determination of the circumstances surrounding Breyer's membership in the Death's Head battalion. 22

The Justice Department considered seeking further review. Technically, the government had lost. The Third Circuit ruling meant that Breyer was not statutorily barred from remaining in the United States. His fate would depend on whether his death camp duties had been involuntary, a factual determination as to which the outcome was as yet uncertain. Moreover, the government believed that the Circuit had applied the wrong standard of review when considering the constitutionality of the statute.

Both OSI and the State Department (which was interested because expatriation has implications beyond OSI cases) recommended asking the full Third Circuit to review the matter. The Civil Division and INS disagreed. In the end, the Solicitor General did not authorize additional review. Many factors were considered. Among them, that: (1) the arcane statutes in this case did not provide the best opportunity to argue the legal principles involved; (2) the retroactivity statute had been poorly worded in any event and therefore would be hard to
defend; and (3) the court's holding had no foreseeable impact on anyone other than Breyer, and as to him, the government might still succeed once the district court heard all the evidence.

OSI handled the expatriation matter in district court. There were legal as well as factual issues to resolve in making a determination as to whether Breyer’s service with the Death’s Head battalion had been voluntary. Under U.S. law at the time Breyer entered the SS, loyalty oaths and military service to a foreign power were not expatriating if the individual was a minor. However, by the time Breyer emigrated, the law had changed such that voluntary actions by a minor could be expatriating. The question of which statute applied was therefore crucial. After hearing the circumstances of Breyer’s joining the SS, the court determined that as a matter of fact, Breyer had acted on his own volition. However, it agreed with Breyer that the law at the time he joined the SS should control. Under that law, everything he did before his 18th birthday was, as a matter of law, not expatriating.

What happened after he turned 18 was another matter. Breyer’s military service ended at the age of nineteen. Had he done anything after his eighteenth birthday which would amount to a voluntary act of expatriation? The burden lay with Breyer to prove that his actions after age 18 were involuntary.

Before a hearing was held on that issue, the government notified Breyer that it intended to argue that his mother had expatriated herself before Breyer was born. If the government prevailed in this argument, Breyer’s citizenship arguments would be precluded. As a non-citizen, Breyer’s mother would not have been able to convey citizenship to her child. However, the court refused to allow the government to raise the issue at this late date in the litigation.

The stage was finally set for a determination of what was now the ultimate issue: had
Breyer done anything after his eighteenth birthday to renounce the U.S. citizenship that had been retroactively granted to him? The court had already concluded that as a factual matter Breyer's joining the SS had been voluntary. While the law precluded a finding that his actions as a minor were expatriating, OSI argued that his motivations should be presumed constant absent evidence to the contrary. Unless Breyer could establish that service past his 18th birthday was performed under duress, OSI contended that he had remained in the SS voluntarily and thereby expatriated himself.

Breyer testified that he had done everything possible to be excused from service and to convey his opposition to the policies of the Death's Head battalion. Among other things, he had asked the town mayor to help him avoid service; he had refused to renounce his religion even though there were economic incentives for SS men who did so; he had also refused to be tattooed in a manner that would mark him as a member of the SS. Although he carried a weapon, he did not always load it and told his superiors that he would not shoot an inmate; and he had ultimately deserted in August 1944, returning months later only because he feared that he might be killed if he failed to do so.28

There were only three documents available concerning the circumstances of Breyer's service after his 18th birthday. All involved requests—by him or on his behalf—to be excused from continued service. As such they supported his assertion that he was not serving voluntarily.29

Given the paucity of documentary evidence, Breyer's testimony was largely irrefutable. OSI's expert historian did testify, however, that some of Breyer's claims e.g., that he was given less onerous responsibilities because he was opposed to shooting inmates, were not historically
plausible. The government also pointed out that Breyer’s service at Auschwitz began after his 18th birthday and that he had taken an oath of loyalty to Hitler at that time. Moreover, there was no evidence that Breyer had ever tried to transfer from the Death Head’s battalion to a fighting unit. OSI relied on the Third Circuit’s characterization of membership in the SS as tantamount to a moral commitment to Nazi ideology. With that as a starting point, OSI contended that transfer to a traditional fighting unit would have shown that Breyer was less at odds with American principles. Not seeking a transfer was, the government argued, evidence that Breyer’s service after age 18 was an expatriating act.

The district court found that such a transfer would have been “technically possible” but “exceedingly difficult” to obtain. Moreover, it found that Breyer had “no conceivable chance” of leaving the SS entirely and that the loyalty oath was an involuntary action necessitated by his circumstances. Based on these findings, the court concluded that Breyer’s service after his 18th birthday was involuntary and therefore not expatriating. Accordingly, Breyer retained the U. S. citizenship that should have been his from birth.

The decision was affirmed on appeal. The Third Circuit concluded that “deserting his unit under what he believed to be penalty of execution suggests that Breyer’s service was not voluntary.” The Court rejected the notion that Breyer had to establish duress. Rather, the panel placed the burden on the government to show voluntariness and then concluded that that burden had not been met.

The government did not seek further review. The court’s ruling was largely driven by its factual findings. Although OSI believed some of those factual determinations were wrong, the government recognized that as a legal matter it is almost impossible to overturn factual
determinations.

The precedential value of the ruling for OSI is minimal. It is highly unlikely that a similar factual pattern will recur – an individual born abroad to a U.S. citizen mother and non-U.S. citizen father and who assisted the Nazis in acts of persecution.

The ruling could, however, have ramifications in non-OSI cases. The Circuit’s determination that membership in the SS was so antithetical to American values that it warranted expatriation even if that was not the defendant’s intent might be cited in support of an expatriation argument involving someone who joined another group whose core values are inimical to U.S. interests. It could also apply to someone who committed intentionally destructive acts to the U.S. body politic.32

Breyer, however, need not worry; he may remain in the United States for the duration of his life. While he can take satisfaction in his victory, he did make one serious miscalculation in a related proceeding.

In 1994, Breyer sued two networks over their coverage of his denaturalization case.33 He was particularly distressed over their equating him with Ivan the Terrible.34 Two weeks before trial, CBS offered to settle the case for $20,000. When Breyer did not respond in a timely manner, CBS withdrew the offer. Breyer failed to show up for trial, but on the morning it was due to start, he notified CBS that he wanted to accept their offer. By that time, the network was no longer willing to settle and the judge dismissed the lawsuit because Breyer was not present. He therefore lost both the payment and the opportunity to litigate his claim.35

The Breyer litigation is so convoluted that it is difficult to categorize. In retrospect, it appears that the original anomaly in the law – granting citizenship to the children of U.S. citizen
fathers but not U.S. mothers – was fatal to the government’s case. There was simply no way to level the playing field despite heroic efforts by both Congress and the courts to do so.

The gender-neutral amendment in 1934 left uncovered the children born to U.S. citizen mothers before 1934. Had the 1994 amendment simply established retroactivity, it would have overcompensated for this inequity by giving more protection to the children of U.S. citizen mothers than to the children of U.S. citizen fathers. Since anything such children did before knowing they were citizens could not have been done with the intent to relinquish that citizenship, military service on behalf of the Axis would not be expatriating. Yet the very same service could be expatriating if performed by someone whose citizenship was derived patrilineally.

One possible solution was to include a statutory exemption for persons inadmissible under the DPA or RRA. But this created yet another inequity. Some children born abroad to U.S. citizen mothers (i.e., those ineligible for entry under the DPA or RRA) were now categorically denied the possibility of derivative citizenship. They had no opportunity to show that their service was not intended to be expatriating. Children of U.S. citizen fathers might be expatriated, but they would at least have an opportunity to litigate the issue. Children of U.S. citizen mothers who served the Axis could not.

In an effort to resolve this problem, the Third Circuit fashioned a remedy allowing for the possibility that someone could voluntarily expatriate himself absent knowledge that he was a U.S. citizen. This tortured traditional notions of expatriation and created an intellectual impossibility. How could someone commit a sentient act of expatriation if he had no idea that he was a citizen? By ruling that Breyer’s continued service in the SS was involuntary, the district
court avoided the problem.\textsuperscript{37}

In sum, the legislature and courts faced an insoluble dilemma. There was simply no way to remove all inequities in the law. Breyer benefitted from a statutory anomaly.
I. Rev. Stat. of 1874, § 1993. The law was a bit more complicated in that citizenship could pass only if the father had at some point resided in the U.S. However, this factor is irrelevant to the handling and outcome of the Breyer litigation.

2. 48 Stat. 797 (1934).

3. Whether he had served at the Auschwitz death camp (Auschwitz II) or the Auschwitz labor camp (Auschwitz I) was itself an issue during part of the case. The court ultimately concluded that he had served at Auschwitz I. However, resolution of that issue is not essential to the legal issues or outcome of this case.


5. The government also charged misrepresentation and concealment of material facts, but these counts were not ultimately relevant to disposition of the case.


9. The impetus for this amendment was a Ninth Circuit ruling, in a non-OSI case, which held that the statute was unconstitutional to the extent that it did not retroactively confer citizenship on offspring of U.S. citizen mothers. Wauchope v. Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993).


11. The Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 (INCTA), Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 101 (a) and (c)(2).


14. The government questioned whether Breyer could even raise the issue. Theoretically, the discrimination was against his mother rather than against him (in that she could not pass on her citizenship whereas a U.S. citizen father could have). However, since Breyer’s mother had long since died, there was no way to resolve the potential inequity unless Breyer could himself raise the issue. The court ruled that he could.

15. INS was at the time part of the Justice Department.

17. This principle has been important in many OSI cases. See e.g., Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2nd Cir. 1986); Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982).


22. This ruling is at odds with the traditional expatriation law. See e.g., Rogers v. Patokowki, 271 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1961). Rogers was cited in dicta in another OSI case which was reviewed (in an unpublished and therefore not precedent binding decision) by the same appellate court which handled Breyer. In U.S. v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff’d, 31 F.3d 1175 (3rd Cir. 1994) (Table), the district court stated that “[a] United States citizen could not form the intent to relinquish his citizenship if, at the time he committed the expatriating act, he did not know he was a citizen.” (Schiffer had been born in the U.S. but later moved to Romania and served as a camp guard during World War II. Unlike the Breyer case however, the court found that Schiffer knew during the relevant period that he was a U.S. citizen and his camp guard service therefore constituted an intent to expatriate.)

23. As noted by the Solicitor General’s office, in denying retroactive application to those who were ineligible to enter under the DPA and RRA, the statute arguably included a very wide group — not simply those who were Nazi persecutors. Moreover, the government’s defense of the statute in district court was problematic. The government had argued that expatriation of Nazi persecutors protected national security and preserved the integrity of the citizenry by removing a group of undesirables. However, since serial murderers, terrorists, child molesters and others involved in heinous activity do not face expatriation, this defense of the statute is dubious. See, Aug. 20, 2000 memorandum to the Solicitor General from Malcolm Stewart, Assistant to the Solicitor General.


26. Breyer’s mother was living in Czechoslovakia when it became a state in 1918. Under the law of the new republic, she automatically became a Czech citizen, unless she indicated that she wanted to retain her U.S. citizenship. OSI wanted to argue that her failure to take affirmative action to retain the citizenship amounted to a renunciation of it.
27. Breyer v. Meissner, 2002 WL 922160 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The issue had been lurking for years. As noted at p. 177, the 1994 district court ruling mentioned this possibility. The court at that time noted that “the parties did not present evidence or argument” on the point. U.S. v. Breyer, 841 F. Supp. at 685. Two years later the INS, denying Breyer’s claim to derivative citizenship, made the same point, stating that it was “aware of no evidence that she expatriated before the applicant’s birth in 1925.” In re Breyer, A08-305-096 (Office of Administrative Appeals, Oct. 15, 1996), p.3.

28. When deposed by OSI, Breyer claimed he had deserted (by failing to return from leave) in January 1945. The court, however, believed his court testimony that he had left in August 1944. The variance is significant. By January 1945, it was clear that the Germans were fighting a losing cause. Moreover, the advancing Russians would likely have cut off Breyer’s means of access to his unit. Failure to return to his unit in January 1945 was therefore less likely due to “desertion” than if he failed to return in August 1944.

29. The government found some useful information even in these documents. According to one, “the inductee” appeared before the German Party in January 1945 to plead his case. OSI argued that the inductee was an obvious reference to Breyer himself and that if he had been a deserter since the prior August, he would hardly appear before the authorities to seek their assistance. However, because of several factual inaccuracies in the document referring to the January event, the court concluded that it was not authentic and discounted it entirely. Breyer v. Meissner, 2002 WL 31086985, n. 13 (2002). This significantly weakened the government’s case.

(OSI believed that most of the inaccuracies had plausible explanations. This could not have been a case of “Soviet fabrication” – an argument which even Breyer did not make – since the documents were helpful to him.)


31. Breyer v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 327, 335 (3rd Cir. 2003). The Circuit agreed with the lower court that Breyer’s return to his unit was borne of necessity, rather than choice. “There is no evidence of any other place Breyer safely could have gone. . . . Therefore] his return was not voluntary in the sense that it might represent an intentional relinquishment of United States citizenship.” Id. at 338.

32. Indeed, Breyer’s attorney argued that the Circuit’s language was so broad that it would encompass terrorist acts such as the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. Yet despite the horrific nature of that act, intended by its perpetrators as an act of defiance against the federal government, no one argued that the defendants should be expatriated. The perpetrators were tried and convicted. One was executed; the other was sentenced to life in prison.

34. See p. 150. On Sept. 7, 1993, a television announcement of upcoming news asked: “Could Philadelphia have its own Ivan the Terrible?”


36. If the government had been able to establish – in a timely manner – that Breyer’s mother had in fact expatriated herself before Breyer was born, the outcome of the case would have been different.

37. Whether the court would have ruled in the same way in the absence of this intellectual impossibility is unclear, although the opinion does suggest that the district court judge felt constricted in some measure by the Circuit’s ruling. *See Breyer v. Meissner*, 2002 WL 31086985, n. 26 (2002).
Propagandists

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg sentenced Julius Streicher, publisher and editor of a German anti-Semitic weekly newspaper, to death.

In his speeches and articles, week after week, month after month, he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism and incited the German people to active persecution.

***

Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with War Crimes... and constitutes a Crime against Humanity.¹

The DPA excluded propagandists because they were seen as members of a “movement hostile” to the United States as well as abettors in persecution.²

Vladimir Sokolov – A Persecutor Who Found a Home in Academia

Vladimir Sokolov was a Ukrainian-born writer and editor of Rech, a Russian-language newspaper published by the Germans after they invaded the U.S.S.R. Before being hired at Rech, Sokolov underwent a background check by German military intelligence to assure, among other things, that he was opposed to “Jewish Bolshevism.”³

His work included writing articles and giving propaganda speeches and lectures to the civilian population. The position provided him with a salary and privileges, including better food and living quarters than would otherwise have been available.⁴ Sokolov, who wrote under the penname Samarin, received two medals from the Germans for his work. His writing often harped on the theme that Jewry and Communism were synonymous.

The same mug with the hooked nose peers from behind the hundreds of millions of bodies that were tortured, executed and shot in the back of the neck over the Katyn graves, in distant Siberia and in the far North.⁵
The current war was prepared and provoked by Jewry, which already had brought so much suffering to mankind through the centuries.

In this war, the peoples of Europe and Asia are fighting against kike-plutocracy and Kike-bolshevisnism, against two outwardly different but inwardly common systems.

Sokolov claimed that "kikes" ran the government, and listed Jews in his hometown who occupied executive posts in various organizations and institutions. Although the list was "far from complete," he exhorted his readers to "Thrash them!"

Sokolov emigrated to the United States in July 1951. He advised the authorities that he had been working at Rech as a "corrector." His visa application included an oath stating that he had not been part of any "movement hostile" to the United States nor had he advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion or national origin.

In 1954, the FBI received information that Sokolov had been associated with Rech, and that he had collaborated with the Gestapo. INS learned of these accusations when processing his application for citizenship in 1956 and called him in for an interview. He told them that he had served as the literary editor and later Deputy Editor of Rech but denied having any involvement with the editorial policies of the newspaper. According to Sokolov, Rech was neither pro-Fascist nor anti-Semitic. He contended that, to the extent that such views appeared in the newspaper, it was at the behest of the German occupation forces.

[W]e were forced to assume certain political lines. We Russians fought this the best way we could, but under the ever-present danger of being shot to death on the spot, we had to put in remarks Fascist and anti-Semitic to please the Germans, but we fought against the Fascist line.... Personally, I confined myself to Anti-Communist articles. I have not written one single Fascist or Pro-Fascist line, and as to Anti-Semitic remarks, there may have been some to which I was forced.

He went on to deny collaborating with the Gestapo. The INS found "[n]o evidence on which to
base Service proceedings.” Approximately one month after his INS interview, Sokolov became a U.S. citizen.

In 1959, Sokolov was hired as a language instructor at Yale University. His application listed his work as an assistant editor of Rech. However, University officials did not do a thorough background verification for this non-tenured position. As they later explained: “If he’d gotten into the United States, the assumption was that he had been closely checked by the government.”

At Yale, Sokolov became active in pro-Zionist affairs and wrote several articles for a Zionist Russian-language newspaper. One of his colleagues described him as the “best language teacher” in the department.

In March 1974, Voice of the Homeland, a Russian-language newspaper published overseas, listed several former Nazi war criminals living in the United States. “Samarin” was among them. Two years later, Komsomol’skaya Pravda, the official journal of Soviet Communist youth, carried a brief article asserting that a current Yale University teacher had worked for the Nazis during occupation of the U.S.S.R.

Neither article attracted much attention. Then in April 1976, Sovetish Heimland, a Yiddish language monthly in Moscow, quoted from several articles written by Sokolov. A Yale librarian who did translations for Morning Freiheit discovered the piece. On May 23, 1976, Morning Freiheit carried a story under the headline “Moscow Yiddish Magazine Charges: Russian Fascist Has Teaching Position at Yale University.”

Yale first learned about the writings a couple of weeks earlier when then Slavic Department Chair Robert Jackson received the text of one of the Soviet articles. He arranged a
meeting with Sokolov. According to two attendees, Sokolov acknowledged writing the Rech articles. He contended, however, that stylistic changes had been made, including substitution of the word "kike" for "Jew."

Sokolov's past activity was not ground for academic dismissal and the University recommended his reappointment for another two-year term. Support for Sokolov within his own department, however, was thin. Four of the six professors wrote him on June 29, 1976.

Some recent publications which carry photocopies of your articles in Rech, as well as extensive reproductions of the same newspaper which have come into our possession recently, reveal to us beyond any reasonable doubt that you were engaged not only in anti-Communist but also in pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic activities under the German occupation. As individual members of the department, and as people engaged in a humanistic endeavor, we feel obliged to express to you our profound feeling of disgust and outrage at these documented revelations of your past activities. We should like to make it clear that under no circumstances can you count on the undersigned for any support whatsoever.

The next day Chairman Jackson advised Sokolov that while he had the right to remain on the faculty, the department "in no way condoned" his activity. The following month, Sokolov resigned. He attributed this decision to the "character of the campaign in [his] own department" and claimed he "did not want to create difficulties for the University administration." He also cited medical problems. Under the terms of his resignation, he continued to receive his salary for a full year and remained eligible to collect a pension from a national teachers organization.

The story did not resonate nationally until students returned to the Yale campus and the Yale Daily News published its first piece on the affair. Professor Schenker, Sokolov's strongest ally in the Department (and himself a refugee from Nazi Germany), tried to put Sokolov's activities in historical context. "The German occupation, paradoxical as it may seem, was the
only real chance to escape. A guy sitting in his apartment in New York can't understand what it was like growing up in a Gulag Archipelago world.”

The Yale Daily News also defended Sokolov.

The hasty action of the four members of the Slavic Languages and Literature Department had the predictable effect of coercing Mr. Samarin into resignation. Acting upon insufficient information, they displayed a contempt not only for Nazism, but for due process as well. Those four instructors did, however, spare the Yale Corporation from a hard decision: should Mr. Samarin have remained at Yale? We are sure the answer to that question ought to have been yes.

Mr. Samarin was and is a dedicated foe of the Soviet government. We find his unspeakable attack on the Jewish people unjustifiable, whatever its ultimate purpose. Not all opponents of Bolshevism found it necessary to lace their essays with anti-Semitism. If there is any argument against Mr. Samarin's dismissal from Yale, it does not lie in his chilling rationalization of Nazi collaboration.

Since his arrival here 17 years ago, Mr. Samarin has become an effective and sympathetic teacher. Had his story not filtered out of Soviet Russia this summer, he would have been remembered as a gentle friend to many Yale undergraduates. In fact, his opposition to the Soviet regime has led him to espouse Zionist interests. Although we are somewhat alarmed by the vast ideological distance one man can travel in 30 years, we must believe Mr. Samarin when he says that he is no longer anti-Semitic and that he "loves his students."

* * *

... His conduct here is in part a testament to the wisdom of running a university free from the political forces and ideological tyranny that he was too weak to transcend in the 1940's. The lesson is simple: all men grow when they leave the house of intellectual bondage.22

The New York Times and several other newspapers around the country picked up the story.23 The following month INS ordered a review of the file in order to determine whether a "full scale and comprehensive investigation" should take place. They concluded that, given the "full investigation" conducted in 1957, there was no basis for a reinvestigation.

The newly formed OSI, reviewing all INS Nazi files, took the matter up in 1979.
However, they had no access to the offending articles. Although Yale had copies in Sokolov's personnel file, the university would not release the material absent a subpoena or Sokolov's consent. During an interview with OSI attorneys, Sokolov agreed to authorize release of the articles.24

OSI filed suit in 1982, alleging that Sokolov's citizenship was illegally procured. As set forth in the complaint, Sokolov had been ineligible for citizenship because he had assisted in persecution, been a member of a movement hostile to the United States, voluntarily assisted enemy forces, and made misrepresentations in his visa and citizenship applications (by denying membership in a movement hostile to the United States). The complaint also cited his lack of good moral character (as evidenced by his misrepresentations).

The case generated much publicity and various people, to no avail, urged the government to reconsider its position. Among them were author and commentator William F. Buckley, Jr. and Mstislav Rostropovich, Russian emigré and renowned cellist and conductor of the Washington National Symphony. Buckley wrote a note to President Reagan, thanking him for the time they had recently spent together and relaying his "outrage[]" at the filing.25 Maestro Rostropovich came to OSI to speak with Director Sher directly. As Sher recalled it, Rostropovich described Sokolov as "a shit [whose] life [was] worth shit." Nonetheless, he begged Sher not to "throw him to the Russians."26

Trial opened in November 1985 before Senior Judge Tom Murphy, himself an historic figure. Murphy was a former New York City police commissioner and the lead prosecutor in the Alger Hiss trials. The government's expert historian explained how the Nazis used propaganda to condition the Russians to accept, and assist the Nazis in executing, the policy of Jewish
extermination. He also explained the hidden role played by the Germans in controlling the content of *Rech*. OSI submitted 17 *Rech* articles published under Samarin’s byline as well as an oath of fealty signed by Sokolov to obtain membership in an anti-Bolshevik group.

In joining the ranks of associates of the Union for Struggle Against Bolshevism, I give my solemn pledge of loyalty to Adolph HITLER, the Liberator of the Peoples of Russia, and the Unifier of New Europe.

I declare myself an irreconcilable and undaunted enemy of Judeo-Bolshevism in all its manifestations.

I oblige myself to place the interests of the people and of the common struggle against Jew-Bolshevism and its allies above my own.

The thrust of Sokolov’s defense was that he had viewed the Germans as liberators from Communism and that his articles had been heavily edited — so much so that he hardly recognized his own work. He claimed he had remained at the newspaper because he feared that if he left he would have been sent to a camp or killed.

In February 1986, while the case was under submission, it was featured on *CBS Sunday Morning*. Director Sher explained to the viewing television audience the rationale for pursuing propagandists.

It was not just a few crazed men in Berlin who had the notion of destroying Jews and others. It took hundreds of thousands of people, if not more. People to operate at every aspect of German society — in Germany proper and in the occupied territories to implement them. Propagandists, they were one cog in that wheel as were the people who pulled the triggers.

Later that year, the district court issued its ruling withdrawing Sokolov’s citizenship.27 He appealed to the Second Circuit. Although there were very few appellate decisions in OSI cases at that time, the government had recently lost a case in that circuit which it believed it should have won.28 This naturally caused OSI concern about the current case.

The concern was unnecessary. The Circuit accepted all the government’s arguments and
affirmed the ruling below. It concluded that Sokolov’s articles “assisted the enemy,” that they advocated or assisted in persecution, and amounted to participation in a “movement hostile” to the United States – all of which made him ineligible for a visa under the DPA. Significantly, in finding that Sokolov had advocated or assisted in persecution, the Court held that no evidence of actual persecution resulting from the articles need be shown. The mere fact that Sokolov’s articles worked to “condition[] the Russian people into accepting and carrying out the National Socialist Policy in regards to the Jews” was sufficient.

Once the Supreme Court denied review, OSI commenced deportation proceedings. Before the first scheduled hearing, OSI learned from media accounts that Sokolov had left the country. After subpoenaing the family telephone records, OSI surmised that Sokolov was in Montreal, Canada.

DAAG Richard worried about the Canadian reaction to this turn of events. Years earlier, when refusing to accept an OSI deportee, they had made clear their distaste for these defendants: “[I]t is extremely unlikely that Canada would be willing to accept any individual, as a deportee, whose removal from the United States is being effected for reasons similar to those pertaining to [the defendant].”

Although Sokolov had not been deported to Canada, DAAG Richard opined that the Canadians were “very sensitive about US wilfully ‘dumping’ our Nazis into their country.” He feared they would believe (mistakenly) that the United States had a role in Sokolov’s choosing their country.

Sokolov had found refuge in a Russian Orthodox church in Montreal. This information, conveyed to OSI by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police War Crimes Investigations Section, was
confirmed by an OSI historian. Conversant in Ukrainian, he called the monastery and identified himself as an anti-OSI crusader. Sokolov spoke with him and asked for a number where he could return the call. The historian happened to have open on his desk a Ukrainian newspaper; he passed along the phone number of a tombstone company advertised therein.

Although Sokolov had already left the country and was on the government's Watchlist to preclude his reentry, OSI proceeded with the deportation hearing in absentia. Director Sher, asked about it years later, surmised that he had been concerned that the U.S./Canadian border was too porous for the Watchlist to be fully effective. Deputy Director Einhorn recalled feeling that living in Canada was no punishment. If Sokolov reentered the United States, the government wanted to be able to put him on a plane to the U.S.S.R. without an additional hearing.  

Sokolov did not appear at the deportation hearing nor was he represented by counsel. The government presented the record from the denaturalization hearing and the court ordered Sokolov deported to the U.S.S.R. The order was never carried out because (to the best of OSI's knowledge) Sokolov never returned to the United States. He died in Canada in 1992.

2. There is no First Amendment issue in these cases as the protections from that Amendment do not apply to actions by foreign nationals overseas.

3. Jan. 24, 1984 deposition of Artur Bay, pp. 11-12. Corporal Bay was with Panzer Propaganda Co. 693 and issued assignments to the Russians working for *Rech*. The assignments were based on directions from the German Propaganda Ministry.


8. A corrector took care that type setting corresponded to the copy.


11. Statement by Yale’s Director of Public Information, speaking on behalf of University President Kingman Brewster, Jr. *Id.*

12. As Sokolov explained it, he adopted a new approach after the war when the U.S.S.R. began its anti-Jewish campaign. “From now on the Jews have become my allies in the struggle against our common enemy – Communism. The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Letter to the Editor, *Yale Daily News*, Oct. 8, 1976.


16. *Id.*

17. *Id.*

18. According to the *Yale Daily News*, the Soviets cited the resignation as an example of “progressive public opinion” which is powerful even at traditionally “imperialist and reactionary”


21. *Id.*


24. Thereafter OSI, aided by the State Department, obtained certified copies of the articles from the U.S.S.R. for submission to court.


26. Sher recorded interview, Apr. 27, 2001. (All references to Sher’s actions hereafter in this chapter stem from this interview unless otherwise noted.) Sher viewed the Buckley letter as “the old Yale boy connection rallying around.” (Buckley was a Yale alumnus.)


30. Feb. 28, 1985 letter to Director Sher from William Lundy, Counsellor and Consul, Canadian Embassy re Karl Linnas. The *Linnas* case is discussed at pp. 271-295.


32. Once stripped of his citizenship, Sokolov reverted to the status of a legal permanent resident. As such, he would have been able to return to the United States at any time within 180 days of his departure.

33. The Canadians, who had opened their own investigation, never filed charges nor did they act on the request for asylum Sokolov filed shortly after entering their country.
Valerian Trifa – A Persecutor Who Found Refuge in His Church

The prosecution of Valerian Trifa was particularly convoluted since he could say – in truth – that he had spent much of the war in Nazi concentration camps and had fought against a government allied with Nazi Germany. The challenge for OSI was to show that those were only half truths.

In 1940, the Romanian government was sympathetic to Nazi Germany. The Iron Guard, a fascist organization within Romania, was part of a governmental coalition whose most dominant group was the Army. The Iron Guard was the most extreme member of the coalition, both in its anti-Semitism and its fascism.

In the fall of 1940, theology student Viorel Trifa became leader of the Iron Guard’s student movement and editor of Libertatae, an anti-Semitic weekly newspaper linked to the Iron Guard cause. As a student leader, he addressed various rallies. A mid-December speech discussed anti-Semitism.

The Romanian student has been anti-Semitic not because he read in some book that he must oppose the Yids, but because he felt that he could no longer make a living in his own country. If our students have been anti-Semitic from 1922 on, this is due to this Romanian tragedy, that after leaving the villages where they were being plundered by the Yids, they found themselves in cities once again plundered by the Yids. And then they had to rise up and say: This can no longer go on!!

Trifa’s newspaper writings in Libertatae expressed similar sentiments.

Throughout the fall and into January, Iron Guardists terrorized the local citizenry, extorting money, expropriating property, looting and killing wantonly. Most victims were Jewish, though some were non-Jewish political adversaries. In mid-January, General Antonescu, head of the coalition government, reacted. He dismissed hundreds of Iron Guardists from
government posts, forbad the wearing of the Iron Guard uniform other than at ceremonial events, and fired the pro-Guard Minister of the Interior.  

On January 20, a widely-publicized Iron Guard manifesto, issued in Trifa's name, called for the "replacement of all Masonic and Judaized persons in the government." The "Trifa Manifesto" was read over Bucharest radio, and that evening Trifa gave the keynote speech at a student demonstration. He extolled the virtues of:

a housepainter with his healthy soul [who] rose to confront the interest of Judaism and of London Free Masonry. . . . The struggle thus initiated led to the unmasking and the removal of the Jewish-Masonic domination in Central Europe, an achievement that is to the credit of Chancellor Hitler.  

On January 21, the Trifa Manifesto was distributed in the provinces. Local Iron Guardists were urged to demonstrate on the basis of its text for the reinstatement of the fired Interior Minister and establishment of an Iron Guard government. For three days, January 21 - 23, bands of Iron Guardists drove through Jewish neighborhoods, plundering, burning and murdering. The riots extended into the countryside, but were most intense in Bucharest, where dozens were killed, many at an animal slaughterhouse. The American legation chief reported that there were "60 Jewish corpses on the hooks used for carcasses . . . all skinned. The quantity of blood about [seemed to indicate]. . . that they had been skinned alive." Dozens, and perhaps many more, were killed before the rioting was quelled.

Germany was ambivalent about the uprising. While sympathetic to the ideological purity of the Iron Guardists, Hitler was concerned that the rioting would destabilize the country and endanger vital supply lines. Although Germany did not assist the insurrection, it granted nine of the top Iron Guard leaders, Trifa among them, sanctuary in the German embassy once the
rebellion was crushed. From there, three months later, the leaders (along with several hundred Iron Guard loyalists) escaped to Germany. The Romanian president was sufficiently outraged by this that Otto von Bolschwing, the German responsible for providing shelter within the embassy, was recalled. Romania tried Trifa in absentia and sentenced him to life at hard labor.

With the Iron Guard leaders in Germany, the Nazis faced a dilemma. Hitler had given sanctuary to Antonescu’s adversaries, but still needed the Antonescu régime to remain a stalwart ally. Hitler’s solution was to appear to punish the Iron Guardists without actually doing so. They were kept in minimal detention, similar to house arrest, although Trifa was spared even this. Due to medical problems, he was allowed to travel throughout the country, visiting spas.

In December 1942, shortly after one of the Iron Guard leaders tried to flee Germany, new restrictions were imposed on the detainees. All, Trifa included, were sent to concentration camps. However, they were segregated from the other prisoners and given special privileges—better living quarters, decent food, and no work assignments. At Dachau, for example, the men had individual cells and a common room with a radio.

Trifa remained in Germany throughout the war. His four years there included three months at Buchenwald and 17 months at Dachau. After the war, he emigrated to Italy and from there, in 1950, to the United States. At that time, those who had been members of the Iron Guard were ineligible to receive a visa. Trifa’s visa application made no mention of his Iron Guard membership; it stated that he had been a forced laborer at Buchenwald and Dachau from 1941 to 1945. He settled in Michigan, and shortly thereafter was ordained as a bishop in the Romanian Orthodox church.

At that time, the church’s traditional headquarters in Romania was part of the Soviet bloc.
Some Romanian Orthodox in America, therefore, vehemently opposed control from abroad.

Trifa was in this group. In 1952, when his faction selected him to serve as Archbishop, the pro-Soviet faction obtained a court order blocking the ordination. The ceremony took place nonetheless and Trifa was then cited for contempt of court for violating the order.\(^{14}\) The order was later vacated and Trifa retained his new position.

Even before Trifa had emigrated, the CIC knew that he had been a member of the Iron Guard.\(^{15}\) For reasons not clear from the files, he was nonetheless granted a visa. Shortly after his arrival, however, the State Department realized that he “may have misrepresented the facts of his career in obtaining his visa.”\(^{16}\) Around the same time, the FBI, alerted about Trifa’s background by a confidential informant, notified INS.\(^{17}\) In a May 1951 INS interview, Trifa denied having been a member of the Iron Guard. When asked if he had given any anti-Semitic speeches, he replied “I don’t believe so.”\(^{18}\)

In September 1951, Walter Winchell, then one of the most influential broadcasters in America, denounced Trifa in a radio broadcast as a Nazi “murderer.” Trifa was reinterviewed by the INS shortly thereafter. This time, he admitted organizing and leading a demonstration on January 20, 1941 as the president of a Romanian student group. He insisted, however, that after his speech he had told the demonstrators to disperse. He denied participating in any of the post-demonstration atrocities or killings.\(^{19}\) INS closed its investigation in 1953, concluding (incorrectly) that membership in the Iron Guard would not have barred Trifa from entering the country under the DPA.\(^{20}\)

As head of the Romanian Episcopate in the United States, Trifa was a powerful and influential religious figure. In May 1955, he presented the opening invocation in the United
States Senate. This sparked renewed controversy as Drew Pearson, another nationally syndicated journalist, questioned the propriety of a “Nazi terrorist” leading the Senate in prayer.\textsuperscript{21}

In December 1955, the FBI spent three days interviewing Trifa. He again acknowledged speaking to assembled students in January 1941, though he claimed not to remember the content of his statements. To the extent that there was any anti-Semitism, he insisted that the speech, as the manifesto, was written by others; he had simply read the prepared script. He denied any involvement in, or responsibility for, the rioting that followed his speech.

Both the INS and FBI were skeptical of the charges against Trifa, the INS because they believed the source of the allegations to be a rival church faction,\textsuperscript{22} and the FBI because they suspected the source to be the Communist government in Romania.\textsuperscript{23}

In 1956, Trifa applied to become a U.S. citizen. The naturalization examiner had a very clear recollection of the matter as “it was an unusual and different type of case.”

I asked him specifically if he had ever been a member of the Romanian Iron Guard, the Nazi Party, the Fascist Party or the Communist party. He categorically denied membership in any of these organizations. . . I asked him if the student organization he had belonged to in Romania was a branch of the Iron Guard and he stated that it was not.

Trifa claimed that he had been arrested by the Germans because of his opposition to the Romanian government. He said he had been taken to Germany against his will.

I asked Mr. Trifa if he had ever been an anti-Semite and he stated that he had not. I asked him if he had ever taken any part in the killing of Jews, or whether he had ever directed any persecutions of Jews and he stated that he had not. . . . He told me that he had not signed the manifesto, but that his name had been placed thereon . . . and that he had been ordered to and did appear at [the January 20, 1941] demonstration. He denied having taken part in the later killing of Jews and other atrocities that allegedly occurred.\textsuperscript{24}

He became a U.S. citizen in 1957.
Since 1952, one private citizen had been exhorting the government to deport Trifa. Dr. Charles Kremer, a Jew, had lost dozens of Romanian relatives in the Holocaust. During a letter writing campaign that spanned more than 20 years, he repeatedly contacted INS and urged the White House, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, Congressmen, news media and members of the public to do the same. He was consistently rebuffed. In retrospect, this may be due to the fact that Trifa, unlike most OSI subjects or defendants:

had been of note in his homeland. . . . He had a constituency in this country. He was a churchman. He was an outspoken anti-Communist. He had a ready-made story about how these accusations were out to scandalize him as part of the Communist disinformation machine. When you play that tune to INS and Congress, which is willing to hear it, it doesn’t take all that much to succeed. No one was looking for these guys then.

As the years passed without any legal action against him, Trifa — an increasingly public figure, both as a church dignitary and as an anti-Communist activist — seemed emboldened. In 1972, he admitted to a reporter that he had been the top leader of a Fascist Youth movement sympathetic to Hitler’s Germany. He went on to acknowledge that there had been anti-Semitism at the time, but he attributed it to the perception that Jews “monopolized the economy,” rather than to any Nazi ideology. He opined that “[p]eople should not be over-sensitive over some incidents.”

Following Trifa’s admission of leadership, Dr. Kremer met with an INS investigator and presented dozens of exhibits, including letters, books and newspaper articles. He had assembled the material with the help of various Jewish groups, including the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Simon Wiesenthal Center (SWC), and The United Israel Bulletin. While much of the information had already been sent to INS by Congressional members at Kremer’s behest,
there was some new material, including statements from eyewitnesses who had been present when Trifa delivered his January 1941 speech. INS forwarded the material to the local U.S. Attorney, who concluded that Trifa’s entry and naturalization should now “be investigated fully.”

In 1973, *The New York Times* reported the renewed investigation on the front page. The reporter spoke with Trifa, who acknowledged that he had worn an Iron Guard uniform and made anti-Semitic speeches. Trifa also admitted that his claim of having been arrested by the Germans was not accurate. Rather, he had received protection from the Germans. Trifa was “not ashamed” of his past “at all.”

For those circumstances in that time I think that I didn’t have any other alternative but to do what I thought to be right for the interests of the Rumanian people.30

A few months later, the INS Commissioner testified at a routine oversight hearing before the House Immigration Subcommittee. Representative Holtzman pressed him about the Trifa investigation;31 she also followed up thereafter.32 Reacting to this pressure, INS met with Dr. Kremer and interviewed witnesses whose names he had earlier forwarded.33 Based on this new eyewitness testimony – some of which had Trifa exhorting and/or joining marauding mobs – INS recommended that a denaturalization petition be filed.34

The Detroit U.S. Attorney’s Office filed a complaint in May 1975. It alleged that Trifa had misrepresented and concealed material facts both in his visa application and in his quest for citizenship. Among the facts allegedly concealed were his membership in the Iron Guard, and his advocacy of, and participation in, the slaughter of Jews.

As noted earlier, the SLU was established in July 1977, shortly after “Wanted, the Search
for Nazis in America" became a New York Times bestseller. Kremer provided much of the book’s material on Trifa. As recounted in the book, Trifa had led an execution squad into a cell filled with Jews. The case was thus notorious by the time the SLU took over primary responsibility for its prosecution. SLU Chief Martin Mendolsohn assigned the prosecution to attorney Gene Thirolf.

I called Gene in and told him this is the biggest dog ever – an absolute loser and totally screwed up. The only thing I can promise you is that I will sign every pleading and go down with you. [Gene] turned it around.35

Although Dr. Kremer had served a vital function in keeping the issue alive, the material he provided was not particularly helpful. Much of it was irrelevant to the legal issues at hand.36 Thirolf concluded that only one witness proposed by Dr. Kremer and the INS was viable;37 he realized that the government needed documentary evidence. Thirolf began by searching through Romanian newspapers at the Library of Congress. A reference to Trifa’s work on a newspaper led to the discovery that he had edited Libertatae, a fact that had not been known when the case was first filed in 1975. DOJ requested copies of the newspaper from Romania.

Getting material from Romania proved exceedingly difficult, however. In four years, Romania had provided only one pertinent document.38 The Romanians told Thirolf that he could neither interview witnesses nor get archival material because the country had no judicial assistance treaty with the United States.39 At Mendelsohn’s suggestion, Thirolf spoke about the problem to a New York Times reporter who then wrote an article about Romania’s intransigence.40

Under the law at the time, eastern bloc countries enjoyed preferential trade status with the United States only if their governments allowed free emigration. This most favored nation
status (MFN) needed to be renewed by the president each year and approved by both houses of Congress. Politicians sympathetic to OSI’s mission realized that the renewal process might give them leverage with the Romanians. Two days after The Times article appeared, the Chair of the House subcommittee in charge of MFN hearings asked the Romanian Ambassador to meet with Representative Holtzman. Days after that meeting, the Romanians delivered a packet of material to the American Embassy in Bucharest. A week later, Representative Holtzman testified before the subcommittee in the hope of pressuring Romania into allowing OSI personnel to interview witnesses and examine archival material. She did not urge Congress to deny MFN status, but suggested that the subcommittee postpone its decision “until the Romanian government has fully cooperated in the prosecution of the Trifa case.”41 A senator interested in the matter sent a similar message through an aide, advising that “anything Romania does to please Congress would be to its advantage.”42

The Congressional pressure had immediate effect. As Representative Holtzman recalled it:

After I testified ... the Ambassador came slithering across the floor in my office and I knew the minute that he picked up my hand to kiss it that I was getting good news. He didn’t have to say a word.43

Shortly thereafter, Thirolf and an historian were granted access to material and personnel. In acknowledgment of this, Representative Holtzman supported extension of MFN status.44

OSI, as is routine, also checked with U.S. intelligence agencies for information about Trifa. The FBI had information from a confidential source that the Romanian government was out to get Trifa because of his unwillingness to collaborate with the Romanian home church and government. According to this source, the Romanian government provided information to
American Jewish groups in the hope that they would use it to attack Trifa. While the source claimed that most of the information provided was legitimate, (s)he advised that some documents were altered to make Trifa's actions appear worse; a certain number were fabricated altogether. The alterations and fabrications were designed to show that Trifa was personally responsible for the decision to murder civilians and/or for the actual murders themselves. According to the FBI:

the Romanian plan against Trifa was . . . to put Trifa in a sufficiently difficult position with U.S. Government authorities that he would be disgraced in his church position and lose it. The use of American-Jewish organizations was a means to this end as was the tactical use of exaggeration and falsifying documents to fill holes in the Trifa story.46

An OSI historian also expressed concern. He noted the possibility of tampering not only by the Communists, but also by preceding Romanian governments. Official reports prepared by the Romanian government shortly after the uprising may have been designed to portray the Iron Guard and its leaders in the worst light possible.47 OSI already had in its possession at least one document the authenticity of which it doubted. A photograph of Trifa looked as if his face had been superimposed. The government did not plan to introduce it into evidence.48

To allay concerns, the government sought multiple levels of corroboration. In addition to examining Romanian documents, including newspapers, trial transcripts and government reports, the government wanted evidence of non-Romanian origin. They searched foreign ministry documents from Germany, England and the United States which detailed the situation in Romania at the time Trifa was active. German SS records yielded a contemporaneous report of the January 1941 rally from a German exchange student studying in Romania. Enclosed with his account was a copy of the Trifa manifesto. OSI also traced Trifa's life in Germany to establish that he had been given special status because of his Iron Guard activities. Finally, they turned to
Trifa’s own statements in the U.S. press. OSI planned to present testimony from The New York Times reporter who had interviewed Trifa in 1973.49

While the case was pending, but before a trial date had been set, Trifa was invited to participate in a broadcast prepared by Radio Free Europe (RFE) for transmission to Romania.50 The occasion for the broadcast was the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate in North America. The use of an alleged Nazi war criminal in a government-sponsored broadcast created a furor.51 Martin Mendelsohn, first as SLU chief and thereafter as Deputy Director of OSI, protested to RFE.52 Representative Holtzman too took up the cause.53 Shortly after the uproar died down, Trifa received another torrent of negative publicity. He was featured on a nationally broadcast television show entitled “Escape from Justice – Nazi War Criminals in America.”54

Trifa’s trial was set for October 1980. Government attorneys traveled to Romania and Israel during the summer interviewing witnesses. Suddenly, seven weeks before trial, and without any forewarning, Trifa’s attorney told the U.S. Attorney in Michigan that he had a “bombshell.” Trifa would turn in his certificate of naturalization; there was no need for a trial. According to his attorney, Trifa “wasn’t up to” a trial because of his health.55

Trifa issued a public statement in which he ceded no ground to the government.

The relinquishment of my citizenship is in no way to be considered an admission of the government allegations...

The litigation against me has actually been enlarged into something far more comprehensive – a trial of the ideological and political milieu of Romanian history in the pre-war years, nearly 50 years ago. To that obvious purpose and direction, I have been made a hostage of my own naturalization, forced to act as a vehicle in the condemnation of my country of origin; and particularly of the Legionary Movement [Iron Guard] of those years, and of the many fine men and
women who gave so much in their dedication to what was then felt as the best solution to Romania’s many and complex difficulties. This I cannot and I will not permit to continue.

However much I believe in the American judicial process – and I do – it is with an equally firm conviction I feel I have been denied due process in this protracted litigation. Even if I were accorded a fair trial as such in a procedural sense, it would appear to be irrelevant when such would still render impossible any attempt to bring across the truth of the matters taking place in Romania during the critical years between the great wars.

The tremendous cost, the enormous amount of time, the heavy burdens of many years of litigation and harassment have rendered me unable to effectively defend myself and give full measure to the parishioners of my far-flung Episcopate.

***

Thus, in order to preserve the integrity of my own convictions, and in the best interests of my Church and its faithful, the struggle must end!

The struggle did not end, however. Two months later, the government filed a deportation action. The denaturalization complaint, which had been filed by the USAO, alleged that Trifa had personally participated in acts of murder. By contrast, the OSI-filed deportation action focused on Trifa as a propagandist. OSI’s exhaustive research into Trifa’s background left it unconvinced that Trifa himself had partaken in the mayhem; it did believe, however, that his writings and speeches had helped create an atmosphere in which such wanton murder and destruction was deemed acceptable.56

The government alleged that Trifa had concealed all information about his Iron Guard activities, and that he had advocated violence and the persecution of Jews. According to the government, “hundreds of innocent civilians were killed” as a result of the Trifa Manifesto.57

As always, Dr. Kremer followed the litigation closely. He wrote to the immigration judge
urging that the trial be expedited.

We ask for an immediate and speedy trial of this pogromist. The pogrom that was ordered by Mr. Trifa is considered by contemporary historians the most ghastly ever, even more cruel than Hitler’s gassing [sic] and incinerating men, women and children. In this pogrom Mr. Trifa and his cohorts perpetrated the most vicious acts ever devised by distorted human minds: Jews and Christians had their ears, tongues, sexual organs cut off before being put to death by slashing their throats “in the ritual manner”, their heads cut off and the carcasses hung on hooks and marked “KOSHER” – on their bellies (KARNE KOSHER in Rumanian).  

The letter did not have the desired effect. The judge, assuming that Dr. Kremer was “an informant and potential witness for the Government,” recused himself from the case.

Although ordinarily I would discount ex parte remarks and accusations, I am of the belief that due to the sensitive nature of this case it would be impossible to maintain the appearance of judicial fairness in that the contents of this letter constitute an outright intentional attempt to influence the decision of this court.

Director Ryan urged the court to reconsider. Ryan assured the judge that the government had had nothing to do with the letter, had no advance notice of it, and “dissassociate[d itself] from everything in it.” Moreover, Ryan opined that the next judge assigned might receive a similar letter since the parties to the case could not “exercise any influence or control over the letter-writing of this private citizen.” The court declined to reconsider its decision and a new judge was assigned.

The government anticipated that it would take two months to try the case. They expected to introduce hundreds of exhibits. The case was complex, both because Romanian politics were complicated (Romania began as an Axis partner but joined the Allies in 1944), and because the anticipated defense was sophisticated. Trifa could argue that he had been a victim himself, since he had spent time in German concentration camps; the government needed to establish that he
had been more a guest than a political prisoner. And if he argued that the government which crushed the Iron Guard also persecuted Jews, the government needed to show that this did not mean that the Iron Guard wasn't itself anti-Semitic. OSI was prepared to present a long and detailed explanation of Romanian politics. Preparing for the case, an OSI historian wrote a 500 page report outlining the relevant political and cultural issues.\textsuperscript{51}

Among the most dramatic evidence the government planned to present was a series of postcards and letters found in the West German archives. They were sent in 1942 by Trifa from various German resorts and spas to his Iron Guard leader comrades. The correspondence supported the government's theory of the case – that Trifa, because of his high-level position with the Iron Guard, had been more a political refugee than a political prisoner.

Although Trifa's handwriting was on the correspondence – and the government had a handwriting expert to so testify – Trifa claimed they were a Communist forgery. Using then brand-new laser technology, the FBI identified Trifa's latent fingerprint on one of the documents. The identification of a 40-year-old print was extraordinary; it was, and remains to this day, the oldest latent print ever matched by the Bureau. Indeed, a blowup of the print is on display at FBI headquarters for tourists to view.\textsuperscript{62}

Last minute pre-trial settlement negotiations came to naught\textsuperscript{63} and trial began in October 1982. The government opened its case with two days of testimony by an historian who discussed Trifa's role in the Iron Guard. Through him, the government introduced numerous articles written and edited by Trifa. On the morning of the third day, defense counsel offered to settle. Trifa conceded that he had been a member of the Iron Guard and that he had concealed that background when he entered the United States. He agreed to depart the United States within 60
days of receiving permission to enter another country. He designated Switzerland as the country to which he would like to be deported. He wanted, at all costs, to avoid returning to Romania which had convicted him *in absentia* and sentenced him to life imprisonment in 1941.

As part of the settlement, the United States agreed that if Switzerland refused to accept him, Trifa and the U.S. would have two years to find another country. If, at the end of that two year period no other country would accept him, the U.S. would seek to deport him to Romania. From the government’s perspective, this “ensured[d] that in no way would the Department ever find itself in a position where we were sheltering him from possible return to Romania, in the event that no other country would accept him.”64 The potential two-year hiatus was acceptable to the government since it was shorter than the likely duration of an appeal had the trial proceeded to verdict.65

Trifa’s attorneys claimed that his abrupt abandonment of the case was due to the fact that he was “old and ill.”66 Trifa himself claimed that he wanted “an end to this. I feel victimized by the fact that things are picked up and enlarged in such a way as to mean completely different things.”67 The court entered an order of deportation in October 1982. It was the first judicial order of deportation litigated by OSI.

It was not easy finding a country to which Trifa could be sent. Switzerland refused to accept him. The United States made inquiries of Italy and (West) Germany. They too were opposed. Romania, the back-up country according to the settlement agreement, expressed extreme reluctance.64

Worried that Trifa might remain in the United States by default, the Justice Department sought to persuade Israel to extradite and prosecute him under a 1950 law punishing “crimes
against the Jewish people" committed during World War II. OSI Acting Director Sher went to Israel to discuss the matter. The following week, DAAG Richard planned to meet with the Israeli Attorney General to continue the discussions. However, at the direction of the State Department, DAAG Richard cancelled the meeting when he learned that it was to be held in East Jerusalem; U.S. policy did not recognize Israel’s annexation of that sector of the city. The cancellation received national coverage, and sparked debate about the wisdom and propriety of sending Trifa to Israel. Some, including Teleford Taylor, former chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, felt that it violated legal notions of fairness to deport someone to a country where he had never been, to be tried for crimes committed before that country had been established.

In the end, the question was moot. After a rescheduled meeting held in another sector of Jerusalem, Israel declined to accept Trifa.

OSI considered another alternative which they dubbed "The Berlin Option." This involved deporting Trifa to the American-occupied sector of Berlin. As OSI saw it:

We would not only fulfill our commitment to deport him; but we would also serve notice to our entire cast of defendants and subjects that deportation is not an idle threat. Moreover, there is great appeal in sending this Nazi war criminal to the former seat of the Third Reich; the symbolism should not be overlooked.

... By establishing this precedent, we can increase significantly the chances of negotiating more deportations.

The Justice Department was skeptical. DAAG Richard was concerned that it would distort OSI’s mandate. Having announced that the United States was unable to bring criminal prosecutions against OSI defendants, it should not suddenly change course without compelling legal justification. AAG Trott thought “dumping the body in Germany” was a “very hostile
act.”\(^{76}\) The State Department too was unenthusiastic about the proposal and it never gained momentum.

While he awaited resolution of the matter, Trifa became ever more expansive with the press. He expressed skepticism as to whether any Jews had been killed during the war since he “didn’t see any bodies.”\(^{77}\) Reflecting on his activities, he concluded: “With what I even know today, I wouldn’t do differently than what I did” and warned that “all this talk by the Jews about the Holocaust is going to backfire. . . [b]e it legislative or whatever, against the Jews.” He was sanguine about deportation.

You know, I’m not looking for any place too hot. Or too cold. I will not stay in a grass hut in the middle of Africa, either. I will be 70 in June. I’m looking for a place with a high standard of living, with culture.\(^{78}\)

He found it. In August 1984, Portugal issued him a visa. Though Portugal later claimed that it had been unaware of Trifa’s background when it issued the papers,\(^{79}\) he was allowed to remain there until his death in 1987.

Trifa’s followers brought his body back to the United States. He was buried on the grounds of the Romanian Episcopate in Michigan, where he had lived for so many years. There was no longer any basis upon which the U.S. could exclude him.\(^{80}\)

Litigation concerning his wartime activities did not end even with his death. Pursuant to statute, the United States terminated Trifa’s social security payments as soon as he was deported.\(^{81}\) Trifa challenged the termination on several grounds, one of which was his claim that he had an “informal” agreement with OSI that would allow him to retain his benefits after he left the country. He also argued that there was new evidence establishing that he should not have been deported.
He died while these issues were still in litigation, and his executor persevered on behalf of the estate. A court ruled that the claims were merely an "an inappropriate attempt to go behind the order of deportation." As such, the claims were denied.
1. Unless otherwise noted, the Romanian history is taken from a 500-page, fully sourced report on "Viorel Trifa and the Iron Guard," prepared by OSI Historian Peter Black, Feb. 1982 (hereafter The Black Report).

2. Trifa changed his name from Viorel to Valerian after he came to the United States.

3. As reported in the Dec. 12, 1940 edition of the Romanian newspaper Buna Vestire in an article entitled "December 10 Under the Sign of Justice."

4. E.g., a November 24, 1940 piece complained that the "kikes" had no interest in a pro-Axis policy because they wanted Romania "to be at the orders of Paris and London where the kikes were strong."

5. A front-page story in a Swiss newspaper referred to "extremists of the Iron Guard, whose uninhibited rule of terror the Romanian people is no longer willing to bear." "Die innere Lage Rumäniens," (The Internal Situation in Romania), National-Zeitung (Basel), Jan. 3, 1941. Franklin Mott Gunther, the U.S. Minister to Romania, described the Iron Guard's "entire history [as] shot through with assassinations and terrorism." Feb. 5, 1941 report to the Secretary of State re "The Iron Guard Revolution of January 21 to 23: A Summary of its Causes, Course and Results," p. 3 (hereafter Gunther Report).

6. Gunther Report, supra, n. 5 at pp. 3-5.

7. Trifa maintained that he did not write the manifesto although he conceded that he did not oppose its issuance. Trifa Deposition, Jan. 25, 1977, p. 42; Trifa FBI interview, Dec. 1955. OSI never developed any independent evidence as to whether he was the actual author.


9. Franklin Gunther to State Department, No. 89, Jan. 30, 1941.

10. The Gunther Report, supra, n. 5, gave official figures of 236 killed, of whom 118 were Jews. Gunther thought this figure too low, but found "no good support for figures running beyond 300 to 400." Jewish groups gave much higher numbers. The JTA reported on Jan. 30, 1941 that 1,000 Jews were killed in Bucharest alone and another 1,000 in the countryside. "2,000 Jews Slain in Rumanian Terror; Eyewitness Tells Brutalities." The Canadian Jewish Weekly claimed that as many as 6,000 Jews were killed. "Nazi Murderer of 6,000 Jews Bishop in Cleveland Church," July 23, 1953.

11. Von Bolschwing was prosecuted by OSI in 1981. See pp. 259-270.

12. In 1946, he was again tried in absentia (by a new Romanian government) and sentenced to death for crimes amounting to genocide under the Romanian penal code. U.S. Emb. Bucharest to
Sec'y of State, No. 2280, Apr. 12, 1979.

13. The IRO Manual for Eligibility Officers stated that Iron Guard members were "prima facie outside the mandate" of the IRO. As such, they were ineligible to emigrate under the DPA.


18. Feb. 7, 1975 memorandum to Regional Commissioner, Northwest from District Director, Detroit, re "Valerian D. Trifa aka Viorel Trifa."

19. Nov. 16, 1973 memo to Trifa file from D.L. Milhollan (INS); Feb. 7, 1975 memo from INS District Director (Detroit) to INS Regional Commissioner (Northwest).


22. The INS had so advised Michigan Senator Homer Ferguson and Michigan Congressman George Dondero in letters dated June 28, 1951.

23. Nov. 29, 1978 memo to Martin Mendelsohn, Chief SLU, from trial attorney Eugene Thirolf. Mendelsohn wondered whether the FBI was protecting Trifa. The Bureau denied that he had ever been an asset or informant. Declassified FBI memorandum of Apr. 6, 1979 re "United States vs. Valerian Trifa;" Declassified and redacted FBI memorandum of Mar. 5, 1980 re "Valerian Trifa."


25. Apr. 9, 1974 letter from INS General Counsel Charles Gordon to James F. Greene, Deputy Commissioner.


33. Sept. 30, 1974 letter from INS Acting Deputy Commissioner Carl Wack, Jr. to Kremer (referencing an Apr. 1974 meeting between Kremer and the INS General Counsel); "12 Witnesses May Tie Bishop to War Crimes," supra, n. 30.


36. Kremer provided the SLU with 186 documents he believed relevant to the prosecution. Dec. 20, 1978 memo from Thomas Fusi, SLU Criminal Investigator, to File, re "Interview with Dr. Charles Kremer on 12/15/78 in the case of Viorel Trifa." Overall, Dr. Kremer's evidence "tended to be more misleading than helpful" in that it suggested that Trifa was directly involved in the murder of Jews; in fact the government found no reliable evidence to substantiate that charge. Recorded interview with former OSI Chief Historian Peter Black, June 24, 2003.


Communist bloc countries were usually willing to help the United States pursue an alleged Nazi war criminal, though they were often slow to respond. Some speculated that the unusual recalcitrance in this case was due to fear that Trifa and his supporters might retaliate by revealing that some Iron Guard members were currently serving in the postwar Communist government. "U.S. Aide Says Rumania Fails to Help in Fascist’s Trial," by David Binder, The New York Times, June 11, 1979.

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39. May 8, 1980 memorandum from Thirolf to OSI Director Allan Ryan re “Our History of Contacts with the Government of Romania” (hereafter Thirolf memo).


41. Statement before the House Subcommittee on Trade, House Ways and Means Committee, June 22, 1979. Rep. Holtzman acknowledged that cooperation with OSI did “not fall explicitly within the ambit of the freedom of emigration requirements.” Nonetheless it was a reflection on Romania’s willingness to work with the United States on a matter “of mutual concern.”


43. Holtzman interview, June 12, 2002.

44. Thirolf memo, supra, n. 39. A year later, when Romania’s MFN status was again up for renewal, Holtzman asked the subcommittee to “strongly remind the Romanian government that its continued cooperation is expected.” Submitted statement before the subcommittee, June 10, 1980 (emphasis in original).

45. Kremer was head of the Romanian Jewish Federation of America, and later the Committee to Bring Nazi War Criminals to Justice in U.S.A., Inc.


47. Black Report, supra, n. 1, at ch. IX, p. 55, n. 133.

48. Recorded interview with Thirolf, Feb. 22, 2002. According to Thirolf, the photograph had come from someone in the opposing faction of the Romanian church. The SLU had submitted the photograph to the FBI for analysis. They were unable to determine whether it had been altered. Mar. 13, 1979 report from FBI to Thomas Fusi, Investigator SLU.

Long after the Trifa litigation was complete, an official in the Romanian intelligence service, who had since defected, claimed that the Romanian premier had ordered evidence be manufactured against Trifa. Red Horizons, Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief, by Ion Pacepa (Regnery Publishing).

49. The government issued a subpoena to reporter Ralph Blumenthal. Although The Times originally contemplated litigating the validity of the subpoena, the Department of Justice and the newspaper agreed without litigation on the parameters of Blumenthal’s testimony. The government would call on Blumenthal to testify about Trifa’s statements only if Trifa did not himself admit he had made the statements to Blumenthal and the government was not able to prove the admissions by independent means. Aug. 15, 1980 memo to AAG Heymann from Director Ryan re “New York Times Subpoena in United States v. Trifa.” July 2, 1980 memo to AAG Heymann from Ann Fleisher Hoffman, Executive Assistant to the Attorney General re
“Subpoena to the New York Times.”

50. Radio Free Europe was founded in the 1950s and broadcast into Eastern Europe. It was originally run by the CIA as a propaganda organ for the United States. In 1971, control was turned over to The Board for International Broadcasting, an independent federal agency funded and overseen by Congress.


52. June 11, 1979 letter to Mendelsohn from William Buell, Senior Vice President, RFE responding to a phone call from Mendelsohn; Nov. 14, 1979 letter to Buell from Mendelsohn.


54. The show was broadcast on ABC’s News Closeup, Jan. 13, 1980. At the time, ABC was one of only three nationally broadcast stations.

55. Sept. 8, 1980 memo from Thirolf to files re “U.S. v. Trifa;” and June 13, 2003 telephone conversation with District Judge George Woods, who was Trifa’s attorney during the denaturalization phase.

56. Recorded interviews with Peter Black (June 24, 2003) and Eugene Thirolf (June 13, 2003). It is unclear why the denaturalization complaint had not been revised to reflect this thinking, as Thirolf recalls viewing Trifa early on as a propagandist rather than a murderer (recorded interview Feb. 22, 2002). Black’s treatise, supra, n. 1, which provided the definitive analysis for the government, was written after the denaturalization case had settled.

57. OSI did not at first rely on the recently-enacted Holtzman Amendment which provided for deportation of persons who assisted Nazi Germany or its allies by ordering, inciting, assisting or
otherwise participating in the persecution of persons because of their race, religion or political opinion. As Romania had not entered the war on behalf of the Axis until June 22, 1941, there was concern that Trifa’s activity six months earlier might not come within the scope of amendment. However, OSI established that Romania had requested a military mission from the Germans in September 1940 and had joined the Axis Tripartite Pact two months earlier. The government thereafter amended its papers to add a “Holtzman count.” The advantage of adding this count was that, if proven, it eliminated the possibility of Trifa’s getting a waiver to preclude deportation.


60. Jan. 12, 1982 letter to Imm. Judge Petrone from Ryan.


63. Sept. 27, 1982 memo to DAAG Richard from Director Ryan re “Viorel Trifa.”

64. Nov. 9, 1982 memo to The File from DAAG Richard re “Trifa Prosecution – Deportation to Romania.”


68. Mar. 14, 1983 letter to the Assistant Legal Advisor, Consular Affairs, State Department from Neal Sher, Deputy Director, OSI.


72. One of the problems in the Trifa case was that the Israeli law applied to those in countries hostile to the Allies at the time the crimes were committed. Since Romania had not officially declared war on the Allies when Trifa was involved in his incendiary activities, some felt the case would not be prosecutable. Ultimately, the Israelis decided that the first OSI defendant they would take would be John Demjanjuk, then (mis)identified as Ivan the Terrible. *See* pp. 150-174. According to DAAG Richard, Demjanjuk was a test case for the Israelis. They anticipated seeking extradition of other OSI defendants if that prosecution went well. It did not and no other OSI defendant has since been extradited to Israel.

73. Following World War II, Berlin was divided into four sectors by the victorious powers. The U.S., the U.S.S.R., England and France each occupied one sector.

74. Apr. 6, 1983 memo to DAAG Richard from Acting OSI Director Sher re “Trifa Deportation to United States Occupation Sector or Berlin.”


76. Aug. 23, 1983 buck slip from AAG Trott to Associate Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen re “Trifa Deportation.”

77. “Trifa Speaks Out: ‘I Was Not a War Criminal,’” by Stephen Franklin, *The Detroit Free Press*, July 17, 1983. Most of the Romanian Jews who died during the Holocaust did in fact die outside of Romania; they died in ghettos and concentration camps to which they had been deported. However, there were still many Jews who died within the country. In addition to those murdered during the January 1941 uprising, approximately 10,000 others were killed in the summer of 1941 during a pogrom in Jassy, Romania.


80. Before the body was returned to the United States, Director Sher contacted the State Department to learn if there was any way to prevent its return. He was told that the only bases of exclusion were (1) if the body were not properly embalmed; or (2) the person died of a communicable disease.

Ferenc Koreh – A Lifetime of Propaganda

There is a measure of irony in the prosecution of Ferenc Koreh for his propagandist activities on behalf of the Nazis in that once he emigrated, Koreh devoted himself to propaganda on behalf of the United States. In the United States, Koreh inveighed against Communism; as a Nazi propagandist, he incited the populace to revile innocent civilians and exhorted the government to promote policies of discrimination and subjugation.

Koreh was born in Transylvania, a region which was part of Hungary at the time of his birth, but which was incorporated into Romania after World War II. During the war Hungary (as well as Romania) was allied with the Axis powers. Between 1941 and 1944, Koreh served as the “Responsible Editor” of a privately owned Hungarian daily. His duties included writing, reading and editing articles, meeting with government officials to discuss the paper’s content, publishing news stories received from the government, and assuring that the government’s political policy was reflected in the paper. During his tenure, the newspaper published dozens of pieces advocating the persecution of Jews as well as defeat of the Allies. Articles alleged that Jews had promoted and funded the war, raped innocent Hungarian girls, tarnished the professions, and wantonly slaughtered military officers. Scurrilous pieces which appeared under Koreh’s byline covered the threat to commerce from Jewish immigrants because of their “unfair” practices; Jewish sabotage and prayer “for the failure of the aspiration of every Hungarian;” and the failure of the Hungarian press to cover adequately the theories of race philosophers.

From 1944 to the end of the war, Koreh was Press Information Officer and Deputy Chief of the Information Section at the Hungarian Ministry of Propaganda. His responsibilities
included preparing radio broadcasts, reviewing speeches, and monitoring Hungarian press coverage of various issues, including "the Jewish question." For a portion of his time at the Ministry of Propaganda, he also served as Responsible Editor of a government-owned weekly. That newspaper, like the privately owned one with which he was associated, was pro-Axis in its coverage. In 1946, the People's Court of Budapest found Koreh guilty of war crimes. The conviction was based on Koreh's work for the government publication. He was sentenced to a year in prison, to be followed by five years' suspension of his political rights.10

Koreh came to the United States in 1950. His visa application stated that he had written "cultural and literary" material for a private newspaper. Nothing indicated that he had been the paper's Responsible Editor nor that he had worked at the Ministry of Propaganda or been editor-in-chief of a government publication. Although he acknowledged being sentenced to a year in prison, he described this as political incarceration based on his anti-Communist stance. He denied having been a member of, or having participated in, any movement hostile to the United States.

In 1956, Koreh became a United States citizen. He was an outspoken critic of the Communist regimes in Hungary and Romania. From 1951 until 1974, he was a broadcast journalist with Radio Free Europe. He remained with RFE on a freelance basis until 1989. Beginning in 1965, he also hosted a two-hour weekly radio program, a portion of which was devoted to the issue of Hungarians within Romania. He also helped organize demonstrations against the Romanian government and served for a period of time as president of an anti-Communist emigré organization.

In early 1977, Dreptatea, a Romanian language newspaper published in New York, ran
an article identifying Koreh as “Chief of the Nazi [Iron Cross] party and of all the political publications appearing in Northern Transylvania from 1940 to 1944.” In addition, the piece held Koreh responsible for mass murders and reported that he had hunted his victims from horseback and had been condemned to death in absentia by a Hungarian court. A few months later, a similar article was published in The United Israel Bulletin, another New York paper. Koreh sued both publications and their editors for libel. The case settled in 1979 when the newspapers retracted all statements other than the ones holding Koreh responsible for mass murder.¹¹

The SLU first learned about Koreh from an article in The United Israel Bulletin.¹² OSI inherited the investigation and filed a denaturalization complaint in 1989, charging that Koreh’s visa should not have been issued because he had (1) assisted in the persecution of Jews through his position as Responsible Editor of the privately owned newspaper; (2) been a member of, or participated in, a movement hostile to the United States through his employment as a press officer in the Hungarian Ministry of Propaganda; (3) given “voluntary assistance” to enemy forces by his employment in the Ministry; and (4) failed to list his conviction as a war criminal.¹³ The case received publicity, in part because (unbeknownst to OSI before the filing), one of Koreh’s daughters was an FBI agent. Three days after the filing, an unidentified person threw an object through a window in Koreh’s home with a note stating “Dog – You Will Die.”¹⁴

The fact that Koreh’s daughter was an FBI agent both complicated and slowed the prosecution. Colleagues in her New York office [NYO] elected, without any discussion with OSI, to analyze the case. Relying in part on material which had been prepared by Koreh for his earlier libel suit, they concluded that the government’s case was based on documents fabricated by the Communist Romanian government.¹⁵ In August 1989, they advised DOJ that it appeared
OSI had been duped by a hostile intelligence service. The New York agents suspected that Koreh had been targeted because he was an outspoken opponent of the Romanian president and an on-air employee of Radio Free Europe. They alerted FBI headquarters that they were preparing a report “recommending an investigative course of action” because they foresaw possible criminal violations stemming from the OSI filing. These included the making of false statements (to OSI) and obstruction of justice.

FBI headquarters was skeptical that there was any predicate for either a counterintelligence or criminal investigation. They were concerned too about a potential conflict of interest because the report was being prepared by an agent who was romantically involved with Koreh’s daughter.

The boyfriend (later spouse) prepared a 46 single spaced page report. Its essence was that the Romanian intelligence services sought to discredit RFE employees and Romanian emigrés who had been active in anti-Communist activities. More than a third of the document discussed OSI’s prosecution of Archbishop Trifa, who, like Koreh, had opposed the Communist regime. The report depicted Trifa as the victim of a Romanian disinformation campaign and saw the Koreh and Trifa cases as having “striking similarities.” The significance of the Trifa case, according to the report, was that it demonstrated the propensity of the Romanian intelligence community to engage in a disinformation campaign.

The document asserted flatly that “[m]ethods used in Mr. Koreh’s case and in other instances include forged documents.” In fact, however, none of OSI’s evidence came from Romania. The case was based entirely on admissions made by Koreh (some of them in his deposition during the libel suit), newspapers from Hungarian archives, and Koreh’s conviction
for war crimes by a Hungarian court.

Even though nothing in the report discredited the evidence upon which OSI based its case, its very existence created problems for OSI. The FBI’s questioning whether the case was based on false documentation raised potential discovery and legal issues.

In preparation for trial, the defense wanted all government documents which would assist in their claim that Koreh had been set up by the Romanian government; this included the unredacted FBI report. However, the government was concerned that material in the report was privileged. The court agreed, approving a stipulation which gave the defense the essence of the classified material without revealing state secrets.  

The stipulation stated that unnamed sources represented that the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) targeted many prominent Hungarian organizations and Hungarians, including Koreh, in the mid to late 1980s. The RIS wanted information about their private lives which could be used against them. However, the stipulation stated that there was no evidence that such information had in fact been collected about Koreh.

Sparring over the report – its preparation and defense access to it – took three years. 

The court finally reached the merits of the denaturalization case in June 1994. It acknowledged being torn by the defendant’s situation.

[T]he court has had to resolve certain difficulties in its own mind and thus has dragged its judicial feet in hopes that the case would be disposed of in ways other than this. On the one hand, the court is faced with a defendant who will be 85 years of age in September, 1994 and who has been in this country for 44 of those years working until his retirement and apparently with some distinction for Radio Free Europe; producing and broadcasting a Hungarian language radio program; and writing for and/or editing a Hungarian newspaper, a Hungarian magazine, and a Hungarian news quarterly. Importantly, there is no suggestion that defendant personally committed or supervised the commission of any of the atrocities that one typically sees in cases in which the United States seeks denaturalization; indeed, had the conduct in which he conceded engaged and the anti-Semitic and
anti-Allied articles he is alleged to have written and admittedly published occurred in this country, that conduct and those articles would most likely be protected by the First Amendment. On the other hand, defendant's admitted and undisputed activities during the discrete periods of time to which the United States points . . . warrant denaturalization as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{22}

The court relied only on facts which were stipulated or otherwise not in dispute. Thus, any articles written at a time when the defendant claimed he was away from the newspaper were excluded. So too were all articles printed under his name because the defendant ("most belatedly" according to the court) claimed these were Romanian forgeries. Even with all these exclusions, there were 55 articles to be considered. The court described them thus:

The "alien-character" of the Jews was emphasized and Jews were described as constituting a separate and distinct race; Jews were portrayed as "traitorous, unscrupulous, cheating" . . . and a consistently dangerous element in Hungarian society responsible for the socioeconomic problems afflicting Hungary and the world; a portion of an article from the National Socialist German Workers Party publication was reprinted . . . concluding that . . . "everyone in Hungary is aware of the fact that a final solution may be achieved only by deporting Jewish elements" . . . [I]n the impoverished and poorly educated region which \textit{Szekely Nep} reached, more than forty articles published while defendant was present blamed the Jews for the economic and social problems and the misery of the people in that region . . . and called for harsher restrictions and punishments, including the suggestion that the homes of Jews be taken away.\textsuperscript{23}

The court concluded that as Responsible Editor of a privately owned newspaper, Koreh gave "assistance in the persecution" of Hungary's Jews; his work amounted to "advocacy" of such persecution, fostering a climate of anti-Semitism which conditioned the Hungarian public to acquiesce, encourage and carry out anti-Semitic policies. Moreover, his work on the paper constituted membership and participation in a movement hostile to the United States.

For all these reasons, he should have been denied a visa to enter the United States. His citizenship was therefore revoked; the Third Circuit affirmed.\textsuperscript{24}
The government filed a deportation action but settled the case before trial because of Koreh's failing health. Koreh admitted responsibility for publishing anti-Semitic articles, conceded his deportability and designated Hungary as the country to which he should be sent. In January 1997, the court entered an order of deportation. The government agreed not to effect the order unless Koreh's health improved. It did not. He died three months later, at age 87.
1. There were some short gaps in this period of service, but they are irrelevant to the issues presented.


4. “Is It Possible for Szekely Maids to Continue to Serve in Jewish Homes?” (reporting that “it frequently occurs that some ugly Jewish man pursues and propositions the defenseless girls who find themselves in a situation of dependency”), Mar. 21, 1942.

5. “The Need to de-Jewify the Legal Profession,” July 18, 1942.


10. He served seven months in jail.


13. Although OSI had investigated a range of allegations, including those leveled by the newspapers, in the end the government concluded that charges of murdering Jews and leading the Iron Cross were not sustainable. The documents connecting Koreh to the Iron Cross were photocopies. Although an FBI forensics examiner opined that Koreh “cannot be eliminated as the possible writer,” he was unable to make a definitive determination absent the original documents. OSI was never able to get the originals from Romania and that part of the investigation was accordingly abandoned.

15. May 2, 1991 memorandum to File from Susan Siegal, then OSI Senior Trial Attorney re “Interview with John Schiman” Schiman was the NYO Assistant Special Agent in Charge of Terrorism.

16. Apr. 26, 1991 memorandum to File from Siegal re “discussion with Mary Lawton.” Lawton was chief of the Justice Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR).

17. Sept. 12, 1989 teletype from NYO to HQ.

18. Sept. 29, 1989 teletype from HQ to NYO. Regulations precluded – absent a written waiver by a supervisor – participation in a criminal investigation by anyone with a personal relationship with a person he knows has a “specific or substantial interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of the investigation or prosecution.” 28 C.F.R. 45.735. The boyfriend did report the potential conflict to his supervisor but received only an oral waiver.

19. Although Trifa voluntarily surrendered his citizenship shortly before his denaturalization trial, and agreed to be deported in the midst of the deportation proceedings, the report did not see this as giving credence to the Justice Department’s case. Instead, it attributed this to Trifa’s desire “to avoid further embarrassment for his church and family and to eliminate protracted and costly litigation.”


23. Id. at 898.


25. The case had repercussions for others beyond the defendant. As early as 1992, OSI reported its concerns about Koreh’s daughter and her husband to the FBI/OPR (Office of Professional Responsibility). OSI was concerned about the propriety of the then-boyfriend working on a report about the defendant, and noted that at the same time as the report was being prepared, both the daughter and boyfriend were assisting the defendant in preparing his case. (Indeed, when deposed about the matter, the daughter described herself as part of the defense “support team” and asserted attorney-client privilege in response to some questions.) OSI questioned whether this presented a conflict of interest, whether there had been unauthorized disclosure of FBI information to defense counsel, and/or an attempt to sabotage a DOJ prosecution.

A month after OSI raised these issues, the husband wrote to DOJ/OPR complaining about the conduct of Director Sher and OSI attorney Susan Siegal. They had interviewed him in
July 1991 when trying to sort out the merits in the allegations of the report. It was an admittedly tense session and the husband described their conduct as "reprehensible, professionally unethical and not, in any way, keeping with the high standards of DOJ attorneys." As he saw it, the OSI representatives were not seeking information but rather presenting him with "vitriolic rhetoric and self-serving narrative that could only be described as passionate zealotry." June 19, 1992 letter to Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., DOJ/OPR.

In June 1996, DOJ/OPR issued its findings. It found no misconduct by OSI. Acknowledging that "some of Mr. Sher's comments may have included words and phrases that could be colorful, his overall 'message'... was clearly one that needed conveying."

The FBI never authorized the criminal investigation called for in the New York report. FBI/OPR ultimately censured Agent Koreh and suspended her husband for seven days. (Many of the FBI supervisors involved in preparation of the report were no longer with the Bureau and were therefore immune from OPR review.)
Senior Officials

Andrija Artukovic – Justice Interminably Delayed

No case spawned as much litigation or extended over as long a period of time as that of Andrija Artukovic, the highest ranking Nazi collaborator ever found in the United States. Extradition proceedings were begun in 1951 – long before the creation of OSI; Artukovic was extradited in 1986. Collateral matters related to the case are still pending.

He was born in 1899 in Croatia, then a region within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Yugoslavia, created after World War I, was an amalgam of nations, including perennial enemies Serbia and Croatia. In April 1941, Germany invaded Yugoslavia and dismembered the young republic. One of the newly-created states was the “Independent State of Croatia,” a Nazi puppet regime run by the fascist Ustasha party. The new government declared war on the United States in December 1941.

Artukovic served the Ustasha government in various capacities, including Minister of the Interior and Minister of Justice and Religion. In these positions, he promoted policies that victimized Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, Orthodox Christians and Communists. Among other things, he issued a series of decrees mandating internment of these undesirables, empowering summary courts to impose death sentences, calling for execution of Communist hostages, confiscating Jewish businesses, and limiting state and academic employment to Aryans. In a speech to the Croatian State Assembly, he described Jews as having:

prepared the world revolution, so that through it the Jews could have complete mastery over all the goods of the world and all the power in the world, the Jews whom the other people had to serve as a means of their filthy profits and of its greedy, materialistic and rapacious control of the world.¹
Approximately 25,000 Jews, 250,000 Serbs, and numerous Gypsies, Orthodox Christians and Communists perished in the Independent State of Croatia between April 1941 and May 1945. After the war, Communists who had fought the Ustasha regime assumed power. They reunited Croatia with the rest of Yugoslavia and placed Artukovic's name on the United Nations War Crimes Commission list of war criminals. He was referenced in the Communist press as "The Butcher of the Balkans."

Artukovic entered the United States in 1948 on a 90-day visitors visa issued to him under an assumed name. He settled in California and began working for a construction company owned by his wealthy brother. His visa was twice extended, the second extension expiring in April 1949. In an effort to ensure his continued presence in the United States, his Congressman introduced a private bill to retroactively bestow lawful admission on Artukovic and his family. Although no action was taken on the measure - which identified him by his proper name - it triggered the government's investigation.

Artukovic's problems began when the bill was routinely sent to INS for review. INS' inquiries led to the realization that Artukovic had been unlawfully admitted under a false name and that he was wanted in Yugoslavia for war crimes. There were two options available for removing him from the United States - deportation and extradition. Both were pursued.

The two proceedings were filed in 1951. The deportation case began first. Artukovic did not challenge his deportability; he had, incontrovertibly, entered the United States under a false name and his visitors visa had long since expired. However, he sought refuge under a statutory provision that suspended deportation proceedings in cases where the defendant could show he was of "good moral character" and that deportation would impose "serious economic
Artukovic was at that time the father of four, the youngest of whom had been born in the United States. The child was therefore a U.S. citizen. Artukovic argued that deportation would impose a severe economic hardship on his infant daughter.

Rather than litigating the economic issue, INS contended that Artukovic was ineligible for the exemption because he lacked good moral character. The government presented evidence to show that, as a cabinet minister, Artukovic had been a major Nazi collaborator, responsible for the deaths of innocent Serbs and Jews. The immigration judge agreed and the ruling was upheld on appeal.

There appears to be little doubt (1) that the new Croatian state, at least on paper, pursued a genocidal policy in Croatia with regard to Jews and Serbs; (2) that Artukovic helped execute this policy in that, as Minister of Interior, he had authority and control over the entire system of Public Security and Internal Administration; and (3) that during this time there were massacres of Serbs and, perhaps to a lesser extent, of other minority groups within Croatia.

[It is difficult for us to think of any one man, other than [the Croatian president] who could have been more responsible for the events occurring in Croatia during this period than was [Artukovic].

Having failed to get the proceedings suspended, Artukovic next sought a stay of deportation by claiming that he himself would be the victim of persecution if he were returned to the communist country of Yugoslavia. In making this argument, he acknowledged that as a Cabinet minister he had authorized the persecution of communists. The judge postponed ruling on the stay application pending resolution of the extradition request.

The extradition was predicated on a Yugoslav indictment charging Artukovic with having murdered, or caused to be murdered, 22 persons, including the Archbishop of Sarajevo. As is customary in extradition proceedings, Artukovic was arrested pending the outcome of the
hearing. Although defendants are rarely released on bail in such circumstances, the court made an exception for Artukovic. The court felt he presented no flight risk and the judge was skeptical about the merits of the case.

I am impressed by the date of the alleged offenses, 1941; and the fact that Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany on April 6, 1941, and thereafter occupied by Germany until 1945 and that the whole world and especially that portion of the world, was in a terrible turmoil . . . . I cannot help but think that it might be possible, if extradition treaties with various countries were carried out to the letter in connection with charges that might be made, they might demand the extradition of every person who was a member of any armed forces against them and charge them with having committed murder, because surely people who are members of armed forces do kill other people, and they kill them just as dead as they would if they privately did it and certainly with as much intention.\(^5\)

Artukovic argued that the U.S. courts should not address the extradition request because (1) the treaty of extradition – entered into in 1902 between the Kingdom of Serbia and the U.S. – was no longer valid; and (2) the charges against him were political and therefore could not form the basis for extradition in any event.

The district court agreed with the first argument. The court did not reach the issue of whether the crimes would be extraditable if there were a treaty.\(^6\)

Up until this point, Yugoslavia had outside counsel representing its interests in court. The U.S., however, was concerned about the ruling as it was against the U.S. interest to have a judicial ruling that a change in government abrogates treaties. Accordingly, the U.S. joined Yugoslavia in successfully appealing the order. The Ninth Circuit reversed and sent the case back for a determination as to whether Yugoslavia’s charges against Artukovic were political.\(^7\)

The district court concluded that they were. It pointed to the “animus which has existed between the Croatians and the Serbs for many hundreds of years, as well as the deep religious
cleavage known to exist among the peoples in the Balkans." This ruling, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, was vacated by the Supreme Court. The matter then returned, yet again, to the district court, this time for a determination as to whether there was probable cause to believe Artukovic had committed extraditable offenses under the 1902 treaty.

The many appeals, reversals and remands had dragged on for eight years by the time the district court found no probable cause to believe that Artukovic had committed an extraditable offense. It based this ruling on the fact that there was:

- no evidence presented that the defendant himself committed murder.
- [Yugoslavia] relies entirely upon their evidence that members of the 'ustasha' committed murders upon orders from the defendant.

Although there was evidence that Artukovic had ordered internment, deportation, and in some cases killing, of civilians, the court analogized this to U.S. policy.

It was common practice during World War II to intern anyone who was even suspected to be an enemy or possible enemy of the government in power. Our own government saw fit to intern all Japanese on the west coast, men, women and children of all ages, immediately following Pearl Harbor.

In the end, the court rejected the Nuremberg concept that leaders are accountable for decrees signed by them but carried out by others.

To so hold would probably result in failure to find any candidate who would accept the responsibilities of such a position if he was going to be held to answer for crimes committed by his underlings without more definite proof that they were acting under his orders.

The request for extradition was denied. By law, the order could not be appealed.

Artukovic received more welcome news four months later. His long-pending application for a stay of deportation was granted. INS agreed with him that deportation to Yugoslavia would subject him to persecution because he had opposed the Communists when he was a
Cabinet minister. However, INS warned him that the stay was “subject to revocation at any time upon written notice to you.” As it developed, it was 18 years before the government sought to lift the stay.

During that interval, Artukovic was not completely out of the public eye. In 1961, his name surfaced during Israel’s prosecution of Adolf Eichmann. Witnesses in that case testified about the deportation and slaughter of Yugoslavian Jews at Artukovic’s behest; one described futile pleas to Artukovic to spare the lives of children about to be deported to death camps.INS reviewed the matter periodically. As late as 1974, it solicited the State Department’s views as to whether it was still likely that Artukovic would suffer persecution if he were sent back to Yugoslavia. The State Department concluded that the threat of persecution remained.

The case resurfaced in 1977 when a delegation from the House Judiciary Committee went on an East European fact finding trip. They reported that Yugoslavia was “disappointed and revolted” by the fact that Artukovic had neither been deported nor extradited. The Yugoslavs wanted to try Artukovic for war crimes; they assured the lawmakers that the trial would be open to the public and would comport with U.S. standards of due process.

Shortly thereafter, an INS Regional commissioner notified Artukovic that his stay would not be further extended unless he could provide new justification for an extension within 30 days. Rather than doing so, Artukovic sued the government to enjoin it from acting. He won at least a temporary reprieve when the court ruled that the government could not summarily lift the stay; the matter would have to be decided by the immigration courts.

Before the matter returned to court, a change in the law substantially enhanced the government’s position. The 1978 Holtzman Amendment eliminated the possibility of a stay of
deportation for aliens who had "assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of persons because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion on behalf of the Nazis and their allies."

After its founding in 1979, OSI's first court filing was a motion to lift Artukovic's stay on the ground that it was precluded by the Holtzman Amendment. In June 1981, the BIA granted OSI's request, concluding that the Holtzman Amendment applied to Artukovic because he had assisted in persecution. In reaching this result, the Board referenced its 1953 findings that Artukovic had been instrumental in persecution and therefore lacked good moral character. The BIA ordered Artukovic deported to Yugoslavia.14

Artukovic appealed and got yet another reprieve. The Ninth Circuit held that it was improper to rely on the 1953 finding to justify deportation in 1981. The Circuit reasoned that the underlying issue considered in the 1950s -- whether Artukovic could establish that there would be economic hardship to his daughter if he were deported -- was different from whether the government could show that he fit within the parameters of the newly-enacted Holtzman Amendment. Although in fact the evidence presented in the 1950s concerned Artukovic's involvement in persecution, it would not suffice. The government would have to ask an immigration judge to hold a new hearing on the question of Artukovic's involvement in persecution.15 The government did so in February 1984 and the new hearing was set for January 1985.

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav government had been signaling its interest in filing a new extradition request. (There is no bar to filing an extradition request after an earlier one has been denied.)
In 1981, shortly after the BIA revoked the stay of deportation, and again in 1982 when the Ninth Circuit ordered a new hearing, Yugoslav officials met with their counterparts from the State Department and the Department of Justice to discuss the mechanics of extradition. The following year, Martin Mendelsohn, former Deputy Director of OSI, and now a private practice attorney representing Yugoslavia, reiterated his client’s interest. As OSI understood it from Mendelsohn, Yugoslavia “would welcome an indication from the US that [an extradition] request would be appropriate.” In July 1983, DAAG Richard, along with Acting OSI Director Sher and Murray Stein, Associate Director of the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA – which handles extraditions), went to Yugoslavia to discuss the procedures involved.

At the same time that the Department of Justice was working with Yugoslavia on a possible extradition request, OSI was preparing for the new deportation hearing. In November 1983, an OSI historian went to Yugoslavia to do research. He found documents pertinent to the deportation case in the Yugoslav archives and asked that they be sent to OSI.

Yugoslavia submitted a formal request for extradition in August 1984, this time asserting that Artukovic was responsible for thousands of murders. Artukovic was arrested in November 1984 and his request for bail was denied. The deportation case was taken off calendar pending the outcome of the extradition hearing. Unlike the 1950s extradition hearing, this time the U.S. represented Yugoslavia in court. Lead counsel for the government was from the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney’s office. He was assisted by OIA and OSI.

Artukovic at first attempted to block the hearing by asking another judge to hold the government in contempt. Artukovic claimed that extradition was an end run around deportation, designed to deprive him of the greater procedural safeguards and defenses available in a
deportation proceeding. His claim was summarily dismissed.

The first issue facing the extradition court was whether Artukovic was mentally competent to understand the proceedings and to assist his counsel. He was by this time 84 years old and suffering from a variety of ailments. Faced with conflicting testimony on the subject, the court appointed its own doctor to make an evaluation. Although this neutral expert found Artukovic incompetent and suggested delaying the proceedings while Artukovic underwent drug therapy, the court refused to do so. Based on his observation of Artukovic in court, the judge concluded that the defendant had good days and bad days. Accordingly, he fashioned a procedure to deal with the problem: a doctor was to prepare a daily report on Artukovic's condition. Court was convened on alternate half-days, Artukovic's health permitting.18

After losing the competency issue, the defense next contended that federal officials had impermissibly encouraged Yugoslavia to request extradition. Although such encouragement is not itself improper, Artukovic argued that the extraordinary time lag - it had been 25 years since the first extradition request had been denied - worked to his disadvantage and thereby deprived him of due process. The magistrate ordered Director Sher to court, warning that "If it develops that some politician was trying to run for higher office by railroad Mr. Artukovic back to Yugoslavia, that would be impermissible."19 After hearing from Sher, the magistrate concluded that there had been no wrongful conduct by the Justice Department, and that the extradition had been at the behest of the Yugoslavs.20

Finally, on the merits of the extradition itself - Yugoslavia's claim that Artukovic was responsible for thousands of murders - the government submitted statements from 52 affiants. The court relied on the only two that presented eyewitness accounts of Artukovic's involvement.
in the murder of civilians.

The first was from Franjo Trujar, a police official in the Ustasha regime. When interviewed in 1984, he signed an affidavit saying that he had been interviewed once previously – in July 1952 – and that his memory now was insufficient. His 1984 affidavit relied on his earlier statement for pertinent details. That document stated that Trujar had witnessed Artukovic ordering the death of an outspoken former member of the Yugoslav parliament.

The second alleged eyewitness affidavit was from Bajro Avdic, who had been a member of an elite Ustasha motorcycle escort assigned to Artukovic. Advic’s 1984 affidavit said that he had heard Artukovic order thousands of deaths, including: (1) the machine-gun firing of approximately 450 men, women and children for whom there was no room in a concentration camp; (2) the killing of all the inhabitants of a town and its surrounding villages; (3) the murder of approximately 5,000 persons near a monastery; and (4) the machine gun execution of several hundred prisoners who were then crushed by moving tanks.

The magistrate ordered Artukovic extradited for the crimes set forth in the Trujar and Avdic affidavits. That order was adopted in full by the district court. Five days later, the Court of Appeals denied Artukovic’s request for an emergency stay. At 1:00 AM, February 12, 1986, just minutes after then Associate Justice William Rehnquist refused a request to delay the extradition order, Artukovic was flown to Yugoslavia. He had been in custody since November 14, 1984.

The deportation caused enormous consternation within the Croatian community, which had always seen the case as a Cold War issue. They feared that the Communists would not provide a fair forum for trial. In Canada, a Croatian national set himself on fire in front of the
U.S. consulate as more than 2,000 people demonstrated to protest the deportation.  

Yugoslavia tried Artukovic two months after his arrival. The timing was dramatic because the history of wartime Yugoslavia was just then receiving worldwide attention from revelations that former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had served as an intelligence officer in the Balkans. His unit had been involved in reprisal killings of partisans and Waldheim had been awarded a medal by the Ustasha regime.  

Artukovic’s trial was broadcast on Yugoslav state television. Due to the tension between the Serb and Croat communities, Artukovic was kept behind bulletproof glass in the courtroom. Streets around the courthouse were blocked to traffic and policemen patrolled with machine guns and muzzled dogs.  

Trujar and Avdic both testified. Trujar had difficulty recalling any pertinent events; Avdic provided new details not mentioned in his earlier affidavit. After four weeks of trial, Artukovic was convicted on all counts. Under international extradition practice, his conviction was limited to those crimes for which he had been extradited. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav court made clear that it believed him responsible for running two dozen concentration camps where between 700,000 and 900,000 Serbs, Jews, gypsies and other prisoners were tortured and killed. He was sentenced to death by firing squad. Due to his failing health, the death penalty was later commuted; he died in a prison hospital in January 1988.  

As complicated and drawn out as the above proceedings were over 35 years, they were not the only litigation involving Artukovic. His case spawned several tangential lawsuits. In 1984, a class action was filed against him by Yugoslav Jews who themselves had served time in Croatian concentration camps or had close relatives murdered during the Ustashi regime. The
plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming Artukovic had violated the Hague and Geneva conventions, international law and the Yugoslavian criminal code. The suit was dismissed, the court ruling that it lacked jurisdiction as to some matters, while others were barred by the statute of limitations. In addition, Artukovic himself filed suit to enjoin his extradition and to recover $10 million in damages on the ground that the Justice Department had conspired with the government of Yugoslavia to deprive him of his civil and constitutional rights. That case too was dismissed, both because there was no legal basis to support the monetary claim, and because the extradition made the request for an injunction moot. And finally, as trial began in Yugoslavia, the family of the parliamentarian whose murder Trujar had discussed, sought, unsuccessfully, to freeze Artukovic's U.S. assets.

The issues surrounding Artukovic did not end with his death. In 1988, Artukovic's son sent a 135-page treatise to OSI, alleging that his father's extradition had been based on fraudulent documents. He also filed a complaint with the Justice Department. His most serious allegation involved the Trujar and Avdic affidavits. The son claimed that DOJ had improperly withheld documents that would have disproven the allegations contained in those documents. He pointed to earlier, somewhat contradictory affidavits by Trujar and Avdic as well as affidavits by others familiar with the incidents described by the two men. He also cited official Yugoslav reports from the 1950s questioning the reliability of the Trujar and Avdic accounts. None of these materials had been provided to the defense or the court, yet they arguably cast doubt on the accuracy of the affidavits filed in the 1985 extradition proceeding. Some of the doubt was due to minor discrepancies in recollection; some was more substantial, including a 1952 Yugoslav government report which said that Avdic "could not be used as a witness."
The son learned of this additional material from a variety of sources. Some documents came to light when a historian hired by the Artukovic family visited the Croatian Archives. He found the allegedly inconsistent documents, and discovered that some of them had been reviewed (or at least identified) by an OSI historian during his October 1983 visit to the archives. Moreover, at the OSI historian's request, these documents had been copied and sent to OSI. The son contended, therefore, that OSI should have been aware of the inconsistencies and known that the documents submitted in court were "fraudulent," especially since the same OSI personnel were working on the deportation and extradition matters.

The son pointed also to a 1988 book published by a former legal adviser in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. The author claimed that the events recounted by Avdic "never took place." Although the book was published after the extradition was completed — and thus DOJ could not be held accountable for not knowing its contents — the son argued that OSI should itself have determined the veracity of Avdic's allegations. He pointed to OSI's oft-repeated claim that it gave close scrutiny to Communist-sourced material, and questioned why no such scrutiny had been given in this case. An outside historian who had worked with OSI on the case gave some credence to the son's claims, publicly questioning the veracity of the 1984 Avdic affidavit.

The son's allegations were referred to OPR for investigation. The charges — and the fact that OPR was investigating them — was given much play in the press. Unfortunately for OSI, media coverage of the story tied it to charges of malfeasance surrounding the explosive Demjanjuk case.

Reviewing its files to respond to the son's claims, OSI discovered that some (though not all) of the documents referenced were indeed in its files although they had never been reviewed.
or analyzed. That was due to the fact that they had been ordered from the Croatian archive as part of the deportation case. They arrived shortly before the deportation case was placed on hold pending the extradition outcome. OSI therefore did not review the new documents but simply left them in a file cabinet.

While there were some inconsistencies between the material submitted to court and the additional material cited by the Artukovic family, OSI maintained that none of it was significant enough in any event to alter the outcome of the case. Moreover, one of the key documents which the son argued should have been provided had actually been introduced into evidence in the 1951 extradition proceeding. It therefore was, or should have been, known to the defense at the time of the 1984 extradition hearing.

More importantly, OSI argued that it was under no obligation to search its files for relevant material. Under established law, the U.S. government is not required to assess the validity of evidence presented by the requesting government in an extradition case. Nor is there a legal obligation to produce potentially exculpatory evidence to the defendant in an extradition proceeding. The credibility of the requesting government’s evidence is determined at trial abroad after the defendant is extradited. The question before the U.S. court is simply whether the requesting government’s evidence is sufficient to establish probable cause that a crime has been committed and that this person committed it. OSI followed these standard procedures as it was directed to do by OIA.

Finally, OSI argued that the close scrutiny it gave to Communist-sourced evidence in Cold War era denaturalization and deportation cases was not appropriate in an extradition proceeding. In denaturalization and deportation, the evidence presented is on behalf of the U.S.
government. Therefore, the government is bound to satisfy itself about the reliability of evidence it is submitting. In extradition cases, the evidence is from, and on behalf of, the requesting government. If the United States were bound to determine the reliability of the evidence, the extradition would become a trial to resolve the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Extradition proceedings are designed to avoid that happenstance. Further details about the OPR investigation are unavailable at this writing.

The Artukovic case stands out in many respects. It was OSI's first filing. Artukovic was the only Cabinet official and the only Croat ever prosecuted by the office. And he was the first OSI defendant to be extradited, though he was followed just two weeks thereafter by John Demjanjuk. Artukovic matters have spanned decades. If one begins with the original INS deportation filing in 1951, the case and its progeny have been around for over half a century. By any measure, that is a testament to the arcane and labyrinthian procedures that apply in these proceedings.

2. It was the first of eight such bills introduced between 1949 and 1961. H.R. 3504 (81st Cong.), H.R. 8186 (82nd Cong.), H.R. 6700 (83rd Cong.), H.R. 2789 and H.R. 2790 (84th Cong.), H.R. 2844 and H.R. 4760 (86th Cong.), and H.R. 2185 (87th Cong.).

3. The 1978 Holtzman Amendment ended such exemptions for OSI defendants. See p. 40.


   Reviewing what had happened in the Artukovic matter, DAAG Richard became convinced that in future, U.S. interests would be best served by having the U.S. represent the foreign government in extradition proceedings. Partly as a result of his urging, this became a standard feature negotiated in extradition treaties. (Specific criteria must be met before the U.S. will begin the litigation process.)

8. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.CA, 1956), aff'd, Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated, Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958). Decades later, the Ninth Circuit noted that its application of the "political offense" doctrine to Artukovic became "one of the most roundly criticized cases in the history of American extradition jurisprudence." With hindsight, the Circuit conceded that the doctrine should not have applied to Artukovic. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 798, 799-800 (9th Cir. 1986).


13. Although Artukovic had been told in 1959 that the stay could be lifted "at any time upon written notice," INS regulations had since modified the procedures for lifting a stay.

15. *Artukovic v. INS*, 693 F.2d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1982).


17. Mar. 10, 1983 buck slip to Director Ryan from Deputy Director Sher.


21. The magistrate at first ordered the extradition only for the one murder described in the Trujar affidavit. Although he found probable cause to believe that the massacres described by Avdic had occurred at Artukovic’s behest, they did not match any charges in the pending Yugoslavian indictment. They could therefore not form the basis of an extradition order. The magistrate gave Yugoslavia 60 days to amend its indictment to conform to information in the Avdic affidavit. It did so, and Artukovic was then ordered extradited for trial involving thousands of deaths.


23. *Artukovic v. Rison*, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).


25. At one point, it looked as if he might be released on bail. Several months after his Nov. 1984 arrest, a different magistrate was assigned to consider whether Artukovic should be released on bail pending the outcome of the extradition hearing. The magistrate was favorably inclined, opining that it was “cruel and unusual punishment” to incarcerate someone with Artukovic’s medical problems. “Man Accused of War Crimes is Scheduled to Have Bail Set,” *AP, The New York Times*, June 29, 1985. Shortly after that statement was made, the case was sent back to the original magistrate and bail was denied. “Magistrate Sympathetic to Artukovic’s Bail


There had been palpable tension in the U.S. proceedings as well. In 1959, the court made note of this in its ruling. *U.S. v. Artukovic*, 170 F. Supp. at 384. And in 1984, a Justice Department attorney from OIA was sufficiently concerned for her personal safety that she withdrew her name from a court filing. Nov. 7, 1984 memo to files re "Artukovic," from Murray Stein, Associate Director OIA.


34. Artukovic had tried to fashion a right to be free from extradition in order to avail himself of the procedural safeguards which apply to deportation proceedings. *Artukovic v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, *et al.*, No. 85-2135 (D.D.C. 1986). Once Artukovic was extradited, the parties agreed to dismiss the pending appeal.


37. The other allegations, raised over a period of years, included charges that DOJ had improperly instigated the extradition request; that Sher had perjured himself in describing the government’s contacts with Yugoslavia; that the government had misrepresented facts relating to the case in response to Congressional inquiries; that DOJ had abused the Freedom of Information Act by not turning over certain documents requested by the son; and that DOJ had not acted appropriately on his misconduct complaint.


43. As discussed on p. 161, the Sixth Circuit did hold that there is such an obligation. *Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky*, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993). However, that ruling is not controlling in other Circuits. The Artukovic proceedings were in the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, Demjanjuk was decided years after Artukovic had been extradited; OSI could not be expected to have foreseen its holding.

44. Others identified as Croatians and prosecuted by the office were in fact ethnic Germans (born in Croatia to German parents and self-identifying as German) e.g., Anton Tittjung, Ferdinand Hammer, Michael Gruber and John Hansl. Moreover, changing borders made nationality ambiguous. In the case of Hammer, for example, the area in which he was born was part of Croatia only from 1941 to 1944, when it was annexed by the Independent State of Croatia. Croatia refused to recognize him as a Croatian or to accept him as a deportee. He ultimately was deported to Austria.

OSI did assist Croatia in bringing its own war crimes prosecution. In 1998, Croatia extradited from Argentina Dinko Sakic, the commandant of Jasenovac, Croatia’s most notorious World War II concentration camp. OSI located a document in the National Archives that was used by the Croatian government at trial to establish the number of deaths at the camp. OSI also
provided the Croatian prosecutors with background material from the Artukovic file and the names of survivor witnesses who could testify about conditions at Jasenovac. In addition, a delegation from the Croatian judiciary met with the State Department’s Special Ambassador on War Crimes and then with members of OSI’s legal and historical staff to discuss the presentation of war crimes cases.


45. The only previous extradition of a Nazi war crimes suspect was Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan in 1973, before OSI’s founding. As noted on p. 2, that case was handled by INS.

Because of Cold War tensions and due process concerns about Soviet judicial procedures, the U.S. had no extradition treaty with the U.S.S.R. The U.S. therefore routinely rejected Soviet extradition requests. According to the State Department, there were 8 such requests between 1945 and 1977. Sept. 19, 1977 letter to Rep. Joshua Eilberg, Chairman, House Subctee on Imm., Cit. and Internat’l Law, from Douglas Bennet, Jr., Ass’t Sec’y for Congressional Relations, State Dep’t, reprinted in Vol. I, “Alleged Nazi War Criminals,” Hearing before the Subctee, Aug. 3, 1977, p. 55. As of this writing, there is still no treaty of extradition with Russia. However, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), providing for closer law enforcement coordination between the two countries, was approved by the Senate in Dec. 2001.
Otto von Bolschwing – An Eichmann Associate Who Became a CIA Source

Otto von Bolschwing worked with Adolf Eichmann and helped devise programs to persecute and terrorize Germany's Jewish population. As the chief SS intelligence officer, first in Romania and then in Greece, he was the highest ranking German prosecuted by OSI.

Von Bolschwing was an aristocrat who spoke several languages and had studied at the London School of Economics. He joined the Nazi party in 1932 and was a member of the Allgemeine SS, the racial elite of the National Socialist Movement. The Allgemeine SS formed the recruiting pool for the Gestapo and the SD, the intelligence-gathering arm for the Nazis. Von Bolschwing’s career path was with the SD. From 1935 until 1937 he worked as its liaison in Palestine; from 1937 to 1939 he worked in its Jewish Affairs Office. That office collected statistical, economic and cultural information on Jews for use by the Nazi government. “The Jewish Problem,” a report submitted by von Bolschwing in January 1937, proposed ridding Germany of Jews by forcing them to emigrate.¹

The Jews in the entire world represent a nation which is not bound by a country or by a people but by money. . . .

The leading thought . . . is to purge Germany of the Jews. This can only be carried out when the basis of livelihood, i.e., the possibility of economic activity, is taken away from the Jews in Germany.

The report recommended extensive use of propaganda to make the populace recognize the pernicious impact of the Jews. Once people were informed, their anger could be harnessed to:

take away the sense of security from the Jews. Even though this is an illegal method, it has had a long-lasting effect. . . . [T]he Jew has learned a lot through the pogroms of the past centuries and fears nothing as much as a hostile atmosphere which can go spontaneously against him at any time.

Von Bolschwing recommended making passports in such a manner that the authorities
could “determine immediately whether the passport holder is a Jew.” He recognized that this procedure was risky, however.

It is expressly emphasized that such an identification can only be effected internally in order to avoid that foreign consulates refuse the issuance of a visa to the holder of such a passport.

He also urged denying passports to Jews for any purpose other than emigration and limiting the amount of money that emigrating Jews could take out of the country.

His later memos elaborated on these plans. His suggestions included having Jewish organizations assisting with emigration deal only with the SD and having foreign currency remittances from Jewish organizations abroad go directly to the SD rather than to Jewish organizations. In a letter to Eichmann (salutation “Dear Adolf”), von Bolschwing reported on snippets of an overheard conversation between two Jews and discussed ways to block their access to Germans who might assist them. The letter closed with “Heil Hitler.”

In 1939, the work of the Jewish Affairs Office was transferred to the newly formed Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). Von Bolschwing began working for this new organization which unified under one jurisdiction the SD, the Gestapo and the Criminal Police.

For a little over a year, beginning in January 1940, he served as chief of the SD agents in Romania. Von Bolschwing provided sanctuary to several Romanian Iron Guard leaders (including Trifa) after their January 1941 rebellion and helped arrange their escape to Germany.

Near the war’s end, he moved to Austria and allied himself with the underground and the Allies. He won accolades from the U.S. military. One U.S. officer credited him with:

materially assist[ing] the armed forces of the United States during our advance through Fern Pass and Western Austria prior to the surrender of the German Army.
During our occupation, he personally captured over twenty high ranking Nazi officials and SS officers and led patrols that resulted in the capture of many more.4

In 1946, von Bolschwing was hired by the Gehlen organization, a group of former Nazi intelligence operatives who came under the aegis of the U.S. Army after the war. The group had provided Germany with data and sources useful in the war on the Eastern front; the U.S. wanted to develop and expand this material for use during the Cold War. Gehlen needed von Bolschwing to provide contacts among ethnic Germans and former Iron Guardsmen in Romania.5

In 1949, the CIA hired some members of the Gehlen organization; von Bolschwing was among those chosen.6 The CIA knew about his Nazi party and SD connections. They also knew that he had supported the Iron Guard uprising and had helped leaders of that rebellion escape from Romania. He portrayed himself, however, as a Nazi gadfly and the agency apparently accepted this characterization.7 The agency was unaware that he had worked in the Jewish Affairs Office and that he had been associated with Eichmann.8

Although he never developed into a “first-class agent,” the CIA was sufficiently grateful to help him emigrate to the United States in 1954.10 The CIA advised INS about his past as they understood it. INS agreed to admit him nonetheless.11 He entered under the INA as part of the German quota. Once here, he worked as a high-ranking executive for various multi-national corporations; he did no further work for U.S. intelligence agencies.12

Even before von Bolschwing emigrated, however, the CIA was concerned that he might have difficulty obtaining citizenship.

Grossbahn [von Bolschwing’s code name] has asked a question which has us fairly well stumped. What should his answer be in the event the question of NSDAP [Nazi party] membership arises after his entry into the U.S., for example,
on the citizenship application forms? We have told him he is to deny any party, SS, SD, Abwehr [German military intelligence], etc. affiliations. Our reason for doing so runs as follows: his entry into the U.S. is based on our covert clearance. In other words, in spite of the fact he has an objectionable background, [ ] is willing to waive their normal objections based on our assurance that Grossbahn's services . . . have been of such a caliber as to warrant extraordinary treatment.

Should Grossbahn later, overtly and publicly, admit to an NSDAP record, it strikes us that this might possibly leave [ ] with little recourse than to expel him from the U.S. as having entered under false pretenses . . . At the same time, we feel such instructions might give Grossbahn a degree of control against us, should he decide he wants our help again at some future date – an altogether undesirable situation. What has Headquarters' experience been on this point? Have we instructed Grossbahn incorrectly? Cabled advice would be appreciated, as time to the planned departure date is running short.¹³

The response urged that von Bolschwing tell the truth.

Assuming that he has not denied Nazi affiliations on his visa application form, he should definitely not deny his record if the matter comes up in dealing with US authorities and he is forced to give a point-blank answer. Thus, if asked, he should admit membership, but attempt to explain it away on the basis of extenuating circumstances. If he were to make a false statement on a citizenship application or other official paper, he would get into trouble. Actually Grossbahn is not entering the US under false pretenses as [ ] will have information concerning his past record in a secret file.¹⁴

It is unclear precisely what the State Department knew at the time of von Bolschwing's entry. He himself told them that he had been a member of the Nazi party and the Waffen SS (the military wing of the SS). In fact he had not been with the Waffen SS, but with the Allgemeine SS. A handwritten (but unsigned) note in the CIA files suggests that the CIA may have told the State Department that von Bolschwing was a member of the SD.

Although the INS generally keeps all immigration records in one "A-file," von Bolschwing had a secret second file. A memo in his A-file references that file containing a January 13, 1954 letter which has "no bearing on immigration status." By the time OSI was interested in von Bolschwing, INS could not locate the secret file. However, the CIA had a
January 13, 1954 letter addressed to the Commissioner of INS; this was presumably a copy of the letter in the missing file. The letter stated that von Bolschwing had been employed by the CIA, a full investigation had been conducted, and there was no reason to believe he was inadmissible or a security risk. The letter made no mention of von Bolschwing’s Nazi background and urged that his entry be expedited.

Von Bolschwing applied for citizenship in 1959 without revealing his membership in the Allgemeine SS, the Nazi party, the SD or the RSHA, even though such information would have been responsive to questions on his naturalization application. However, he did send a letter to the INS which suggested that he had intentionally withheld certain information which might be relevant to his application for citizenship.

With regard to incomplete information on my application form . . . I spoke over the telephone to the information officer at your office . . . and was advised by him that my record, at your office, would contain such information which I am unable to give, and that I should submit my application as is pending subsequent explanation to be given by me verbally to your examiner.

I am ready to give any additional information which you may require.\(^\text{15}\)

The SLU first became aware of von Bolschwing while investigating the wartime activities of Valerian Trifa. The office recognized almost immediately that von Bolschwing might “be guilty of acts more heinous than anyone else currently under investigation.”\(^\text{16}\) In June 1979, just as OSI was getting established, attorney Eugene Thirolf interviewed von Bolschwing.\(^\text{17}\) He denied membership in the SS. Although he acknowledged helping arrange for the escape of Iron Guard leaders, he described this simply as an effort to “create a peaceful settlement between the two warring parties.”

OSI Deputy Director Martin Mendelsohn wrote to the CIA asking a series of pointed
questions.

(1) was there any objection to the initiation of proceedings and would von Bolschwing be able to “blackmail” the agency;

(2) would the CIA testify for him;

(3) had the agency known the full truth, would it would have assisted his entry into the U.S.;

(4) had the agency told von Bolschwing to reveal his Nazi background on his naturalization application;

(5) what information had the CIA given INS; and

(6) had von Bolschwing worked for the agency after coming to the United States.18

The answers were varied. The CIA did not oppose the case filing nor feel vulnerable to blackmail. While von Bolschwing had been valuable, and they would so testify, they would also make clear what information he had given (and what he had not) concerning his World War II activities. They would not testify that he had misrepresented his past although they were unclear as to whether they would have aided his entry into the United States if they had known everything. Although headquarters had directed that von Bolschwing be told to answer truthfully all naturalization questions, it was unknown whether that message (negating previous counsel) had been passed on to von Bolschwing. The agency had no role in von Bolschwing’s obtaining citizenship and he had not worked for them since he came to the United States.19

It was clear to the OSI investigating team that von Bolschwing had withheld relevant and pertinent information both when he applied for a visa and again when seeking citizenship. Yet
the legal case was murky for a variety of reasons. First was the problem of the secret file. Since it was missing, von Bolschwing might claim that all the omitted information must be in that folder. OSI could not rule out the possibility that this had occurred, although it seemed unlikely. While the CIA had only the January 1954 letter in its files, they could not be certain that other written and oral communications had not been made at the time of the visa application.

A separate problem existed with regard to naturalization. Von Bolschwing’s 1959 letter to INS alluded to additional information which might be in a file and which von Bolschwing would amplify in an interview. There was no information in the files (although again the missing file could be key) but OSI needed to learn if there had been any verbal explanation offered. They spoke with the examiner who interviewed von Bolschwing as part of his naturalization process. After reviewing his notations in von Bolschwing’s file, the examiner was confident that von Bolschwing had not provided any of the relevant and missing information.

Thirdly, von Bolschwing might claim (and ultimately did) that his lack of candor was at the behest of the Agency. Von Bolschwing’s CIA contact had since died so there was no way to determine whether he had ultimately been told to be candid about his background.

Despite these problems, Ryan believed the case was winnable and should be filed because von Bolschwing “played a significant role in the SD’s program of persecution of Jews in the late 1930’s.” He originally proposed charging misrepresentation both in the visa application and during the naturalization process. However, DAAG Richard feared that there were “too many potential defenses available to a charge that [von Bolschwing] materially misrepresented his background on entry to this country to warrant going forward on that basis.” He therefore directed OSI to prepare a complaint focused solely on the naturalization process. Since the CIA
was not involved in the citizenship application, von Bolschwing alone could be accountable for any misstatements and concealments at that stage. AAG Trott agreed with this strategy.24

OSI filed a three-count complaint in May 1981 alleging (1) that von Bolschwing had procured his naturalization by concealment or misrepresentation since he failed to reveal his wartime activities and associations as part of his naturalization application; (2) that these memberships and activities were evidence of lack of good moral character requisite for citizenship; and (3) that his swearing to the truth of his naturalization application, when in fact the application was not truthful, was further evidence of lack of good moral character. The filing received much publicity. Von Bolschwing denied the charges, telling the press that he had been working for the OSS (predecessor agency to the CIA) during the war.25

By the time the case was filed, von Bolschwing was in a nursing home suffering from a progressive neurological disorder which impaired his memory and intellectual functioning. There were questions as to his capacity to understand and assist in the proceedings. Even before the filing his attorneys had sought to settle the case in light of this problem.26 Ryan was amenable since he thought “serious due process questions” would be raised if the government tried to deport someone unable to understand or assist in his defense.27 DAAG Richard supported the disposition. Given the circumstances, he viewed surrender of von Bolschwing’s naturalization certificate as “a significant victory.”28

The district court approved the settlement. Von Bolschwing made no admissions about his work in the Jewish Affairs Office, but did acknowledge concealing his membership in the Nazi Party, the SS and the SD at the time he applied for citizenship. He agreed not to contest the denaturalization and the United States agreed not to proceed with deportation proceedings.
unless his medical condition improved. He was to be reexamined annually. A consent judgment was entered on December 22, 1981.29 Von Bolschwing died 10 weeks later. He was 72 years old.
I. The report in OSI’s files is not signed by von Bolschwing, though a cover letter contains a signature space with his name. Moreover, two SD memoranda referencing the report attribute it to him. Jan. 12, 1937 “Opinion on the write-up ‘The Jewish Problem,’” by SS Senior Platoon Leader Kröder; unsigned Apr. 26, 1937 memo re “Party Leader von Bolschwing (informer II 112).”


3. See pp. 204-205.


6. Naftali, supra, n. 5 at p. 349.

7. Von Bolschwing’s Sept. 14, 1949 Statement of Life History submitted to the CIA.

8. See e.g., undated memo for Director of Security from Chief, EE re “Request for Aid in Facilitating US Entry for Agent.”

9. Sept. 17, 1980 prosecution memo from Ryan to DAAG Richard, pp. 7-8. The von Bolschwing-Eichmann nexus did not come to light until 1960. Following Eichmann’s capture that year by the Israelis, Germany reinstituted an active investigation of him. Reviewing captured war records in the U.S., the Germans found reference to von Bolschwing. This information was shared with the U.S. authorities and the Israelis. Feb. 2, 1961 memo to Chief/CIA [ ] re “Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing.” (The blank brackets indicate information not released when the document was declassified and approved for release by the CIA in 2001 pursuant to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.)

10. Naftali, supra, n. 5 at p. 352. See also, Nov. 25, 1953 memorandum from American Consulate General, Munich, Germany to Department of State; undated memo to Director of Security from Chief, EE, re “Request for Aid in Facilitating US Entry for Agent.”

11. As set forth in a CIA memorandum declassified in 2001 under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act:

The true story, as CIA then knew it, was made known to them and they agreed after consultation with our Alien Affairs Staff, to make the administrative decision to admit [von Bolschwing] as an immigrant. CIA did not provide a
sponsor but we are on record with I and NS [sic] as vouching for [von Bolschwing] and providing all assurance that he was not a security hazard. His entry was in effect accomplished by the CIA statement that his services on our behalf were of such a nature as to override his otherwise undesirable background as defined by the McCarran Act.

Undated and untitled memorandum found in vol. 2 of CIA “Name File on Otto von Bolschwing.”

12. CIA files released under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act indicate that von Bolschwing was “instructed to refrain from applying for sensitive [sic] jobs with the United States government which will entail a thorough investigation.”


14. Nov. 24, 1953 memo to Chief, Salzburg from Chief, EE re “Grossbahn Termination.” The blank brackets indicate information not released when the document was declassified and approved for release by the CIA in 2001 pursuant to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.

A responsive memo advised that Grossbahn would be instructed “immediately” to answer “any and all such questions truthfully.” Dec. 10, 1953 memo to Chief EE from Chief Salzburg re “Grossbahn - Termination.”


16. Feb. 28, 1979 memo from SLU Chief Mendelsohn to AAG Egan.

17. Thirolf described von Bolschwing as a dashing “Gary Cooper sort of character.” Interview with Thirolf, Feb. 22, 2002.

18. Nov. 30, 1979 letter from Mendelsohn to the CIA.

19. Jan. 15, 1980 memo to Director Rockler and Deputy Director Ryan from OSI attorney Jeffrey Mausner re “Addition to Status Report on Bolschwing.” The memo documents a Jan. 9, 1980 meeting at the CIA between officials of OSI and the CIA. See also, undated letter to Ryan from Joseph Kimble, a member of the CIA’s Office of General Counsel. The Kimble letter was attached to Ryan’s prosecution memo.


21. Id., p. 23.


24. May 14, 1981 buck slip from AAG Trott to DAAG Richard approving the “modified complaint.”


26. Mar. 9, 1981 memo to file from Director Ryan.

27. Apr. 6, 1981 memo from Ryan to D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General Designate for the Criminal Division.

28. Apr. 10, 1981 cover memo from DAAG Richard to AAG Jensen, forwarding the Ryan memo of Apr. 6. It is unclear whether DAAG Richard’s concerns were directed at problems in the case itself (which had made him reluctant about the filing, see Dec. 3, 1980 memo from DAAG Richard to AAG Heymann) or the health issues, or both.

29. While the United States felt the settlement was justified because of the defendant’s deteriorating health, the Soviet government called the settlement “a blatant outrage to the memory of millions of victims of the Fascists.” “They Conceal Criminals,” *Tass News Agency*, Dec. 26, 1981.
Karl Linnas — Cold War Politics and OSI Litigation

Karl Linnas, chief of a Nazi concentration camp in Estonia, was one of the highest ranking Nazi collaborators ever found in the United States. As the head Estonian in the camp, he ordered guards to fire on prisoners kneeling along the edge of an anti-tank ditch; the dead fell directly into their graves. His persecution of civilians was the crux of both the denaturalization and deportation cases filed against him.

The legal proceedings, begun in November 1979, were one of the first OSI filings. Linnas never seriously contested the facts. He refused to participate in the deposition of Soviet witnesses on the ground that their testimony — taken in the presence of Soviet authorities — would be inherently unreliable. He also defied the court’s order to answer certain questions at his own deposition and presented no evidence countervailing any offered by the government.

Linnas was denaturalized in 1982 and ordered deported two years later. His case illustrates, arguably better than any other OSI matter, the impact of the Cold War on OSI prosecutions.

Linnas was born in Estonia, a nation forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. The United States did not recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet annexation and yet, as a practical matter, until 1992 Estonia no longer existed as an independent country. Therefore, in the 1980s, whether and how someone could be deported to Estonia presented a political conundrum. The issue was complicated by the fact that the Soviets had charged Linnas with having taken an active part in the killing of 12,000 persons during the war. He had been convicted and sentenced to death in absentia by the Soviet Union in 1962. Deportation to Estonia (on Soviet soil as a result of the annexation) therefore could have life or death consequences as well as
significant repercussions on foreign affairs.5

When the U.S. immigration court ordered Linnas to designate a deportation designation, he chose "the free and independent Republic of Estonia," explaining that this should not be confused with "the puppet government formed by the Soviet occupiers of Estonia." For Linnas, the free and independent Republic referred to the government "still recognized by the United States." That was a government-in-exile, led by Estonian emigrés and operating out of offices in New York City.6

The immigration court did not address the issue of "the Free Republic of Estonia." It simply ordered Linnas deported to Estonia or, if that country were unwilling to accept him, then to the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. was chosen by the immigration court because it was the country in which Linnas' place of birth – Estonia – was situated.7

Linnas and his supporters challenged the ruling both in the court of public opinion and judicially. In both arenas they stressed Cold War concerns. Thus, his daughters argued in a letter to the Estonian community that:

... U.S. government offices have been infiltrated by Soviet supporting activists.

The creation of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in the Justice Department is one typical example. The persecution of so called "war criminals," 40 years after it supposedly happened, is just an attempt to silence anticommunist groups by leading Soviet style court cases in the U.S. and to promote communism in the free world.

The denaturalization of our father ... by [a judge] who accepted Soviet supplied "witnesses and documents" in U.S. courts is only the continuation of the 1962 Soviet "show trial"... As a final measure, the immigration judge ... also accepted the Soviet "information"...8

While Linnas' judicial appeal raised a variety of issues, only one resonated with the BIA.
That was that designation of the U.S.S.R. was unreasonable in light of the United States’ refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet annexation of Estonia. The BIA ordered a new deportation hearing. The immigration judge was told to “consider the implications of the United States’ refusal to recognize the Soviet annexation of Estonia, [to] designate a country of deportation pursuant to the appropriate [statutory] provisions . . . and [to] articulate the statutory basis for selection, whichever country is designated.”

OSI contacted West Germany (FRG) to determine whether it would accept Linnas. The basis for the request was that Linnas had resided in the FRG from 1945 to 1951 and had embarked for the United States from Munich. However, the FRG remained steadfast in the position it had adopted in the Trifa case: it would admit only German citizens. Linnas did not qualify.

In preparation for a new hearing before the immigration judge, the Justice Department sought input from the State Department. State was not anxious for a deportation to the Soviet Union. In light of the “special sensitivity” of the question, the State Department felt it would be “in the interest of the United States” to “more fully . . . explore the feasibility . . . of deporting Linnas to another country.” The State Department asked U.S. embassies to make overtures to 17 nations: Brazil, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. OSI reached out to the Canadians, Germans, Israelis and Russians. Of all the nations contacted, only the U.S.S.R. responded affirmatively.

After discussing the matter with the White House (NSC staff), the State Department prepared a declaration for submission to the deportation judge. It stated that since no country,
other than the U.S.S.R., was willing to accept Linnas, a deportation to that country "would not as a matter of law contravene the longstanding and firmly held United States policy of nonrecognition of the forcible incorporation of Estonia into the U.S.S.R."

Linnas urged the court to consider the consequences of sending him to the Soviet Union. He pointed out — correctly — that his death sentence had been reported in the Soviet press even before his 1962 trial in absentia had taken place. He argued that this demonstrated the impossibility of getting a fair trial in the Soviet Union. He also contended that his deportation "would lead the Soviets, as well as others, to believe that the United States can be indifferent to the process by which the Gulag acquires its inhabitants; that our concern for the religious, political and ethnic dissidents in Soviet camps, jails, insane asylums and internal exile is but a passing fancy to be ignored." Linnas accused OSI of having an "urge to kill" him and questioned whether the State Department (which he saw as a "rubber stamp" for OSI) had made sincere efforts to find an alternative deportation destination.

Although the U.S. argued that a deportee's treatment in the receiving state is "legally irrelevant" to determining the appropriate country of deportation, the government was fairly confident that Linnas' earlier conviction and death sentence would not be binding. As early as August 1984, officials from the Soviet embassy had assured DAAG Richard and Director Sher that a new trial was "most likely."

Before the new deportation proceeding began, Linnas galvanized political support. United States Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Congressman Don Ritter (R-Pa.) both argued that deportation to the Soviet Union would violate U.S. policy against recognizing Soviet incorporation of Estonia. They suggested he be sent to Israel for prosecution. This, however,
was not a viable option. Years earlier the Israelis had told DAAG Richard and Director Sher that
they would not accept Linnas because the critical incriminating evidence against him came from
the Soviet Union. Since Israel did not have diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., it lacked
access to the evidence.18

At Linnas' new deportation hearing, several people from the Baltic emigré community
tested on the importance of the non-recognition doctrine. The immigration court was not
persuaded. The court held that deportation to "the free Republic of Estonia" would be fruitless,
since that entity, housed in the United States, lacked the authority to accept him. The court
rejected the argument that the U.S.S.R. was not a proper designation because Linnas' conviction
there did not comport with U.S. notions of due process. The court concluded that the U.S.S.R.
was the proper destination both because it was the country within which his place of birth was
now situated and because it was the only country willing to accept him.

Although this was a victory for OSI, it was not in accordance with the very constrained
mandates of the State Department, as set forth in their carefully worded declaration. The
declaration had sanctioned deportation to the Soviet Union only because it was the sole country
willing to accept Linnas. By citing an alternative basis for deportation, the court had arguably
given credence to the Soviet position that Estonia was now part of the U.S.S.R. This was a cause
of concern to the State Department. Since Linnas was appealing the ruling, OSI had an
opportunity for judicial reconsideration of the basis for deportation. At the State Department's
request, OSI argued that deportation to the U.S.S.R. was appropriate only on the ground that it
was the sole country willing to accept Linnas.19

The BIA accepted the argument. Although the panel acknowledged that Linnas had been
sentenced to death “in what appears to have been a sham trial,” it was not persuaded by his argument that deportation to the Soviet Union would deprive him of life without due process of law.

[The Constitution does not extend beyond our borders to guarantee the respondent fairness in judicial proceedings in the Soviet Union. Moreover, under our immigration laws there is no requirement that a foreign conviction must conform to our constitutional guarantees.

Linnas appealed to the Second Circuit. Rudolph Giuliani, then the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, argued the case. Shortly after the argument, OSI learned that Linnas had begun having his Social Security payments deposited directly into his account rather than sent to his home. Fearing that Linnas was planning to flee, INS began surveillance of his home, his workplace, the home of one of his daughters, and the home of an acquaintance. He was not seen at any of the sites. Sher worried that Linnas, as the “poster boy” for anti-Soviet sentiment, might have an underground support network which would help him flee to Canada.

Before the Second Circuit issued its ruling, the U.S. Attorney’s Office asked Linnas’ attorney to bring his client to a meeting to discuss custody. Linnas and his attorney appeared at the requested time, whereupon Linnas was arrested. His attorney was outraged and accused OSI of having masterminded this perceived perfidy.

While Linnas was in custody, the Second Circuit affirmed the deportation order. The court scoffed at Linnas’ designation of “an office building in New York” as a deportation destination, saying it amounted to “wasting the opportunity to choose a proper place of deportation.” The court acknowledged that there might be circumstances where the fate awaiting a deportee was so inimical to the court’s sense of decency as to warrant judicial
intervention. This, however, was not such a case.

The foundation of Linnas' due process argument is an appeal to the court's sense of decency and compassion. Noble words such as "decency" and "compassion" ring hollow when spoken by a man who ordered the extermination of innocent men, women and children kneeling at the edge of a mass grave. Karl Linnas' appeal to humanity, a humanity which he has grossly, callously and monstrously offended, truly offends this court's sense of decency.

The planned deportation was attacked from a variety of quarters. Amnesty International was opposed because Linnas faced the death penalty in the U.S.S.R. White House advisor Patrick Buchanan, emphasizing that he was speaking personally rather than institutionally, stated that it was "Orwellian and Kafkaesque to deport an American citizen to the Soviet Union to stand trial for collaboration with Adolf Hitler when the principal collaborator with Hitler in starting World War II was that self-same Soviet government." Others urged the passage of legislation allowing alleged World War II war criminals to be charged criminally in the United States.

Linnas' daughters also renewed their pleas for help in a letter addressed to "Concerned Americans."

Civil trials do not permit juries, cross-examination of the witnesses, nor equal access to the records. This particular kind of civil matter well illustrates how our father has been denied the basic Constitutional right to due process: cross-examination, jury trial, and access to court appointed counsel. This kind of proceeding has brought forth a criminal death sentence to our father who has been denied a criminal trial!

It is difficult to politically criticize the OSI without the risk of being branded anti-Semitic or nazi sympathizer. However, in a free society, we are able to question and challenge any government institution. It is urgent that we now put aside our fears and inhibitions and bombard the Congress, the Senate, and the Executive branch of government with telephone calls and letters expressing our disapproval of OSI methods.

(italics in original)

In addition to these appeals to the court of public opinion, Linnas asked the Supreme
Court to review his case. He also replaced his counsel with Ramsey Clark, who had been Attorney General of the United States during the Lyndon Johnson administration. The key argument presented in the Supreme Court petition was that the pending death sentence in the Soviet Union made it an improper destination for deportation.

The government did not see this as an impediment. Officials at the Soviet Embassy had again assured the office of the "strong" likelihood that Linnas would be retried. Moreover, they indicated that the proceeding would be open to the public. The Soviets "made it very clear that out of all of OSI's defendants, Linnas was the person who they most thought was deserving of criminal punishment and who they were most interested in having back on their territory." They felt his deportation would be the "crowning achievement" in their relationship with OSI. The U.S. was confident its own evidence —"solid [and] irrefutable"— would be used by the Soviets, thereby precluding a sham conviction.

In anticipation of a denial of certiorari, OSI began to plan the details of deportation. At the time there were no direct flights to the Soviet Union. There would have to be a stopover, and OSI did not want this to be in a Western country where a request for asylum might lead to new proceedings. Sher believed that Eastern European countries, knowing the Soviet's intention to get Linnas within their territory as quickly as possible, would not be receptive to an asylum request.

OSI contacted various Warsaw Pact nations. In the end, Czechoslovakia was the pass-through nation. But in an unusual circumstance, Poland too had granted permission for a stopover.

Bruce Einhorn, then Deputy Director for Litigation, went to the Polish Embassy in
Washington, D.C. He assumed that the Soviets would have laid the necessary groundwork, and that the request would be a mere formality. It was not. Einhorn recalled the Poles being "very reticent." They advised that Linnas would need a visa, and the visa application needed to be signed by him. Einhorn requested the form, asked to use the restroom, and when he came out, turned over a completed form with a signature reading "Karl Linnas" at the bottom. Einhorn asked if anything else was needed. "There was a long hesitation after which the official in charge said 'No.'"

With deportation looming, Patrick Buchanan sent a memo to Attorney General Meese on White House letterhead. It did not address the Linnas case directly but rather the general issue of "deportations of denaturalized citizens to Communist countries."

Buchanan told the Attorney General that he had received nearly 15,000 cards, letters and phone calls concerning the denaturalization, deportation and prosecution of suspected war criminals. While those writing supported finding, prosecuting and punishing war criminals, they had "serious concerns" with the current procedure. As summarized by Buchanan:

1. The United States should not grant the Soviet Union or other communist governments the moral authority to try people for atrocities committed during World War II. The Soviet Government is itself guilty of massive war crimes, and it was the Soviet/Nazi Pact that allowed Hitler to pursue his own atrocities.

2. Suspected war criminals should be tried in the United States, Western Europe or Israel. U.S. accession to the Genocide Treaty should grant it the authority to try these persons even though the crimes were not committed on U.S. soil.

3. Currently, persons accused of war crimes are tried in U.S. courts under civil procedure which denies to them the right of trial by jury and court appointed counsel.
4. Deportation of Baltic nationals to the Soviet Union violates U.S. policy of non-recognition of Soviet authority over the Baltic States. Though the Department of State has determined that such deportations are consistent with the current statute, logic and common sense argue that the statute does not comply with U.S. policy.31

Buchanan urged the Attorney General to "meet in the very near future with representatives of responsible East European American organizations to discuss this matter" and offered to assist in making the arrangements. The Attorney General responded to the suggestion and a meeting was held on March 5, 1987. The Attorney General, his Chief of Staff, the Associate Attorney General, and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division met with six Baltic leaders. No OSI representative was present. Reconstructing the meeting from handwritten notes taken by one of the DOJ participants, as well as from a newspaper account written by one of the Baltic participants, it appears that the discussion was free-ranging and extensive.

The emigré participants argued that the U.S.S.R. had no legal or moral right to try anyone for crimes against humanity. In their view, sending Linnas to the Soviet Union would seal his fate since he would be facing a political trial. They also discussed having criminal, rather than civil, prosecutions in the United States for alleged war criminals, even if this meant enacting new legislation. The emigrés wanted the safeguards of the criminal process, including trial by jury, for those facing charges stemming from their wartime activities; they believed the Attorney General was receptive to the idea.32

The meeting received favorable coverage in the Baltic press. One of the participants compared its positive tone to a meeting he had attended at the Justice Department a year and a half earlier.
In contrast to the boorish behavior of OSI officials at our 1985 meeting, the climate on March 5 was positive and constructive. Mr. Meese was attentive. He took notes. He appeared interested in what we had to say.

The emigrés took away from the meeting a commitment by the Attorney General to look into allegations of impropriety in OSI proceedings and a promise to appoint a non-OSI person within the Department of Justice to meet with the emigrés and report their concerns to him.34

Meanwhile, the case continued to receive media attention. Noted columnist William F. Buckley, Jr. took up the cause.

[I]f it is a crime warranting execution to have collaborated with the Nazis, then just about every Soviet official over the age of 62 should be executed.

• • •

The entire episode is judicially revolting. How is it possible to try someone on the basis of Soviet testimony – which was written before the trial was actually conducted? Even if someone had films showing Linnas as a guard at a concentration camp in the early '40s, what is the appropriate penalty in 1986?

One can be open to suggestion on the subject, but not to a suggestion that he be sent back to be shot in the country that signed a pact with Adolf Hitler and, in its bloody history, has slaughtered some 50 million people.35


But what is difficult to understand is how a handful of American Jews can routinely slander as “Nazi sympathizers” their fellow Americans simply because we do not wish to collaborate with a brutalitarian and anti-Semitic regime that is Hitler’s surviving partner from World War II, and whose K.G.B. agents are today beating up Jewish women in the streets of Moscow.37

On December 1, 1986 the Supreme Court declined to review the case. With deportation imminent, politicians again weighed in. Three senators wrote to the Attorney General and
expressed concern about deporting someone to the U.S.S.R. based on "Soviet evidence." Fourteen others, joined by 54 Representatives, urged the Attorney General to allow the deportation to proceed.

AAG Trott asked the State Department to weigh in. The State Department replied that it had "treated the case as a purely legal matter, and have neither expressly opposed nor supported Linnas' deportation to the U.S.S.R." State recounted its efforts to find a country to accept Linnas, and concluded that no more could be done.

We would naturally prefer to avoid deporting Linnas to the U.S.S.R. because if he gets a new trial it will be pro forma at best. However, our experience with his and similar cases leads us to conclude that further efforts to persuade countries other than the U.S.S.R. to accept him at this time would be futile.

Then, suddenly, in April 1987, Panama offered Linnas asylum. According to the Minister of the Panamanian Embassy, the decision was based "on humanitarian grounds." Sher learned of it from the INS office in New York. It was news "out of the blue" and he was "devastated."

Whether or not Panama would have been a viable option at the start of the case, Sher felt it was not appropriate at this late date. "We fought like hell to get an order to the Soviet Union. That issue was litigated all the way to the Supreme Court." Both Sher and AAG Trott feared that the Soviets might limit their cooperation with OSI if the original deportation order were not carried out. That cooperation – involving access to essential witnesses and documentation – was crucial to the investigation and prosecution of OSI cases.

There were other concerns as well. Even before the Panamanian offer emerged, DAAG Richard feared that:

[b]y refusing to deport Linnas to the Soviet Union, the only country that will take
him, we would be carving out an unprecedented exception to deportation for a Nazi war criminal in contravention of the intent of Congress which provided that Nazi war criminals should not be eligible for discretionary relief from deportation.

He noted too that refusal to send Linnas to the Soviet Union would afford the Russians "an unprecedented propaganda victory."

The fact that our own courts have unequivocally found Linnas to be a war criminal while he ends up walking the streets of the United States because of our refusal to deport him will be cited by the Soviets as confirmation of their position that our government knowingly harbors such Nazi criminals in our midst.

And finally, he warned that refusal to deport Nazis to the Soviet Union could "destroy the OSI project."

"[I]t is the fear of ultimate deportation to the Soviet Union that has in part led to the voluntary departure from the United States of several OSI defendants. If these subjects know that in the final analysis we will not deport them, there will be no incentive for them to leave and our entire litigative program in this field will become an exercise in futility."

AAG Weld (Trott's successor) shared these concerns.

OSI leaked the Panamanian offer to the press in an effort to embarrass the Panamanian government, which had a working relationship with Israel. The Panamanian Jewish community was also galvanized to bring pressure to bear. The president of Panama, a figurehead in a country actually run by military strongman Manuel Noriega, was himself Jewish. A message was gotten to him that he must act. It is likely that a message was sent also to Noriega. To the best of Einhorn's recollection, Noriega's children attended a Jewish Day School in Panama City and he was advised that they would not be welcome if the Linnas plan took hold.

On April 15, 1987, Sher learned that the matter was on the agenda for the Attorney
General and some of his counselors. Sher was not invited to the meeting. However, from the Attorney General’s antechamber, and within earshot of Attorney General’s secretary, Sher called Liz Holtzman\(^4\) to inform her about the situation. "I wanted people [in the Attorney General’s office] to know I had called. I wanted to be in their faces."

The Jewish community mobilized. Rosenbaum told the press that sending Linnas to Panama would be “a subversion of justice in monumental proportions.” He rued that Linnas would have a “comfortable retirement under the Panamanian palm trees.”\(^5\) Elizabeth Holtzman opined that the Justice Department had acted intentionally during the Passover holidays when Jewish leaders would not be available to mobilize.\(^6\) Despite the holiday she, Rosenbaum and Menachem Rosenshaft of the International Network of Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, went from New York to Washington and met with the Panamanian Ambassador to the United States. Later in the day, Panama withdrew its offer of asylum.

Although the press reported that the United States had wanted Panama to accept Linnas,\(^7\) the evidence suggests otherwise. The State Department cables listing countries to be contacted did not mention Panama.\(^8\) Neither did a DOJ memorandum on the issue.\(^9\) The Panamanian statement withdrawing asylum referred to the request it had received on behalf of the Linnas family. In court papers, Linnas referenced efforts to have Austria, Sweden, Norway, Panama, and Paraguay accept him as a deportee.\(^10\) Moreover, an undated and unsigned handwritten note in the Department of Justice Linnas file has Ramsey Clark’s name with five countries listed beneath it: Portugal, Costa Rica, Panama, Bolivia and Uruguay. All this suggests that it was the defense which approached the Panamanian government.\(^11\)

The Panamanian turnaround was a major national story. While OSI was pleased that
Linnas would not find safe haven in Panama, they were disturbed over one aspect of the coverage. The Washington Post reported that Attorney General Meese "had been inclined to agree to the Panamanian refuge because of doubts about the Soviet supplied evidence used to convict Linnas of obtaining his U.S. citizenship fraudulently."57

Director Sher was irate and expressed his anger in a memo to DAAG Richard.

As you know, this Department has repeatedly and vigorously contended in court papers and appearances that the Soviet-supplied evidence in this case was fully admissible and reliable. Moreover, each and every United States tribunal which reviewed the Soviet evidence concurred in the Department's position. The statement in the Post is particularly troublesome since the petition presently pending before the Supreme Court is based on Linnas' renewed claim that Soviet evidence is unreliable.58

Others were similarly distraught. The WJC accused the Attorney General of showing "greater sensitivity for the rights of Nazis than for their victims."59 A cartoon to similar effect appeared in The Miami News and was reprinted in The New York Times.60

The day after the Panamanian turnaround, a spokesman for the Attorney General said the Justice Department would continue to consider offers from any country that would accept Linnas.61 When no other countries came forward, the Attorney General acceded to the Soviet designation.62

Linnas was taken to the airport from the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City, where he had spent the year since his arrest in the U.S. Attorney's Office. OSI had three phone lines open. One was to the airport in order to be notified about flight plans; a second was to the Supreme Court in case the Chief Justice issued a stay; the third was to the Soviets in order to keep them apprised of the situation.63 Minutes after Chief Justice Rehnquist denied a final request to prevent Linnas' deportation, the plane was airborne.
The media and Jewish groups, alerted by OSI, were there to see him go. *The New York Post* ran a banner page one headline: "Nazi Butcher Kicked Out Screaming." At a stopover in Prague, Czech officials found and confiscated a razor blade in Linnas' tobacco pouch. Whether this was a potential suicide weapon is unknown; Linnas claimed he needed the blade to clean the bowl of his pipe. From Prague, Linnas was flown non-stop to Tallin, Estonia.

Opinion was divided over whether he should have been sent either to Panama or to the Soviet Union. *The Boston Globe* labeled the Attorney General's actions to find a "haven" for Linnas "shameful." Former Congresswoman Holtzman had a similar view. She accused the Attorney General of attempting to "pervert justice" by trying to "sneak Linnas into Panama."

*The Washington Post* thought the greater problem lay in sending Linnas to the U.S.S.R. Justice must be done to Nazi war criminals, but a true and disturbing question remains whether justice by accepted American standards was done in this case, where a human life - never mind what kind of a human he may have been - is on the line.

*The New York Times* saw it differently. It supported the deportation and hailed the Attorney General for bringing it about.

Mr. Meese overrode strong right-wing sentiment in the case of Karl Linnas, deporting the former concentration camp commander to the Soviet Union where he is under a death sentence for killing innocent Jews.

What made Mr. Meese's straightforward action[] remarkable was [its] political setting. This is the Administration that countenanced President Reagan's tribute at the Bitburg cemetery honoring SS troopers who ran German death camps. Mr. Reagan's former communications director, Patrick Buchanan, resisted the Linnas deportation long and loud, with intemperate charges of caving in to Soviet injustice.

It was not only the media that was divided over how to assess the deportation. Within
OSI itself there were divergent views. An historian of Lithuanian heritage, who had been with OSI for five years, resigned over the case. Although he supported Linnas' denaturalization and had no doubt that he met the criteria for deportation, he thought it wrong to deport him to the Soviet Union.69

The Attorney General was clearly troubled by the case. He requested that the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy review alternatives to deportation in the case of persons accused or tried in absentia for Nazi war crimes in jurisdictions where there was concern about the fundamental fairness of the legal system. The resulting memorandum, 18 single-spaced pages, was completed two months after Linnas' departure. It outlined a variety of options, all designed to delay departure from the U.S. so dramatically that the aged defendant would likely die before he had to leave the country.70 When Attorney General Meese resigned a year later, none of the suggestions had been implemented.

Meanwhile, Linnas remained incarcerated in Tallin until June 1987 when he was transferred to Leningrad (St. Petersburg) where he underwent two emergency operations. He died on July 2.71 With him at the time of death were his eldest daughter and his attorney, Ramsey Clark. He was buried in Long Island, New York.72

Looking back on the case, Sher saw it as pivotal for OSI. "If it had gone the other way, I don't think the office could have survived. . . . I would have resigned, made a lot of noise and who knows where that would have gone." It was "far and away the most tense moment in OSI as far as I was concerned."
1. The district court, sensitive to the possibility of witness intimidation, used the deposition testimony only to corroborate other unrefuted government evidence, including documents signed by Linnas as chief of the camp. *U.S. v. Linnas*, 527 F. Supp. 426, 434 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).

2. *Id.* at 429, 434.


5. Boleslas Maikovskis was the only other OSI defendant sentenced to death *in absentia* by the U.S.S.R. However he fled to Germany before the court ruled on OSI's request that he be ordered deported to the Soviet Union. *See* p. 430. Feodor Fedorenko was tried and sentenced to death in the Soviet Union *after* he had been deported.

6. Ironically, the Office of International Affairs (OIA) within the Department of Justice had made a very similar argument as early as 1974 when discussing the possibility of an extradition (rather than deportation) of an OSI subject to Latvia, another of the Baltic countries annexed by the Soviet Union.

   [T]he United States government still recognizes in exile the former governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia with whom this government has viable extradition treaties. Thus, technically, if the Department of State were to receive an extradition request from the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic in Riga, Latvia, State would be obliged by protocol to formally present same to the representatives of the former government of Latvia, to wit the Consul General of Latvia last known to be located in Philadelphia, Pa.

Apr. 26, 1974 memorandum to INS Regional Commissioner, Northeast Region from Deputy Commissioner, re "Lists of reported Nazi War Criminals Residing in the United States; Your WF 50/10.1 memorandum dated January 23, 1974, w/ attachments re Boleslav Maikovskis, A8 194 566 and Karl Linnas, A8 085 626, and prior correspondence."

7. The U.S.S.R. had wanted to extradite Linnas, but was precluded from doing so by the lack of an extradition treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Oct. 26, 1984 memo from Director Sher to File re "Karl Linnas (OSI 132)."

8. June 14, 1983 letter from Anu, Tiina and Epp Linnas to "Estonians and friends of Estonians."
9. Jan. 28, 1983 memorandum from Neal Sher to DAAG Richard recounting meeting he and then Director Ryan had with a legal officer at the FRG Embassy re whether they would accept Valerian Trifa as a deportee. For a fuller discussion of Germany’s position on admitting OSI defendants, see pp. 426-442.


13. The trial was originally scheduled for Jan. 2, 1962 but was continued until Jan. 16. In mid-January, before the trial began, the Soviet magazine Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost published an interview with the prosecutor, who gave details of the testimony and sentence. The Soviets later withdrew the magazine from the newsstands and issued a new edition after the trial was completed.


17. Dec. 14, 1984 letter from Senator D’Amato to Director Sher. Ritter Op-Ed piece written for the Allentown, Pennsylvania Sunday Call Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1985. D’Amato later retracted his statements, saying he had known only that Linnas was from Estonia but not that he was a “potential war criminal.” He charged that the Joint Baltic American National Committee had deceived his staff on this matter. “D’Amato: I was Duped [sic] for Alleged Nazi,” by Judith Bender and Alan Eyesen, Long Island Newsday, Jan. 15, 1985.

The Israelis found a way around the diplomatic relations problem when they extradited and prosecuted Demjanjuk. See p. 170-171, n. 13.

19. June 7, 1985 letter to Director Sher from Mary Beth West, Assistant Legal Adviser for European and Canadian Affairs. However, in at least one other Cold War era case OSI designated the U.S.S.R. pursuant to the theory that it was now the country in which the defendant’s place of birth (Lithuania) was situated. Matter of Palciauskas, 939 F.2d 963, 967 (11th Cir. 1991).

20. Giuliani later served as mayor of New York City from 1994 to 2002. Having a U.S. Attorney argue a case is unusual. It generally indicates the significance (and or political importance) of a case. Director Sher noted an additional factor: “To have a Republican arguing for sending him to the Soviet Union” sent a powerful message. Recorded interview with Neal Sher, May 25, 2001. All references hereafter to Sher’s actions or recollections come from this interview unless otherwise indicated.

21. May 1, 1986 letter to David Milhollan, Chair, Board of Immigration Appeals from Ivars Berzins.

22. Later, after reviewing material supplied by Eli Rosenbaum, they changed their position, opposing only the death penalty but not the deportation. Oct. 31, 1986 letter from Jessica Neuwirth at Amnesty International to Eli Rosenbaum at the WJC.

23. Both the Amnesty International and Buchanan positions were reported in “U.S. Nazi Hunters Brace for Criticism; Doubts about Soviet Evidence Surround Move to Deport Linnas,” by Jay Mathews, The Washington Post, July 13, 1986.


26. Years later, Ramsey Clark also represented OSI defendant Jack Reimer.


28. July 25, 1986 memo from Wolf, supra, n. 27.

29. Sept. 16, 1986 memorandum from Sher to DAAG Richard re “Karl Linnas.”

30. As Einhorn saw it, there was no deception because the officials knew what had transpired. He saw them as "bureaucrats first, last and always, and authoritarians much lower down on the totem pole of priority." Recorded Einhorn interview, Oct. 2, 2001. All references to Einhorn’s thoughts or actions come from this interview unless otherwise indicated.


40. In addition to the specific requests made about Linnas in 1984, see p. 275, the Department had polled all its diplomatic posts in Sept. 1987 to ascertain generally if any would be willing to accept persons deported under the Holtzman Amendment.

41. Mar. 13, 1987 letter to AAG Trott from Mary V. Mochary, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State.


43. Einhorn recalled it differently. According to him, they learned about it in a phone call from Liz Holtzman.

45. Sept. 17, 1986 memo to the Deputy Attorney General from DAAG Richard re “Deportation of Karl Linnas to the Soviet Union.” Sher also worried that failure to send Linnas to the U.S.S.R. would have a deleterious effect on OSI’s program. It would send a message to OSI’s “opponents” that “there is no real significance to our litigation.” Sept. 16, 1986 memorandum from Sher to DAAG Richard re “Karl Linnas.”

46. Handwritten notation by AAG Weld on DAAG Richard’s memo. AAG Weld added that he would condition deportation on receiving adequate assurances from the Soviets that the trial would be open to international observation. He later followed this up with a suggestion that the U.S. ask for a “gesture” from the Soviets “along the line of allowing the exit of an appropriate number of Soviet dissidents.” Oct. 20, 1986 memo to Deputy AG Arthur Burns from AAG Weld re “Karl Linnas - Deportation Proposal.”

47. Einhorn interview, supra, n. 30.

48. The president was Eric Arturo Devalue. As best Einhorn could recall, the message to him was sent through the American Jewish community.

49. Holtzman was then the District Attorney in Brooklyn, N.Y. The account of Sher’s calling her comes both from his interview and her book, Who Said it Would be Easy? One Woman’s Life in the Political Arena (Arcade Publishing), p. 94.


51. Id. Accord, recorded interview with Ms. Holtzman, June 12, 2002.

52. See e.g., “U.S. Asks Panama to Take Nazi but Is Rejected,” The New York Times, Apr. 16, 1987. The Times reported that the Attorney General’s decision to allow Linnas to go to Panama was made over the objections of several Justice Department officials, including AAG Trott, AAG Weld and Director Sher.


54. Feb. 9, 1987 memorandum to Sher from OSI attorneys Philip Sunshine and Aron Golberg re "Countries Approached to Accept Linnas as Deportee." See also, Mar. 13, 1987 memo to DAAG Richard from Director Sher re “Linnas: Efforts to Locate a Country Other than the U.S.S.R.”


*New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis, who had chastised the Attorney General for trying to send Linnas to Panama, apologized. He came to believe that the Attorney General did not initiate the idea, but only explored it after Panama made an offer “because he had doubts about the Soviet legal system.” Lewis went on to credit the Attorney General with reviewing the record and sending Linnas to the Soviet Union only after he determined that the findings against Linnas were correct. See “A Strange Solicitude,” by Anthony Lewis, *The New York Times*, Apr. 21, 1987 and “Poisoning Ourselves,” by Anthony Lewis, *The New York Times*, Apr. 24, 1987.

57. “Agreement to Send Linnas to Panama Is Canceled,” *supra*, n. 56.


59. “Agreement to Send Linnas to Panama is Canceled,” by Jay Mathews, *supra*, n. 56.

60. Drawing by Don Wright, *The Miami News*, reprinted in *The New York Times*, Apr. 26, 1987. It depicted the two hemispheres of Meese’s brain. "Things That Matter" were in the right half. The only issue found there was “accused Nazi war criminal.”


62. Martin Mendelsohn was no longer at the Department of Justice during the Linnas deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, he followed the case. According to him, he and Meese had a mutual friend. Mendelsohn told the friend that Linnas should be sent back to the U.S.S.R. He sent the friend a copy of the Circuit opinion and asked him to talk to Meese. The friend called back a few days later. “I go through life dropping pebbles into bottomless wells. I just heard a splash. You have nothing to worry about.” Recorded interview with Mendelsohn, May 23, 2001.

63. Einhorn interview, *supra*, n. 30.

64. Apr. 23, 1987 memorandum from OSI investigator Thomas Fusi to Sher re “Deportation of Karl Linnas.”


70. June 25, 1987 memorandum to Attorney General Meese from Stephen Markman, AAG for Legal Policy. The delaying tactics included:

   (1) determining that it was "inadvisable" to execute the order of deportation and then trying to find an alternative destination by contacting other countries *seriatim*. If this delay alone did not resolve the issue, it nonetheless may have the added advantage of allowing a politically charged situation to diffuse somewhat, which in itself may lead to alternate solutions. For example, if there could have been additional delay of deportation in the Linnas case, it might not have been necessary to ask third countries to accept Linnas during a time when the case was so prominently portrayed by the media. With less publicity it might have been possible for a country to accept him quietly.

   (2) prosecuting the alien for failing to "voluntarily depart" after the order of deportation has been entered. The memo acknowledged that the Attorney General has traditionally carried out orders of deportation but concluded that he was not obligated to do so. If the Attorney General did not act, the writer opined that alien would be obligated to depart on his own. Failure to do so would leave him vulnerable to prosecution for "willfully refusing to present himself for deportation" — a crime punishable for up to ten years.

   With regard to Nazi operatives, most of whom are in their late sixties or older, a ten-year sentence would effectively ensure that they would never have to return to the country specified on the deportation order, yet would remain incarcerated.

   For added insurance, the memo suggested increasing the statutory maximum period of incarceration for failing to willfully depart.

   (3) prosecuting the alien criminally for misrepresentations based on current "reliance . . . or use of fraudulently-acquired citizenship or naturalization documents." Charging multiple misrepresentations would lead to a long jail term. The memo also suggested increasing the penalty for such crimes and extending the statute of limitations.

   (4) arranging for extradition to a country which has jurisdiction to try the alien for his alleged war crimes;

   (5) repealing or modifying the Holtzman Amendment, although the memorandum acknowledged that this was not politically feasible;
(6) amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to (a) prohibit the deportation of aliens to countries with "sham legal systems" or (b) provide the Attorney General with discretion to withhold deportation to such countries. The memo recognized that it would be difficult to establish criteria to identify such legal systems, and if any "friendly countries" met such criteria, this could cause "considerable political damage."

(7) amending the law to provide for criminal prosecution in the United States before an individual could be deported to a country with a "sham legal system." (This, the memo acknowledged, presented the same difficulties as the preceding suggestion.)

(8) entering into an agreement with another country to accept an OSI defendant in exchange for some requested favor.


72. See p. 227, n. 80, re the circumstances under which a deported person can return to the United States for burial.
Chapter Four: Protecting Our Borders

Introduction

OSI's litigation generally targets persecutors who have settled in the United States. There are, however, many instances of persecutors applying to enter on a less permanent basis – for tourism, business, family visits, or simply to transfer airplanes en route elsewhere. It is much simpler and quicker to keep someone from entering than it is to denaturalize and/or deport him after he has gained admission. Not only is the process more streamlined at this early stage, but the burden of proof is different. It rests with the alien to establish his eligibility to enter, rather than on the government to prove his ineligibility to remain. Moreover, one who is excluded cannot avail himself of the many levels of legal appeal open to defendants in denaturalization and deportation proceedings. OSI has been able to prevent many more persecutors from entering the country than it has ejected through litigation.¹

¹ Between 1989, when OSI began keeping detailed records of the matter, and this writing, the government has kept more than 170 people of concern to OSI from entering the United States. By contrast, since OSI's founding in 1979, 60 people left the country as a result of litigation or threatened litigation. (This figure is not a full measure of OSI's efforts, however, since many died before a case was filed or litigation was complete.)
The Watchlist

OSI's ability to preclude entry depends largely on "the Watchlist." Although the term is singular, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the State Department each has its own list of excludable persons. The DHS list is in part a composite of lists originally prepared by Customs and INS, which both now are part of DHS. DHS uses its list to screen entrants at ports of arrival; the State Department list is intended to keep consular officials abroad from issuing a visa to persons ineligible to enter. The lists contain millions of names, among them terrorists, suspected drug dealers and criminals. Up to 80,000 names were placed on each list at OSI's behest. They include SS officers, concentration camp guards, members of mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen), persons denied entry to the United States under the DPA, individuals wanted or convicted by other nations of war crimes, and persons successfully prosecuted by OSI.

The only criterion for placement on the Watchlist is that there be a "reasonable basis to suspect" that the individual is excludable. OSI recommends placement on the Watchlist if there is reason to believe a person assisted the Axis powers in persecution based on race, religion, national origin or political persuasion because such a person would be excludable under the Holtzman Amendment.

When someone on the Watchlist applies for a visa, the State Department notifies OSI. If OSI determines that the person is *per se* excludable (he served in a unit or organization which had persecution as its principal purpose), no visa will be issued. However, if the applicant is arguably admissible (e.g., he served with the SS but it is unknown whether his unit was involved in persecution), OSI will do research, send pertinent information to the State Department, and request that they question the applicant on specific issues. Based on his answers and the
information gathered by OSI, a determination of eligibility is made by the State Department Consular Officer. If the applicant is admissible, his name is removed from the Watchlist and the visa is issued.

Not all aliens go through the visa process however. In July 1989, the United States instituted a program to permit most nationals of selected countries to enter the United States for up to 90 days without a visa.² OSI feared that an unintended consequence of this tourist-enhancing program would be to facilitate the entry of persons involved in persecution during World War II. The office therefore proposed limiting the waivers for Germans to those born after 1925. The State Department refused, concerned that such a restriction:

would not be consonant with our stated policy of requiring that the program be the same in the U.K., Japan, and any other country named to participate. Such a step would be perceived in Germany as the de facto penalization of a whole generation of Germans, and would stimulate a strong and negative reaction.³

INS, however, did make an accommodation at OSI’s request after the visa waiver program was instituted. In 1995, they modified the questionnaire which must be completed by persons entering the United States from visa waiver countries before they can disembark from an overseas flight. INS form I-94 now includes the question: “[B]etween 1933 and 1945 were you involved, in any way, in persecution associated with Nazi Germany or its allies?” If the person answers yes (no one ever has), he will not be admitted.

When a visa waiver traveler whose name is on the Watchlist arrives in the United States, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – successor to INS – notifies OSI;⁴ OSI then faxes questions to be asked of the traveler. Unless it is quickly clear that the person should not be on the Watchlist, or does not match the name listed, he is sent back to his originating port.⁵ He can
then apply for a visa; if he does so, OSI will have sufficient time to determine whether he is excludable under the Holtzman Amendment. If he is, OSI passes that information on to the State Department.

In some instances, a person entering with a visa is stopped at the port of entry because his name is on the Watchlist. (Most likely he was issued a visa because he was not examined fully at the time he applied or was not truthful in the answers he gave during the application process.) Again, OSI is notified and faxes questions to be posed to the applicant under oath. For those on SS lists, OSI also may ask that the traveler remove his shirt to determine whether he has a tattoo under his left armpit. (Many, though not all, SS members were given a tattoo denoting their blood type.)

The inspector is instructed to call OSI as soon as the interview is complete. If the answers indicate that the visitor's Nazi-era past was fully examined by the State Department before the visa was granted (and the State Department confirms this was so), the applicant is admitted and his name removed from the Watchlist. However, if the visa was granted before he was placed on the Watchlist, if the traveler was not questioned about his wartime activity when he applied for the visa, or if it appears in some respect that the visa was improperly granted, then OSI asks that the visa be cancelled. If the person is clearly inadmissible (e.g., a camp guard), he is given the options of remaining in custody pending a hearing before an immigration judge or departing on the next available flight. (Most persons take the second option.) If the traveler is in the grey area of admissibility (e.g., an SS officer who claims his unit had no involvement in persecution), he may be allowed in for the duration of his visit or scheduled for another interview ("a deferred inspection") several days hence. The traveler's passport, itinerary and return ticket
are taken by the inspector to insure that he will return for the next interview. By then OSI will presumably have gathered more information. If it turns out that there is no basis for exclusion, the deferred inspection may be cancelled. Alternatively, if there is added reason to doubt his eligibility to enter, there will be additional questioning and he may be told to leave.6

Of the tens of thousands of names OSI has placed on the Watchlist, most come from massive lists of potentially excludable people (e.g., SS officers). OSI first began placing names on the list in 1980 and has added to it as more World War II era documents become available. (In August 2000, an OSI attorney determined that if all persons over 90 were eliminated from OSI's entries – based on the presumption that they are either dead or unlikely to travel – there would be 24,000 names still on the list.)

The presumptive validity of the listing for a particular individual can be tested once the person applies for a visa or makes an effort to enter the country.7 In a few instances, however, OSI has undertaken a comprehensive investigation to determine whether a particular person should be preemptively listed or removed from the list. The most famous of these individual watchlist studies is that of Kurt Waldheim, former Austrian President and United Nations Secretary General. His listing is discussed elsewhere in this report.8

OSI prepared two other exhaustive and independent Watchlist reports. One concerned Harry Männil, an Estonian who OSI learned had been a wartime member of two organizations which persecuted Jews.9 When denied entry in 1994, Männil hired Martin Mendelsohn to persuade the government to delete his name from the Watchlist. At the time, Mendelsohn also represented the SWC in the United States. Ironically, the Wiesenthal Center's Israeli office first brought Männil to OSI's attention.
Mendelsohn forwarded affidavits in support of Mannil to OSI. One was from former President Gerald Ford who had known Mannil since 1974. President Ford swore that he found Mannil "to be an upstanding[] fair, honorable, humane citizen" who had:

never exhibited tendencies or character that would lead me to believe that he engaged in anti-Semitic activity or that he was someone who engaged in the killing or arrest of individuals while in the service of Estonian Self Government under the occupation of Nazi Germany.

OSI reviewed archival material, transcripts from relevant war crimes trials, as well as statements made by Mannil and people who knew him during the war. It concluded that there was credible evidence not only that Mannil had served in persecutory organizations, but that he personally arrested and interrogated Jews and suspected Communists. His name therefore remained on the Watchlist.

Things went differently for André Bettencourt, a French Senator, former Cabinet official, and industrialist whose name was referred to OSI by Serge Klarsfeld, a prominent French Nazi hunter. Klarsfeld reported a series of allegations stemming from Bettencourt's having written anti-Semitic articles in the French press during World War II. Because France had no mechanism for dealing with Nazi propagandists, Klarsfeld urged the United States to place Bettencourt on the Watchlist. New York's Governor George Pataki and Senator Alfonse D'Amato joined in the request.

Bettencourt conceded that he had written some anti-Semitic articles and expressed regret for having done so. OSI reviewed his writing (only two articles referenced Jews) and found it significantly different from the writings of propagandists OSI had prosecuted. Whereas they had described Jews "as posing such an immediate and serious danger to society as to make the
drastic measures adopted against them appear to be justified," Bettencourt had focused more on historic misdeeds by Jews. His name was therefore not referred to the Watchlist.

It is hard to prove that a person did not come to the United States because he knew he was listed on the Watchlist. Nevertheless, in at least one instance it seems possible that a highly prominent Nazi who would otherwise have come refrained from doing so. Georg Liebbrandt was the third ranking official in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. He was one of only 15 persons attending the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 where plans for implementing the “Final Solution” were discussed. Among his many contributions to the Third Reich, Liebbrandt had helped draft a decree which defined the term Jew more broadly than it had been defined under the notorious Nuremberg laws. This expanded definition subjected more people to annihilation.

In 1979, the newly formed OSI learned that Liebbrandt had been issued a visitors visa five years earlier. (INS records show that he spent five weeks in the United States in 1974.) At OSI’s request, Liebbrandt was placed on the Watchlist and his visa was revoked in December 1979. Although people are not generally told that they are listed, they do get notified if their visa is revoked. Liebbrandt never applied for another visa; he died in 1982.

Less prominent than Liebbrandt, but still significant in the Nazi power structure, was Hermann Josef Abs, honorary president and former director of West Germany’s Deutsche Bank. His wartime responsibilities at the bank included supervising and financing the Nazi Aryanization program which compelled the sale of Jewish companies to German enterprises at vastly undervalued prices. Abs also had served on the Board of Directors of several companies that exploited slave labor to reap large profits during the war, including I.G. Farben, Siemens,
BMW, Daimler-Benz and Mannesmann Iron Works. After the war, he was convicted, in absentia, of war crimes by a Yugoslav court.

As a prominent international banker, Abs had traveled to the United States many times. In 1982, he was appointed by the Vatican to serve on an advisory board to the Vatican bank, which was then under investigation. OSI believed this appointment would lead to additional U.S. travel. In January 1983, OSI asked that he be placed on the Watchlist. Although INS agreed to do so, OSI learned years later that the agency did not follow through. This error was apparently without consequence, however, since there is no record of Abs' having returned to the United States after 1981.

Although the Watchlist is generally a mechanism for keeping people from entering the country in the first instance, it has on at least two occasions served to alert OSI that someone may have erroneously been allowed to enter the U.S. years earlier. Alexander Schweidler, an ethnic German from Slovakia, emigrated to the U.S. from England in 1965. He had served as a guard at the Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria. His name was one of many which OSI, as part of its routine research, asked INS to check in the 1980s. It came back negative, causing OSI to conclude that he was not in the United States. By chance, Schweidler traveled outside the United States for the first time in 1992. When he tried to reenter, there was a Watchlist hit. As a documented alien (he had never sought citizenship), he was allowed to reenter, but OSI began an investigation and ultimately filed a deportation action. Schweidler was deported to England in 1994.

The events of 9/11 indirectly led to the second instance of after-the-fact Watchlist identification. As a result of increased security following the attacks of 9/11, DHS began to run
Watchlist checks on all resident aliens seeking to renew their green cards. One such check in May 2005 provided a hit for a former SS officer who had been in the United States since 1960. As of this writing, he is under investigation by OSI.

Not all Watchlist hits have gone smoothly. One significant mishap involved Gunther Tabbert, who entered from Germany in September 1993. (A deferred inspection was set up because Tabbert had a visa issued years earlier.) By the time of the deferred inspection, OSI knew that Tabbert had been chief of a branch office of German Security Police in Latvia. In a 1970 German trial for war crimes, the court found that Tabbert had selected the site for a mass murder of ghetto Jews and had ordered his forces to dig a trench which later served as the death pit. Nonetheless, he was acquitted, the court surmising that he acted out of fear of retribution.

Whether or not he was criminally liable in Germany, his actions involved persecution of Jews on behalf of the Nazis. After OSI interviewed Tabbert, INS told him he would have to leave the next day. Overnight, and without any notification to OSI, INS changed its position. They offered a plethora of reasons, including the fact that Tabbert had only a few days remaining on his scheduled tour; there was no likelihood that he would overstay; sending him back would be vindictive; he posed no present danger; he was old; his wife was with him; he had not actually been convicted of war crimes; he had a visa, and he had been in the United States twice previously. He returned to Germany several days later when his tour was completed.

It is, of course, impossible to know the number of times the system has failed completely and a person on the Watchlist has been admitted to the U.S. If the person is traveling under an assumed name there would be no Watchlist hit. But at least twice persons traveling under their proper names and birthdates have been admitted despite the fact that their names were listed.
In 1995, Helmut Oberlander, who at age 17 allegedly served as an interpreter for an SS mobile killing unit, entered the U.S. from Canada. (The day preceding, the Canadians had filed a denaturalization case against him.) OSI received a tip about the entry from a Canadian who also alerted the office to the fact that Oberlander owned a condominium in Florida. Director Rosenbaum and an OSI investigator flew to Florida. They found Oberlander and his wife in an apartment which the wife acknowledged they had owned for six years. The OSI team advised Oberlander that if he did not leave voluntarily, he would be turned over to INS and detained until he had a hearing on his admissibility. He chose to leave. OSI helped make the travel arrangements; Rosenbaum and the investigator drove him to the airport, and he left that day.

The second known failure of the system concerned Chester Wojciechowski, against whom OSI had filed a denaturalization complaint in 1985. Two years later, before litigation was complete, Wojciechowski moved to Germany. An order of denaturalization was issued and Wojciechowski was placed on the Watchlist. Since he had not been deported, he was allowed by law to receive his Social Security payments in Germany.

In response to a routine inquiry from the Social Security Administration in 2001, Wojciechowski stated that he was about to return to the United States for a visit with his family. Social Security notified OSI. A check of INS records showed that Wojciechowski had made at least three extended visits to the United States since his voluntary departure. At OSI’s behest, a State Department consular official in Germany presented Wojciechowski with a letter from Director Rosenbaum notifying him that he could not return to the U.S.

While the typical use of the Watchlist in OSI-related matters is to prevent Nazi persecutors from entering the country, there have been a few unusual uses of the Watchlist. One
involved Japanese persecutors who wanted to enter the United states in order to apologize and explain their role in World War II. Their story is set forth elsewhere in this report.24

Another involved a criminal prosecution of Germans placed on the Watchlist by OSI. The matter was handled by the United States Attorney’s Office in Hawaii. Two German nationals stopped at the Honolulu airport in 1990 were charged with making a false statement (denying their wartime activity when applying for a visa) and using a visa procured by means of fraud. One of the men pled guilty, was fined $55,000 and returned to Germany; the other was convicted after trial and deported.25

Finally, OSI once was in the anomalous position of filing a lawsuit simply to ensure that it could ultimately place someone on the Watchlist. In 1990, OSI learned that a naturalized U.S. citizen, who had served as a camp guard, was living abroad. He had moved overseas in 1975 and there was no indication that he intended to return to the United States. However, there was no way to preclude his doing so— for either a visit or permanent relocation — since U.S. citizens cannot be prevented from returning to the country. Rather than the usual situation of filing a case in the hope of ultimately evicting a Nazi persecutor from the U.S., OSI filed a denaturalization action to preclude his ever returning. The case settled, citizenship was revoked, and his name was then placed on the Watchlist.26
1. While there is an enormous overlap, the lists are not identical.

2. Those coming in under the program waive the right: (1) to review or appeal the determination of admissibility at the port of entry; or (2) to contest, other than on the basis of application for asylum, any action for deportation.

3. Feb. 2, 1989 letter to Director Sher from Joan Clark, State Department Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs. Two years later, when the State Department proposed adding Austria to the list of waiver countries, OSI raised the same objections, again to no avail.

4. Unfortunately, in a fair number of cases, the call mistakenly goes to the State Department rather than OSI. If no one at State is reached or they do not pass the information over to OSI, the traveler is admitted. If and when OSI learns of the entrance, it is sometimes too late to track down the traveler. OSI’s efforts to have the office number posted at all ports of entry have had limited success.

   INS was dissolved in 2003. Most of its former responsibilities relating to OSI matters were transferred to ICE, the largest investigative arm of DHS.

5. In two cases, investigations were begun and denaturalization cases filed in Canada after OSI informed the Canadians of the travelers’ background. See p. 487.

6. Airlines with landing rights in the United States have entered agreements providing that they are responsible for return airfare if a visa waiver traveler is turned back at the port of entry. If a traveler is allowed to enter the United States while the government gathers information, it is not clear who is responsible for paying the cost of return passage. In some instances, the United States purchases the ticket.

7. Because the names were incorporated en masse, there are many errors possible in the listings. Among them is the fact that some of those on the list became U.S. citizens before their names were listed; citizens cannot be kept from entering the country. OSI’s only recourse then is to file a denaturalization case.


10. For a listing of the affiants, see p. 521, n. 34.


12. May 7, 1996 memorandum to Rosenbaum from OSI historian Elizabeth White, then Chief of Investigative Research. All references to OSI’s research on Bettencourt come from this memo.
13. In one of the articles however, Bettencourt writes of the “Jews’ cry of ‘May his blood fall again on us and our children.’ You know, moreover, in what way it [Christ’s blood] has fallen and still falls. It is necessary that the prescriptions of the eternal book be carried out.” While OSI acknowledged that this sounded “perilously close to a justification for the persecution being suffered by the Jews in France,” it concluded that this was not its intent since it was unlikely Bettencourt was aware of actions being taken against Jews at that time.

14. Jeffrey Mausner, the OSI attorney who handled the matter, could not recall how he had first learned about Liebbrandt’s visa. But once he did, Mausner prepared a report outlining Liebbrandt’s activities on behalf of the Third Reich. Although his memo was forwarded to Germany, the Germans never charged Liebbrandt with a crime.

15. INS records establish that he visited the United States 14 times between 1972 and 1981.


17. Mar. 11, 1983 memo from INS General Counsel Maurice Inman, Jr. to Marvin Gibson, Acting Associate Commissioner, Examinations.


19. For a discussion of his fate in England, see p. 492.

20. Sept. 15, 1993 memo to Director Sher from Edward Stutman, OSI senior trial attorney. All statements hereafter about the Tabbert affair come from this memo unless otherwise noted.

21. This suggests that they probably entered the country multiple times, but it is unknown whether that is indeed the case.


In Feb. 2000, a Canadian court concluded that Oberlander’s citizenship had been obtained by fraud. His citizenship was revoked in July 2001. The ruling was reversed in May 2004 on the ground that the Canadian Cabinet – which ultimately determines whether citizenship should be revoked – did not consider Oberlander’s personal circumstances, including “50 years of irreproachable life in Canada,” nor did it explain how his case complied with government policy on denaturalization. As of this writing, the Canadian government is seeking to reinstitute denaturalization proceedings. “CTV News Says Government to Move to Strip Citizenship of five Suspected Nazis,” The Canadian Press, June 10, 2005; “Canada Struggles for Six Decades to Bring War Criminals to Justice,” by John Ward, The Canadian Press, Oct. 15, 2005.
23. The letter explained, in part, that he would have to complete an I-94 Form (see p. 300) and that if he falsely denied assisting in persecution he would be subject to criminal prosecution. See discussion of *U.S. v. Paal* at p. 305, where one such case was prosecuted.

24. See pp. 503-505.

25. Both defendants had gotten visas shortly before the visa waiver program went into effect. Although the men could simply have been sent home – as OSI would have handled the case – there may have been other factors at play. The USAO had shortly before criminally charged several Japanese crime figures with visa fraud, leading some to accuse the U.S. Attorney of racial bias. INS suggested to Director Rosenbaum that the criminal prosecution of Germans was in part intended to show that there was no racial motivation in the earlier prosecutions.

   A historian recommended by OSI testified at the trial, and OSI helped the USAO assemble and analyze historical material. The Hawaii conviction was upheld on appeal. *U.S. v. Paal*, (unpub'd), 937 F.2d 614, 1991 WL 126642 (9th Cir. 1991).

Kurt Waldheim – A Prominent International Figure

Austrian President Kurt Waldheim is the only head of state ever placed on the Watchlist. The decision to place him there was made by the Attorney General of the United States after consultation with the State Department and review of a report prepared by OSI. The listing put OSI at odds, in varying degrees, with Waldheim, the Austrian government and Simon Wiesenthal.

Waldheim’s wartime activity was first brought to the government’s attention by the WJC. In January 1986 Eli Rosenbaum – who had been an OSI attorney and would later return to OSI – was serving as General Counsel to the WJC. The WJC had received a tip that Waldheim had served as a senior intelligence officer with the German army in the Balkans from 1942 to 1945. Rosenbaum began to investigate.

At the time, Waldheim was a candidate in the upcoming Austrian presidential election. He had already served two terms (1972 - 1982) as Secretary General of the U.N. His recently published autobiography, like all official statements about him, stated that he had been wounded on the Russian front in 1941 and had spent the remaining war years as a law student in Vienna.¹

Rosenbaum began to learn otherwise. He found documents showing that Waldheim had served in a unit that had taken civilian hostages, burned homes, and shot male prisoners. The WJC gave its preliminary findings to The New York Times.² After doing some of its own investigation, the newspaper reported that Waldheim had served with a German Army command that fought “brutal campaigns against Yugoslav partisans and engaged in mass deportations of Greek Jews.” His commanding officer had been executed for war crimes.³

Faced with documentation establishing his wartime posting, Waldheim conceded that he
had served in the Balkans rather than attended school from 1942 to 1945. However, he denied knowing about, or being involved in, any atrocities or persecution. He insisted that he had been a mere functionary and accused his opponents of releasing derogatory information in order to damage him in the upcoming presidential election. 4

Shortly after the allegations became public, both the WJC and former Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman asked the Attorney General to place Waldheim on the Watchlist. 5 At the Attorney General’s request, Director Sher reviewed the documents released by the WJC. As early as April 7, 1986, Sher recommended the Watchlist placement.

As a counterintelligence officer in a unit which — according to orders of its commander — was engaged in activities which included reprisals against civilians, the taking of hostages, the burning of homes and destruction of villages, and the shooting of male prisoners, Waldheim must be considered implicated in activities which fit squarely within the Holtzman Amendment. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that among his responsibilities were prisoner interrogations (and we know from the military order that prisoners were treated very harshly) and “special tasks.”

Sher concluded that:

if such a person was a United States citizen (who had concealed his wartime service in the Balkans, as Waldheim has done for decades) he would be an OSI subject and a prime candidate for denaturalization proceedings. 6

DAAG Richard joined in the Watchlist recommendation, although he noted it might be best to defer action until renewing longstanding requests to the U.N. to turn over its war crimes files. 7

Waldheim’s son sought a meeting with officials at the Justice Department to present his father’s response to the allegations. After meeting with him and reviewing some of the material, AAG Trott urged caution.

I am not persuaded that we ought to take any action at this juncture other than to continue privately to review with great care the evidence on the subject. I remain
very skeptical based on the timing of these charges, the fact that Kurt Waldheim has been a world-renown person for years without any of this coming to the fore, Waldheim’s assertions that he can refute or explain everything, and Waldheim’s support by no lesser an authority than Simon Wiesenthal.

So, let’s get the United Nations (U.N.) file and continue to study the evidence, and let’s do it without any public comment whatsoever. . . . We have a special obligation under these unusual circumstances not only to enforce our own laws but also to not allow ourselves to be used as a wedge in the Austrian electoral process. It also goes without saying that we do not want to slander any person before we get all the facts and determine what they mean.\(^8\) (emphasis in original).

The U.N. files, obtained shortly thereafter, revealed that Waldheim’s name was on a U.N. War Crimes Commission list of persons who “should be delivered up for trial.”

Sher again recommended a Watchlist posting.\(^9\) Before either of his memoranda reached the Attorney General, and only nine days before the Austrian election, one of Sher’s memos was released to the media “by a former Justice Department official.”\(^10\) AAG Trott sought to determine the source of the leak;\(^11\) he was unable to do so.\(^12\)

The Austrian government also reacted to the leak. In a letter to the Attorney General, the Austrian Ambassador warned that placement on the Watchlist at this time “could be considered in Austria first and foremost as an interference in the current presidential campaign.”\(^13\) The Attorney General assured the Ambassador that the Justice Department would act “with due regard for the sensitivities of the Presidential campaign to avoid as much as possible any appearance of interference.”\(^14\)

On May 4, 1986, Waldheim received 49.64% of the votes – just short of the majority needed. He won a runoff election the following month. Many, including Waldheim, his chief opponent, the president of Vienna’s Jewish community and Simon Wiesenthal, credited the Nazi
allegations with strengthening Waldheim’s support. In their view, the Austrians were reacting, in part, to perceived outside interference in their internal affairs.  

Days after the election, Sher wrote yet another memorandum urging that Waldheim be placed on the Watchlist. Meanwhile, OSI began looking into the allegations. It relied largely on the material from the WJC but also uncovered new information from the Yugoslavian archives. This information concerned the role Waldheim’s unit had played in processing prisoners for deportations and executions. OSI (and Rosenbaum, then still at the WJC) also reviewed hundreds of pages of material presented by Waldheim’s son and attorneys. The material came in waves, as Waldheim responded to a series of new revelations. OSI found his responses riddled with inconsistencies, distortions, and misleading statements. AAG Trott thought Waldheim’s submissions were starting “to sound like the ‘I-just-worked-there-and-followed-orders’ explanation.”

Waldheim’s responses also contained prophecies of dire consequences to the world political order if the U.S. were to place him on the Watchlist. According to Waldheim’s attorneys:

The action of the Department in the matter of Kurt Waldheim will have significance far greater than that contemplated by the narrowly focused issues addressed by the Immigration and Nationalities Act, and greater even than any injury to personal reputation or status that might result from Dr. Waldheim’s name being placed on the “watch list”. Adverse action against Dr. Waldheim by the U.S. Government would seriously undermine larger U.S. interests in which Austria is a factor. Such an action could hamper the effectiveness of Dr. Waldheim’s leadership, and thereby reduce Austria’s pivotal role in Europe, where it enjoys a unique status as a bridge between the eastern and western blocs.

In April 1987, OSI completed a 204-page report containing a comprehensive account of
Waldheim's wartime service from 1942 and 1945 and a detailed refutation of Waldheim's defense. The report concluded that Waldheim – who was awarded a prestigious medal by the Nazi puppet regime in Croatia – had been involved in the transfer of civilian prisoners to the SS for exploitation as slave labor, the mass deportation of civilians to concentration and death camps, the use of anti-Semitic propaganda, the turning over of Allied prisoners to the SS, and reprisal executions of hostages and other civilians. Moreover, as the officer responsible for assessing prisoner of war interrogation reports at the headquarters of his Army Group, Waldheim played a key role in determining the fate of individual prisoners. His wartime record thus established that he had "assisted or otherwise participated in persecution because of race, religion, national origin or political opinion." OSI again recommended that he be placed on the Watchlist.22

By happenstance, before the Attorney General reviewed the report, a reporter was preparing an article on the possible deportation of Karl Linnas to the Soviet Union. The reporter went to OSI's offices to meet with its deputy director. The resulting article was as much about Waldheim as Linnas. Indeed, the opening line read: "A photo of Austrian President Kurt Waldheim... hangs on the wall of the unmarked offices..." The article ended with another reference to Waldheim.

There have been calls for the office to take up the Waldheim case following allegations that the former U.N. secretary-general was aware of German atrocities in the Balkans. [OSI's deputy director] denied that any formal investigation is under way.

Asked why Waldheim's picture was hanging on his wall, he replied with a smile: "No comment."23

The article (the accuracy of which the former deputy director disputes)24 triggered a
protest from the Austrian ambassador. He complained that the picture display:

might even suggest that the part of the arm of the Department assigned to gather, consider and evaluate evidence for decision making by you as Attorney General lacks the appropriate objectivity. To convey the impression of such an attitude seems all the more disturbing since it concerns a matter with broad international implications.25

On April 27, 1987, the Department of Justice and the Department of State announced that Kurt Waldheim “as an individual” was being placed on the Watchlist. While he remained president, he could enter the U.S. for matters of state. Admission would be denied only if the State Department concluded that the visit would be “prejudicial to the public interest.”26 However, he would not be allowed to enter for non-official reasons during his presidency nor for any reason after his presidency ended.

The Justice Department’s press release explained that:

[t]he standards applied in placing persons on the Watchlist do not require a finding of having engaged in “war crimes” or “crimes against humanity.” The statutory standard is met if a person assisted or participated in any material manner in any form of proscribed persecution. Such cases are frequently based upon a person’s membership in an organization listed as “inimical” because of its particularly heinous activities, or upon a person’s playing a role in an organization or operation that provides a reliable basis for inferring the proscribed assistance or participation. Efforts by a person to hide or otherwise distort potentially improper activities have routinely been regarded as significant in determining whether a prima facie case exists.

The release also sought to stanch any diplomatic fallout.

Relations between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of Austria have traditionally been close and friendly. We share a fundamental commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We highly value our relationship with Austria and we will work to strengthen our friendship.

Shortly after the Watchlist decision was announced, DAAG Richard and Director Sher -

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at the request of the State Department -- went to Vienna to explain the findings which led the
Attorney General to his decision. Despite U.S. efforts to preserve the diplomatic status quo,
there were repercussions from the Watchlist decision. Austria briefly recalled its ambassador to
the United States and opened a global public relations campaign to regain international
acceptance of President Waldheim. Concomitantly, the State Department ordered the U.S.
Ambassador to limit his contacts with the new Austrian president.

Years later, Austrian sensitivities were still raw. In 1990, Sher told a WJC meeting in
Berlin that he was proud to report that Waldheim would remain “persona non grata” in the
United States. Austria summoned Washington’s chargé d’affaires to express concern over the
remark and to make clear that Sher was unwelcome in Austria. Sher had planned to travel to
Vienna with then OSI Principal Deputy Director Rosenbaum to participate in an OSI deposition.
The Austrians advised that it would not comport with consular conventions for “a functionary of
a foreign administration” to conduct official business in Austria. Sher could come only as a
“private citizen.” Rosenbaum went to Vienna alone.

Although the Justice Department released the broad outlines of its Waldheim report, the
document itself was not made public. When an international commission of historians
appointed by the Austrian government to examine Waldheim’s past asked for the report, their
request was denied. However, Director Sher sent a letter assuring the commission that the
Justice Department’s findings were sufficient “to implicate Mr. Waldheim personally.”

The contents of Sher’s letter were reported in the media. Once again, the matter
escalated diplomatically. The Austrian Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the State Department
saying that it was “astonish[ed]” by OSI’s lack of cooperation and “dismayed” by the fact that
Sher's letter had been quoted in the newspapers.\textsuperscript{34}

The international commission was not the only outside group seeking a copy of OSI's report. Two lawsuits were filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain the report and supporting documentation. In one case, the plaintiff was a curious prisoner; in the other, the plaintiffs were a retired intelligence officer and a journalist. The government opposed release of the material on two grounds set forth in an affidavit from Director Sher: (1) the report was an "internal, pre-decisional" document designed for the Attorney General; and (2) its release would enable Waldheim "to tailor testimony and shape evidence in a manner favorable to him" should the Austrian government challenge the listing.\textsuperscript{35} In both lawsuits, the court upheld the government's right to withhold the material.\textsuperscript{36}

Shortly after the decision involving the journalist and intelligence officer was issued, Eli Rosenbaum's book \textit{Betrayal, the Untold Story of the Kurt Waldheim Investigation and Cover-Up}, was published. Rosenbaum began writing the book while serving as General Counsel to the WJC; he completed the book on his own time after he returned to OSI. The book recounted the WJC's efforts to document Waldheim's World War II past.\textsuperscript{37}

In an effort to bolster his FOIA case, counsel for the journalist and intelligence officer referenced the book in a letter to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General. The letter complained that Rosenbaum, as a non-governmental employee working for the WJC, had been given access to documents denied the FOIA plaintiffs.

[1] Indeed, Rosenbaum boasts in his book that he was twice given special access to secret Justice Department documents on Waldheim, and that he frequently had conversations relating to the Waldheim investigation with OSI Director Neal Sher.
The attorney added that he had discussed the book with the Austrian ambassador who was:

extremely troubled that a high-ranking Justice department official can publish a devastating attack on Waldheim (which, for all I know, is entirely accurate) while the Austrians are being denied any access to the materials on which the Justice Department's decision was based. 38

The Attorney General had already assured the Austrians that the Department would review its position on the Waldheim materials. 39 In March 1994, the Department released the report under recently-loosened FOIA guidelines. 40

In addition to the FOIA cases, the Waldheim matter spawned litigation abroad. In 1988, the Austrian government filed a criminal defamation action against Edgar Bronfman, president of the WJC. The litigation was triggered by Bronfman's statement that Waldheim "was part and parcel of the Nazi killing machine." The Austrians requested assistance from the Justice Department because Bronfman was an American citizen. 41 The Department turned down the request, concluding that it would create "an untenable conflict" to play a role "no matter how minor, in facilitating a criminal defamation prosecution by Austria where we have already confirmed the truthfulness of the statements which form the basis of this prosecution." 42 The Austrians ultimately dropped the case, citing the Justice Department's refusal to cooperate as one reason for doing so. 43

In February 1988, the Austrian-appointed international commission of historians issued its report. Although they found no evidence that Waldheim was personally involved in war crimes, they strongly criticized him for not trying to halt atrocities of which he was aware and for concealing his wartime record. 44 Waldheim touted the report as proof of his "personal innocence." 45 As he saw it, condemnation of him would necessitate condemnation of other
soldiers who served in areas of fierce fighting, including those in Viet Nam, because they knew that “terrible things happened.” OSI did not share this perspective. In a comment which reportedly angered many Austrians, Sher opined that the historians’ report “would probably have sufficed to condemn [Waldheim] at Nuremberg.”

A year later, the British issued their own Waldheim report, narrowly focused on whether Waldheim had interrogated British prisoners of war in the Balkans or was responsible for the harsh treatment or execution of British commandos. They found no evidence of his personal involvement, although they concluded that he must have been aware of the activities. Sher was publicly critical of the British report. “To say that he had no involvement is preposterous, clearly absurd.”

The Waldheim matter also brought OSI into conflict with Simon Wiesenthal, the 1980 recipient of a special Congressional gold medal for having helped track down over 1,100 Nazis worldwide. Wiesenthal, who lived in Austria, repeatedly voiced doubt that Waldheim had been personally involved in any acts of persecution. He saw Waldheim as an “opportunist” rather than a war criminal, but did challenge Waldheim’s claim of ignorance concerning the persecutory activities committed by others in his unit. Sher accused Wiesenthal of warning him not to push too hard on the matter. Wiesenthal vehemently denied trying to intervene in OSI’s investigation and the two men exchanged testy letters. Tensions escalated even further after the publication of Betrayal, as the book discussed, in very harsh terms, Wiesenthal’s efforts to “protect” Waldheim.

In 1996, Rosenbaum was invited to discuss his book on a German television program. He agreed, after cautioning the producers that he would not be speaking as a government official.
but rather in his private capacity as an author. He asked that a statement to that effect be made to the viewers. Unfortunately, it was not. On the contrary, he was identified during the show as "Chief, Nazi Prosecutions, U.S. Department of Justice."

During the broadcast, Rosenbaum was asked about Wiesenthal. While acknowledging that Wiesenthal had achieved some "positive things," he was very critical of the Nazi hunter.

He claims to have found 1,100 or now 1,200 Nazis. I think he's mostly a Nazi-hunter and not a Nazi finder. The number is surely very, very low; it might be under ten.

***

I don't believe that without Wiesenthal's support Waldheim could have been elected president.

***

The words I would use for Mr. Wiesenthal? Incompetent, egomaniac, spreader of false information, tragic figure. He betrayed the hopes, even the dreams of survivors who thought that there would be some serious, credible effort led by this man to bring to justice the killers of their families, and he betrayed the hopes of all of us who are not survivors who shared that dream.54

The comments drew enormous media attention in Germany and galvanized Wiesenthal supporters in the United States. Wiesenthal himself threatened to go before Congress and renounce the gold medal he had received sixteen years earlier.55 U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd, the son of a Nuremberg prosecutor, wrote to the Attorney General to express his "outrage" at Rosenbaum's comments.56

The Department of Justice assured Senator Dodd that it was "working diligently with representatives of the Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles and Mr. Wiesenthal's attorney" to resolve the contretemps. As part of the effort, Attorney General Reno agreed to speak at the Wiesenthal Center.57 Her remarks, delivered on June 13, 1996, described Wiesenthal as "an individual who has devoted his life to insuring that Holocaust victims receive a justice in death
that they were denied in life." The Department also arranged for Wiesenthal to receive a letter of praise from President Clinton. Using the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, the president praised Wiesenthal for "forcing an often reluctant world to confront [a] painful subject." He added that "[o]ur government appropriately recognized your visionary leadership in the arena of international human rights when Congress authorized the President to confer a gold medal on you in 1980."58

Over the years, there have been various efforts made to persuade the United States to remove Waldheim from the Watchlist. In 1989, the Austrian government sent a diplomatic note to that effect to the State Department and Waldheim himself sent a handwritten letter to President George H.W. Bush.59 In 1994, the Austrian Foreign Minister urged U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali to intervene in order to enable Waldheim (whose presidential term had ended) to attend celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the United Nations.60 That same year, shortly after public release of the OSI report, the Austrian Ambassador appealed to the Department of Justice to rescind the Watchlist decision.61 In 1998, the Austrian ambassador to the United States asked the State Department to issue a visa allowing Waldheim to attend a U.N. celebration of its fiftieth anniversary of peacekeeping operations.62 And in 2001, the Austrian government again urged reconsideration of the Watchlist decision based on the fact that recently declassified CIA material contained no reference to Waldheim's wartime activities.63 All these requests were denied.

OSI's working relationship with the Austrians had been strained even before the Waldheim matter arose64 and the countries had been trying to negotiate a mutual cooperation agreement on OSI/Nazi matters. That initiative was derailed in light of the Watchlist decision.65

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In addition, the Austrians suddenly refused to honor a 1954 commitment to readmit persons who emigrated from Austria to the United States under the RRA if the United States could show that the emigrant had obtained a U.S. visa “by fraudulent means or on the basis of false statements.”

The issue came to a head in 1988 after OSI defendant Josef Eckert, who had entered the United States under the RRA, was ordered deported to Austria. Austria indicated that it was not willing to accept him. Officials from the Departments of State and Justice (including OSI Assistant Deputy Director Michael Bernstein) met with the Austrians to discuss the matter, first in Washington and then again in Vienna. At the conclusion of those negotiations, the two governments agreed to a procedure that would assure readmission in most RRA cases.66

While the December 1988 agreement resolved the question of readmission (Austria accepted Eckhart in 1989), the issue of investigative cooperation remained unsettled. During an informal meeting with an attorney-advisor at the State Department in 1994, the Austrian Ambassador indicated that a legal assistance agreement would not be signed unless the Department agreed to reexamine the Waldheim decision. Nonetheless, the U.S. did not alter its position. It was another four years before a Memorandum of Understanding was finally adopted providing for judicial assistance from Austria in OSI cases.67

The impact of the Waldheim exposé and his placement on the Watchlist was enormous. In 1991, the Austrian government officially acknowledged the country’s role in the Holocaust, thus ending its long-held position that the country was Nazi Germany’s first victim. An Austrian historian involved in bringing about this acknowledgment credited the Waldheim affair with creating a climate in which such a reckoning was finally possible.68 Although the WJC had been the first to publicize Waldheim’s direct involvement in acts of persecution, OSI’s additional
research made the case stronger. The U.S. government’s decision to place a sitting president on the Watchlist – despite the inevitable diplomatic awkwardness of such a move – gave enormous credibility and legitimacy to the matter. The world was forced to confront the fact that a renowned diplomat had worked with the Nazis to persecute civilians and then had concealed the matter for decades. Although Waldheim won the Austrian election, he was largely isolated during his presidency. Very few foreign countries or dignitaries would deal with him directly.

While he stands out as the only head of state ever placed on the Watchlist, his listing was unusual in another regard as well. Prior to the Waldheim revelations, the U.S. had not put any members of the regular German Army (Wehrmacht) on the Watchlist. SS men were presumed to have been involved in persecution; military men were not. After Waldheim – and others who served with him – were listed, the historical record was made that persecutory activity was not as “confined” as previously thought.

In 1992, Waldheim chose not to seek reelection. As of this writing, he receives a U.N. pension and resides in Austria. He is still on the Watchlist.


7. Apr. 7, 1986 memo from DAAG Richard to AAG Stephen Trott re “Kurt Waldheim.” The United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) was established in 1943 to collect, record and investigate evidence of war crimes and to advise governments on the legal procedures to be adopted in bringing suspects to trial. It circulated lists of war crimes suspects and brief details of their alleged crimes alleged to Allied governments. The organization remained active until 1948. As early as April 1980, the newly-formed OSI had requested access to the files. See Apr. 28, 1980 letter to Secretary General Waldheim from Attorney General Civiletti referencing an April 3, 1980 request by OSI personnel. Access to the files for research purposes was denied. On June 8, 1984, Director Sher renewed the request in a letter to John Scott of the U.N. Secretariat. Once again, access for general research purposes was denied. However, the U.N. offered access for particular charge files provided that the name and identifying data of the subject were provided to the U.N. See Sept. 23, 1986 letter to Alf Erlandsson, Chief Archivist, U.N. Archives from AAG Weld.

8. Apr. 10, 1986 memo from AAG Trott to DAAG Richard and Sher re “Waldheim Investigation.”

9. Apr. 21, 1986 memo from Sher to DAAG Richard re “Kurt Waldheim.”


11. Apr. 25, 1986 memo from AAG Trott to Sher re “Leak of Waldheim Report.”

12. DAAG Richard called a meeting of OSI personnel to express his strong displeasure about the leak. He warned that office matters should not be discussed with former Department officials or
members of OSI and advised that anyone unable to abide by such rules should leave the Department of Justice. Apr. 30, 1986 memo from DAAG Richard to AAG Trott re “Waldheim Visit with OSI.” Director Sher denied that OSI played any role in leaking the document. Apr. 30, 1986 memo from Sher to AAG Trott re “ Leak of Waldheim Report.”


14. May 6, 1986 letter to Amb. Klestil from Attorney General Meese. Not all public figures shared the Attorney General’s sensitivity. Shortly before the election, N.Y. Sen. Daniel Moynihan warned that “the people of Austria really ought to know that to elect Waldheim would give a kind of symbolic amnesty to the events at Salonika.” “Moynihan: Waldheim Is a Liar,” by David Holmberg, New York Newsday, Apr. 22, 1986. (Waldheim served with a German unit stationed in Salonika, Greece when Jews from that town were rounded up and deported to concentration camps.)


16. May 9, 1986 memo from Sher to DAAG Richard re “Waldheim.”


18. In his 1993 book Betrayal, The Untold Story of the Kurt Waldheim Investigation and Cover-Up (St. Martin’s Press), p. 314, Rosenbaum describes having the material delivered to him by an intermediary from “a mutual friend at Justice.” (The book was co-authored by William Hoffer.)


20. May 28, 1986 memo to Attorney General Meese from AAG Trott re “Waldheim.”


24. As former deputy director Michael Wolf recalls the interview, he explained to the reporter that the photograph “reminded me why I was doing this sort of work. I opined that if Waldheim was not too old to be President of Austria, then our defendants could not be too old to be prosecuted.” Aug. 20, 2003 e-mail from Wolf to Judy Feigin.


34. Dec. 7, 1987 diplomatic note from the Embassy of Austria to the State Department.

35. Supplemental Declaration of Neal Sher, filed in Nevas v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 89-00042 (D.D.C.).

36. St. Hilaire v. Dep’t of Justice, 1992 WL 73545 (D.D.C. 1992); Mapother and Nevas v. Dep’t of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533 (C.A.D.C. 1993). (In the latter case the court remanded to the lower court the question of whether the Department should have released just that portion of the report that contained an inventory of Waldheim’s military postings.)

37. One of the conditions of Rosenbaum’s return to the Justice Department was that he be recused from all matters relating to Waldheim.

39. The assurance was apparently given orally at a forum sponsored by the American League for Exports and Security Assistance. Id.

40. The guidelines, issued in 1993, provided that documents were to be withheld only if “disclosure would be harmful” to the government. (In Oct. 2001, these guidelines were superseded by others calling for the withholding of documents as long as there was a “sound legal basis” for doing so.)

41. The Austrians asked the U.S. to execute letters rogatory, which involve a formal request from a court in one country to “the appropriate judicial authorities” in another country for compulsion of testimony, documentary or other evidence, or service of process.

42. July 8, 1988 letter to Mary Mochary, DOS Principal Deputy Legal Adviser from DAAG Richard.

43. Two other reasons given were their view that an international commission had “determined Waldheim’s personal innocence,” and “an endeavor to contribute to calming down and reconciliation.” “Waldheim Cancels Suit Against Bronfman,” AP, The New York Times, July 3, 1988. The international commission report is discussed on p. 318.


52. June 12, 1990 letter from Wiesenthal to Sher; June 14, 1990 letter from Sher to Wiesenthal.
53. Jan. 18, 1996 e-mail from Rosenbaum to reporter John Goetz re “interview request.”

54. “Panorama,” Feb. 8, 1996. Rosenbaum is not the only public figure to have questioned Wiesenthal’s role in finding Nazi persecutors. See e.g., And the Sea is Never Full, by Elie Wiesel (Alfred Knopf), pp. 127-131.

55. March 1, 2000 recollection of DAAG Mark Richard.


57. May 22, 1996 letter to Senator Dodd from Andrew Fois, AAG for Legislative Affairs.

58. Sept. 24, 1996 letter to Wiesenthal from President Clinton. Four years later, in August 2000, President Clinton presented Wiesenthal with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor.


60. Cable 08653 from AmEmbassy, Vienna to the Secretary of State, Sept. 29, 1994.

61. June 15, 1994 letter to Austrian Ambassador Helmut Tuerk from AAG Jo Ann Harris.


64. See e.g., May 2, 1986 letter from Director Sher to James Hergen, Ass’t Legal Advisor at DOS, advising that the Austrian government was granting only restricted access to their archives and would not allow OSI any contact with Austrian residents who might possess information useful in OSI investigations. Although the letter was unequivocal, in fact there had been some level of cooperation. One such example was Austria’s willingness to have OSI contact Robert Jan Verbelen and anyone else in country as part of OSI’s investigation of the U.S. government’s post-war relationship with Verbelen. Verbelen is discussed at pp. 385-389.


66. Austria would be given the evidence in all RRA cases and would have 30 days to seek consultation with the United States. Absent a request for consultation, the Austrians would grant readmission. If a consultation were sought and the parties could not thereafter agree, the U.S. could still seek readmission and all efforts would be made to resolve the issue “through
diplomatic negotiations."

The agreement was signed on December 21, 1988. That day Bernstein flew from Vienna to London. He made a last minute change of plans and boarded Pan Am flight 103 from London to New York. A bomb exploded mid-air, killing all 259 people on board (plus 11 on the ground). In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for this terrorist act.

67. Under the agreement, assistance is to include information from, and access to, court and administrative files, including military files and archival documents. Austrian authorities will take testimony in the presence of U.S. representatives who can suggest questions. Independent investigatory activities are prohibited.


Chapter Five: Alleged U.S. Support for Entry of Former Nazis into the Country

Introduction

Whether the United States helped persecutors enter the country has implications for our nation in terms of the values it may reflect. Did we knowingly permit major or even minor Nazi persecutors to enter, and if so, what justification was given? At what level within the government was there legal and moral authority to advance such a policy? And were efforts made to conceal such activities from the public in order to advance some perceived higher national good?

OSI did not originally conceive its mission as including the need to answer these questions. But it was inexorably drawn to the issues when subjects argued that they were in the country at the behest, or with the knowledge, of the United States – allegedly in return for information or services supplied to the government during or after the war.

OSI learned that some persecutors were indeed knowingly granted entry. America, which prided itself on being a safe haven for the persecuted, became – in some small measure – a safe haven for persecutors as well. Some may view the government’s collaboration with persecutors as a Faustian bargain. Others will see it as a reasonable moral compromise borne of necessity.
Arthur Rudolph – An Honored Rocket Scientist

As early as July 1945, the U.S. War Department brought selected German and Austrian scientists to the United States under military custody for “short-term exploitation.” The immediate goal was to have them pursue military research in an effort to shorten the war with Japan. The longer term goal was to keep the Soviet Union and other countries from gaining access to the information and skills of many elite members of the scientific community.

With the direct approval of the president of the United States, the program was extended after the close of hostilities:

in order to permit the Armed Services of the United States to take advantage of German scientific and technical progress in such fields as guided missiles and aerodynamics, pending formulation of governmental policy to permit legal entry of these and other specialists... to pursue research and development projects for both military and civilian agencies.

Ultimately codenamed “Operation Paperclip,” the program was designed to exclude anyone who was more than a “nominal participant” in Nazi party activities or had been an “active supporter of Nazism or militarism.” Those scientists who wished to settle permanently in the United States could, “at a later date... be granted regular status under the immigration laws.”

Eventually, hundreds of scientists came to the United States under the program. Those seeking permanent residence had to apply for a visa. Once it was issued, they had to leave the country and then “formally” reenter. They generally did so through a Mexican border city.

During the war, Arthur Rudolph had served as Operations Director at the massive Mittelwerk underground V-2 rocket manufacturing facility. The factory was part of the Dora-Nordhausen concentration camp complex and used prisoners of war and slave laborers. The latter group included thousands of Czech, Polish, Russian, and French political prisoners, as well
as Jewish and Jehovah's Witness inmates. The laborers, wearing striped concentration camp uniforms, came from Nazi camps including Auschwitz and Buchenwald. They were guarded by armed SS men as well as kapos, and worked 12-hour shifts in cold, damp, and dusty tunnels. Thousands perished, generally from malnutrition, exhaustion and overwork; some were murdered. Until Dora got its own crematorium, the dead were burned at Buchenwald.

Rudolph was one of the first Germans to come to the United States under Operation Paperclip; he arrived in December 1945. Although INS knew that he had been a member of the Nazi party and that he had worked at Mittelwerk, there is no indication that they had any information about his use of slave labor. On the contrary, there was much to recommend Rudolph. The number two official at the Department of Justice urged INS (an agency then under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department) to admit him. Based on information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army, the official opined that failure to do so "would be to the detriment of the national interest."

In 1949, Rudolph went to Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, where he received a visa and then formally reentered the United States under the INA. Although the "assistance in persecution" provisions of the DPA and RRA were inapplicable, State Department visa regulations prohibited the entry of an alien "who has been guilty of, or has advocated or acquiesced in, activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf of the Axis countries."

Rudolph became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1954 and worked in the U.S. rocket program until his retirement from NASA in 1969. He was considered the father of the Saturn V rocket which enabled the United States to make its first manned moon landing. At his retirement, NASA awarded him the Distinguished Service Award, its highest honor.
OSI learned about Rudolph by chance. Two recently published books attracted Eli Rosenbaum’s attention in 1979, shortly after he completed a summer internship at OSI. One was about the Dora camp itself; the other discussed German scientists in the United States rocket program. The latter had a reminiscence from Rudolph about his dismay at being called from a New Year’s Eve party in 1943/1944 to have rocket parts moved. An accompanying picture showed prisoners of war moving the parts. Rosenbaum knew that the Geneva convention forbids having prisoners of war work on munitions, and he was particularly offended by Rudolph’s taking umbrage at missing a gala party while slave laborers toiled. When he began work at OSI a year later, he persuaded the office to open an investigation of Rudolph.

Nineteen people from the Dora-Nordhausen complex had been tried in 1947 before a U.S. military court in Dachau, Germany. The transcript of that trial, as well as much of the pre-trial investigative material, was on microfilm at the National Archives. The investigative material included a 1947 interview of Arthur Rudolph, who was a potential witness in the case. He discussed attending a hanging of 6 to 12 Dora inmates accused of sabotage, and ordering the laborers under his supervision to bear witness. The file also contained a diagram, prepared by the 1947 prosecution team, of the underground rocket factory. A dotted line labeled “Path of Overhead Crane Trolley [sic] On Which Men Were Hung” came very close to Rudolph’s office. Testimony at the German trial indicated that Rudolph received daily prisoner strength reports which showed the number of prisoners available for work, the number of “new arrivals,” and the number of people lost through sickness or death.

Armed with this information, OSI twice interviewed Rudolph. He acknowledged knowing that prisoners were dying of disease, overwork, mistreatment and malnutrition. Faced
with a diminishing work force, he had requested labor replenishments from the SS, and knew that these replacements came “probably from Buchenwald or somewhere else.” He also allocated the laborers within Mittelwerk.

Given Rudolph’s statements, both in 1947 and to OSI, the office recommended filing a denaturalization action alleging that Rudolph should not have been allowed to formally enter and obtain citizenship. OSI argued that as a supervisor, Rudolph was directly responsible for exploiting slave laborers and that this was persecution which violated the State Department regulation barring entry to persons who participated, advocated, or acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human decency. Forcing slave laborers to watch hangings was, according to the prosecution memo, a form of “terror” which further added to the persecution. OSI also recommended that this persecutory activity be the basis for a charge that Rudolph lacked the good moral character essential for citizenship.

Although the U.S. knew when he entered the country that Rudolph had been at Mittelwerk, OSI contended that its own research – including its two interviews of Rudolph – gave a much clearer picture of his true accountability than had been previously known. The office acknowledged that some might argue against prosecuting Rudolph because of his contributions to the space program. OSI countered, in part, that failure to bring charges would present more serious concerns. Among other things, it would give credence to the criticism that the office discriminated against non-Germans (i.e., Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Latvian camp guards) who occupied low-level collaborationist positions during the war, never belonged to the Nazi party, and lived quiet lives in the U.S.

The Department of Justice authorized filing the case and OSI notified Rudolph. Faced
with the prospect of an imminent prosecution, he entered into a written agreement with the government: he would leave the United States and renounce his citizenship. The United States agreed to withhold any announcement of the matter until Rudolph had departed. Rudolph in turn agreed not to contest allegations that, while at Mittelwerk, he participated in the persecution of unarmed civilians because of their race, religion, national origin or political opinion.

OSI hoped the agreement would have an impact far beyond the individual case.

When other OSI subjects and defendants see that the department is prepared to go after someone of Rudolph's stature and importance (and presumed official "connections"), the depth of the Government's commitment to the Nazi prosecution program will become ever more apparent to them. The fact that a man of Rudolph's obvious sophistication and intelligence was willing to surrender without a fight cannot fail to make a powerful impression upon them and to increase significantly the likelihood of our securing similar settlements in other cases.

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The government's willingness (without any "outside" prodding, moreover) to publicly acknowledge – and punish – the complicity in Nazi persecution of such an individual will, I am convinced, significantly bolster the public's confidence in the integrity of the Justice Department's Nazi prosecution program.\(^{13}\)

Rudolph went to Germany in October 1984 and forfeited his U.S. citizenship. When questioned by the press, however, he denied any wrongdoing. He maintained that he "tried to help the poor forced laborers to have their conditions improved" and that he renounced his citizenship only to avoid the sensationalism and cost of litigation in light of his health and age.\(^{14}\)

Former Congresswoman Holtzman, convinced of the accuracy of OSI's conclusions, asked NASA to rescind the medal earlier awarded Rudolph. The agency refused to do so.\(^{15}\)

As recounted elsewhere in this report,\(^{16}\) the West Germans did not initially welcome Rudolph's return; they were angered that they had not been forewarned by OSI. Nonetheless,
they began an investigation of their own (aided by material provided by OSI) to determine whether Rudolph was subject to criminal prosecution for murder, the only relevant crime not barred by their statute of limitations. In the end, no charges were filed, and Germany restored the citizenship Rudolph had renounced when he became a naturalized United States citizen.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1989, Rudolph went to the U.S. Consulate in Hamburg, Germany and applied for a visa to reenter the United States. His request was denied. The following year, the Department of Justice learned that Rudolph was planning to fly to Canada.\textsuperscript{18} OSI alerted the Canadians, who briefly detained Rudolph when he arrived, then released him on bond pending deportation proceedings. The case received extensive publicity in the United States, as Rudolph’s cause was championed by Ohio Congressman James Traficant.\textsuperscript{19}

Rudolph testified at the Canadian hearing, claiming he had been shocked to learn that concentration camp inmates would be used as a source of labor at Mittelwerk. One day after this testimony, a historian at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum notified OSI of two documents he had found in Germany. They showed that Rudolph was not simply aware of the use of slave laborers at Dora; he had in fact worked to institute that program.

The first document was an April 1943 report, signed by Rudolph, stating that he had recently visited a factory which utilized concentration camp inmates as forced laborers under SS guard; Rudolph recommended that the same system be used in the rocket program. The second was minutes of a June 1943 meeting attended by Rudolph in which he was told to work with the camp commandant to implement such a program.\textsuperscript{20} OSI obtained copies of both documents and forwarded them to the Canadian authorities. The Canadian court concluded that Rudolph “called for, made use of and directed” slave laborers who suffered “indescribably brutal” conditions.\textsuperscript{21}
Rudolph was sent back to Germany in 1992.

Shortly thereafter, he filed suit against the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and four OSI attorneys who had been involved in his case. He sought to have his settlement agreement rescinded and to be granted readmission into the United States. He claimed that the government had misled him into believing that it had sufficient evidence to file a denaturalization suit when in fact a key witness had actually exculpated him in a declaration under oath. His suit was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. He filed another suit, this time claiming that he was wrongly denied a visa to enter the United States in 1989 and the right to enter Canada in 1990. He asserted also that his civil rights had been violated during his OSI interviews because some of the questions had been “incriminatory, impermissibly suggestive and argumentative” and he had not been advised of his right to, or need for, an attorney prior to the second interview. These claims too were rejected by the court, some because there was no basis for them under the law and others because they were barred by sovereign immunity.

Rudolph died in Germany in 1996. He was the only Paperclip scientist prosecuted by OSI. His case raises the question of whether persons involved in persecution on behalf of the Nazis can ever expiate their past. Patrick Buchanan, often an OSI critic, believed that the contributions Rudolph made to the United States space program earned him the right to remain in the country. Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, expressed a similar view.

I am inclined to think he should have been recognized as having paid whatever debt to society his World War II activities deserved because of his very deliberate effort to contribute his science and technology, which was of great genius to the United States and to the strategic defenses of this country in the troubled period after World War II.
OSI saw it differently.

[D]eciding to refrain from seeking Rudolph's denaturalization simply because of the work he performed for our government would, it can be argued, amount to a desecration of the memories of Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Niels Bohr, and other leading scientists who made at least equally substantial contributions to our nation - but who did so either after being forced by the Nazis to leave Germany or after voluntarily risking their lives to flee the introduction of Hitler's racial policies in Europe.\(^{39}\)

However one views Rudolph's life work, there is no doubt that camp inmates were victimized by a brutal system of which he was a part. In 1990, the Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution opened a permanent exhibit on V-2 rockets. One of the exhibit panels reads:

Concentration camp prisoners built V-2s under unbearably harsh working conditions. Thousands perished in the process.

2. The percentage of Jews at Mittelwerk was relatively low.

3. His “Statement of Personal History” (date unknown) explained why he had joined the Nazi party. As he saw it, the vast unemployment in Germany caused a proliferation of socialist and communist parties which could take control of the government. He joined the Nazi party “to help, I believed, in the preservation of the western culture.”

4. Feb. 28, 1949 memorandum from Peyton Ford, The Assistant to the Attorney General to Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization re “German Scientists Program Immigration of Arthur Louis Hugo Rudolph.” (The position of Deputy Attorney General, the current number two position, was not officially established until 1950. Prior to then, The Assistant to the Attorney General was second in command.)


6. The picture was listed as coming from the personal collection of Werner von Braun who came to the United States as part of Operation Paperclip in 1945. Von Braun went on to become the first Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, serving from 1960 to 1970. He died in 1977, before OSI’s founding.


8. One of the defendants, George Rickhey, had come to the U.S. under Operation Paperclip. He was arrested in Ohio and sent back to Germany to face trial. Fifteen of the defendants were convicted of various crimes; Rickhey was one of the four acquitted.


10. Apr. 21, 1983 Prosecution Memorandum to DAAG Richard from Director Sher.

11. OSI did not recommend charging Rudolph with either misrepresentation or concealment, although most OSI cases at that time had one or both as part of the filing. The office did not want to give Rudolph a “triable issue” as to whether the government was aware, prior to his entry, of his wartime activities. Prosecution memorandum, pp. 7-8.

12. See p. 533.


17. In order to prove murder, Germany would have to establish “base motive” - a mental state (such as racial hatred) at the time of the offense. Germany lacked proof that Rudolph had knowledge of the executions beforehand. July 30, 1990 memorandum to Rosenbaum from Peter Black, Chief Historian, OSI re “West German Investigation of Arthur L.H. Rudolph.”


Traficant’s opposition to OSI is discussed further on pp. 160, 543, 553, notes 56-58.

20. Aug. 3, 1990 memorandum from Rosenbaum to the Rudolph file re “Documents on Rudolph Found at Freiburg by Dr. Michael Neufeld.” The documents, as catalogued in Freiburg, are RH8/v.1210, pp. 105-06, 136-37.

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22. The attorneys were Allan Ryan, Neal Sher, Eli Rosenbaum and Bruce Einhorn. The first three conducted the initial OSI interview of Rudolph; Sher and Rosenbaum did the second.


25. Others were investigated but not prosecuted, either because the government lacked sufficient evidence, the men were too ill, or they died before OSI's investigation was complete. After the Rudolph case, and likely as a consequence of it, none of the rocket scientists would submit to an interview with OSI.

   In 1993, the WJC brought public pressure to bear on Ohio State University and Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, each of which had honored Hubertus Strughold, a Paperclip scientist who had been a leader in the field of aerospace medicine. (Strughold died in 1987.) As a result of the WJC pressure, Ohio State removed reference to Strughold from a stained glass mural commemorating leaders in the history of medicine. "Alleged Nazi's Name on Library Stirs Protest," by Mark Smith, *The Houston Chronicle*, Oct. 29, 1993. In 1995, after Air Force personnel reviewed material at OSI, the Strughold Aeromedical Library at Brooks Air Force Base was renamed. "Name of Scientist Nixed from Library Due to Nazi Past," by Alissa Kaplan, *JTA*, Oct. 6, 1995. Eleven years later, pressure from the ADL led the New Mexico Museum of Space History to remove Strughold's name from its Hall of Fame. "Former Nazi Removed from Space Hall of Fame," *The San Jose Mercury News*, May 18, 2006.

   In 2003, the Space Medicine Branch of the Aerospace Medical Association contacted OSI about Strughold. The association awarded a prize in his name and had recently been asked to rename the award. In order to evaluate the request, they wanted accurate information about Strughold's past. OSI advised that Strughold had been the subject of "a promising investigation in the early 1980s that had to be terminated after it was learned that he was no longer mentally and physically competent." The basis of the investigation was Strughold's apparent support of the infamous Dachau experiments, involving immersion of live subjects into freezing water for prolonged periods. Many of the subjects died. Mar. 23, 2004 letter to Dr. Denise Baisden from OSI Chief Historian Elizabeth White. As of this writing, the prize is still awarded in Strughold's name.

26. See e.g., pp. 95, n.1, 174, n. 46, 277, 279-281, 378, 552, notes 47 and 53.


29. Prosecution Memorandum, p. 45.
Tscherim Soobzokov – The Victim of Vigilantes

The story of Tscherim Soobzokov was suffused with intrigue from the start. There were allegations that he was a Nazi murderer, a CIA operative and a white collar criminal. Although none of the charges was ever tested in court, Soobzokov was killed, apparently by someone who believed the Nazi allegations to be true.

Soobzokov was the only OSI defendant from Circassia, then an Islamic region of the Soviet Union between the Black and Caspian Seas. He worked with the CIA during the 1950s. In 1955 he was admitted to the U.S. under the INA from Amman, Jordan. According to the Agency, it had no involvement in his obtaining a visa.

Six years after he emigrated, Soobzokov became a U.S. citizen. He settled in Paterson, New Jersey where he became active in Democratic party politics and was a controversial leader in the local Circassian community. In the 1960s, several members of that community urged INS to review his activities both before and after he entered the country. INS found no basis for action.

In 1972, one of Soobzokov’s political rivals reported him to the Social Security Administration. He claimed that Soobzokov was presenting fraudulent birth certificates to the Social Security Administration and bribing someone in the bureaucracy to accept the documents in order to obtain government subsidies for members of the Circassian community. While looking into the charges, the Social Security investigator heard rumors that Soobzokov had been in the SS and was involved in the killing of three Soviet officials during World War II. The investigator requested information from the Berlin Document Center (BDC), a repository of personnel and membership records of the Nazi party and its affiliated organizations. He received
a roster showing that first lieutenant Soobzokov had transferred from a foreign army into the Waffen SS in January 1945. A cover letter from the Director of the BDC said that while there were no other records about Soobzokov, she “assumed,” “based on similar cases,” that Soobzokov transferred from a group that had worked either with SS partisan-hunting units or SS mobile killing units. The investigator passed this information along to INS. In 1974, when the Justice Department released its list of 37 individuals under investigation for alleged war crimes, Soobzokov’s name was among them.

Reacting to pressure from Congresswoman Holtzman and “various individuals and groups in New York including B’nai B’rith,” INS ordered “a full-scale and comprehensive investigation.” Soobzokov gave a sworn statement, outlining his wartime activities. He claimed that after the Germans had overrun his home town, he performed clerical duties for the local chief of police (who was under German supervision) and then joined a German military unit in order to fight the Russians. He denied knowledge of any Nazi execution squads and claimed he had deserted after a few months. His asserted goal was to assist a group of Circassian refugees trying to escape from both the Germans and the Russians. He explained that a Circassian general fighting in an SS unit against the Soviets provided him with an SS uniform and listed him as a member of the unit. Soobzokov said that this enabled him to travel more readily in Nazi-occupied territory. He denied taking part in any duties or assignments for the SS. While acknowledging that he had not revealed his full background on his visa application (he had not mentioned any SS affiliation), he said that “[t]he correct information was given to another government agency and I do not understand why they have not come forward.”

INS interviewed members of the New Jersey Circassian community. The results were
The Service is becoming more and more involved in the internal feud of the Circassian Community of which [blanked out name] and Soobzokov are the leaders. Each childish action taken by one side is repeated by the other and then some sort of information is forwarded to this Service so that we become involved. It is becoming more and more difficult to maintain any type of dignity to this investigation because those members of the community who refuse to become involved look upon us as pawns of the leaders and shun our inquiries.9

In March 1976, INS announced that it was dropping the investigation.10 It was officially closed in January 1977.11 Ironically, that same month, the bestseller Wanted! The Search for Nazis in America was published. While alleging that there were dozens of war criminals in the country, the book focused on four, one of whom was Soobzokov. According to author Howard Blum, Soobzokov served as a first lieutenant in a mobile killing unit that had participated in the murder of 1,400,000 Jews on the Eastern front. The book also accused Soobzokov of criminal activity in the United States, specifically the Social Security scam outlined above. Blum suggested that Soobzokov’s political connections were protecting him from prosecution. After the book was published, the Jewish Defense League (JDL), a militant organization whose motto was “Never Again,” twice picketed Soobzokov’s home, chanting “Death to Soobzokov” and “No trial for Nazi murderers.” They also picketed the home of his attorney.13

Soobzokov aggressively fought the allegations in the media.14 He also filed several lawsuits against persons both inside the government and out. These included libel as well as invasion of privacy claims. The privacy suit was dismissed; a libel action against Blum and the book publishers was settled, with the terms sealed.15

The book and the attendant publicity led to renewed law enforcement interest in
Soobzokov. In May 1977, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York opened a criminal investigation to determine whether Soobzokov had lied to INS in his sworn interview, whether he was in fact involved in a bribery scheme with Social Security, and whether INS or the Social Security Administration had improperly thwarted an investigation. The State Department, at the request of the USAO, prevailed upon the Soviets to get statements from Soviet citizens who might have served with Soobzokov or known of his wartime activities. The Soviets forwarded a group of statements (taken between 1944 and 1978). Some of those questioned claimed to have seen Soobzokov murder Soviet officials on behalf of the SS, others to have only heard about such crimes; one said Soobzokov had admitted the murders to him. To counter these claims, Soobzokov submitted his own set of affidavits from persons who had known him during the war, including some of the refugees he allegedly had helped.

The SLU was established a month after the U.S. Attorney’s office opened its criminal investigation. In 1979, the U.S. Attorney’s Office closed its investigation and INS’ civil investigation passed from the SLU to the newly-formed OSI. At just about this time, a pipe bomb was left in a cigar box outside Soobzokov’s home. A note attached to the device read “Buddy. You didn’t kill enough of them. Have a smoke on me. Fedorenko.” A caller to the Associated Press warned that this was the first of many to be sent “to Nazi war criminals across the United States.”

OSI reviewed the material gathered by the Social Security Administration, the U.S. Attorneys Office and the SLU. These included the SS roster, a criminal record from the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet statements. OSI also obtained a 1978 deposition Soobzokov had given in the libel action against Blum. According to that deposition, Soobzokov had told the U.S. Vice
Consul in Amman about his SS membership and submitted a written statement about the matter. Soobzokov claimed the matter had been fully investigated before his visa was granted. Since Soobzokov’s INS record made no mention of a statement to the U.S. Vice Consul, OSI asked the State Department to search its files for the document. State found no reference to it. OSI also contacted the CIA and learned that Soobzokov had told the agency about his SS service at some point after he emigrated and before he became a citizen.

Although the statements by Soviet witnesses tied Soobzokov to possible persecutory actions, OSI personnel had not met the declarants. Moreover, “most of the better circumstantial witnesses” were dead. Without testing the testimony of the remaining witnesses “according to U.S. standards of due process and admissibility,” OSI was unwilling to base its case on their claims. However, the newly-established office wanted to file some cases quickly.

The Soobzokov case was particularly pressing since he was the only subject in Blum’s best-selling book against whom charges had not yet been filed. Rather than charging him with involvement in persecution, the government focused on his failure to disclose his full military and criminal history to the State Department at the time of his visa application, and to the INS when he sought citizenship. OSI filed charges in December 1979, alleging illegal procurement of citizenship (in that he had never been “lawfully admitted” because he had concealed pertinent information which would likely have barred his entry) and misrepresentations in his citizenship application. The complaint also charged that Soobzokov lacked the good moral character necessary for citizenship; the lack of good moral character was based on his misrepresentations. The media, in reporting on the case, stated that Soobzokov had “worked as a U.S. intelligence agent in Jordan in the 1950s, and may have been granted asylum secretly.”
Three months after the complaint was filed, Soobzokov submitted to OSI a copy of a 1952 document (State Department Personal Data Form V-30) on which he had listed all the information that the complaint alleged had been concealed. Soobzokov said he had given the form to the Consul in Amman at the time he applied for a visa. Although OSI had not seen this document in State Department or CIA files before the case was filed, it asked both agencies to search their files anew for any reference or copy of the form. The State Department found nothing, though it noted that some of its records from that era had been routinely destroyed.\(^\text{28}\) The CIA, however, produced copies of the Form V-30 as well as two other relevant documents. All were State Department records, though none were in the State Department's own files.

OSI had examined the CIA records before filing suit, yet found no copy of this material. The CIA told Director Ryan that the problem stemmed from application of the "third agency rule." Under that doctrine, one agency may not reveal documents classified by another. The CIA asserted that when it made its file available to OSI for review, it had removed the form V-30 and substituted a manila envelope captioned "State Department" and marked with the date of the document. This was done so that the reviewing OSI attorney would know to contact DOS and seek disclosure from that agency of the missing information. The OSI attorney who had reviewed the CIA files denied seeing any such envelope.\(^\text{29}\)

Whatever happened during the file review, the documents were now part of the case, and OSI had to determine their authenticity and impact. The office contacted persons who had been in Amman at the time the newly discovered documents were apparently prepared. Though none could remember the specific case, they did attest that the documents were of the type in use at the time.\(^\text{30}\) OSI also asked the FBI to examine the typeface on the documents; they learned that it
was from a typewriter manufactured in the mid-1930s and could well have been used in Amman.

Since the new information indicated that Soobzokov had told the State Department about his past when he applied for a visa, the Department of Justice determined that it could not, in good faith, pursue the SS misrepresentation charges, which were the crux of the complaint. And without misrepresentation, there was no longer a basis for the lack of moral character charge. The only charges left were those involving the unreported criminal record. Although the Soviets claimed Soobzokov had spent five years in custody, the statutes violated involved hooliganism and arbitrariness, both crimes used by the Soviets to pursue those who opposed the Communist state. The Soviet Union was unwilling to give details about the alleged criminal activity. Without additional information, the Department was not willing to pursue this charge either. Accordingly, in July 1980, the government moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion detailed the efforts OSI had made to verify its facts both before and after the case was filed.

OSI Director Ryan also issued an extensive statement of explanation to the press. In addition to reviewing the sequence of events, he sought to answer questions that he knew would be raised by the case.

Some may find it ironic that we must terminate this litigation because the defendant admitted his affiliation with organizations loyal to the Third Reich. But that, in my opinion, is the law, ironic or not, as it applies to this case. . . .

The question might well arise whether Soobzokov had any independent connection to the Central Intelligence Agency apart from the fact that the State Department apparently forwarded to that agency the information I have described. . . . I am aware that a claim of such a connection has been made in the public media. My answer to such a question is simply that I am not at liberty to reveal any such connection, if it exists, in this case or in any other case. I will state what is more to the point: My decision to seek dismissal of the complaint in this case, or in any other case — and indeed my decision whether or not to institute a proceeding in any case — is entirely independent of whether or not an individual
has any connection with the Central Intelligence Agency or any other government agency. I will also state that the CIA has not directly or indirectly sought to influence the decision to institute this case or to withdraw it. On the contrary, the CIA has been responsive to the requests we have made in our investigations. I take this occasion to restate what has been my determination since I came to the Office of Special Investigations in January: a decision to file legal proceedings, and necessarily any decision to withdraw proceedings once filed, will be made on the evidence and the law.33

Ryan went on to say that the investigation remained open; if the government developed sufficient evidence to prove Soobzokov had taken part in persecution, a new action would be filed.

Shortly thereafter, an OSI attorney traveled to the U.S.S.R. to question those witnesses who had previously given statements to the Soviet authorities. Those he could interview had limited, if any, information, and most of it was hearsay. The most damning information—alleged admissions of murder made by Soobzokov—came from an ally of Soobzokov's rival for leadership of the Paterson Circassian community. There was, therefore, the possibility of bias. Accordingly, OSI recommended, and the Criminal Division agreed, that the investigation be closed.34

There were varying reactions to the aborted case. Some were openly skeptical about whether the late-discovered documents were genuine, especially since the State Department, apparently the originating agency of the documents, had no record of them.35 Others found the CIA explanation plausible.36

Dismissal of the case was, tragically, a pyrrhic victory for Soobzokov. The Jewish Defense Organization (JDO), a splinter of the JDL, repeatedly called for violence against him.37 On August 14, 1985, a week after their last such exhortation, Soobzokov reported to the police that two people in a car had tried to run him down.38 Hours later, a fire broke out in the
Soobzokov car, parked in front of his home. A neighbor went to alert the family and a bomb exploded as Soobzokov opened the door. Soobzokov was fatally injured and died three weeks later. His wife, daughter and four-year old grandchild suffered injuries in the blast.

The JDO and JDL both denied responsibility. Nonetheless, the JDL “applaud[ed] the action” and the JDO described it as “a righteous act.” The FBI suspected the perpetrators were also responsible for two other bombings. One injured OSI defendant Elmars Sprogis; the second resulted in the death of Alexander Odeh, a west coast regional director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. As of this writing, none of these cases has been solved.
1. It is today part of the Karachay-Cherkessia Republic of the Russian Federation.

2. July 15, 1975 letter to INS Director from CIA (name deleted as part of declassification process) re “Your Request for Information Dated 3-21-75 Regarding Tscherim Soobzokov.” CIA authorization for his continued work with the Agency was cancelled in Apr. 1960 based on his poor performance during a series of polygraph examinations. See n. 34, infra.


5. Apr. 11, 1973 letter to Reuben Fier, SSA from Matild E. Holomany, Director, BDC.

6. Membership in a Waffen SS unit was not a disqualifying factor at the time that Soobzokov was seeking a visa (though it had been under the DPA). Participation in a mobile killing unit would, however, have made him ineligible to emigrate to the United States.

7. May 31, 1974 memorandum from Acting District Director, New York, New York to District Director, Newark, New Jersey.


11. Jan. 27, 1977 memorandum from INS Regional Director, Eastern Division to District Director, New York.


15. There were several libel suits. Defendants in two libel actions included Blum, his publisher and distributors, as well as several sources named in the book. A member of the Circassian community, depicted in the book as an accomplice of Soobzokov’s in the alleged Social Security scam, also sued. “Second Suit to Be Filed Over Book,” by Mark Gabriel, The Evening News (Paterson, NJ), Feb. 7, 1977.

The privacy suit was against Blum, the INS and Social Security investigators who looked into the allegations against Soobzokov, and HEW, then the parent agency of the Social Security Administration. The thrust of the privacy lawsuit was that the government’s investigators had violated the law by giving information collected during their investigations to the author. Soobzokov v. Blum, et al., No. 77 Civ. 1750 - CLB (S.D.N.Y. 1978).


17. See Mar. 29, 1978 letter from Soobzokov’s attorney to AUSA Siegel as well as Nov. 21, 1980 memo from OSI attorney Richard Sullivan to Ryan re “Soobzokov Investigation” (hereafter Sullivan memo). These two documents outline much of the evidence against Soobzokov and tell how and when it was collected.


19. In another example of the perpetrator’s sick humor, the return addressee on the envelope was Karl Linnas, against whom OSI filed charges several months later. Linnas was never a suspect in the pipe bombing. June 14, 1979 FBI teletype from Washington Field Office to FBI Director.


21. Because of statutory restrictions, the USAO could not share any grand jury material.


23. Undated draft prosecution memorandum prepared by OSI attorney Joseph Lynch (hereafter Lynch memo). Only a draft of the prosecution memorandum remains in the files and Joe Lynch has since died. It is therefore not clear what information was in the final version which the AAG reviewed before authorizing the filing.

24. Lynch memo, supra, n. 23.
25. Apr. 24, 2003 recorded interview with Richard Sullivan, an OSI attorney from 1979-1983, who became involved in the Soobzokov case after it had been filed; Oct. 6, 2000 recorded interview with Allan Ryan, who joined OSI a month after the case was filed.

26. The other three featured subjects were John Demjanjuk (against whom charges were filed in 1977); Valerian Trifa (1975) and Andrija Artukovic (1951).


29. Apr. 9, 1980 memo from Ryan to DAAG Richard re "Review of CIA Files."

30. OSI also found the secretary who had worked at the Embassy in Amman. However, she was no longer mentally competent.

31. The Soviet Criminal Code defined hooliganism as mischievous acts accompanied by manifest disrespect for society; arbitrariness was wilful exercising outside of established authority by any person of his actual or assumed right called into question by another person.

32. In one respect the motion misstated the facts. The moving papers asserted that pre-filing checks with the FBI and CIA revealed no information about Soobzokov having served with the Waffen SS, the local police or the Northern Caucasian Legion. In fact, as set forth in the draft prosecution memorandum, OSI knew that Soobzokov had advised the CIA of his SS connection after he arrived in the United States. The complaint, however, was based on his failure to notify the State Department or INS.


34. Sullivan memo, supra, n. 17; Dec. 3, 1980 memo to Sullivan from Director Ryan re Soobzokov Investigation; and Dec. 30, 1980 memo from Ryan to DAAG Richard re Tscherim Soobzokov.

In 2004, pursuant to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the CIA declassified various documents concerning Soobzokov. One discussed a series of polygraph examinations given to him by the Agency in 1953, 1956, 1957 and 1959. Untitled (due to redaction for declassification) memo hand dated Apr. 1960 (though in fact that date must be erroneous since the document references incidents of a later date.) In all, Soobzokov was polygraphed by the Agency seven times, each of them inconclusive according to a July 19, 1974 CIA document (untitled due to redaction prior to declassification) re Soobzokov.

In the 1957 polygraph, he admitted giving false information to the American Consulate in Jordan when seeking to emigrate. The report did not specify what information was false. In 1958, he acknowledged being in charge of an execution squad which killed a Soviet partisan.
(The polygrapher concluded that Soobzokov was an “incorrigible fabricator.”)

Notes in OSI’s files from one of the attorneys working on the case indicate that OSI was aware of all the polygraphs. However, most anti-partisan activity, even if it rose to the level of a war crime, would not come under the Holtzman amendment. There are exceptions however, e.g., if a partisan had been killed simply because he was Jewish.

As of this writing, OSI is unaware of evidence that Jews were still in the area when Soobzokov claims to have been active. OSI believes that the evidence to date would not establish that Soobzokov participated in crimes against Jews. Feb. 10, 2006 discussion with Director Rosenbaum.

35. Congresswoman Holtzman voiced skepticism. “CIA 1952 Files Save Ex-Nazi in Deportation Case; Blushing Prosecutors Withdraw Suit,” by Thomas O’Toole, The Washington Post, July 10, 1980. So did Bruce Einhorn, former Deputy Director of OSI. Recorded interview, Oct. 2, 2001. However, it should be noted that OSI has never come across a V-30 form in any State Department case file throughout the years. This suggests the possibility that these forms were not typically made part of the permanent record.

36. Mark Richard was in the latter camp.

I don’t want to sound like an apologist for the intelligence community, but especially in the early 80s, their file system was so rudimentary in terms of their ability to retrieve documents, that it was problematic at any given point that you had access to all documents on any given subject, notwithstanding that it was their intention. I have seen in the criminal area, the Agency just throwing up their hands at their inability to know what they even had. There were so many different systems of records. If you didn’t think to query a different component, no one would think of it.

Recorded interview, Apr. 18, 2001. Richard Sullivan, who worked at the CIA after leaving OSI, was in full agreement with this view. He noted that the matter arose in pre-computer days and that when the agency was established in 1947, it pulled together files from various organizations around the world. He recalled seeing “piles and stacks” of documents which no one had examined. Recorded interview, Apr. 24, 2003.

Allan Ryan too was not skeptical about the turn of events: “The fact that some consular file from Amman, Jordan in the early 50s . . . was not able to be reassembled from State Department files in 1980 doesn’t strike me as particularly unusual.” Recorded interview, May 7, 2003.


41. “Man Accused on Nazi Past, Injured by Bomb in Jersey,” *supra*, n. 39.


43. *See* p. 527.

44. A macabre footnote to the Soobzokov story surfaced two years after his death when the *New York Post* ran a nine-page display of wartime photographs allegedly found in a Paterson garbage heap three blocks from the Soobzokov home. The newspaper admitted paying $5,000 for the pictures, which showed hanged partisans and POWs, as well as images of Hitler, Mussolini and Goering on the Eastern front. The pictures were found in the back of a stamp album and one of Soobzokov’s neighbors told the newspaper that Soobzokov had been an avid stamp collector. Based on this, as well as the fact that some of the pictures appeared to have been taken in Soobzokov’s native Caucasus region, the newspaper concluded that “a mass of circumstantial evidence” indicated the photos belonged to Soobzokov. They drew this conclusion despite the fact that the Soobzokov family had moved from the area shortly after the bombing. “Album of Evil,” *New York Post*, Aug. 24, 1987. Although experts believed the photos were genuine, there was no evidence about who placed them in the garbage or how that person obtained them. Nonetheless, the leader of the JDO said “It looks like history’s proven us right.” “War Photos Found in Trash,” by Leslie Berger, *The Bergen Record*, Aug. 25, 1987.
The Belarus Conspiracy – Sensationalism vs. Reality

Over the years, John Loftus, a former OSI attorney, has made sweeping allegations of a government conspiracy to intentionally, but covertly, admit legions of Nazi war criminals into the United States. Loftus’ claims, rejected by historians as well as by the GAO, have focused on emigrés from Belarus.

Belarus (formerly Byelorussia or White Russia) has a tortured history of twentieth century subjugation. The country was partitioned by Poland and the U.S.S.R. after the Russo-Polish War (1919-1921). The portion taken by the Soviets became the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (B.S.S.R.).

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 provided for the division of Poland between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in the event of war. The following month both Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland. The Soviets formally annexed portions of the former Polish territory into the B.S.S.R. and Ukraine. Two years later, Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. and occupied Byelorussia, installing Nazi sympathizers in government posts. In 1944, the Soviets “liberated” the area and reinstalled it as a Soviet republic. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independent state of Belarus was established in 1991.

The fate of Byelorussian Nazi collaborators became a matter of abiding interest to Loftus when he joined OSI shortly after its founding. In February 1980, he wrote a memo stating that approximately 40 of the top 100 Nazi collaborators in Byelorussia were in the United States. He described them as:

cabinet level rank and above: Presidents, Vice Presidents, Senators, Governors (both civilian and military), Ambassadors, Editors in Chief, Army and Police Commanders, Cabinet Secretaries [sic] and their Division Heads, and other
luminaries of the Nazi regime.²

Loftus told then OSI Deputy Director Ryan that the U.S. intelligence community had knowingly defied immigration laws to make this wholesale emigration possible. The motive, according to Loftus, was to have the Byelorussians assist the intelligence community in anti-communist activities. Loftus even suggested that Ronald Reagan (who had been an actor during the relevant years) had been involved in the conspiracy.³

In October 1980, Ryan sent a memorandum (drafted by Loftus) to the Attorney General about the “Belarus Project.” Although OSI did not routinely apprise the Attorney General of matters under investigation, Ryan did so in this case partly because Reagan was then a presidential candidate. “I didn’t want any accusation that we were trying to cover things up or save Reagan a month before the election. . . . I also wanted expanded resources for this investigation.”

The memorandum detailed Loftus’ thesis, to wit, that the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a component of the CIA which worked with the Departments of State and Defense, had assisted Byelorussian Nazis in entering the United States under the guise of displaced persons. Based on “updated” information, the memo stated that virtually all the Nazi leaders had been brought over, not just the 40% Loftus had originally estimated. Although many of the emigrés had since died, the memorandum focused on five individuals considered most worthy of further investigation. Ryan advised that “the Belarus investigation is the single most important matter that OSI is now engaged in, and that thorough exploration of its ramifications is essential if OSI is to fulfill the Department’s mandate to take appropriate legal action against Nazi war criminals.”
Shortly after this memorandum was completed, additional information fueled Loftus' concerns. As noted elsewhere, in 1978 Congress had asked the GAO to determine whether the government had diligently investigated alleged Nazi persecutors living in the United States. The GAO concluded that no "widespread conspiracy" existed to obstruct the investigation of "Nazi war criminals" although there might have been undetected, isolated instances of deliberate obstruction. As part of its investigation, GAO had requested 111 files from the Department of Defense (DOD). In two instances, both involving Byelorussians, DOD had denied having information. Yet DOD's response to a 1979 request from OSI for hundreds of files had included information on both men. Ryan reported this discrepancy to DAAG Richard. DAAG Richard referred the matter to the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division for investigation into whether there had been an obstruction of Congress. The referral letter — relying on Loftus' assertions — credited OSI (i.e., Loftus) with finding the missing files. It also charged DOD with sanitizing information in one of the files.

Loftus left the government in August 1981 before any Byelorussian cases were filed. As others in OSI took over Loftus' investigations, they began to question his thesis. Although some individual investigations seemed plausible, no one could find evidence of a conspiracy to transplant en masse Byelorussian Nazis to the United States.

Early in 1982, the media reported that Loftus had provided Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass.) with material (some of it then classified) that suggested that the CIA, Air Force, Army, State Department, FBI, INS and a special group of the NSC were all part of a conspiracy. According to Loftus, these agencies employed Nazi war criminals as informants, knew of their "illegal" entry into the United States, and withheld that information from Congress during the
1977 hearings that had helped lead to the creation of OSI.\textsuperscript{9} Loftus also told the Congressman about the two Byelorussian men whose files he had allegedly uncovered. One was an SS general employed by the CIA/OPC, and the other was a cabinet-level official who worked as an informant for a number of U.S. agencies. Both had emigrated to the United States but had since died. Congressman Frank, concerned about a coverup, passed this information on to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.\textsuperscript{10}

In addition to promoting his ideas to Congress, Loftus wrote to DAAG Richard with a strategy for pursuing Byelorussian cases. He suggested proving that the "Byelorussian Collaborationist Movement" was linked to systematic persecution of Jews and therefore that mere membership in the movement would warrant denaturalization. OSI found his arguments too facile. According to then OSI historian David Marwell:

\begin{quote}
The allegations lodged against Byelorussians living in the United States are, almost without exception, limited to mere membership in one or more of the following organizations. . . . My initial investigation, although not complete, revealed no evidence to suggest that mere membership in any of these organizations would be sufficient grounds even to suspect persecution, let alone to initiate legal action.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

Nothing Marwell found in subsequent research altered his opinion.

Meanwhile, Loftus began a public campaign to promote his ideas. On May 16, 1982 he appeared on 60 Minutes, then the most popular television show in the country. He reiterated and expanded upon the allegations he had made to Congressman Frank: he now asserted that files had been withheld not only from Congress, but also from the courts, from the CIA, and from local agents of the Immigration Service. Loftus described finding the missing files in the Army's vaults. Moreover, he estimated that with the knowledge of the FBI, CIC, the Army and
the State Department, "more than 300" Byelorussian Nazis were in the United States, some working for "quasi-governmental" agencies like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

Loftus expounded also on his thesis that the Army had withheld relevant information from Congress; he believed it called into question the GAO's 1978 finding of no conspiracy to obstruct investigations. For Loftus, the conspiracy was ongoing. He claimed to have access to classified information which showed that the U.S. had recently admitted someone who had cooperated with the OPC "way back then." According to Loftus, there was "substantial evidence" that the recent admittee had persecuted hundreds of thousands of civilians.

Loftus' television appearance received front page coverage in major newspapers.12 Dozens of Congressmen wrote to the Attorney General, asking him to investigate whether there had been any violation of federal law.13 Both the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee asked the GAO to reopen its investigation.14 (GAO ultimately limited the focus of the new investigation to whether the U.S. government had assisted Nazi war criminals in entering the country.) DOJ issued a press release stating that the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division was investigating whether DOD had withheld documents.15

In order to further stanch the impact of Loftus' allegations, Ryan, with the approval of AAG Jensen, wrote to 60 Minutes. An excerpt of the letter was aired two weeks later (in a portion of the show then reserved for viewer comments). The letter asserted that the Byelorussian investigations were continuing and that cases would be brought if the evidence warranted.

AAG Jensen deemed the 60 Minutes broadcast of sufficient import to warrant alerting the Attorney General of its "consequences... and the action now being taken by the Department."16
He reported that OSI was investigating several Byelorussians, but so far had not found sufficient evidence linking the slaughter of Jews in Byelorussia to persons in the United States. He also told the Attorney General that the estimate of 300 Byelorussians was likely a vast exaggeration. Finally, he expressed concern that Loftus had improperly turned over classified material to Congressman Frank and had divulged some of that information (including the names of current OSI subjects) on television. He assured the Attorney General that the Criminal Division was looking into the matter.

60 Minutes rebroadcast the Loftus segment in September 1982. Ryan wrote a letter to be used in the rebroadcast, in which he challenged Loftus' assertion that over 300 Byelorussian Nazis were in the United States.

This irresponsible statement has understandably been taken by many people to mean that there are 300 Byelorussian war criminals living in the United States: "people who kill babies," in Mr. Loftus' words.

That is not true. Mr. Loftus persistently made such claims while he was employed by this Office, but he was unable to document them satisfactorily and eventually he left the Office. The investigation has continued quite thoroughly without him.17

The rerun included a statement by Ryan that "[t]he person [Loftus] described as persecuting hundreds of thousands of civilians was not a Nazi but a Middle Eastern national who had nothing to do with World War II."

Two months after the rebroadcast, publication of a book by Loftus brought the issue again before the public.18 The book expanded his charges beyond Byelorussia, alleging that between 1948 and 1950 "the State Department systematically imported the leaders of nearly all the puppet regimes established by the Third Reich from the Baltic to the Black Sea."19 It opened with a
dramatic account of Loftus surreptitiously making a midnight visit to a cemetery in New Jersey that held the remains of dozens of Byelorussian "war criminals." Describing Byelorussia, Loftus wrote: "In no other nation under German occupation did the inhabitants so willingly and enthusiastically visit such a degree of inhumanity upon their neighbors." 30

OSI had not been contacted for any fact checking by the publisher before the book went to press. Reviewing the book for the office, Marwell found it to be:

the worst kind of amateur history. It is bad history because it is poorly written, poorly researched, and poorly documented. It is fraudulent history because it mangles facts, distorts events, and misrepresents major themes. 21

Checking various citations in the book, Marwell discovered that they often did not support Loftus' claims; in many instances they flatly contradicted them. This included matters of major import to Loftus' thesis. Thus, his claim that the Byelorussian Nazis "ran everything for the Germans" 22 referenced (with an improper number) a microfilm which in fact established that the Germans bemoaned Byelorussian inertia.

Pogroms against the Jews have been till now next to impossible to stage because of the passivity and political indifference of the White Russians.

***

A pronounced Anti-Semitism is missing. . . . The population has general feelings of hate and rage against the Jews and approves of the German measures (establishment of ghettos, creation of work columns, security police management, etc.) However, it is not in the position to seize the initiative in handling the Jews. It can be said very generally that the population lacks activism; the reason for this is to be found probably to a certain extent in its treatment by the soviets. 23

The book also made some grandiose generalizations. Thus, it suggested that all members of the Waffen SS were "war criminals" and hence ineligible to enter the United States. In fact, mere membership in the Waffen SS - which was all that could be established for many in the
cemetery visited by Loftus – was not disqualifying for those who entered after April 1951. 24

Despite these factual concerns, the book had wide appeal. Indeed, CBS used it as the plotline for an attempted revival of “Kojak,” an immensely popular television series. 25

In March 1983, the Public Integrity Section completed its investigation of the alleged obstruction of Congress. They found “[n]o evidence . . . which demonstrates an intentional effort by anyone to obstruct the GAO investigation.” It was indeed the case that files of two Byelorussians had been requested but had not been turned over to the GAO. However, one of the Byelorussian names was on a document that was only partly legible. In an effort to supply the requested material, DOD had searched under several variations of the purported name and birth date. Unfortunately – but innocently – it had not come up with the proper combination. (This was in the very early computer era, and programs automatically providing variations were unavailable.) Once given the proper spelling by OSI, the Army had located the file.

The explanation for the missing files on the second name was no more damning. They had been found – by the Army – in a cross-reference from another OSI requested file. 26 Thus, in both cases, DOD – rather than Loftus – had located the missing files. Since DOD turned over the relevant files to OSI in 1979, Public Integrity found no reason to impute a nefarious motive to the 1978 incidents. Public Integrity concluded that human error was a more likely explanation than malfeasance. This was especially so since DOD had handled hundreds of requests (most from OSI, but dozens also from GAO), yet:

there has been no suggestion that the responses were less than candid and complete except with regard to these two individuals. There is no apparent reason why these two individuals would be singled out for concealment of files when the files on everyone else – including other war criminals – were being produced. 27
As for Loftus' claim that one file ultimately turned over had been "sanitized," Public Integrity compared an early microfilmed version of the file with one that had been turned over. They were identical.

In 1985, the GAO issued a new report. It found no evidence of a concerted effort by the intelligence agencies to bring Byelorussian Nazis and Axis collaborators to the United States. Most of the collaborators who had assisted the U.S. remained in Europe. The government had chosen whom to help on a case-by-case basis; they were not part of an overall aid program. The report referenced five individuals who had emigrated with U.S. assistance. All were investigated by OSI.

In the end, OSI prosecuted two Byelorussians, Basil Arteshenko and Jan Avdzej. (Some who might have been prosecuted had died in the interim.) Avdzej had in fact been identified by John Loftus as a potential defendant. Indeed, he was one of the five men listed as priorities in the memorandum sent to the Attorney General in October 1980. The case ultimately filed, however, bore little relationship to the one set forth in Loftus' writings.

Loftus had partly confused Jan Avdzej with his brother, who in fact was denied a visa because of his wartime activities. Moreover, the memo to the Attorney General had misrepresented some significant aspects of World War II history and Jan Avdzej's personal story. For example, Loftus reported that Avdzej was "wanted for his war crimes by several nations" when in fact no nation had ever sought his apprehension. The memo claimed that he, along with other Byelorussians, had exterminated "virtually the entire Jewish population" of their area "with little, if any, German assistance." However, as discussed earlier, the Germans directed the massacres and were in fact disappointed at the level of assistance they received from the Byelorussians. The memo also claimed that Avdzej was "the subject of massive publicity in
both the Polish and Soviet press, so that we can anticipate historical corroboration of his quisling status.” In fact, OSI could find no such publicity. The Soviets and Poles informed the office that they had no corroborating evidence. In June 1991, OSI closed its investigation of a “Byelorussian Collaborationist Movement,” though individual cases remained open for review.

Loftus’ wide-ranging accusations have had both short and long-term impact. Little more than a year after Loftus’ book and television revelations, OSI historian Elizabeth White began work on the Verbelen Report. She needed Army and CIA cooperation to access documents in their files. Both organizations were distrustful, citing Loftus’ public dissemination of material he had earlier gathered at the behest of OSI. According to White, it took tremendous effort to “work through” these reactions.

Although scholars have dismissed Loftus’ claims as hyperbolic, his allegations – dramatic and conspiratorial – have clearly resonated with a segment of the public. Even today – more than 25 years after Loftus first made his claims – OSI speakers are often are asked about the Belarus allegations.

The Belarus Secret launched Loftus’ career as a “whistle blower.” He describes himself as someone who “may know more intelligence secrets than anyone alive” and he has gone on to other exposés. Some of them involve Jewish and/or World War II issues, e.g., the “Bush-Nazi scandal” and “the truth about Jonathan Pollard.” He also co-authored two books, The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People and Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, The Nazis, and Soviet Intelligence and served for several years as president of the Florida Holocaust Museum. Loftus continues to be a featured speaker before many Jewish organizations. As of this writing, a five-minute segment titled “The Loftus Report” airs each weeknight on ABC National Radio (The John Batchelor Show).
1. Loftus traces his involvement in Jewish causes back to 1973 when he claims to have "helped train Israelis on a covert operation that turned the tide of battle in the 1973 Yom Kippur War." [www.John-Loftus.com](http://www.John-Loftus.com) (last visited, Nov. 2005). Loftus expanded on this in a newspaper interview. According to Loftus, the U.S. knew of Arab plans to attack Israel in 1973 but Secretary of State Kissinger chose to withhold supplies from Israel for political reasons. Loftus says he worked behind the scenes with then Chief of Staff Alexander Haig to help the Israelis. On Haig’s orders, Loftus gave 40 Israeli officers a crash course in how to use a newly introduced missile system. Days later, the Israelis used that very system to prevent an Egyptian tank advance. “Ex-prosecutor Crusades to Unveil ‘Evil,’” by Graham Brink, *The St. Petersburg Times* (Fl.), Mar. 22, 2002.

2. Feb. 8, 1980 memo from Loftus to Director Rockler, Dep’ty Dir. Ryan, Art Sinai and Neal Sher re “OSI #4374: Belarus Network: Cabinet Level War Criminals.”

3. Recorded interview with Allan Ryan, Jan. 4, 2005. All references to statements or actions by Ryan in this chapter come from this interview unless otherwise noted.

4. See p. 2.


6. For various reasons, mostly due to time constraints, the GAO ultimately looked into only 94 of the cases.

7. He had prepared one promising prosecution memorandum, but the subject died within days of the memo’s completion.

8. See e.g., June 17, 1982 memo from OSI trial attorney Betty Shave to Ryan re “Status of Tumash.” Shave felt the investigation was still worth pursuing (it ultimately closed) but that many of the citations given by Loftus did “not stand for the proposition” for which they were cited. *Accord, Ryan interview, supra, n. 3.*


11. June 8, 1982 memo from Marwell to Ryan re “Belarus.”


14. May 17, 1982 letter from Chairman Rodino to GAO Comptroller General Charles Bowsher; May 18, 1982 letter from Congressman Hamilton Fish to Comptroller General Bowsher.


16. May 25, 1982 memo from AAG Jensen to the Attorney General re “‘60 Minutes’ Segment on Byelorussian Nazi War Criminals.”


21. The portion of the memorandum available is undated and incomplete and therefore cannot be more fully cited. Another scathing criticism of the historical content of the book can be found in “How Not to Pursue War Criminals in USA, What’s Wrong with The Belarus Secret,” by Charles Allen, *Jewish Currents*, Apr. 1984.


23. Ereignesmeldungen No. 43, National Archives Microfilm Section T175, Roll 233, frames 2721786 and 2721780.

24. Instruction Memo No. 206, Apr. 15, 1951 from John Gibson, DPC Chairman to European Coordinator, DPC. Although service in the Waffen SS was originally *per se* disqualifying, by November 1951, the United States was making measured distinctions. Those below the rank of major in “military” units were admissible, barring relevant information warranting a contrary determination. See e.g., Instruction Memo No. 242, Nov. 12, 1951 to All Senior Officers from Robert J. Corkery, DPC Coordinator for Europe. (Camp guard duty, for example, was relevant
material warranting exclusion.)

25. In the show, broadcast on Feb. 16, 1985, the police try to solve the murders of three elderly Russians who may have been Nazi war criminals. The answer to the mystery lies in “the Belarus file,” a top-secret document in the possession of the State Department. The show credits acknowledged that the plot was based on *The Belarus Secret*.

26. In the second case, DOD had actually turned over one file, but failed to locate two others on the subject. Public Integrity acknowledged that one of the two later-located files might have been identifiable in 1978. However, there was no way to determine this with certainty in part because there was no way to ascertain the computer indexing which would have appeared in 1978.

27. Mar. 28, 1983 memorandum re “Allegations that the 1977-78 GAO Investigation of Nazi War Criminals was Obstructed,” p.15.


30. Jan. 12, 1984 memo from Rosenbaum to Neal Sher, Michael Wolf and Belarus Team re “Annotated Version of John Loftus’ Account of John Avdzej’s Wartime Activities & Postwar Immigration.”

31. See p. 362.

32. See pp. 385-389.

33. In the end, CIA restrictions on publication of the Verbelen report were so extensive that the Justice Department was unable to publish an appendix of supporting documents. Whether the Loftus matter contributed to these restrictions is unknown.


35. Both pieces can be accessed from a link on Loftus’ website.

   In the Bush piece, Loftus argues that the Bush family made its fortune from the Holocaust. He asserts that family members served on corporate boards of Nazi front groups even after it became apparent that doing so helped the Third Reich.

   The Pollard piece was originally published in *Moment* magazine, June 2003. Loftus argues that Pollard was “framed” and that the U.S. was “conned” into convicting him of compromising U.S. methods and sources. According to Loftus, the information Pollard was convicted of passing on actually came from Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanson, both later determined to be spies within the U.S. intelligence community. The only crime committed by
Pollard, according to Loftus, was giving Israel the names of Saudi and Arab intelligence sources in order to “help protect[ ] Israelis and Americans from terrorists.”

36. St. Martin’s Press (1994). The book, written with Mark Aarons, accuses western diplomats and governments of extraordinary perfidies against the Jewish people and Jewish state. Among the allegations in the book: that an anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist Allen Dulles (later head of the CIA) helped set up dummy corporations to absorb Jewish assets confiscated by the Nazis and that, while ostensibly supporting Israel in the Six Day War, both the U.S. and U.K. shared Israeli defense plans with Arab oil producers.

37. St. Martin’s Press (1991). The book, also written with Mark Aarons, claims that the Pope entered into a post-war espionage alliance with British and American intelligence agents. According to the authors, the three powers ferreted Nazi criminals out of Europe to use in the fight against Communism. The book also argues that U.S. and Britain bugged Swiss banks during the war and then buried secrets of Nazi gold transfers in order to protect improprieties by Allen Dulles.

38. The program is disseminated on the Internet as well. www.WABCRadio.com (last visited Dec. 2005).
Chapter Six: Expanding Jurisdiction

Introduction

When allegations arose of U.S. assistance to some notorious persecutors who had never even entered the United States, the public demanded that the claims be investigated. Successive administrations turned to OSI to determine what role, if any, the government had played. OSI’s reports on these matters are seen by some as its greatest contribution to social justice. Others, concerned that the additional assignments were not accompanied by expanded resources, view the reports as a diversion from OSI’s main mission, i.e., the removal of Nazi persecutors from the United States. Whatever one’s perspective, it cannot be gainsaid that the reports address matters of national and international concern. They also provide a comprehensive review of some of the moral issues that arise in the world of realpolitik.

Although written solely to answer pressing questions about specific matters, the reports had the unanticipated effect of increasing OSI’s visibility on the world stage. The reports ultimately uncovered questionable conduct by various countries and triggered reflection on the role of governments around the world. The significance of the issues raised in the reports, and the quality of the scholarship evident in their preparation, drew the attention of the international media. As a result, OSI’s profile was enormously elevated.

OSI began exerting a presence overseas in other ways as well. Its role gradually expanded to include helping, encouraging, and sometimes pressuring, other countries to acknowledge more openly their role in World War II and to prosecute Nazi persecutors in their midst.
Klaus Barbie – The Butcher of Lyons

That OSI personnel would help prepare a report on Klaus Barbie – or anyone else – was not readily foreseeable when OSI was founded. OSI’s mission was framed in terms of its litigative purpose: to secure the denaturalization and deportation of persons in the United States who assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians between 1933 and 1945. Such a mandate did not necessarily include writing reports about U.S. post-war activity. Moreover, since Barbie was not in the United States, there was no obvious reason for OSI to focus on him.

Klaus Barbie, a German by birth, joined the SS and served the Nazi cause in Vichy France. Between 1942 and 1944, he served in the intelligence branch of the German security apparatus and headed the Gestapo in Lyons. His rank at war’s end was captain. During his tenure in Lyons, thousands of Jews and resistance fighters were tortured by the Gestapo and sent to concentration camps. Most died. Because of his alleged role in many of these atrocities, Barbie became known as “the butcher of Lyons.”

At the war’s end, France submitted a statement of charges against Barbie to the United Nations War Crimes Commission. Among the alleged crimes were “murder and massacres, systematic terrorism, and execution of hostages.” He was sentenced to death in absentia by a French postwar military tribunal.

In 1963, the French government learned that Barbie was living in Bolivia under the name Klaus Altmann. It did not seek his removal until nine years later, when Beate Klarsfeld, a Nazi hunter living in France, uncovered the information and made it public. In 1972, and again in 1975, Bolivia’s military government – with which Barbie had close ties – refused France’s
request for extradition on the ground that there was no extradition treaty between the two countries. After civilians regained control of the Bolivian government in 1982, France filed a new indictment against Barbie, charging him with “crimes against humanity,” and again requested his return. Although there was still no extradition treaty, the new administration devised an alternative method to oust him. He was charged with making a fraudulent loan to the Bolivian government and expelled to French Guyana. When his plane landed, the French, who had been forewarned, arrested him and flew him to France. He arrived in Lyons on February 6, 1983.

News of his expulsion unleashed a flood of information. A former American intelligence officer asserted that the U.S. had protected Barbie and paid him $1,700 a month for intelligence information after the war. Newspapers reported that while the Americans were harboring Barbie in Germany, they turned down French requests to locate him. A Canadian, claiming to know Barbie from Bolivia, recalled Barbie’s telling him that he had come to the United States several times during the 1960s and 1970s. Many in the media called for a governmental investigation to determine what relationship, if any, the U.S. had with Barbie. The Justice Department, the State Department, the CIA, and Defense Department were all suggested as appropriate agencies to pursue the allegations. In a well-publicized letter, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee wrote to Attorney General William French Smith, suggesting that OSI:

could play a unique and valuable role in any investigation conducted by the Executive Branch. Given the expertise of OSI’s staff, and the fact that attorneys and investigators there have the necessary security clearances, it would seem that the office would be ideally suited to coordinate such an inquiry. More importantly, OSI, with no direct ties to the intelligence community and no vested interest in any predetermined outcome, is sufficiently detached to assure that its findings would be viewed as complete and honest.
While the primary function of OSI must remain the prosecution of denaturalization and deportation actions involving suspected Nazi war criminals in this country, the case of Klaus Barbie is potentially too important a part of the historical record to be left unattended.\textsuperscript{10}

Some within the Department feared that taking on the task might lead to an inundation of similar assignments. The Department might be asked to conduct inquiries on all sorts of prior government conduct.\textsuperscript{11} The Attorney General decided against investigating the Barbie matter on the grounds that no prosecution was likely to result (the statute of limitations on any crimes having long since passed), and that historical inquiry was not the work of the Justice Department in any event.\textsuperscript{12} William Clark, the national security advisor, urged the Attorney General to reconsider.\textsuperscript{13} Outside groups also pressed to have the matter investigated,\textsuperscript{14} and nine members of Congress appealed to President Reagan to authorize an investigation.\textsuperscript{15}

As this pressure was mounting, OSI Director Allan Ryan received a call from an ABC News reporter who had gone to Bolivia to pursue the story.\textsuperscript{16} He told Ryan he had documents showing that Barbie had worked for U.S. intelligence and that the United States had helped him escape to Bolivia. The story would air on that evening's news. Ryan relayed this information to the Attorney General's office; within hours the Attorney General authorized the Department to conduct an inquiry.

Ryan had indicated his intention to leave government service before the Barbie issue arose. He was, however, intensely interested in the Barbie controversy. Therefore, he was very amenable when AAG Jensen asked him to lead the Barbie investigation. He was named AAG Jensen's Special Assistant for the duration of the project. Ryan selected two investigators, one historian, and one attorney, all from OSI, to work with him full time.\textsuperscript{17} The report was
completed five months later.

It revealed not only that the Army used Barbie as an informant after the war, but that it had ignored several requests by the French for extradition, had misled the State Department (which then passed on this misinformation to the French) as to Barbie's whereabouts, and had used the services of a shady intermediary to help Barbie escape to Bolivia in 1951 under the name Klaus Altmann. Once he was there, the U.S. no longer protected or used him. He obtained Bolivian citizenship and twice made business trips to the United States under his new name; the visits were not connected to any agency or activity of the U.S. government.

The 218 page report (with over 600 pages of attachments) was detailed and pointed. It recounted the enormous pressure on the Army to develop "sources" during the early Cold War period, and concluded that from 1947 — when Barbie first began working with the United States — until 1949, the U.S. did not know that he was accused of involvement in wartime atrocities. (The report suggests that this information was available, but not readily so.) By 1949, however, the allegations were inescapable, as Nazi victims and former Resistance fighters were publicly claiming that Barbie had used torture as an interrogation technique.

Ryan concluded that the Army officials who continued to use and protect Barbie, even after they had reason to suspect he was a war criminal, did so for two reasons: (1) surrender of Barbie would "embarrass" the U.S. by revealing it had worked with a former Gestapo official, and (2) it would risk compromising procedures, sources and information. The latter concern was based on the fact that Barbie had recruited informants from within the German Communist Party as well as right-wing groups. At the time, the U.S. believed that French intelligence had been penetrated by Communists. Therefore, if Barbie were turned over to the French, the Communists
might learn about U.S. sources. This not only could compromise U.S. operations, but also might jeopardize the lives of the informants.32

The report was non-judgmental about the initial decision to work with Barbie.

... I cannot conclude that those who made the decision to employ and rely on Klaus Barbie ought now to be vilified for the decision. Any one of us, had we been there, might have made the opposite decision. But one must recognize that those who did in fact have to make a decision made a defensible one, even if it was not the only defensible one. No one to whom I spoke in this investigation was insensitive to the horrors perpetrated by Nazi Germany, nor entirely comfortable with the irony of using a Gestapo officer in the service of the United States. They were, on the whole, conscientious and patriotic men faced with a difficult assignment. Under the circumstances, I believe that their choice to enlist Barbie’s assistance was neither cynical nor corrupt.

Once the United States had reason to believe that Barbie was involved in war crimes, however, Ryan opined that there was no longer any moral or legal underpinning to the Army’s actions. By lying to the State Department about Barbie, and then helping spirit him out of the country, Army personnel precluded the U.S. from making a fully informed decision about whether to honor France’s request for extradition. According to Ryan, the Army’s actions amounted to a criminal obstruction of justice. The question then became how to deal with – and prevent future occurrences of – such conduct.

Prosecution was not an option, since the five year statute of limitations on obstruction of justice had run. The obstruction had occurred in 1950 when Army officers – knowing that the State Department was considering an extradition request from France – falsely told the State Department that Barbie’s whereabouts were unknown.

Ryan held out no hope that legislative or regulatory reforms would be effective.

[Given the almost infinite variety of circumstances that an intelligence agency encounters in the course of its operations, it would be exceedingly difficult to
define a class of eligible informants based on their background or status. And any such line-drawing would require the comparison of . . . two fundamentally dissimilar considerations . . . : the need for information of strategic importance versus the repugnance of dealing with criminals, or former enemies, or brutal thugs, or officials of evil institutions. Even if there were a consensus on whom we ought not to deal with, any workable definition would be so broad as to be useless to those who must apply it, or so narrow that it would be of little practical significance.

He was optimistic, however, that during the thirty years since the United States had ended its relationship with Barbie, there had developed a greater sense of accountability on the part of the various intelligence agencies. The report ended on an upbeat note, hopeful that persons faced with similar issues in the future would not assume that anything was permissible, including obstruction of justice, simply because it falls under the cloak of intelligence.

These findings and conclusions – that the United States had worked with a Nazi Gestapo leader and that Army officers had obstructed justice on his behalf – would alone have been sufficiently shocking to make headlines, as had the allegations leading to the report. However, Ryan went further. In a letter accompanying the report, and addressed to the Attorney General, Ryan urged that the United States publicly apologize to France.

It is true that the obstruction of efforts to apprehend and extradite Barbie were not condoned in any official sense by the United States Government. But neither can this episode be considered as merely the unfortunate action of renegade officers. They were acting within the scope of their official duties. Their actions were taken not for personal gain, or to shield them personally from liability or discipline, but to protect what they believed to be the interests of the United States Army and the United States Government. Under these circumstances, whatever may be their personal culpability, the United States Government cannot disclaim responsibility for their actions. Whether Barbie is guilty or innocent of the crimes with which he is charged will be decided by a French court. But whatever the verdict, his appointment with justice is long overdue. It is a principle of democracy and the rule of law that justice delayed is justice denied. If we are to be faithful to that principle – and we should be faithful to it – we cannot pretend that it applies only within our borders and nowhere else. We have delayed justice in
Lyons.

I therefore believe it appropriate, and I so recommend, that the United States Government express to the Government of France its regret for its responsibility in delaying the due process of law in the case of Klaus Barbie. We should also pledge to cooperate in any appropriate manner in the further investigation of the crimes for which Barbie will be tried in France.

This is a matter of decency and of honorable conduct. It should be, I believe, the final chapter by the United States in this case.

This recommendation had originally been in the report itself. However, after receiving an advance copy of the document, the State Department expressed some reservations. In order to accommodate their concerns – and yet not back down on the need for an apology – Ryan proposed excising the recommendation from the report and instead making it a separate memorandum to the Attorney General. The State Department could then present the final report to the French, along with a formal note of apology which the State Department prepared. The Justice Department would withhold public release of the report and the memorandum until after the apology had been made. DAAG Richard helped negotiate these accommodations with the State Department.

On August 12, 1983, the State Department presented the full report to the French chargé d’affaires in Washington, along with a note expressing the United States’ “deep regrets over the actions taken in Germany . . . to conceal Barbie.” Five days later, the cover letter, report and apology were made public. The story received enormous attention. It was page one in The New York Times, which printed Ryan’s cover letter in its entirety, large excerpts from the report, and a statement by Ryan as its “quotation of the day.” The Justice Department held a news conference and the presidential press secretary announced delivery of the note to the French. Ryan was a
guest on two of the three major network morning news shows as well as on public television's *MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour*.

Although there was much praise for his scholarship, there was some debate over his conclusions. Conservative newspaper columnist Patrick Buchanan, who had no sympathy for Barbie, thought an apology unwarranted.

Ironic, is it not? The U.S., which gave thousands of its sons freeing France from the grip of Adolf Hitler, finds itself apologizing to the French nation, many of whose citizens actively collaborated with Hitler.\(^{28}\)

Liz Holtzman questioned Ryan's belief that the Americans working with Barbie prior to 1949 did not know of his true wartime activities: "[F]or me to accept that conclusion, I would have to believe either that these people were very unintelligent or that they wore the narrowest of blinders."\(^{29}\) Some Jewish leaders shared her skepticism.\(^{30}\) Other public figures did as well. Flora Lewis, foreign affairs columnist for *The New York Times*, found the report "unconvincing" in its conclusion that the obstruction of justice was limited to only about a dozen officers; she suspected others higher up in the administration were involved.\(^{31}\) Her suspicions got some support from Eugene Kolb, an Army colonel who had supervised the Barbie matter in the early years. He opined that Ryan's inability to establish culpability higher up the chain might be due to the fact that decisions at the higher levels were often made during phone calls, leaving no paper trail.\(^{32}\)

For the most part, however, reaction to the report and the apology was positive. *The Washington Post* found the "candor and balance" of the report "a credit to the Justice Department and particularly to its principal author, Allan A. Ryan, Jr."\(^{33}\) *Time* magazine called the report "remarkable."\(^{34}\) *The New York Times* noted "[h]ow rare it is for a proud and powerful nation to
admit shabby behavior." It described the report as one which "serves history and invites us to learn from it." Newspapers in both France and Germany praised the work, with one German paper extolling the United States' "powerful and impressive capacity for democratic self-purging." And the GAO, which later investigated the Barbie matter for Congress, fully endorsed Ryan's report.

The decision to prepare the report had a significant impact on OSI. Strictly speaking, the report was not an OSI project; Ryan was no longer OSI Director when he prepared the document, though he relied on OSI staff exclusively to assist him. Nonetheless, Ryan had been chosen because of his OSI connection and the credibility he had helped establish for the office. He further enhanced that credibility by producing a document of unassailable scholarship and by directly taking on the issue of the government's moral and legal posture vis-à-vis Nazis in the post war period.

When the next Nazi-era investigation needed to be conducted, there was no issue about whether the Department of Justice should be involved or which office should prepare the document. OSI was the natural and noncontroversial choice to do the investigations and to write reports on Robert Verhelen, Kurt Waldheim, and Josef Mengele, each discussed elsewhere in this report. The quality of the Barbie and subsequent reports helped establish OSI as an essential resource for persons dealing with World War II issues.

As one result of that development, the Attorney General designated the OSI Director to represent the Justice Department on the Interagency Working Group (IWG), created to implement the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 and the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act of 2000. The IWG is charged with locating, identifying, inventorying,
recommending for declassification and making available all classified Nazi war criminal records, subject to certain specified restrictions. The restrictions include records related to or supporting any active or inactive investigation, inquiry, or prosecution by OSI and any records solely in the possession, custody or control of the office.\textsuperscript{39}

The Barbie report has thus had the unforeseeable effect of subtly expanding OSI's recognized mandate. After the report was issued, it became a given that the mandate went beyond prosecutions and covered matters beyond U.S. borders.

As for Barbie, in 1987, after an eight-week trial in France, he was convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life in prison.\textsuperscript{40} He died four years later.

2. See p. 324, n. 7 re the role of the UNWCC.


   In 1976, the Bolivian Ambassador to France was murdered. His alleged role in attempting to stop the French government from seeking Barbie’s extradition was given by the terrorists as one reason for the assassination. “Envoy of Bolivia is Slain in Paris,” by Andreas Freund, The New York Times, May 12, 1976.

   Apart from the French request, Peru sought to extradite Barbie on charges of currency fraud and smuggling. He was in Bolivian custody for almost 8 months before the Peruvian request was denied. “War Crimes Suspect Released by Bolivia,” The New York Times, Oct. 30, 1973.


   The Department of Justice report ultimately issued on Barbie casts serious doubt on the $1700 figure. It concludes it much more likely that Barbie was paid about $100 per month in food, cigarettes, ration cards and German currency.


12. Mar. 3, 1983 letter to Chairman Rodino from Attorney General Smith. See also, “U.S. is Reported to Have Evidence that Barbie Visited in ‘69 and ‘70,” supra, n.10.

   Martin Mendelsohn shared this view. He believed a congressional committee or specially
designated commission should investigate the "sordid mess," leaving OSI to focus on finding and expelling Nazi war criminals. "Nazi Hunting for Nothing," by Martin Mendelsohn, The San Jose Mercury News, June 12, 1983. At the time he wrote the article, Mendelsohn served as legal counsel to the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles; it is unclear whether he was speaking for the organization.


15. "U.S. is Reported to have Evidence that Barbie Visited in '69 and '70," supra, n. 10.

16. Recorded interview with Ryan, Dec. 13, 2002. All statements in this chapter concerning Ryan's positions come from this interview.

17. Neal Sher was named Acting Director of OSI while Ryan worked on the project.

18. During the period covered by the Barbie episode, intelligence work in Europe was handled by the CIC. Although the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA, it was several years before the agency was fully operational.

19. The Army used an underground railroad of sorts, which had been established by others to evacuate defectors or informants who had come to Austria from the Soviet zone or Soviet bloc countries. The escape route, known as the "rat line," ran from Austria to Italy. There, for an exorbitant fee, a Croatian priest helped Nazis obtain passports from the International Red Cross and visas from various South American countries. One Army document described the priest as "a Fascist, war criminal, etc." Ryan came across no other instance in which the United States used the rat line.

20. Barbie traveled to the U.S. in 1969 and 1970, before OSI was formed. It was of course also before OSI entered tens of thousands of names to the Watchlist. See p. 297. In any event, a Watchlist posting of the name "Barbie" would have been useless since he traveled under the name Altmann.


The great majority of documents reviewed for the report had been classified when executed and remained classified during the intervening years. The agencies involved, particularly the U.S. Army, declassified extensive amounts of material so that it could be included in the report's appendix. The declassifications were done in full consultation with Ryan. In the report's introduction Ryan expressed confidence that the material still classified did not in any way detract from the completeness of the report.

23. The 1976 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (generally referred to as “the Church Report”), had detailed abuses in counterintelligence by the FBI and CIA. This increased public awareness of the issues and led to new guidelines for domestic intelligence agencies.

24. The Department of Justice records do not contain the letter sent by the Secretary of State. However, extrapolating from an extant draft letter for the Secretary of State’s signature, which was given to Ryan and attached by him to a memo to AAG Jensen, State was not opposed to the concept of an apology, but believed that it should not be included in the published report. They also wanted assurance that the French would receive a copy of the report before it was made public. Aug. 3, 1983 memo to AAG Jensen from Ryan re “Draft State Department letter re Klaus Barbie.”


27. “U.S. Says Army Shielded Barbie; Offers its ‘Regrets’ to the French,” by Stuart Taylor, Jr., Aug. 17, 1983. Press Secretary Larry Speakes said “there was no interagency conspiracy to conceal Barbie from the French.”


29. “What Job Specifications Call for a War Criminal?” by Stuart Taylor, Jr., *The New York Times*, Aug. 21, 1983. Holtzman was no longer in Congress when the report was issued. She was serving as the District Attorney in Brooklyn, New York.


39. OSI has interpreted the restriction narrowly and has waived it entirely in many cases.

40. France had abolished the death penalty in 1981.
Robert Verbelcn – Another Barbie?

The Verbelcn assignment came on the heels of the Barbie report and in many ways was a natural outgrowth of the earlier document. The Barbie report shocked the public with news that U.S. intelligence services had worked with a known Nazi collaborator after the war. Verbelcn raised the question of whether the Barbie case was unique.

During World War II, Robert Jan Verbelcn commanded an SS security corps which terrorized the Belgian populace in retaliation for activities conducted by the Belgian underground. Acts of reprisal included the arbitrary arrest, beating, torture, imprisonment, deportation, and murder of innocent civilians. In 1947, a Belgian military court convicted Verbelcn in absentia and sentenced him to death. At the time of this conviction, he was living in Austria and working under a pseudonym for the CIC.

In 1983, the ADL filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for documents about Verbelcn. The responsive material established that Verbelcn had worked for the CIC from 1947 to 1956, although the redacted documents suggested that CIC had been unaware of his true identity.

The ADL likened the matter to the Barbie revelations and petitioned the Attorney General to institute a “comprehensive examination” of working relationships between Nazi collaborators and U.S. intelligence services.1 AAG Trott asked OSI to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the allegations “as expeditiously as possible.”2 This initial inquiry quickly confirmed the broad outlines of Verbelcn’s work for the United States – he ran a network providing intelligence and counterintelligence information – but it also raised a host of additional questions. Among them were when the Army had first learned Verbelcn’s true identity, whether there were other known
Nazi collaborators working for CIC, and whether the Army had protected him. After meeting
with Director Sher and the historian working on the report, AAG Trott authorized OSI to expand
its inquiry in order to resolve these issues. 3

In June 1985, before OSI completed its investigation, the GAO issued a report dealing
with some of the same matters. The GAO report had been commissioned by the House Judiciary
Committee. Its purpose was to determine, in part, whether federal agencies helped Nazi war
criminals and collaborators emigrate to the United States and/or conceal their backgrounds once
they were admitted. The GAO concluded that U.S. intelligence agencies knowingly employed
alleged Nazis and Axis collaborators who could provide information about Communist agents in
western Europe. 4 The report stated that 12 such cooperators had emigrated to the United States,
four with U.S. assistance. The report did not name the twelve, although the GAO provided the
names to OSI. 5

OSI completed its own report in October 1986. Due to the amount of classified material
cited, it took another year and a half before the report was cleared for release by the State
Department, the CIA and the Army. 6 The June 1988 document concluded that the Army had
been ignorant of Verbelen's true identity and full history until 1956, although it did know from
the outset that he had been an SS officer and was trying to avoid arrest for his wartime activities.
CIC severed ties to Verbelen for reasons independent of his past; 7 there was no evidence that the
United States attempted to prevent his being brought to justice.

On the broader question of whether the U.S. systematically used known Nazi
collaborators as intelligence sources, the answer was an emphatic yes.

For the CIC, its mission of protecting American security apparently

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justified the use of persons who were morally repugnant. A . . . CIC directive explained that, while it was preferable to use informants whose ideals were similar to those of the United States, this did not preclude "use of an informant of the 'stab-your-neighbor' type if it seems that there is definite value to be obtained thereby. It is realized that all types of characters must be used in order to obtain adequate coverage." Nearly all the former CIC agents interviewed in the course of this investigation acknowledged that membership in the SS or participation in questionable war-time activities did not disqualify a person from use as a CIC informant. Indeed, Verbelen's first CIC control agent maintained that it was advantageous to use such persons, not only because of their knowledge and experience, but also because their dependence upon the United States for protection ensured their reliability.\textsuperscript{8}

OSI cited 13 unnamed individuals with Nazi backgrounds who had been used by the CIC in Austria, noting that in some instances the CIC protected the men from arrest.\textsuperscript{9} The list was intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive.\textsuperscript{10}

The report did not have the impact of other OSI special projects. Perhaps this is because its most astonishing conclusion — that there had been a pattern of reliance upon Nazi collaborators — had been foretold by the GAO two years earlier. The matter had received wide media coverage at that time.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, Verbelen — unlike Mengele, Barbie and Waldheim — was not a household name. Therefore, news of his connection to U.S. intelligence services did not generate front page coverage or public outrage.

At the time the report was issued, Verbelen was living in Austria, writing espionage novels and working as a speaker and publicist for neo-Nazi organizations. He died in 1991; according to newspaper accounts, his funeral was attended by a muster of approximately 100 former SS troops and neo-Nazis.\textsuperscript{12}
1. Dec. 16, 1983 letter to Attorney General Smith from Justin Finger, Director, ADL National Civil Rights Division.

2. Dec. 27, 1983 memo from AAG Trott to DAAG Richard and Director Sher; Dec. 27, 1983 memo from AAG Trott to Attorney General Smith.


5. June 5, 1985 letter to Director Sher from GAO evaluator John R. Tipton. One of the twelve had already been prosecuted by OSI and another was under investigation. Two others were dead. OSI opened investigations on the remaining eight. For various reasons, none of these investigations led to prosecutions. Some of the subjects died before the investigation was complete; in other cases, there was insufficient evidence to take to court.

6. Ultimately, the Army declassified all CIC files pertaining to Verbelen. The CIA was more problematic. The agency was concerned that release of some of the documents referenced in the report might compromise liaison relationships or cover assignments. In the end, as noted on p. 365, the Justice Department forewent publishing an appendix of supporting material because the CIA mandated redactions were so extensive.

7. They were concerned that at least one foreign intelligence agency knew about his work with CIC and they felt that his intelligence gathering capabilities were no longer of value.


9. The Justice Department took the additional precaution of not revealing the names of the countries associated with these individuals when doing so might help a reader ascertain the informant’s identity.

10. May 26, 1988 memo from John Keeney, Acting AAG for the Criminal Division to Mark Levin, Chief of Staff to the Attorney General, re "Response to Memorandum of May 11, 1988 regarding OSI’s Verbelen Report."